Lazaro Santiago Rodriguez v. Secretary, U.S. Department of Homeland Security

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[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
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No. 14-11464
Non-Argument Calendar
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D.C. Docket No. 0:12-cv-60870-RNS
LAZARO SANTIAGO RODRIGUEZ,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
versus
SECRETARY, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY,
Defendant-Appellee.
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Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Florida
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(April 2, 2015)
Before MARTIN, JULIE CARNES and FAY, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
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Lazaro Santiago Rodriguez, a Hispanic male, appeals the district court’s
grant of summary judgment to the Secretary of the Department of Homeland
Security in an employment discrimination suit under Title VII of the Civil Rights
Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-16(a), and the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 29
U.S.C. § 633a(a). In 2012, Rodriguez filed a five-count complaint, alleging that
the DHS had failed to promote him for discriminatory and retaliatory reasons, and
that the DHS’s facially neutral evaluation system had a disparate impact on
minority applicants. The district court found that Rodriguez’s disparate impact
claim was barred by res judicata and granted summary judgment to the DHS on his
remaining claims.
Rodriguez advances three arguments on appeal. First, he argues that the
magistrate judge abused her discretion by denying, in part, his motion to compel
discovery. Second, he argues that the district court erred by granting summary
judgment on his discrimination claims because he established that the DHS’s
proffered legitimate nondiscriminatory reasons for not promoting him were
pretextual. Finally, he argues that the district court erred by granting summary
judgment on his retaliation claim because he demonstrated a causal connection
between the DHS’s failure to promote him and a prior complaint alleging
discrimination. After careful review, we affirm.
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I.
We first address Rodriguez’s argument that the magistrate judge abused her
discretion by denying, without prejudice, his motion to compel discovery related to
job vacancies for which he did not apply. 1 We review the district court’s
management of discovery for an abuse of discretion. Adkins v. Christie, 488 F.3d
1324, 1330 (11th Cir. 2007). “Discretion means the district court has a range of
choice, and that its decision will not be disturbed as long as it stays within that
range and is not influenced by any mistake of law.” Josendis v. Wall to Wall
Residence Repairs, Inc., 662 F.3d 1292, 1306 (11th Cir. 2011) (quotation marks
omitted). Therefore, we will reverse only if we “determine that the district court
has made a clear error of judgment or has applied an incorrect legal standard.”
SunAmerica Corp. v. Sun Life Assurance Co. of Canada, 77 F.3d 1325, 1333 (11th
Cir. 1996) (internal citation and quotation marks omitted).
Although Rodriguez argues that information related to other job vacancies is
relevant to both his disparate impact and discriminatory treatment claims, he has
failed to explain how. First, the district court held that Rodriguez’s disparate
impact claim was barred by res judicata, and he has not appealed that dismissal.
Second, because the information that Rodriguez seeks involves other applicants
and other vacancies, it sheds no light on why the DHS failed to promote him. It is
1
The magistrate judge granted all of Rodriguez’s discovery requests related to the job vacancy
for which he did apply.
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within the district court’s discretion to deny discovery requests that are overbroad
or irrelevant. Josendis, 662 F.3d at 1307. We find no reversible error in the
magistrate judge’s partial denial of Rodriguez’s motion to compel discovery.
II.
We turn next to Rodriguez’s argument that the district court erred by
granting summary judgment on his discrimination claims. We review de novo the
grant of a motion for summary judgment, viewing evidence in the light most
favorable to the non-moving party. Carter v. Three Springs Residential Treatment,
132 F.3d 635, 641 (11th Cir. 1998).
Title VII prohibits discrimination based on race, color, religion, sex, or
national origin in employment decisions made by federal agencies, including the
DHS. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-16(a). Similarly, the ADEA prohibits discrimination
based on age for those who are at least 40 years old. 29 U.S.C. § 633a(a). For
discrimination claims that rely on circumstantial evidence—like Rodriguez’s—we
apply the burden-shifting analysis from McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411
U.S. 792, 93 S. Ct. 1817 (1973). See, e.g., Sims v. MVM, Inc., 704 F.3d 1327,
1332 (11th Cir. 2013) (age discrimination); Carter, 132 F.3d at 642 (racial
discrimination).
