United States v. Michael J. Charniak

Case: 14-11883 Date Filed: 04/14/2015 Page: 1 of 16
[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
________________________
No. 14-11883
Non-Argument Calendar
________________________
D.C. Docket No. 8:13-cr-00204-EAK-TBM-1
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
versus
MICHAEL J. CHARNIAK,
Defendant-Appellant.
________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Middle District of Florida
________________________
(April 14, 2015)
Before MARCUS, WILLIAM PRYOR, and ANDERSON, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Case: 14-11883 Date Filed: 04/14/2015 Page: 2 of 16
Michael Charniak appeals his 262-month total sentence, imposed after
pleading guilty to one count of transporting child pornography, in violation of 18
U.S.C. § 2252(a)(1), (b)(1), and one count of receiving child pornography, in
violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2552(a)(2).
On appeal, Charniak argues that the district court erred in counting his prior
state conviction of sexually abusing his daughter toward his criminal history points
and criminal history category, because the state offense was inextricably
intertwined with the federal offenses. He argues that the district court erred in
applying enhancements under both U.S.S.G. § 2G2.2(b)(2) and (b)(4), resulting in
impermissible double-counting. In addition, he argues that the district court
committed procedural error by running his federal sentences consecutively to his
state sentence, contrary to U.S.S.G. § 5G1.3(b)(2). Charniak argues that the
district court imposed a substantively unreasonable sentence. Finally, he argues
that the district court plainly erred in imposing two consecutive life terms of
supervised release.
I.
We review the district court’s interpretation of the sentencing guidelines de
novo. United States v. Coe, 79 F.3d 126, 127 (11th Cir. 1996). The district court’s
fact findings, including the finding that two cases are not related, are reviewed for
clear error. See United States v. Query, 928 F.2d 383, 385 (11th Cir. 1991).
2
Case: 14-11883 Date Filed: 04/14/2015 Page: 3 of 16
Section 4A1.1(a) provides that, when calculating a defendant’s criminal
history, the sentencing court should add three points for each prior sentence of
imprisonment exceeding one year and one month. U.S.S.G. § 4A1.1(a). Section
4A1.2(a)(1) defines “prior sentence” as “any sentence previously imposed upon
adjudication of guilt, whether by guilty plea, trial, or plea of nolo contendere, for
conduct not part of the instant offense.” Id. § 4A1.2(a)(1). Conduct is part of the
instant offense if it is relevant conduct to the instant offense. Id. § 4A1.2,
comment. (n.1). Relevant conduct includes all acts and omissions committed by
the defendant during the commission of the instant offense of conviction, in
preparation for that offense, or in the course of attempting to avoid detection or
responsibility for that offense. Id. § 1B1.3(a)(1)(A).
Section 2G2.2(b)(5) provides that “[i]f the defendant engaged in a pattern of
activity involving the sexual abuse or exploitation of a minor,” the district could
should increase the offense level by five levels. Id. § 2G2.2(b)(5). A pattern of
activity involving the sexual abuse or exploitation of a minor is defined as:
any combination of two or more separate instances of the sexual abuse
or sexual exploitation of a minor by the defendant, whether or not the
abuse or exploitation (A) occurred during the course of the offense;
(B) involved the same minor; or (C) resulted in a conviction for such
conduct.
3
Case: 14-11883 Date Filed: 04/14/2015 Page: 4 of 16
Id. § 2G2.2, comment. (n.1). Furthermore, a conviction considered under
§ 2G2.2(b)(5) is not excluded from consideration when calculating criminal history
points. Id. § 2G2.2, comment. (n.3).
The district court did not err in counting Charniak’s state conviction toward
his criminal history points because that offense met the definition of “prior
sentence” under U.S.S.G. § 4A1.2(a)(1). Charniak’s state sentence for abusing his
daughter was imposed prior to his conviction for the instant federal offenses. See
U.S.S.G. § 4A1.2(a)(1). The state offense was not part of the instant offenses
because it was not relevant conduct. See U.S.S.G. § 4A1.2, comment. (n.1).
