Deutsche Bank National Trust v. Clifford Holyfield

[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FILED
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
________________________ ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
JAN 30, 2009
No. 08-13865 THOMAS K. KAHN
Non-Argument Calendar CLERK
________________________
D. C. Docket No. 08-01101-CV-T-30MAP
DEUTSCHE BANK NATIONAL TRUST COMPANY,
as Trustee for Long Beach Mortgage
Loan Trust 2006-8,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
versus
CLIFFORD L. HOLYFIELD,
PHYLLIS HOLYFIELD, his wife,
Defendants-Appellants,
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
acting through the Rural Housing Service,
et al.,
Defendants.
_____________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Middle District of Florida
_________________________
(January 30, 2009)
Before BIRCH, BARKETT and PRYOR, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Clifford and Phyllis Holyfield (the “Holyfields”), a husband and wife
proceeding pro se, appeal the district court’s sua sponte dismissal of their qui tam
action under the False Claims Act (“FCA”), 31 U.S.C. §§ 3729-3733, for lack of
subject matter jurisdiction. The Holyfields also appeal the district court’s denial of
their motion for reconsideration. Because the Holyfields cannot maintain a qui tam
suit under the FCA as pro se relators, we conclude that the district court did not err
in dismissing their complaint and in denying their motion for reconsideration.
AFFIRMED.
I. BACKGROUND
The Holyfields filed their qui tam claim in response to foreclosure
proceedings on their home occurring in the Florida state court system. See R1-1 at
1-5; R1-3 at 1-5. In their qui tam claim, the Holyfields allege that the Farmers
Home Administration (“FHA”) of the U.S. Department of Agriculture (“USDA”)
held the mortgage and promissory note to their property. As such, they argue that
Deutsche Bank National Trust Company (“Deutsche Bank”) was attempting to
steal from the United States by initiating a foreclosure action on their property in
state court. R1-3 at 2.
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The district court sua sponte dismissed, without prejudice, the Holyfields’
qui tam claim for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. R1-5 at 1-2. The court found
that the Holyfields failed “to allege any particular fraud upon the government or
the presentation of a false claim for payment to the government as required in order
to invoke jurisdiction under the Federal False Claim Act.” (Id. at 1).
The Holyfields then filed both an original and amended motion for
reconsideration. See R1-6; R1-7. In both motions, the Holyfields urged the
district court to reconsider its decision on grounds that the district court
“inadvertently” thought that the Holyfields “were suing the FHA and USDA when,
in fact,” the Holyfields brought suit in order to protect the government’s interests.
R1-7 at 1. The district court denied the motion and found that the Holyfields failed
to demonstrate any basis for the court to reconsider its order. R1-8 at 1-3. The
Holyfields now appeal the district court’s denial of their motion to reconsider to us.
II. DISCUSSION
We review a district court’s dismissal of a complaint for lack of subject
matter jurisdiction de novo. Makro Capital of America, Inc. v. UBS AG, 543 F.3d
1254, 1258 (11th Cir. 2008). We review a denial of a motion for reconsideration
for abuse of discretion. Id. at 1261. In general, we embrace “a policy of liberal
construction of notices of appeal when (1) unnoticed claims or issues are
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inextricably intertwined with noticed ones and (2) the adverse party is not
prejudiced.” Hill v. BellSouth Telecomm., Inc., 364 F.3d 1308, 1313 (11th Cir.
2004) (quotation marks and citation omitted). Finally, we may affirm the district
court’s decision for reasons different than those stated by the district court.
Turlington v. Atlanta Gas Light Co., 135 F.3d 1428, 1433 n.9 (11th Cir. 1998).
In a qui tam claim, a private individual, called a relator, may file a civil
action on behalf of the federal government. Stalley v. Orlando Reg’l Healthcare
Sys., Inc., 524 F.3d 1229, 1233 (11th Cir. 2008) (per curiam). The right to file a
qui tam claim is statutory. Id. The FCA is the qui tam statute at issue in this case.
In Timson v. Sampson, 518 F.3d 870, 873-74 (11th Cir. 2008) (per curiam),
cert. denied, 129 S. Ct. 74 (2008), we held that a private individual could not
maintain a qui tam suit under the FCA as a pro se relator. If a person brings a qui
tam claim based on the FCA, and he or she proceeds pro se, the district court will
lack subject matter jurisdiction over the claim. See id. at 874.
In this case, the district court correctly dismissed, without prejudice, the
Holyfields’ qui tam claim for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Although the
court predicated its decision on the Holyfields’ failure to correctly invoke
jurisdiction under the FCA, we conclude that the district court lacked subject
matter jurisdiction because the Holyfields filed the suit pro se. Logic then dictates
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that because it did not have subject matter jurisdiction over the claim, the district
court did not abuse its discretion in denying the Holyfield’s motion to reconsider
the dismissal order.
III. CONCLUSION
The Holyfields appeal the district court’s sua sponte dismissal of their pro se
qui tam action under the FCA for lack of subject matter jurisdiction and the district
court’s denial of their motion for reconsideration. Because the Holyfields cannot
maintain a qui tam suit under the FCA as pro se relators, we conclude that the
district court did not err in dismissing their complaint and in denying their motion
for reconsideration. Accordingly, we AFFIRM.
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