Kenneth Arugu v. City of Plantation

[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
________________________ FILED
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
No. 11-11163 ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
NOVEMBER 8, 2011
Non-Argument Calendar
JOHN LEY
________________________
CLERK
D.C. Docket No. 0:09-cv-61618-WJZ
KENNETH ARUGU,
llllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllll Plaintiff - Counter Defendant - Appellee,
versus
CITY OF PLANTATION,
llllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllll Defendant - Appellant,
KIMBERLY STALKER,
WILLIAM SMITH,
llllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllll Defendants - Counter Claimants,
LAURETTA DECKER,
a.k.a. Lauretta Arugu,
llllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllll Defendant.
________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Florida
________________________
(November 8, 2011)
Before CARNES, MARTIN, and ANDERSON, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
The City of Plantation appeals the district court’s denial of its motion for
attorney’s fees and costs. The City contends the court abused its discretion when
it denied the motion.
I.
Kenneth Arugu and his then-wife Lauretta Decker were involved in a
domestic dispute that resulted in the involvement of City of Plantation police
officers William Smith and Kimberly Stalker. The parties agree that the officers
wanted Arugu to leave the house where Decker lived and that Arugu believed he
did not have to leave. The officers eventually used physical force and pepper
spray on Arugu. The parties dispute whether Arugu or the officers were the
aggressors, whether he struck one of the officers, whether the officers told him
that he was under arrest, and whether he resisted arrest.
2
Arugu filed a complaint in Florida state court alleging only state law claims
against Smith, Stalker, Decker, and the City. Two years later the City filed a
motion for summary judgment. Four months later Arugu filed an amended
complaint adding claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against the officers and the City.
He alleged that the officers used excessive force in violation of the Fourth
Amendment and that the use of excessive force was “pursuant to the execution or
implementation of a custom policy or official act” of the City. He alleged the City
was directly liable under § 1983 and under a theory of respondeat superior.
The defendants removed the case to federal court, which eventually
remanded all of the state law claims back to state court. The City filed a motion
for summary judgment in the district court on the remaining § 1983 claim, and
Arugu made multiple discovery requests. The City then filed a motion for
attorney’s fees and sanctions under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11, 28 U.S.C.
§§ 1920 and 1927, and 42 U.S.C. § 1988. It argued that Arugu’s § 1983 claim was
frivolous. The City asserted that it had complied with the the 21-day “Safe
Harbor” provision in Rule 11 and was entitled to sanctions. The City also asserted
that it was entitled to attorney’s fees under 42 U.S.C. § 1988 because it was a
prevailing party within the meaning of the statute. It also argued that Arugu’s
3
attorney had “unreasonably and vexatiously” multiplied the proceedings, which
entitled it to attorney’s fees and costs under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1920 and 1927.
Over a year later and after multiple requests for additional discovery and for
more time to respond to the City’s summary judgment motion, Arugu filed a
“Motion for Stay or Abstention, or in the Alternative, Motion for Voluntary
Dismissal.” The court denied the motion for stay or abstention, but granted the
motion for voluntary dismissal. In that same order, the court denied without
elaboration the City’s motion for attorney’s fees and sanctions.
The City filed and then withdrew a motion to reconsider its motion for
attorney’s fees and sanctions, electing instead to appeal the order denying that
motion.
II.
We review for abuse of discretion a district court’s decision to deny
sanctions, costs, and attorney’s fees. See Peer v. Lewis, 606 F.3d 1306, 1311
(11th Cir. 2010) (“A court’s decision to deny sanctions under Rule 11, 28 U.S.C. §
1927, and the court’s inherent power is reviewed for an abuse of discretion.”);
E.E.O.C. v. W&O, Inc., 213 F.3d 600, 620–21 (11th Cir. 2000) (reviewing for
abuse of discretion the taxation of deposition costs under 28 U.S.C. § 1920);
Ensley Branch, N.A.A.C.P. v. Seibels, 31 F.3d 1548, 1563 (11th Cir. 1994)
4
(reviewing for abuse of discretion a denial of attorney’s fees under 42 U.S.C. §
1988). “A district court abuses its discretion if it applies an incorrect legal
standard, follows improper procedures in making the determination, or bases the
decision upon findings of fact that are clearly erroneous.” Peer, 606 F.3d at 1311(quotation marks omitted).
Abuse of discretion review, however, requires something for us to review.
When ruling on a motion for attorney’s fees or sanctions, the district court must
provide an explanation of the basis for its ruling that is sufficient to allow for
meaningful appellate review. See Thompson v. RelationServe Media, Inc., 610
F.3d 628, 637 (11th Cir. 2010) (“In this case, however, the district court’s
conclusory Rule 11 analysis is not sufficient to permit meaningful appellate
review” because “its one paragraph order provides no explanation of the basis for
its ruling . . . .”); Tilton v. Playboy Entm’t Group, Inc., 554 F.3d 1371, 1378–79
(11th Cir. 2009) (“Although an award of attorney’s fees is ordinarily a matter for
the discretion of the district court, an order on attorney’s fees must allow
meaningful review.” (citation omitted)); cf. Gilmere v. City of Atlanta, Ga., 931
F.2d 811, 814 (11th Cir. 1991) (“The district court, however, must explain its
reasoning in determining a reasonable attorney’s fee to give this court an adequate
and informed basis for review.”).
5
Although the district court did find that Arugu’s motion for voluntary
dismissal was itself not made in bad faith, its denial of the City’s motion for
sanctions and attorney’s fees was not accompanied by any explanation, analysis,
or findings. The court gave no reason for rejecting the City’s contentions that
Argu had filed a frivolous § 1983 claim and had unreasonably multiplied the
proceedings. We therefore vacate the order denying sanctions and attorney’s fees
and remand for the district court to revisit the issue, make appropriate findings,
and explain its decision. We leave open the possibility that the court may decide
the sanctions and attorney’s fees issue differently on remand, but we do not imply
any view about whether it should.
VACATED AND REMANDED.
6