eCases

. To make such showing, a petitioner must
prove that (1) counsel’s performance was deficient and (2) the deficient
performance prejudiced the defense.

Id. at 687

. The Supreme
Court has held that the reviewing court need not address both components of the
inquiry, however, if the petitioner makes an insufficient showing on one.

Id. at 697

104 S. Ct. at 2069

.
Regarding the deficient performance component, the Supreme Court stated
that the proper measure of attorney performance is reasonableness under
prevailing professional norms.

Id. at 688

104 S. Ct. at 2065

. We further have
explained that counsel is not incompetent so long as the particular approach taken
could be considered sound strategy. Chandler v. United States,

218 F.3d 1305

,
1314 (11th Cir. 2000) (en banc). The Supreme Court has held that counsel’s
performance deserves substantial deference and that there is a strong presumption
that counsel’s performance fell within the range of reasonable professional
assistance. Strickland,

466 U.S. at 689

104 S. Ct. at 2065

. The Supreme Court
likewise has held that the reviewing court should make every effort to eliminate the
distorting effects of hindsight and evaluate the conduct from counsel’s perspective
at the time.

12
Regarding the prejudice component, the Supreme Court has stated that “[t]he
defendant must show that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s
unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different.”

Id. at 694

104 S. Ct. at 2068

. The Supreme Court also has explained that a reasonable
probability is one sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.

 We have
recognized that given these principles and presumptions, “the cases in which
habeas petitioners can properly prevail . . . are few and far between.” Chandler,

218 F.3d at 1313

.
1. Investigation
The Supreme Court has stated that “counsel has a duty to make reasonable
investigations or to make a reasonable decision that makes particular investigations
unnecessary.” Strickland,

466 U.S. at 691

104 S. Ct. at 2066

. In Fortenberry v.
Haley,

297 F.3d 1213

, 1227-28 (11th Cir. 2002), we considered the duty to
investigate with regard to a defendant’s argument that his counsel was ineffective
for failing to uncover certain testimony to present to the jury. We held that the
defendant’s argument was insufficient to undermine confidence in the defendant’s
conviction since (1) the defendant had not shown that certain of the named
witnesses would have given helpful information if interviewed, especially as one of
these witnesses did not reveal to anyone her helpful information until many years
13
after the defendant’s conviction; (2) certain of the named witnesses’ testimony was
“simply too insubstantial to create any doubt in [the defendant’s] conviction”; and
(3) certain of the witnesses were unreliable.

Likewise, Hembree has not shown that Pinkerton’s described conduct was
prejudicial. See Strickland,

. The evidence
does not establish that Hembree would not have been convicted had Pinkerton
interviewed, or even called to testify, the named witnesses or reviewed the
documents in question. See id.; Fortenberry,

297 F.3d at 1227-28

. Also, the jury
heard testimony at trial similar to that proffered and nonetheless convicted
Hembree. As a result, it is unlikely that calling the named witnesses to testify
would have altered the outcome of the trial. See Fortenberry,

297 F.3d at 1228

(“[A]lthough Yates would have testified that he had heard Guest make a statement
suggesting that no robbery had taken place, there was conclusive evidence
produced at trial that a robbery had occurred; thus, the absence of Yates’ testimony
is unlikely to have produced a different outcome.”).
Specifically, Hembree proffered that the named witnesses (1) would have
stated that Hembree stopped using cocaine, offered the sheriff’s department
information on his sources of cocaine, and could not have traveled to south Florida
to retrieve cocaine at the times in question; (2) would have impeached Kelli
14
Hembree; and (3) would have corroborated Hembree’s story that Greg Lake and
Nodie Lake threatened him and thereby coerced him to commit perjury. However,
the record demonstrates that Pinkerton elicited this same testimony at trial. For
instance, at trial Hembree testified that he stopped “partying,” attempted to give the
police information on his sources, and that Greg Lake and Nodie Lake threatened
him. Also, Nodie Lake testified that she told Hembree there might be
“consequences” for his testimony. Furthermore, Kelli Hembree testified at length
on her drug usage. Likewise, Pinkerton thoroughly cross-examined Kelli Hembree
on her testimony regarding when Hembree traveled to Miami to retrieve cocaine,
ultimately forcing her to correct and contradict herself, and on the fact that her
children had been taken from her by the state because of her drug usage. Thus, the
jury was exposed to the same information that Hembree claims the witnesses he
suggested would have given. We do not believe that the cumulative evidence
Hembree wished to introduce would have changed the jury’s verdict. See
Strickland,

