United States v. Isaiah Johnson

[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FILED
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
________________________ ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
JAN 14, 2009
No. 08-10860 THOMAS K. KAHN
Non-Argument Calendar CLERK
________________________
D. C. Docket No. 07-00164-CR-WTM-4
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
versus
ISAIAH JOHNSON,
Defendant-Appellant.
________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Georgia
_________________________
(January 14, 2009)
Before TJOFLAT, MARCUS and PRYOR, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
A Southern District of Georgia jury found Isaiah Johnson guilty on three
counts of possession of a firearm by a convicted felon, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §
922(g)(1): Count 1, possession of a 9mm rifle and a 12-gauge shotgun via a pawn
shop purchase on December 31, 2003; Count 2, possession of a 9mm rifle on April
23, 2004, as Johnson attempted to pawn the 9mm rifle at the same pawn shop; and
Count 3, during a traffic stop by the police, he was found in possession of a
12-gauge shotgun on September 28, 2005. The district court sentenced Johnson to
concurrent prison terms of 63 months. He now appeals his Count 1 and Count 3
convictions.
On September 28, 2005, Lt. Hooks of the Richmond Hill police department
stopped Johnson’s pick up truck for violating a traffic code while he was
investigating an attempted car theft. Hooks instructed Johnson to step out of the
truck and produce his license, proof of insurance, and a registration. Johnson
presented his license but not the other items. He did, however, give Hooks the
registration for a 1999 Volkswagen and a bill of sale indicating that he had recently
purchased the pick up. During the stop, Hooks asked Johnson if there were any
weapons or drugs in the truck. Johnson said no, and that Hooks could call a drug
dog to walk around the truck. Ten minutes later – 25- 30 minutes into the traffic
stop, the dog and her handler arrived. The dog alerted, at which time Johnson said
that there were no narcotics in the truck and that the officers could search it. The
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search revealed a shotgun, with a pistol grip, which Johnson, after claiming the gun
was for hunting, said that it was for self defense, then that he bought it for his
girlfriend. Because Johnson had a felony conviction, the officers arrested him.
On appeal, Johnson argues that the district court erred when it denied his
motion to suppress evidence seized during a search of his truck, arguing that
Hooks stopped his truck for a pretextual reason, and that the subsequent
warrantless, non-consensual search and seizure of the truck and his arrest were
conducted without reasonable suspicion or probable cause. Additionally, he argues
that the evidence was insufficient to convict on Count 1, to-wit: that he lacked
actual or constructive possession of the firearms.
We review a district court’s denial of a defendant’s motion to suppress under
a mixed standard of review, reviewing the district court’s findings of fact for clear
error and the district court’s application of law to those facts de novo. United
States v. Ramirez, 476 F.3d 1231, 1235-36 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 127 S.Ct. 2924(2007). The court’s factual findings are construed in the light most favorable to the
prevailing party. United States v. Smith, 459 F.3d 1276, 1290 (11th Cir. 2006).
The Fourth Amendment provides that “[t]he right of the people to be secure
in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and
seizures, shall not be violated.” U.S. Const. amend. IV. It additionally provides
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that “no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath and
affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or
things to be seized.” Id.A temporary detention of an individual during a traffic stop by law
enforcement, even if only for a brief period and for a limited purpose, constitutes a
“seizure” within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. Whren v. United States,
517 U.S. 806, 809-10, 116 S.Ct. 1769, 1772, 135 L.Ed.2d 89 (1996). A stop thus
must not be “unreasonable” under the circumstances. Id. at 810, 116 S.Ct. at 1772.
As a general rule, the decision to stop an automobile is reasonable when the police
have probable cause to believe that a traffic violation has occurred. Id.The duration of the traffic stop must be limited to the time necessary to
effectuate the purpose of the stop and may not last “any longer than necessary to
process the traffic violation” unless there is articulable suspicion of other illegal
activity. Purcell, 236 F.3d at 1277. Where reasonable suspicion of criminal drug-
related activity exists, an officer has a duty to investigate further and is justified in
continuing to detain the suspect, calling for a drug-sniffing dog, and making a
request to search the vehicle. United States v. Hernandez, 418 F.3d 1206, 1211
(11th Cir. 2005).
The basic premise of search and seizure doctrine is that warrantless searches
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are “per se unreasonable.” Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357, 88 S.Ct. 507,
514, 19 L.Ed.2d 576 (1967). However, the warrant requirement is subject to “a
few specifically established and well-delineated exceptions.” Id. One of these is
the “automobile exception,” which permits a warrantless search or seizure “if
(1) there is probable cause to believe that the vehicle contains contraband or other
evidence which is subject to seizure under law, and (2) exigent circumstances
necessitate a search or seizure.” United States v. Alexander, 835 F.2d 1406, 1408-
09 (11th Cir. 1988). Probable cause to search exists “when the facts and
circumstances would lead a reasonably prudent [person] to believe that the vehicle
contains contraband.” United States v. Clark, 559 F.2d 420, 424 (5th Cir. 1977).
Here, Lt. Hooks had probable cause to believe a traffic violation had
occurred and therefore lawfully conducted a traffic stop. Because he and the
officer handling the drug dog subsequently obtained probable cause to believe that
Johnson’s truck contained contraband, the search of the truck and detention of
Johnson were lawful. In sum, the court did not err when it denied Johnson’s
motion to suppress.
We review de novo the sufficiency of the evidence supporting a criminal
conviction, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the government.
United States v. Benbow, 539 F.3d 1327, 1331 (11th Cir. 2008). The evidence is
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sufficient so long as a reasonable trier of fact, choosing among reasonable
interpretations of the evidence, could find guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. United
States v. Lluesma, 45 F.3d 408, 409-10 (11th Cir. 1995). Furthermore, all
reasonable inferences from the evidence are drawn in favor of the verdict. United
States v. Robertson, 493 F.3d 1322, 1329 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 128 S.Ct. 1295(2008).
To obtain a conviction for being a felon in possession of a firearm, the
prosecution must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that “the defendant was (1) in
knowing possession of a firearm, (2) a convicted felon, and (3) that the firearm
affected interstate commerce.” United States v. Glover, 431 F.3d 744, 748 (11th
Cir. 2005). Knowing possession can be demonstrated by proof of either actual or
constructive possession, and constructive possession is established by proving
“ownership, dominion, or control” over the firearm. Id. at 748 (quotation omitted).
Given the evidence of Johnson’s subsequent control and possession of the
rifle and shotgun referenced in Count 1, the jury had ample proof on which to
convict Johnson on Count 1.
AFFIRMED.
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