United States v. Willie Dixon

Case: 14-13462 Date Filed: 11/18/2015 Page: 1 of 3
[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
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No. 14-13462
Non-Argument Calendar
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D.C. Docket No. 1:13-cr-20370-CMA-1
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
versus
WILLIE DIXON,
a.k.a. Smack,
Defendant-Appellee.
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Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Florida
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(November 18, 2015)
Before WILSON, JORDAN, and JILL PRYOR, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Case: 14-13462 Date Filed: 11/18/2015 Page: 2 of 3
The government appeals Willie Dixon’s 27-month sentence, imposed after
he pled guilty to being a felon in possession of a firearm, in violation of 18 U.S.C.
§ 922(g)(1). The district court held that Dixon’s prior conviction for burglary of an
unoccupied dwelling under Fla. Stat. § 810.02(3)(b) was not a “crime of violence”
within the meaning of U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2(a)(2) and thus could not be used to
calculate Dixon’s base level offense under U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1. The government
challenges this finding, asserting Dixon’s burglary conviction is a crime of
violence under the “residual clause” of U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2(a)(2). In response, Dixon
argues the residual clause is unconstitutionally vague and, even if the clause is
constitutional, the conviction is not a crime of violence under the clause.
We recently addressed this exact issue in United States v. Matchett, No. 14-
10396, __ F.3d __ (11th Cir. 2015). Matchett held the residual clause of U.S.S.G.
§ 4B1.2(a)(2) is constitutional and that burglary of an unoccupied dwelling under
Fla. Stat. § 810.02(3)(b) falls within the scope of the clause. 1 Matchett, No. 14-
10396, at *8–*9. Accordingly, the district court erred in finding Dixon’s burglary
conviction was not a crime of violence under U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2(a)(2). We
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In Johnson v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2551 (2015), the Supreme Court held the
residual clause of the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA) is unconstitutionally vague. We
interpret the ACCA’s residual clause “in the same manner as we interpret” the residual clause in
U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2(a)(2). Matchett, No. 14-10396, at *6. As such, relying on Johnson, the
defendant in Matchett argued the residual clause of U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2(a)(2) is unconstitutional.
We rejected this argument. Matchett, No. 14-10396, at *8.
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Case: 14-13462 Date Filed: 11/18/2015 Page: 3 of 3
therefore vacate Dixon’s sentence and remand for proceedings consistent with this
opinion.
VACATED AND REMANDED.
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