Chiles v. United States

PUBLISH
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
_____________________________________
No. 95-4061
_____________________________________
D. C. Docket No. 94-676-CIV-EBD
LAWTON M. CHILES, JR., Governor of the State
of Florida; STATE OF FLORIDA; DADE COUNTY
PUBLIC HEALTH TRUST, an agency and
instrumentality of Dade County, a political
subdivision of the State of Florida, THE
SCHOOL BOARD OF DADE COUNTY, FLORIDA,
Plaintiffs-Appellants,
versus
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA; DORIS MEISSNER,
Commissioner of the Immigration and
Naturalization Service of the Department of
Justice; JANET RENO, Attorney General of the
United States; JENNIFER NELSON, Acting
Regional Administrator of the Southern
Regional Office of the INS of the Department
of Justice; WALTER D. CADMAN, District
Director of the Miami District Office of the
INS of the Department of Justice; DONNA E.
SHALALA, Secretary of the United States
Department of Health & Human Services,
Defendants-Appellees.
______________________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Florida
_______________________________________
(November 8, 1995)
Before EDMONDSON and DUBINA, Circuit Judges, and CUDAHY*, Senior
Circuit Judge.
____________
* Honorable Richard D. Cudahy, Senior U.S. Circuit Judge for the
Seventh Circuit, sitting by designation.
EDMONDSON, Circuit Judge:
In this expedited appeal, Florida alleges it is injured by the
United States' failure to enforce the immigration laws. The State
asserts claims under both the Administrative Procedure Act and the
United States Constitution. Florida asks for equitable restitution
of its unreimbursed expenses or for declaratory relief and an
injunction requiring the United States to fulfill its statutory and
constitutional duties. The district court dismissed all counts,
concluding the claims presented nonjusticiable political questions.
For the reasons as set forth in the district court's order1 and for
the reasons set out below, we AFFIRM.
Count II
In Count II,2 Florida sues the Attorney General under the APA
for her failure to perform the duties imposed by the immigration
laws. See 8 U.S.C. 1103(a); 1251(a). The district court dismissed
this claim as a political question. We conclude that, to the
extent Florida asks this court to construe the statutory
1
See Chiles v. United States, 874 F. Supp. 1334 (S.D. Fla.
1994).
2
Count I is moot.
2
responsibilities of the Attorney General, the claim is justiciable.
See Japan Whaling Ass'n v. American Cetacean Soc., 106 S.Ct. 2860,
2866 (1986).
A. Standing
The Attorney General asserts Florida lacks standing to raise
this claim.3 On the redressibility component of standing, we
recognize that the level of illegal immigration is dependent on
many factors outside the control of the Attorney General. See Simon
v. Eastern Kentucky Welfare Rights Org., 96 S.Ct. 1917, 1926
(1976). But, because an order against the named defendants would
offer some relief to Florida, we suppose that the State does have
standing to raise this claim.
B. The Statutes
Assuming justiciability and standing, we -- for much the same
reasons as are expressed in the district court's order4 -- conclude
that the district court properly dismissed this count. The overall
statutory scheme established for immigration demonstrates that
Congress intended whether the Attorney General is adequately
guarding the borders of the United States to be "committed to
agency discretion by law" and, thus, unreviewable. See 5 U.S.C. §
3The district court did not address this argument.
4
While the district court dismissed this count as
nonjusticiable, it did discuss whether Congress intended judicial
review under Section 1103(a). Chiles, 874 F. Supp. at 1339-41.
3
701(a); cf. Heckler v. Chaney, 105 S.Ct. 1649, 1659 (1985). 5 And,
Section 1251(a) expressly gives the Attorney General discretion
whether to deport a particular alien.
Count III
Count III alleges that the Federal Medicaid and AFDC
reimbursement programs unconstitutionally discriminate against the
state in violation of the Spending Clause (Art. I, §8) and "other
constitutional provisions guaranteeing equality among the states."
While initial spending decisions are exclusively the domain of
Congress,6 if a specific constitutional limit is exceeded judicial
review is possible, even if the case involves foreign policy. Cf.
INS v. Chada, 103 S.Ct. 2764 (1983). But, because no specific
constitutional limit on the spending power has been exceeded by the
reimbursement policies of AFDC and Medicaid, we conclude this count
was properly dismissed. See Buckley v. Valeo, 96 S.Ct. 612, 668
(1976); South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 86 S.Ct. 803, 816 (1966)
(states not protected by Fifth Amendment's equal protection
guarantee). Florida must seek relief in Congress. Cf. Garcia v. San
Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 105 S.Ct. 1005, 1017-18 (1985).
5
The part of the statute relied on by Florida would not
justify even an allegation of complete abdication of statutory
duties to go to trial. Cf. Heckler, 105 S.Ct. at 1656 n. 4.
6
Because of this circumstance, the district court concluded
that this claim was nonjusticiable. Chiles, 874 F. Supp. at 1342.
4
Count IV
Count IV alleges the United States violates the Guarantee and
Invasion Clause (Art. IV, §4) and the Tenth Amendment by forcing
Florida to provide unreimbursed benefits to illegal immigrants.
For much the same reasons expressed in the order of the district
court, we conclude that whether the level of illegal immigration is
an "invasion" of Florida and whether this level violates the
guarantee of a republican form of government present nonjusticiable
political questions. See generally Baker v. Carr, 82 S.Ct. 691(1962). And, we agree that Florida's provision of benefits to
illegal aliens is not the product of federal coercion of the kind
which violates the Tenth Amendment. Compare New York v. United
States, 112 S.Ct. 2408, 2427-29 (1992) with Plyler v. Doe, 102
S.Ct. 2382 (1982); and Dep't of Health & Rehabilitative Services v.
Solis, 580 So.2d 146 (Fla. 1991).
Conclusion
We recognize that the difficulty in fashioning a remedy for an
alleged wrong can result in a case being nonjusticiable. See Powell
v. McCormack, 89 S.Ct. 1944, 1961 (1969). Because we conclude that
Florida fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted by
a court, we do not reach this issue. The order of the district
court is AFFIRMED.
5