Vidal Suriel v. Commissioner of IRS

Case: 14-11533 Date Filed: 04/09/2015 Page: 1 of 3
[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
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No. 14-11533
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Agency No. 367-12
VIDAL SURIEL,
Petitioner - Appellant,
versus
COMMISSIONER OF IRS,
Respondent - Appellee.
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Petition for Review of a Decision of the
U.S. Tax Court
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(April 9, 2015)
Before HULL and DUBINA, Circuit Judges, and BOWEN, * District Judge.
PER CURIAM:
*
Honorable Dudley H. Bowen, Jr., United States District Judge for the Southern District
of Georgia sitting by designation
Case: 14-11533 Date Filed: 04/09/2015 Page: 2 of 3
Vidal Suriel petitions for review of the United States tax court’s decision
that he is liable for $40.62 million in tax deficiencies for taxable years 2004 and
2006.
Suriel raises three issues in his petition: (1) whether the tax court erred by
imposing an adverse inference against him for failing to present a witness from
Protabaco to corroborate testimony about Vibo Corporation’s reasons for joining
the Tobacco Master Settlement Agreement (MSA); (2) whether the tax court erred
in determining that Vibo could not deduct its MSA payment obligations under
I.R.C. § 468B; and, relatedly, (3) whether the tax court erred by failing to analyze
Vibo’s MSA payments under I.R.C. § 461.
We review the tax court’s application of the federal tax code de novo and its
factual findings for clear error. Campbell v. Comm’r, 658 F.3d 1255, 1258 (11th
Cir. 2011). The credibility of a witness is a question for the factfinder and thus is
reviewed for clear error. See Blohm v. Comm’r, 994 F.2d 1542, 1552 (11th Cir.
1993).
We agree with Suriel that the tax court should not have found that Suriel was
subject to an adverse inference for failing to present a witness from Protabaco to
corroborate the testimony that Vibo joined the MSA because of pressure from the
Colombian tobacco manufacturer. Although we conclude that this was error, based
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on our precedents regarding nonjury trials, our case law makes it clear that the
improper admission or exclusion of evidence is harmless “unless there is an
insufficiency of competent evidence, or the trial court was induced by incompetent
evidence to make an essential finding it would not otherwise have made.” Cain v.
Comm’r, 460 F.2d 1243, 1244 (5th Cir. 1972); see also Airlift, Inc. v. United
States, 460 F.2d 1065 (5th Cir. 1972).1 Based on our review of the record, it
becomes clear to us that there was sufficient competent evidence to support the tax
court’s conclusion that Vibo voluntarily entered into the MSA for financial reasons
rather than at the behest of Protabaco. Accordingly, we conclude that the tax
court’s error was harmless.
Except for the adverse inference error, we deny Suriel’s petition for review
based on the well-reasoned opinion of the tax court. Suriel v. Comm’r, 141 T. C.
507 (2013).
PETITION DENIED.
1
In Bonner v. City of Prichard, 661 F.2d 1206, 1207 (11th Cir. 1981) (en banc), the
Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals adopted as binding precedent the decisions of the former Fifth
Circuit issued before October 1, 1981.
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