Charniak did not abuse his daughter during the commission of his child
pornography offenses, in preparation for them, or in the course of attempting to
avoid detection or responsibility for them. See id. § 1B1.3(a)(1)(A). Even though
the state and federal offenses occurred during the same time period, they involved
different victims and different conduct – receiving and distributing media on one
hand and sexually abusing an individual on the other. The fact that agents
discovered Charniak’s abuse of his daughter during an interview about his child
pornography offenses does not alone make that offense relevant conduct. Neither
does the inclusion of facts regarding the state offense in the “Offense Conduct”
section of the presentence investigation report (“PSI”) make it relevant conduct,
4
Case: 14-11883 Date Filed: 04/14/2015 Page: 5 of 16
because these facts were necessary to include in order to apply the five-level
increase under U.S.S.G. § 2G2.2(b)(5).
In addition, Charniak’s argument that the state offense was relevant conduct
as a result of the application of the five-level increase under U.S.S.G.
§ 2G2.2(b)(5) fails. This section specifically allows the district court to consider
offenses not determined to be relevant conduct and provides that these offenses are
not excluded from the calculation of criminal history points. See id. § 2G2.2,
comment. (n.1); id. § 2G2.2, comment. (n.3). The use of Charniak’s state offense
to apply this five-level increase does not preclude the district court from
considering the offense when calculating his criminal history points.
II.
We review de novo a claim of double-counting under the Guidelines. United
States v. Suarez, 601 F.3d 1202, 1220 (11th Cir. 2010). However, if a party fails to
raise an argument before the district court, we review the issue for plain error.
United States v. McNair, 605 F.3d 1152, 1222 (11th Cir. 2010). Plain error occurs
when there is (1) an error, (2) that is plain, and (3) that affects substantial rights. Id.If the first three conditions are met, then we “may exercise discretion to correct a
forfeited error, but only if (4) the error seriously affects the fairness, integrity, or
pubic reputation of judicial proceedings.” Id. (quotations omitted). “An error is
‘plain’ if controlling precedent from the Supreme Court or the Eleventh Circuit
5
Case: 14-11883 Date Filed: 04/14/2015 Page: 6 of 16
establishes that an error has occurred.” United States v. Ramirez-Flores, 743 F.3d
816, 822 (11th Cir. 2014), cert. denied (No. 14-6502) (U.S. Jan. 12, 2015). An
error is also plain if it is clear or obvious. United States v. Joseph, 709 F.3d 1082,
1095-96 (11th Cir. 2013), cert. denied, 134 S.Ct. 1273 (2014).
“Impermissible double counting occurs only when one part of the guidelines
is applied to increase a defendant’s sentence on account of a kind of harm that has
already been fully accounted for by application of a different part of the
guidelines.” Suarez, 601 F.3d at 1220 (quotation omitted). Further, “[d]ouble
counting a factor during sentencing is permissible if the Sentencing Commission
intended the result, and if the result is permissible because each section concerns
conceptually separate notions related to sentencing.” Id. (quotation omitted). We
“presume[] the Sentencing Commission intended to apply separate guideline
sections cumulatively, unless specifically directed otherwise.” United States v.
Rodriguez-Matos, 188 F.3d 1300, 1310 (11th Cir. 1999).
Under § 2G2.2(b)(2), the district court applies a two-level increase to the
defendant’s offense level “[i]f the material involved a prepubescent minor or a
minor who had not attained the age of 12 years.” U.S.S.G. § 2G2.2(b)(2). If the
material portrays “sadistic or masochistic conduct or other depictions of violence,”
the district court applies a four-level increase. Id. § 2G2.2(b)(4). We have held
that § 2G2.2(b)(4) is appropriately applied when a district court determines that
6
Case: 14-11883 Date Filed: 04/14/2015 Page: 7 of 16
“(1) the minor in the image is a young child and (2) the image portrays vaginal or
anal penetration of a young child by an adult male” because this act is necessarily
painful. United States v. Hall, 312 F.3d 1250, 1263 (11th Cir. 2002).
