Michael Griffin v. Commissioner of Social Security

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[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
________________________
No. 12-14849
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D.C. Docket No. 8:11-cv-01524-SPC
MICHAEL GRIFFIN,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
versus
COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY,
Defendant-Appellee.
________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Middle District of Florida
________________________
(March 19, 2014)
Before MARTIN and HILL, Circuit Judges, and HUCK, * District Judge.
MARTIN, Circuit Judge:
*
Honorable Paul C. Huck, United States District Judge for the Southern District of Florida,
sitting by designation.
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Michael Griffin appeals the denial of his application for a period of Social
Security disability and disability insurance benefits by an administrative law judge
(ALJ). Mr. Griffin argues three issues on appeal, which we address in turn. After
a careful review of the parties’ briefs and the relevant precedent, and with the
benefit of oral argument, we affirm the ALJ’s denial of benefits.
I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Mr. Griffin was injured after his car was rear ended and totaled in 1996. Mr.
Griffin saw several doctors after this accident. He began to see Dr. Sharad
Lakdawala in early 1998. Dr. Lakdawala was a mental health professional. The
visits with Dr. Lakdawala were “fifteen-minute medication adjustments.” At a
visit in July 1998, Mr. Griffin complained to Dr. Lakdawala of depression and
difficulty doing anything because of pain and tinnitus. Similarly, in April 2001,
Mr. Griffin told Dr. Lakdawala of depression, ringing in his ears, and inability to
sleep. During 2002, Mr. Griffin continued to complain about back pain and
ringing in his ears.
Although in 2003 Dr. Lakdawala noted that Mr. Griffin was “doing well,” he
also noted continued problems with back pain, depression, and ringing in Mr.
Griffin’s ears. By November 2003, Dr. Lakdawala noted that Mr. Griffin was
sleeping better despite the ringing in his ears. Mr. Griffin continued to see Dr.
Lakdawala in 2004 and 2005, and though the doctor considered Mr. Griffin’s
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anxiety and depression generally well controlled, he continued to note back pain
and ringing in Mr. Griffin’s ears. Into 2006, Mr. Griffin reported doing “extremely
well,” and Dr. Lakdawala noted that his medication controlled his mental
symptoms. Three “State agency psychological consultants” reviewing Dr.
Lakdawala’s records in 2003, 2008, and 2009 all agreed that Mr. Griffin did not
have a severe mental impairment during the relevant period.
Mr. Griffin also had appointments with Dr. Robert Martinez and Dr. R.
Krishna Moorthy. Mr. Griffin saw Dr. Martinez, a neurologist, four times between
1999 and 2006. At the visit in March 2002, Mr. Griffin complained of headaches,
neck and back pain, ringing in the ears, depression, and trouble sleeping. Mr.
Griffin began seeing Dr. Moorthy shortly after the accident, including a visit in
April 2003 where an MRI revealed a “lateral protrusion at the C3 to C4 level,” but
Dr. Moorthy noted no neurological abnormalities, no paravertebral muscle spasm,
no motor deficits, and no abnormal sensory, motor, or reflex responses.
In April 1998, Mr. Griffin filed an application for a period of disability and
disability insurance benefits. In March 2001, in a decision denying Mr. Griffin’s
1998 application, an ALJ found that Mr. Griffin’s tinnitus “appears mild.” The
2001 decision found that though Mr. Griffin could not “perform any of his past
relevant work” as an insurance manager, he was “capable of performing a
significant range of sedentary work.” Therefore, the ALJ concluded that Mr.
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Griffin “is not disabled within the meaning of the Social Security Act.” Mr.
Griffin did not appeal that March 2001 decision.
On May 20, 2008, Mr. Griffin filed his second application for a period of
disability and disability insurance benefits, which is the one at issue in this
litigation. In this application, Mr. Griffin alleged he became unable to work on
December 31, 2002. He was last insured for disability benefits on June 30, 2004
and so was required to demonstrate a disability on or before that date to qualify for
Social Security disability insurance benefits. His claim was denied at the initial
level and at reconsideration, and Mr. Griffin requested a hearing before an ALJ.
The ALJ decided Mr. Griffin’s claim in 2010. The ALJ found that Mr.
Griffin had the severe impairment of degenerative disc disease and determined his
depression and anxiety were not severe, but did not discuss whether tinnitus was a
severe impairment as well. The ALJ also found that Mr. Griffin had “the residual
functional capacity to perform [a] full range of light work,” and “was capable of
performing past relevant work as an insurance manager” as well as “other jobs
existing in the national economy.” The ALJ found some of Mr. Griffin’s
statements about his condition not entirely credible. At the ALJ hearing, Mr.
Griffin noted he earned approximately $32,000 in 1999, but was unsure of the
source. He first stated it was alimony, but when told that alimony is generally not
considered earned income, he then said it was “very likely” he had received
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disability benefits that year. And the ALJ stated that Mr. Griffin “[a]t most [had]
visited Dr. Moorthy once and Dr. Lakdawal [sic] once” between the alleged onset
date and the date last insured. Ultimately, the ALJ found Mr. Griffin was not
disabled. After the ALJ decision, Mr. Griffin asked for review by the Appeals
Council, which was denied.