In a refusal-to-promote case alleging racial discrimination, the plaintiff can
establish a prima facie case by showing that: “(1) the plaintiff is a member of a
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protected minority group; (2) the plaintiff was qualified for and applied for the
promotion; (3) the plaintiff was rejected in spite of his qualifications; and (4) the
individual who received the promotion is not a member of a protected group and
had lesser or equal qualifications.” Carter, 132 F.3d at 642. In a refusal-to-
promote case alleging age discrimination, the plaintiff can establish a prima facie
case by showing: “(1) that he was a member of the protected group of persons
between the ages of forty and seventy; (2) that he was subject to adverse
employment action; (3) that a substantially younger person filled the position that
he sought or from which he was discharged; and (4) that he was qualified to do the
job for which he was rejected.” Turlington v. Atlanta Gas Light Co., 135 F.3d
1428, 1432 (11th Cir. 1998).
If a plaintiff establishes a prima facie case, the “burden [of production] then
shifts to the employer to articulate legitimate nondiscriminatory reasons for the
failure to promote.” Carter, 132 F.3d at 643. The employer may rely on subjective
evaluations as long as the employer provides “a clear and reasonably specific
factual basis” for those evaluations. Chapman v. Al Transp., 229 F.3d 1012, 1034
(11th Cir. 2000) (en banc).
If the employer meets its burden, the plaintiff must then demonstrate that the
defendant’s proffered reason for failing to promote the plaintiff was pretextual.
Carter, 132 F.3d at 644. To show pretext, “[t]he plaintiff must meet the reason
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proffered head on and rebut it.” Crawford v. City of Fairburn, Ga., 482 F.3d 1305,
1308 (11th Cir. 2007). He must “present concrete evidence in the form of specific
facts which show[] that the defendant’s proffered reason [is] mere pretext.” Bryant
v. Jones, 575 F.3d 1281, 1308 (11th Cir. 2009) (quotation omitted). A plaintiff’s
belief that he was qualified for a promotion, without more, is insufficient to
establish pretext. Brooks v. Cnty. Comm’n of Jefferson Cnty., 446 F.3d 1160,
1163–64 (11th Cir. 2006).
In this case, the district court did not err by concluding that the DHS
articulated a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for its failure to promote
Rodriguez. The DHS showed that it promoted candidates with better ratings on a
subjective evaluation form. It also provided clear and specific factual bases for
these subjective evaluations, including that Rodriguez rarely volunteered for
additional duties and did not take on leadership roles.
Neither did the district court err by concluding that Rodriguez failed to
demonstrate pretext. He has produced no evidence demonstrating that his
supervisors provided false explanations for their evaluations, or that their
evaluations were motivated by age, race, or national origin. See Combs v.
Plantation Patterns, 106 F.3d 1519, 1529 (11th Cir. 1997) (“[A] plaintiff is entitled
to survive summary judgment . . . if there is sufficient evidence to demonstrate the
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existence of a genuine issue of fact as to the truth of each of the employer’s
proffered reasons for its challenged action.”).
III.
Finally, we address Rodriguez’s argument that the district court erred by
granting summary judgment on his retaliation claim. Title VII prohibits an
employer from retaliating against an employee for his opposition to an unlawful
employment practice. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a). An employee establishes a prima
facie case of retaliation by showing that: “(1) [he] engaged in an activity protected
under Title VII; (2) [he] suffered an adverse employment action; and (3) there was
a causal connection between the protected activity and the adverse employment
action.” Crawford v. Carroll, 529 F.3d 961, 970 (11th Cir. 2008).
“To establish a causal connection, a plaintiff must show that the decision-
makers were aware of the protected conduct, and that the protected activity and the
adverse actions were not wholly unrelated.” Shannon v. Bellsouth Telecomms.,
Inc., 292 F.3d 712, 716 (11th Cir. 2002) (quotation omitted). Rodriguez has failed
to show a casual connection between the DHS’s failure to promote him and prior
protected activity—specifically, an earlier discrimination complaint. First, there is
no evidence that the DHS employee who selected applicants for promotion knew
that Rodriguez had previously filed a complaint alleging discrimination. Beyond
that, unrebutted evidence shows that three of the four supervisors who evaluated
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Rodriguez did not know about his prior discrimination complaint. Rodriguez has
therefore not demonstrated that the relevant decision-makers knew of any
protected conduct.
AFFIRMED.
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