The district court did not plainly err by applying both enhancements. First,
Charniak points to no binding precedent holding that applying both the
§ 2G2.2(b)(2) and (b)(4) enhancements represents double-counting, so even if
there was error, it is not plain. See Ramirez-Flores, 743 F.3d at 822. Furthermore,
there is no error at all, because the harm encompassed by § 2G2.2(b)(4) is not fully
accounted for by § 2G2.2(b)(2), and each of the guideline sections represents
conceptually different notions related to sentencing. See Suarez, 601 F.3d at 1220.
An individual may receive or distribute child pornography images involving
simulated intercourse or the lascivious exhibition of a prepubescent child’s
genitals, either of which would result in the application of § 2G2.2(b)(2) based on
the age of the child but not § 2G2.2(b)(4). While the age of the child is part of the
analysis articulated in Hall as to whether § 2G2.2(b)(4) applies, the image must
also portray vaginal or anal penetration of the young child by an adult male. See
Hall, 312 F.3d at 1263. The fact that the child is prepubescent is only one part of
the analysis of whether the image necessarily depicts violence. See id. In addition,
the application of both enhancements would not impact Charniak’s substantial
7
Case: 14-11883 Date Filed: 04/14/2015 Page: 8 of 16
rights, because he possessed and distributed images of children tied up, which
would result in the application of § 2G2.2(b)(4) even if the images of adults having
sex with very young children did not. See McNair, 605 F.3d at 1222.
III.
We review the imposition of a consecutive sentence for abuse of discretion,
and the resulting sentence must be reasonable. United States v. Covington, 565
F.3d 1336, 1346-47 (11th Cir. 2009). We review the application of U.S.S.G. §
5G1.3 de novo. United States v. Bidwell, 393 F.3d 1206, 1208-09 (11th Cir. 2004).
When a sentence is imposed on a defendant who is already subject to an
undischarged term of imprisonment, the district court may elect to run the terms
concurrently or consecutively. 18 U.S.C. § 3584(a). Terms imposed at different
times run consecutively unless the court orders them to run concurrently. Id.Regardless of how the district court determines to run the terms, it must make the
decision in consideration of the factors set forth in § 3553(a). Id. § 3584(b).
Echoing the statute, the Sentencing Guidelines state that when imposing a sentence
on a defendant already subject to an undischarged sentence, the sentence for the
instant offense may run concurrent, partially concurrent, or consecutive to the prior
sentence. U.S.S.G. § 5G1.3(c) (Nov. 2013). The application notes provide that the
district court should consider the following factors in determining whether to
impose consecutive or concurrent terms of imprisonment: (1) the factors set out in
8
Case: 14-11883 Date Filed: 04/14/2015 Page: 9 of 16
§ 3584 (which references § 3553(a)); (2) the type (meaning, e.g., determinate or
indeterminate/parolable) and length of the prior undischarged sentence; (3) the
time served on the undischarged sentence and the time likely to be served before
release; (4) whether the prior undischarged sentence was imposed in state or
federal court, or at a different time before the same or different federal court; and
(5) “[a]ny other circumstance relevant to the determination of an appropriate
sentence for the instant offense.” Id. § 5G1.3(c) comment. (n.3(A)). This Court
has recognized that § 3584 and § 5G1.3 evince a preference for consecutive terms
of imprisonment when the sentences are imposed at different times. Ballard, 6 F.3d
at 1506.
However, U.S.S.G. § 5G1.3(b) provides that if the instant offense was not
committed while the defendant was serving a term of imprisonment, a term of
imprisonment resulted from another offense that is relevant conduct to the instant
offense of conviction, and that offense was the basis for an increase in the offense
level for the instant offense under Chapter Two or Three of the Guidelines, the
sentence shall be imposed concurrently to the remainder of the undischarged term
of imprisonment. U.S.S.G. § 5G1.3(b)(2) (Nov. 2013). Before imposing the
sentence, the district court shall adjust the sentence for any period of imprisonment
already served on the undischarged term if the court determines the Bureau of
9
Case: 14-11883 Date Filed: 04/14/2015 Page: 10 of 16
Prisons will not credit the time already served to the federal sentence. Id.