Mr. Griffin then appealed to the U.S. District Court for the Middle District
of Florida, which rejected the three issues he raised. First, the District Court
rejected the argument that the ALJ should have included Mr. Griffin’s tinnitus in
the severe impairment finding, because Mr. Griffin failed to demonstrate his
tinnitus was a significant limitation on his ability to perform basic work activities.
Even if Mr. Griffin could have demonstrated it was a significant limitation, the
District Court found that the ALJ committed only harmless error, because the ALJ
found a different severe impairment. Second, the District Court agreed that
substantial evidence supported the ALJ’s credibility determination because Mr.
Griffin sought only “sporadic treatment,” and because of his statements about his
ability to work after the accident. Finally, the District Court rejected the argument
that the 2001 ALJ decision, which found Mr. Griffin could not do past relevant
work and which the ALJ in the 2010 decision did not even mention, should have
res judicata effect. Those are the same three issues presented to this Court.
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
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The Commissioner’s findings of fact are conclusive if supported by
substantial evidence. 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). This Court may not reweigh evidence
and decide facts anew, and must defer to the ALJ’s decision if it is supported by
substantial evidence. Dyer v. Barnhart, 395 F.3d 1206, 1210 (11th Cir. 2005).
Substantial evidence must do more than create a suspicion of the existence of a
fact; it is evidence that a reasonable person would accept as adequate to support the
conclusion. Foote v. Chater, 67 F.3d 1553, 1560 (11th Cir. 1995). If the
Commissioner’s decision is supported by substantial evidence it should be
affirmed, even if this Court would have reached a contrary result. Phillips v.
Barnhart, 357 F.3d 1232, 1240 n.8 (11th Cir. 2004).
III. SEVERE IMPAIRMENT
Mr. Griffin first contends that substantial evidence does not support the
ALJ’s failure to find that his tinnitus constituted a severe impairment. In order to
determine whether a claimant is disabled, the Social Security Administration
(SSA) applies a five-step sequential analysis. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a). This
process includes a determination of whether the claimant: (1) is presently engaged
in substantial gainful activity; (2) has a severe and medically determinable physical
or mental impairment; (3) has such an impairment that meets or equals one of the
listed impairments and meets the duration requirements; (4) can perform his past
relevant work, in light of his residual capacity; and (5) can make an adjustment to
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other work, in light of his residual functional capacity, age, education, and work
experience. Id. § 404.1520(a)(4).
A claimant is not disabled unless he has a severe impairment. Id.
§ 404.1520(a)(4)(ii), (c). A severe impairment is an impairment or combination
thereof that significantly limits the claimant’s physical or mental ability to do basic
work activities. Id. § 404.1520(c). The determination of whether the claimant
suffers from a severe impairment acts as a filter. Jamison v. Bowen, 814 F.2d 585,
588 (11th Cir. 1987). Thus, while a claim is denied if the claimant does not suffer
from a severe impairment, the finding of any severe impairment, regardless of
whether it qualifies as a disability or results from a single impairment or
combination thereof, is sufficient to satisfy the second step of the SSA’s sequential
analysis. Id. Nonetheless, beyond the second step, the ALJ must consider the
entirety of the claimant’s limitations, regardless of whether they are individually
disabling. See id.; Bowen v. Heckler, 748 F.2d 629, 635 (11th Cir. 1984).
The ALJ found that Mr. Griffin suffered from the severe impairment of
degenerative disc disease, which was all that the second step of the SSA’s
disability analysis required. See Jamison, 814 F.2d at 588. The record also
demonstrates that the ALJ considered Mr. Griffin’s tinnitus at subsequent steps.
The ALJ considered Mr. Griffin’s tinnitus at the third step by finding that Mr.
Griffin did not have an impairment, or combination thereof, that met or medically
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equaled one of the listed impairments. See Jones v. Dep’t of Health & Human
Servs., 941 F.2d 1529, 1533 (11th Cir. 1991) (noting a simple expression of the
ALJ’s consideration of the combination of impairments constitutes a sufficient
statement of such findings).
Likewise, in determining Mr. Griffin’s residual functional capacity, the ALJ
expressly acknowledged that Mr. Griffin’s statements regarding the limiting effects
of his impairments were not credible. The record demonstrates that, even if the
ALJ should have found that Mr. Griffin’s tinnitus was a severe impairment, the
ALJ fulfilled his responsibility to consider Mr. Griffin’s tinnitus in the remaining
steps of his disability analysis. See Jamison, 814 F.2d at 588; Heckler, 748 F.2d at
635; 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4). Thus, any error that the ALJ made in failing to
find that Mr. Griffin’s tinnitus was a severe impairment was harmless. See
Jamison, 814 F.2d at 588; Diorio v. Heckler, 721 F.2d 726, 728 (11th Cir. 1983)
(applying the harmless error doctrine to a Social Security appeal).
