Bolin v. Secretary, Florida Department of Corrections

Case: 15-15761 Date Filed: 01/07/2016 Page: 1 of 7
[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
________________________
No. 15-15761
Non-Argument Calendar
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D.C. Docket No. 8:15-cv-02943-JDW-MAP
OSCAR RAY BOLIN, JR.,
Petitioner - Appellant,
versus
SECRETARY, FLORIDA DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS,
ATTORNEY GENERAL, STATE OF FLORIDA,
Respondents - Appellees.
________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Middle District of Florida
________________________
(January 7, 2016)
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Before ED CARNES, Chief Judge, TJOFLAT and WILLIAM PRYOR, Circuit
Judges.
PER CURIAM:
On December 28, 2015, prior to his execution for the murder of Teri Lynn
Matthews, which is scheduled to take place on January 7, 2016, Oscar Ray Bolin,
Jr., filed a second or successive petition for writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28
U.S.C. § 2254 in the United States District Court for the Middle District of Florida.
In conjunction with that petition, Bolin moved for a stay of execution. On
December 30, 2015, the District Court dismissed Bolin’s petition for lack of
jurisdiction because Bolin failed to show that he was entitled to file a second or
successive habeas petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2244.1 Accordingly, the court denied
his request for a stay as well.2
1
Bolin has also filed an application seeking from this Court authorization for the district
court to consider a second or successive petition for a writ of habeas corpus. We have denied
that application in a separate order. See In re: Oscar Ray Bolin, Jr., No. 15-15710-P (11th Cir.
Jan. 4, 2016).
2
The court did, however, grant a certificate of appealability (COA) that reads, in full:
“Bolin is granted a [COA] on the issue of the district court’s jurisdiction.” Oscar Ray Bolin, Jr.
v. Sec’y, Dep’t of Corr., Case No. 8:15-cv-2943-T-27MAP, at 5–6 (M.D. Fla. Dec. 30, 2015)
(emphasis added). That COA was granted in error on a broad jurisdictional question rather than
a specific constitutional denial as required by 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c). As we made clear in Spencer
v. United States, federal courts “cannot ignore the clear command” that “Congress articulated in
subsections 2253(c)(2) and (3).” 773 F.3d 1132, 1137 (11th Cir. 2014) (en banc). Those
provisions provide that a COA may issue “only if the applicant has made a substantial showing
of the denial of a constitutional right” and “shall indicate which specific issue or issues satisfy
[that] showing.” 28 U.S.C. §§ 2253(c)(2), (3). Though we ultimately exercised our discretion to
rule on the merits in Spencer despite a faulty COA because of the “late hour” at which the issue
was raised and the substantial judicial resources already expended, we also noted that “[w]e will
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Because the District Court was correct to dismiss Bolin’s successive habeas
petition for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction and because our precedent
establishes that such a dismissal does not constitute a “final order in a habeas
corpus proceeding” for purposes of 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c), we affirm that dismissal
as a “final decision” pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.
The District Court correctly held that Bolin lacked jurisdiction to bring a
second or successive petition because he failed to first obtain authorization to do so
from this Court as required by 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(3)(A). 3 For the reasons given
in our order denying Bolin’s application for leave to file a second or successive
habeas petition, see In re: Oscar Ray Bolin, Jr., No. 15-15710-P, at 6–13 (11th Cir.
not be so lenient in future appeals when a certificate fails to conform to the gatekeeping
requirements imposed by Congress.” Spencer, 773 F.3d at 1137–38; see also Damren v.
Florida, 776 F.3d 816, 820–21 (11th Cir. 2015) (reiterating that “we are reluctant to disregard
the gatekeeping requirements Congress has set up” but choosing to reach the merits because of
the litigation’s “lengthy procedural journey,” which lasted more than a decade and involved a
previous appeal before this Court). We ended our discussion of the correct process for issuing a
COA by warning that a “failure to specify” the underlying constitutional issue, whether
committed by this Court or a district court, “will result in the vacatur of the certificate.” Spencer,
773 F.3d at 1138.
Here, the District Court failed to identify with any meaningful degree of specificity a
potential constitutional denial. Rather, the COA encompasses only a jurisdictional question—
and an extraordinarily capacious one at that. Given that the entirety of this round of Bolin’s
habeas litigation has lasted only a handful of days, we see no reason not to make good on our
warning in Spencer. Were we not affirming the District Court’s dismissal of Bolin’s successive
petition for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction, we would vacate the COA as improvidently
granted.
3
Section 2244(b)(3)(A) provides, “Before a second or successive application permitted
by this section is filed in the district court, the applicant shall move in the appropriate court of
appeals for an order authorizing the district court to consider the application.”
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Jan. 4, 2016), Bolin is unable to show either that he is entitled to bring a successive
habeas petition in line with the requirements of 28 U.S.C. § 2244 or that the claims
he seeks to bring “f[a]ll within [the] small subset of unavailable claims that could
not reasonably be categorized as ‘successive.’” Stewart v. United States, 646 F.3d
856, 861 (11th Cir. 2011) (quoting Leal Garcia v. Quarterman, 573 F.3d 214, 222,
224 (5th Cir. 2009)). Therefore, the District Court properly held that it was barred
from hearing Bolin’s latest battery of claims.