§ 5G1.3(b)(1).
The district court did not err when it imposed Charniak’s federal sentences
to run consecutive to his state sentence. Charniak fails to show that his state
offense met the requirements under U.S.S.G. § 5G1.3(b)(2) to require the district
court to impose concurrent sentences. As explained previously, Charniak’s state
conviction for sexually abusing his daughter was not relevant conduct for his
federal offenses of child pornography and the application of the five-level increase
did not cause the offense to be deemed relevant conduct. Because the state offense
was not relevant conduct, the district court had the discretion to impose concurrent,
partially concurrent, or consecutive sentences. See U.S.S.G. § 5G1.3(c). The
district court discussed the seriousness of child pornography and the need to be fair
to both the victims and the community in determining whether to impose the
sentences consecutively. The district court’s decision to impose Charniak’s
sentences to run consecutively to his state sentence was within the court’s
discretion and did not constitute error. See U.S.S.G. § 5G1.3(c); Covington, 565
F.3d at 1346. In addition, the judge’s comment stating that she did not have a
choice, when considered in context, was not an expression of her belief that she
was bound by the guidelines to impose consecutive sentences, but rather an
expression of her belief that the circumstances surrounding the offenses compelled
10
Case: 14-11883 Date Filed: 04/14/2015 Page: 11 of 16
her to exercise her discretion to impose consecutive sentences. Finally, the
resulting sentence was reasonable, as described below. See Covington, 565 F.3d at
1347.
IV.
We review the reasonableness of a sentence using a deferential abuse of
discretion standard. Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 41, 128 S.Ct. 586, 591, 169
L.Ed.2d 445 (2007). We examine the sentence’s substantive reasonableness under
the totality of the circumstances. United States v. Shaw, 560 F.3d 1230, 1237 (11th
Cir. 2009). The burden of establishing unreasonableness lies with the party
challenging the sentence. United States v. Tome, 611 F.3d 1371, 1378 (11th Cir.
2010).
The district court is required to impose a sentence “sufficient, but not greater
than necessary, to comply with the purposes” listed in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2),
including the need to reflect the seriousness of the offense, promote respect for the
law, provide just punishment for the offense, deter criminal conduct, and protect
the public from the defendant’s future criminal conduct. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2).
In imposing a particular sentence, the court must also consider the nature and
circumstances of the offense, the history and characteristics of the defendant, the
kinds of sentences available, the applicable guideline range, the pertinent policy
statements of the Sentencing Commission, the need to avoid unwarranted
11
Case: 14-11883 Date Filed: 04/14/2015 Page: 12 of 16
sentencing disparities, and the need to provide restitution to victims. Id.§ 3553(a)(1), (3)-(7).
A district court abuses its discretion and imposes a substantively
unreasonable sentence when it fails to afford consideration to relevant factors that
were due significant weight, gives significant weight to an improper or irrelevant
factor, or commits a clear error of judgment in considering the proper factors.
United States v. Irey, 612 F.3d 1160, 1190 (11th Cir. 2010) (en banc). We will
remand only when “left with the definite and firm conviction that the district court
committed a clear error of judgment in weighing the § 3553(a) factors by arriving
at a sentence that lies outside the range of reasonable sentences dictated by the
facts of the case.” United States v. Pugh, 515 F.3d 1179, 1191 (11th Cir. 2008)
(quotations omitted). A sentence well below the statutory maximum penalty is one
indicator of a reasonable sentence. See United States v. Gonzalez, 550 F.3d 1319,
1324 (11th Cir. 2008).
Charniak has not met his burden of establishing that his sentence is
substantively unreasonable in light of the totality of the circumstances and the
§ 3553(a) factors. See Tome, 611 F.3d at 1378. Although Charniak does not have
an extensive criminal history, his recent offenses were for the extremely serious
crimes of child pornography and sexually abusing his daughter over a period of
years. Charniak’s sentence reflects both the seriousness of his child pornography
12
Case: 14-11883 Date Filed: 04/14/2015 Page: 13 of 16
offenses and the concerns for public safety, particularly the safety of children.
