Karen Seaberg v. Steak N' Shake Operations, Inc.

Case: 16-15956 Date Filed: 06/14/2017 Page: 1 of 7
[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
________________________
No. 16-15956
Non-Argument Calendar
________________________
D.C. Docket No. 5:13-cv-00634-WTH-PRL
KAREN SEABERG,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
versus
STEAK N’ SHAKE OPERATIONS, INC.,
Defendant - Appellant.
________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Middle District of Florida
________________________
(June 14, 2017)
Before WILSON, JORDAN, and ROSENBAUM, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Case: 16-15956 Date Filed: 06/14/2017 Page: 2 of 7
Following a three-day jury trial in a slip-and-fall case resulting in a
favorable verdict for appellee Karen Seaberg, Steak N’ Shake Operations, Inc.
(SNS) appeals the district court’s denial of its motion for a judgment as a matter of
law and its motion for a new trial. SNS first challenges the determination of
Seaberg’s legal status at the time of her injury, arguing that she was an uninvited
licensee, not a business invitee and that, in any case, the question of her legal status
should have been submitted to the jury instead of being decided by the district
court. SNS further argues that it should have been granted a new trial on several
grounds, including the district court’s failure to properly instruct the jury,
Seaberg’s prejudicial arguments, and the verdict being contrary to the weight of the
evidence. After a careful review of the parties’ briefs and the record, we affirm.
I.
SNS is an Indiana-based fast-food chain operating throughout the United
States. On December 8, 2011, Karen Seaberg slipped and fell at an SNS restaurant
in Ocala, Florida. Seaberg was on the premises waiting to pick up her daughter, an
employee of the restaurant, from work as she often did. After Seaberg entered the
restaurant, she sat on a bench at the front of the store and consumed a drink
purchased for her by her daughter. As Seaberg was waiting for her daughter to
finish her shift, there were two different spills, caused by two different employees.
Seaberg only witnessed the first spill, caused by an employee dropping a soufflé
2
Case: 16-15956 Date Filed: 06/14/2017 Page: 3 of 7
cup of mayonnaise. The employee noticed that she dropped the cup and turned
around to retrieve it and clean up the spill. Unbeknownst to Seaberg, another
employee had dropped a soufflé cup shortly after the first spill, and as Seaberg was
exiting the restaurant, she slipped and fell. Following the fall, Seaberg alleged
injuries to her wrist and knee which required medical care.
II.
While we review a district court’s denial of a motion for a judgment of a
matter of law de novo, we review a district court’s denial of a motion for a new
trial for an abuse of discretion. Lamonica v. Safe Hurricane Shutters, Inc., 711
F.3d 1299, 1306, 1312–13 (11th Cir. 2013). 1 Courts should grant judgments as a
matter of law only when the plaintiff fails to present any legally sufficient evidence
that would allow for a reasonable jury to find in her favor on a material element of
the claim. Pickett v. Tyson Fresh Meats, Inc., 420 F.3d 1272, 1278 (11th Cir.
2005).
III.
SNS argues that because Seaberg was an uninvited licensee, and not a
business invitee, the district court erred in not granting its motion for a judgment as
a matter of law. According to SNS, Seaberg was owed a lesser duty of care and
1
Because diversity jurisdiction was the basis for this appeal, Florida premises liability
law governs the substantive issues. See Burke v. Smith, 252 F.3d 1260, 1265 (11th Cir.
2001).
3
Case: 16-15956 Date Filed: 06/14/2017 Page: 4 of 7
failed to meet her evidentiary burden to show that SNS breached its duty to her.
But in the alternative, SNS argues that the question of Seaberg’s legal status should
not have been decided by the district court and should have instead been submitted
to the jury, requiring a new trial.
In rejecting SNS’s arguments, the district court not only found that it
properly determined Seaberg’s legal status, but also found that Florida law no
longer recognizes uninvited licensees and that even if that status did exist and
common law principles were applicable, Seaberg was still a business invitee.