; Fortenberry,

297 F.3d at 1228

.
Further, Hembree has not asserted how Pinkerton’s alleged failure to investigate
the box of documents may have influenced the trial, and therefore we cannot
conclude that this alleged error was prejudicial.8 See

8
Moreover, Pinkerton called Michael Moon, a special agent with the Drug Enforcement
Agency, to testify in Hembree’s favor. Moon stated that the agents found no physical evidence
15
2. Choice of Defense
Hembree next contends that Pinkerton provided ineffective assistance of
counsel by choosing a defense based on Hembree’s withdrawal from the
conspiracy in lieu of a defense based on the statute of limitations.
The statute of limitations for a conspiracy charged pursuant to § 846 is five
years.

18 U.S.C. § 3282

(a). The requirements of the statute of limitations are
satisfied if the government proves that the conspiracy continued into the limitations
period. United States v. Arnold,

117 F.3d 1308

, 1313 (11th Cir. 1997). A
conspiracy is presumed to continue so long as its objective has neither been
abandoned nor accomplished. United States v. Coia,

719 F.2d 1120

, 1124-25 (11th
Cir. 1983). A conspirator is presumed to have continued participating in the
conspiracy for its duration. See United States v. Finestone,

816 F.2d 583

, 589
(11th Cir. 1987). The conspirator can overcome this presumption by establishing
that he withdrew from the conspiracy.

 To do so, he must show that (1) he
undertook affirmative steps, inconsistent with the objects of the conspiracy, to
disavow or to defeat the conspiratorial objectives and (2) either communicated
those acts in a manner reasonably calculated to reach his co-conspirators or
linking Hembree to Greg Lake after the execution of a search warrant in Greg Lake’s residence.
Thus, the jury was made aware of the fact that the government lacked physical evidence of
Hembree’s involvement in the conspiracy.
16
disclosed the illegal scheme to law enforcement authorities.9

Hembree has not shown that Pinkerton’s described conduct was prejudicial.
See Strickland,

. The evidence does not
establish that Hembree would not have been convicted had Pinkerton focused more
on arguing that Hembree’s only contribution to the conspiracy occurred before
1997. See

 First, the evidence suggests that the jury was made well aware that
the statute of limitations was a concern and that Hembree believed his contribution
to the conspiracy last occurred in 1996 and not thereafter. Further discussion of
this point would not have altered the jury’s conclusion. Specifically, the record
demonstrates that Pinkerton related in his opening statement that Hembree could
not be convicted because the government failed to “[bring] a prosecution within the
statute of limitations.” The district court also instructed the jury that it must find
that the conspiracy extended into the limitations period. Hembree further testified
that he retrieved cocaine from Miami and helped to cut and package the cocaine for
Greg Lake in 1996 but never assisted Greg Lake or anyone else involved in the
conspiracy again after that.
Also, there was substantial evidence presented to the jury establishing that
9
“Withdrawal . . . is an affirmative defense, which the defendant has the burden of
proving.” Finestone,

816 F.2d at 590

. Thus, the government had to show that the conspiracy itself
did not stop before July 17, 1997, and Hembree had to show that he personally withdrew from the
conspiracy before July 17, 1997.
17
Hembree participated in the conspiracy beyond 1996, so that the jury would have
reason to convict Hembree even if Pinkerton pursued this defense more
aggressively. See