Furthermore, Charniak continued to obtain and trade child pornography after his
initial interview with agents. His actions show that he is likely to engage in the
offenses again and show a need for adequate deterrence. Under the circumstances,
Charniak’s sentence accomplished the needs for the sentence to reflect the
seriousness of the offenses, protect the public, and provide deterrence. See 18
U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2). His sentence was within the range of reasonable sentences
dictated by the facts. See Pugh, 515 F.3d at 1191.
Charniak’s specific arguments also fail. First, the 262-month total sentence
is significantly below the 480-month maximum statutory sentence Charniak could
receive with his sentences imposed consecutively. The federal sentence does not
punish Charniak twice for conduct related to the federal offenses, because the state
and federal offenses are separate and unrelated. The district court judge’s
comments regarding her experience served to place Charniak’s offenses within the
context of her knowledge regarding sex crimes against minors. Finally, the district
court did not apply the “market thesis theory” to its determination of Charniak’s
sentence. The district court did not discuss the nature of child pornography in
relation to the theory that consumers of child pornography increase the harm to
future children by increasing the demand for child pornography, as described in the
market thesis theory. Instead, the district court spoke about the harm to children
13
Case: 14-11883 Date Filed: 04/14/2015 Page: 14 of 16
who are already victims of child pornography when new consumers continue to
view and transfer that child pornography long after it was made.
V.
We generally review questions of statutory interpretation and the district
court’s application of the Sentencing Guidelines de novo. See United States v.
Barrington, 648 F.3d 1178, 1194 (11th Cir. 2011) (Sentencing Guidelines); United
States v. Segarra, 582 F.3d 1269, 1271 (11th Cir. 2009) (statutory interpretation).
If a party fails to raise an argument before the district court, we review the issue for
plain error. McNair, 605 F.3d at 1222. Plain error occurs when there is (1) an
error, (2) that is plain, and (3) that affects substantial rights. Id. If the first three
conditions are met, then this Court “may exercise discretion to correct a forfeited
error, but only if (4) the error seriously affects the fairness, integrity, or pubic
reputation of judicial proceedings.” Id. (quotations omitted). To show that an error
affected a defendant’s substantial rights, the defendant must establish a reasonable
probability that the result would have been different but for the error. See United
States v. Cartwright, 413 F.3d 1295, 1300-01 (11th Cir. 2005). An error that
seriously affected the fairness of the judicial proceedings is one that is “particularly
egregious,” and, if left uncorrected, would result in a miscarriage of justice. See
United States v. Puche, 350 F.3d 1137, 1151 (11th Cir. 2003).
14
Case: 14-11883 Date Filed: 04/14/2015 Page: 15 of 16
Terms of supervised release must run concurrently. 18 U.S.C. § 3624(e)
(providing that a term of supervised release “runs concurrently with any Federal,
State, or local term of probation or supervised release or parole for another offense
to which the person is subject or becomes subject during the term of supervised
release”); U.S.S.G. § 5G1.2, comment. (n.2(C)).
Here, the district court committed an error that was plain when it imposed
consecutive supervised release terms. See U.S.C. § 3624(e); U.S.S.G. § 5G1.2,
comment. (n.2(C)). However, the error did not affect Charniak’s substantial rights
because, even absent the error, his total term of supervised release – life – would
remain the same. See Cartwright, 413 F.3d at 1300-01. Charniak’s arguments
concerning the possible impact of a court reducing one of the supervised release
terms in the future does not show an effect on his substantial rights, because
Charniak would still have to serve his other life term even if that term was
concurrent. Because Charniak does not meet the first three conditions to show
plain error, this Court need not determine whether the error seriously affects the
fairness of the judicial proceedings. See McNair, 605 F.3d at 1222. Even if the
Court considered this fourth factor, Charniak does not show the error would result
in a miscarriage of justice if left uncorrected, because the error will not cause him
to be subjected to any punishment beyond that which would have applied absent
the error. See Puche, 350 F.3d at 1151.
15
Case: 14-11883 Date Filed: 04/14/2015 Page: 16 of 16
AFFIRMED.
16