Before concluding, we pause briefly to note why a COA need not issue
before we can affirm a district court’s dismissal of a second or successive habeas
petition for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. As we have previously held, a
dismissal of a successive habeas petition for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction
does not constitute a “final order in a habeas corpus proceeding” for purposes of 28
U.S.C. § 2253(c). Hubbard v. Campbell, 379 F.3d 1245, 1247 (11th Cir. 2004). If
it did, due to the limits Congress imposed on our jurisdiction, either a COA would
first have to issue or our review would be precluded. Instead, such a dismissal is a
“final decision” pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and a COA is thus “unnecessary to
permit us to review the district court’s order of dismissal.” See id.
With that in mind, we AFFIRM the District Court’s dismissal of Bolin’s
successive habeas petition for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction.
AFFIRMED.
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ED CARNES, Chief Judge, concurring.
I agree with the Court that we are bound by precedent to hold that a
certificate of appealability is not required before a petitioner can appeal a district
court’s dismissal under 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(2) & (3)(A) of a habeas petition for
lack of subject matter jurisdiction. See Hubbard v. Campbell, 379 F.3d 1245 (11th
Cir. 2004). That is unfortunate because Hubbard wrongly decided that issue.
A habeas petitioner is required to obtain a COA to appeal “the final order in
a habeas corpus proceeding in which the detention complained of arises out of
process issued by a State court.” 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1)(A) (emphasis added).
Where a district court dismisses a habeas petition for lack of jurisdiction, “the
petitioner has no further recourse in the district court, and, as such, the dismissal is
a final order by that court.” United States v. Harper, 545 F.3d 1230, 1233 (10th
Cir. 2008). And the order is obviously “in a habeas corpus proceeding.” See Jones
v. Braxton, 392 F.3d 683, 688 (4th Cir. 2004). That being so, § 2253(c)(1)(A)
expressly prohibits a petitioner whose petition was dismissed for lack of
jurisdiction from appealing that dismissal without a COA. All the circuits to
address the issue have reached that conclusion. See Harper, 545 F.3d at 1233;
Resendiz v. Quarterman, 454 F.3d 456, 458 (5th Cir. 2006); Sveum v. Smith, 403
F.3d 447, 448 (7th Cir. 2005); Jones, 392 F.3d at 688–89. Except us.
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Without the benefit of the later decisions from those four other circuits, the
Hubbard opinion’s entire discussion of the COA issue consists of just three
sentences:
Section 2253(c) has no application here because the district court’s
decision dismissing the Amended Petition is not “a final order in a
habeas corpus proceeding” within the meaning of the statute. Rather,
the decision is a final order dismissing the Amended Petition for lack
of subject matter jurisdiction. We have jurisdiction to review the
order pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.
379 F.3d at 1247. Each of those three sentences is purely conclusory. None of
them explains why a jurisdictional dismissal, which is “a final order dismissing [a
petition] for lack of subject matter jurisdiction,” is not “a final order in a habeas
corpus proceeding.” An order dismissing a habeas proceeding for lack of
jurisdiction is as much a final order as one dismissing a habeas proceeding for lack
of merit. Both finally dispose of the proceeding. The Hubbard opinion does not
explain why an order dismissing a habeas petition for lack of jurisdiction is a “final
decision” under § 1291, but not a “final order in a habeas corpus proceeding” for
purposes of § 2253(c)(1)(A).
In Gonzalez v. Sec’y for the Dep’t of Corr., 366 F.3d 1253, 1263 (11th Cir.
2004) (en banc), we held that “a certificate of appealability is required for the
appeal of any denial of a [Federal Rule of Civil Procedure] 60(b) motion for relief
from a judgment in a [28 U.S.C.] § 2254 . . . proceeding.” We reiterated that
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holding in Jackson v. Crosby, 437 F.3d 1290, 1294–95 (11th Cir. 2006). Given
our en banc holding in Gonzalez, what Hubbard means is that if a petitioner labels
his successive pleading a Rule 60(b) motion he must obtain a COA to appeal the
dismissal of it on jurisdictional grounds, Gonzalez, 366 F.3d at 1263, but if he
labels it a § 2254 petition he can appeal the dismissal of it on jurisdictional grounds
without a COA, Hubbard, 379 F.3d at 1247. That illustrates Hubbard’s error.
If we were free of the Hubbard decision, I would hold that the dismissal of a
habeas petition for lack of subject matter jurisdiction is a “final order in a habeas
corpus proceeding” that requires a COA under § 2253(c)(1)(A). Given that we
must follow Hubbard until it is overturned, I join the Court in addressing the
“merits” of the district court’s decision that under § 2244(b)(2) & (3)(A) Bolin’s
petition was due to be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction, and I agree that decision
should be affirmed.
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