The record demonstrates that several witnesses testified that
Hembree was involved in trafficking cocaine after July of 1997 and therefore that
he participated in the crime within the limitations period. Specifically, Nodie Lake
testified that she and Hembree traveled to Miami to retrieve cocaine in July of
1997 and in September of 1997 and that she knew that both of these trips occurred
after Hembree’s daughter was born in July of 1997 because she recalled Hembree
bathing his daughter in the sink when they returned from the first trip. Greg Lake
likewise testified that Hembree traveled to Miami to retrieve cocaine in July of
1997 and in September of 1997. Dr. Nicholas Malamos also testified that he
purchased cocaine from Hembree in 1998 and 1999 and that he remembered
Hembree’s daughter being present when Hembree delivered cocaine to him on
certain occasions. In fact, Malamos stated that Hembree continued to deliver
cocaine even after Hembree’s daughter was old enough to walk. Kelli Hembree
further testified that Hembree assisted Greg Lake in the trafficking scheme in
question after 1997 and that she remembered traveling with Hembree to retrieve
cocaine after the birth of their daughter.
Hembree also contends that Pinkerton erred by not insisting that the trial
18
court answer a question posed by the jury in a manner different than chosen by the
district court judge. Specifically, the jury asked: “If the defendant never withdrew
from the conspiracy, does the statute of limitations date apply?” Hembree states
that Pinkerton should have insisted that the district court answer this question,
“yes.” Instead, Pinkerton consented to the court’s decision to refer the jury back to
the jury instructions. On direct appeal, we approved the district court’s handling of
this question and the jury instructions. Thus, Pinkerton could not have provided
ineffective assistance of counsel by consenting to the district court’s reliance on
legally correct jury instructions. Further, the question asked by the jury is
sufficiently ambiguous such that a simple “yes” answer, as Hembree urges, or a
“no” answer, as the government initially requested, would not have provided the
jury with appropriate guidance.
3. Government’s Use of Hembree’s Testimony
Hembree finally argues that Pinkerton should have objected to questions that
the government asked on cross-examination which suggested that the pooling of
money to purchase cocaine for personal use can constitute possession with intent to
distribute. Hembree also argues that Pinkerton should have objected to a similar
line of argument during the government’s closing.
To establish a violation of

18 U.S.C. § 846

, the government must prove that
19
two or more persons agreed to violate the narcotics laws and that the defendant was
a knowing participant in the agreement. United States v. Pintado,

715 F.2d 1501

,
1503 (11th Cir.1983). In Hardy, the government charged the defendant with
violating this provision because the defendant personally used cocaine, hosted
parties attended by drug users and suppliers, helped a friend purchase cocaine for
the defendant and the friend’s joint personal use, and gave another friend a small
amount of cocaine on one occasion. 895 F.2d at 1334. We held that the facts that
the defendant possessed and shared a small amount of cocaine did not support an
inference that the defendant entered into a prior agreement with certain unnamed
persons to distribute cocaine. Id. Likewise, in Dekle, we held that evidence of a
buyer-seller relationship, even when the buyer repeatedly purchased cocaine from
the seller and sometimes shared the cocaine with friends, was insufficient to
establish that the buyer and seller had a joint criminal objective to distribute
cocaine to third parties.

165 F.3d at 829-30

.
Hembree, however, reads Hardy and Dekle as forbidding the government
from arguing that personal use of cocaine can support the existence of an ongoing
conspiracy to distribute cocaine. He contends that Pinkerton rendered ineffective
assistance of counsel by failing to object to this line of argument. We disagree and
conclude that Hembree has failed to show that Pinkerton’s described conduct was
20
deficient.10 See Strickland,

.
As an initial matter, we disagree with the factual premise of Hembree’s
argument. The record does not support Hembree’s contention that the government
suggested Hembree’s admitted conduct of buying cocaine to use personally and to
share with friends was alone sufficient to establish his guilt for the crime charged.
Specifically, Hembree testified that he, Kelli Hembree, and five or six friends
would “pool” their money, purchase “eightballs” of cocaine from Greg Lake and
Nodie Lake, “dump [the cocaine] on a plate,” and snort the cocaine. Hembree also
stated that he would occasionally pick up an extra eightball for one of his friends to
take home. On these points, Hembree and the government’s counsel engaged in
the following line of questions and answers:
A I would – I would purchase more than one [eightball] for my
friends, and I – if it’s – if that’s selling [cocaine], then that’s
what I was doing.
Q Well, has – has your attorney shared with you the definition of
distribution for federal law enforcement purposes and what the
jury will hear down the road?
A Yes, sir.
Q The transfer of possession from one person to another –
A Yes, sir.
10
The government argues that this matter is beyond the scope of the COA. It appears,
however, that the question certified, whether Pinkerton should have argued that Hembree’s conduct
supported a simple-possession conviction only, is broad enough to encompass Hembree’s argument
on appeal that Pinkerton was ineffective for failing to object to the government’s characterization
of his testimony. Further, Hembree’s argument on appeal, rather than the argument described in the
COA, is the argument that Hembree presented to the magistrate and district court.
21
Q – with or without any financial [remuneration]?
A Yes, sir. That’s correct.
Q So you were transferring cocaine from one person to another?
A Yes, sir.
Q You don’t deny that?
A No, sir.
Q But the key denial is that it didn’t happen after July 17th of
1997, right?
A Absolutely.
Q Because if you can convince the jury of that, you walk out those
doors a free man?
The government stopped short of suggesting that Hembree’s post-1997
purchase of cocaine for personal use and to share with friends was an admission of
guilt to his involvement in a conspiracy to possess and distribute cocaine. The
government also argued in its closing that Hembree’s testimony supported his
guilt. However, the government explicitly argued that Hembree’s testimony was
inculpatory because he admitted to involvement in a trafficking scheme before
1997 and to obtaining cocaine to give to friends after 1997. Therefore, the
government did not argue that giving cocaine to his friends alone was sufficient to
establish Hembree’s guilt, but rather that Hembree’s testimony established his
continued participation in the conspiracy within the limitations period.
We also disagree with Hembree’s argument that Hardy and Dekle preclude
the government from arguing that personal use of cocaine can support the existence
of an ongoing conspiracy to distribute cocaine. Our case law does not bar the
22
government’s argument regarding Hembree’s testimony, and therefore Pinkerton
did not have a clear reason to object. In Hardy and Dekle, we held that evidence of
a buyer/seller relationship did not support an inference that the defendant entered
into a prior agreement with certain unnamed persons to distribute cocaine. Hardy,
895 F.3d at 1334; Dekle,