In Florida, when a person is injured after a slipping and falling on a
“transitory foreign substance” while on the premises of a business, she must prove
“that the business establishment had actual or constructive knowledge of the
dangerous condition and should have taken action to remedy it” in order to recover
any damages. Fla. Stat. § 768.0755. This statute, however, does not affect any
common-law duties of care. Id. And under Florida common law, “[v]isitors upon
the private property of others fall within one of three classifications: they are either
trespassers, licensees, or invitees.” Post v. Lunney, 261 So. 2d 146, 147
(Fla. 1972). Licensees enter property for their own convenience, while invitees
enter for purposes connected with the business. Id. at 147–48. Furthermore,
where the material facts are not in dispute, the legal status of the person injured on
4
Case: 16-15956 Date Filed: 06/14/2017 Page: 5 of 7
the business premises is a question of law for the court. See Wood v. Camp, 284
So. 2d 691, 696 (Fla. 1973).
The district court did not err in denying SNS’s motion for a judgment as a
matter of law. “Judgment[s] as a matter of law [are] appropriate only if the
evidence is so overwhelmingly in favor of the moving party that a reasonable jury
could not arrive at a contrary verdict,” and that is just not the case here.
Middlebrooks v. Hillcrest Foods Inc., 256 F.3d 1241, 1246 (11th Cir. 2001).
Regardless of whether the statutory or common law premises liability principles
apply, Seaberg met her evidentiary burden. Under common law premises liability
principles, Seaberg was a business invitee at the time of her fall by virtue of her
consuming a drink sold by SNS—the fact that her daughter purchased it for her is
irrelevant. See Post, 261 So. 2d at 147–48. And under statutory principles,
Seaberg met her evidentiary burden for all of the required elements. Video
evidence and testimony established that two spills occurred, that at least one
employee had actual knowledge about a spill, and that these kinds of spills
occurred with such regularity that SNS would have been on constructive notice.
See Fla. Stat. § 768.0755. Lastly, because none of the material facts were disputed
due to the incident being on video, the district court had the authority to determine
Seaberg’s status as a matter of law. See Wood, 284 So. 2d at 696.
5
Case: 16-15956 Date Filed: 06/14/2017 Page: 6 of 7
IV.
SNS also contends that it is entitled to a new trial based on several
grounds—the district court’s refusal to grant SNS a jury instruction on comparative
negligence, Seaberg’s unfair and prejudicial arguments during closing, and the
verdict being contrary to the weight of the evidence.
The district court did not abuse its discretion in declining to grant SNS’s
motion for a new trial on any of the grounds argued. First, because SNS did not
plead comparative negligence as an affirmative defense, it was waived. See
Latimer v. Roaring Toyz, Inc., 601 F.3d 1224, 1239 (11th Cir. 2010). Second,
Seaberg’s counsel’s arguments were neither unfair, nor prejudicial. Attorneys are
afforded “broad latitude in closing arguments.” Riggins v. Mariner Boat Works,
Inc., 545 So. 2d 430, 433 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1989). Thus “an improper closing
argument will not result in a new trial unless the statements are highly prejudicial,
inflammatory, and improper.” Id. During rebuttal closing arguments, Seaberg’s
counsel (1) mirrored SNS’s comments arguing that SNS’s expert witness also had
a financial stake in testifying, and (2) commented on the absence of witnesses and
testimony in response to opposing counsel’s comments about the soufflé cup being
empty. None of counsel’s statements, on their own, are “sufficiently prejudicial or
inflammatory [so as] to warrant a new trial.” Id. And third, the verdict was not
against the manifest weight of the evidence. Between video evidence and
6
Case: 16-15956 Date Filed: 06/14/2017 Page: 7 of 7
testimony, there was more than enough evidence presented, for a jury to find for
Seaberg. See Lamonica, 711 F.3d at 1312–13.
AFFIRMED
7