165 F.3d at 829-30

. We did not hold that a buyer/seller
relationship cannot be characterized as continued activity within an already
existent conspiracy. See

 In the instant case, unlike in Hardy and Dekle, the
government did not argue that Hembree’s testimony, alone, was sufficient to infer
that Greg Lake and Hembree had made an agreement to distribute cocaine. Rather,
the government argued that Hembree had admitted to his involvement in the
conspiracy with Greg Lake and others by testifying that he traveled to Miami to
retrieve cocaine in 1996. The government argued that the jury should use
Hembree’s testimony concerning his continued acquisition of cocaine from the
Lakes and his use of cocaine with his friends to conclude that Hembree still was
involved in this already existent conspiracy after 1997.11 Therefore, because the
11
On direct appeal, we explained:
Not only did [Hembree] sell cocaine for his supplier, Greg Lake, he also sold cocaine
to Dr. Malamos, who in turn gave Hembree prescriptions for pain medications.
Furthermore, Hembree and his coconspirators entered the narcotic[s] business in part
to fund their addictions to cocaine and prescription pain medications. Hembree’s
ongoing drug use and his interaction with his coconspirators while consuming drugs
was a vital part of the conspiracy.
23
government did not make the argument rejected by this Court in Hardy and Dekle,
it did not mistate the law in manner that a reasonable attorney would have a basis
to object. 12
Because the evidence does not demonstrate that Pinkerton’s conduct was
deficient or prejudicial in the manner claimed, Hembree did not establish that he
received constitutionally ineffective assistance of counsel. See Strickland,

. Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s
decision finding no ineffective assistance of counsel as to this matter.
B. Evidentiary Hearing
We review a district court’s denial of an evidentiary hearing on a § 2255
motion for abuse of discretion. Aron v. United States,

291 F.3d 708

, 714 n.5 (11th
Cir. 2002). Pursuant to

28 U.S.C. § 2255

(b),
[u]nless the [§ 2255] motion [in question] and the files and records of
the case conclusively show that the prisoner is entitled to no relief, the
court shall cause notice thereof to be served upon the United States
attorney, grant a prompt hearing thereon, determine the issues and
make findings of fact and conclusions of law with respect thereto.
We have interpreted this law and held that “if the petitioner alleges facts that, if
true, would entitle him to relief, then the district court should order an evidentiary
United States v. Hembree, No. 03-16001, slip op. at 19 (11th Cir. Dec. 8, 2004).
12
In fact, Pinkerton stated in his affidavit that Hembree’s own testimony “involved the
purchase of multiple ‘eightballs’ of cocaine that were not personally being consumed.” Thus,
Pinkerton did not feel that he could make a good faith objection to the government’s argument.
24
hearing and rule on the merits of his claim.” Aron,

291 F.3d at 714-15

.
The district court did not abuse its discretion in declining to hold an
evidentiary hearing. See