IV. CREDIBILITY
Mr. Griffin next argues that the ALJ’s credibility finding was not clearly
articulated or supported by substantial evidence. Where a claimant attempts to
demonstrate a disability through his own testimony of pain or other subjective
symptoms, there must be evidence of an underlying medical condition. Dyer, 395
F.3d at 1210. If that threshold is met, then there must be either objective medical
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evidence that confirms the severity of the alleged pain or symptoms arising from
the underlying medical condition, or evidence that the objectively determined
medical condition can reasonably be expected to give rise to the alleged pain. Id.If the ALJ decides not to credit the claimant’s testimony as to his subjective
symptoms, “he must articulate explicit and adequate reasons for doing so,” or
substantial supporting evidence in the record must clearly support the credibility
finding. Foote, 67 F.3d at 1561–62. We will not disturb a clearly articulated
credibility finding that is supported by substantial evidence. Id. at 1562. The
failure to articulate reasons for discrediting a claimant’s subjective testimony,
however, requires that the testimony be accepted as true, and becomes grounds for
remand where credibility is critical to the outcome of the case. See id.Based on the record before us, we cannot say that the ALJ failed to articulate
the reasons for his credibility determination. The ALJ explicitly found that, while
Mr. Griffin suffered from impairments that reasonably could be expected to
produce the alleged symptoms, his statements regarding the frequency, intensity,
and duration of the symptoms were not credible. In support of his credibility
determination, the ALJ found that: Mr. Griffin’s statements were inconsistent with
the evidence; he received limited treatment for his ailments; and his testimony
conflicted with his earnings report. Thus, the ALJ satisfied his responsibility to
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explicitly articulate the basis for his credibility finding. See Foote, 67 F.3d at1561–62.
Substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s finding that Mr. Griffin was not
credible with respect to the frequency, intensity, and duration of his symptoms.
Mr. Griffin received sporadic treatment for his spinal injuries, as he only consulted
with Dr. Martinez once every few years and did not consult with him at all
between December 31, 2002, and June 30, 2004. Likewise, the record only
contains reference to one visit with Dr. Moorthy during the relevant period. The
sporadic nature of Mr. Griffin’s treatments supported the ALJ’s finding that his
statements regarding his symptoms were not fully credible.
Substantial evidence also supports the ALJ’s finding that Mr. Griffin’s
statements regarding his physical limitations were inconsistent with the medical
record. Dr. Moorthy provided the only medical opinion that addressed the relevant
time period with respect to Mr. Griffin’s spine injuries, and, as the ALJ found, her
findings largely fell within normal limits. In the end, Dr. Moorthy only diagnosed
strains, and her opinion can be construed as inconsistent with Mr. Griffin’s claims
regarding the limiting effects of his injury.
Mr. Griffin’s argument about his tinnitus rests largely on the ALJ’s
statement regarding his visits with Dr. Lakdawala. It is true that the ALJ erred in
stating that Mr. Griffin only consulted with Dr. Lakdawala once during the
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relevant time period. However, the record demonstrates that the ALJ considered
all of Dr. Lakdawala’s medical notes. Specifically, the ALJ noted that Mr. Griffin
complained about insomnia, depression, and lack of motivation, which were
complaints that Mr. Griffin raised on several occasions with Dr. Lakdawala. Thus,
the ALJ’s mistake appears to be harmless. See Diorio, 721 F.2d at 728.
In any event, Mr. Griffin’s statements regarding any limitations from his
tinnitus are not credible. Mr. Griffin consulted with Dr. Lakdawala on seven
occasions during the relevant time period, with each appointment being roughly
three months apart. Within these seven appointments, however, Mr. Griffin only
complained of his tinnitus on three occasions. Mr. Griffin reported doing well or
feeling better on several occasions during the relevant time period, and Dr.
Lakdawala’s medical notes do not reveal any information regarding the limiting
effects of Mr. Griffin’s tinnitus. Mr. Griffin’s inconsistent treatment and
complaints regarding his tinnitus, his reports of doing well and feeling better, and
the lack of any medical evidence addressing the limiting effects of the tinnitus
provides substantial evidence for the ALJ’s credibility determination regarding the
tinnitus. See Dyer, 395 F.3d at 1210–12 (concluding substantial evidence
supported the ALJ’s determination that a claimant’s subjective complaints were
inconsistent with his testimony and the medical record).
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While Mr. Griffin faults the ALJ for failing to consider his tinnitus in the
credibility determination, the ALJ expressly recognized Mr. Griffin’s reports of
ringing in his ears in his credibility analysis. The record therefore demonstrates
that that ALJ did in fact consider Mr. Griffin’s tinnitus in his credibility
determination. And while the ALJ’s reference to that ailment was short, he was
not required to refer to every piece of evidence. See Dyer, 395 F.3d at 1211(holding the ALJ does not have to specifically refer to every piece of evidence so
long as the decision is not a broad rejection that is insufficient to permit a court to
conclude that the ALJ considered the claimant’s medical condition as a whole).
V. RES JUDICATA
Finally, Mr. Griffin contends the ALJ, in formulating his residual functional
capacity assessment, should have given res judicata effect to, or at least considered,
a March 29, 2001 decision from the ALJ in his disability proceedings, which
would have resulted in a finding of disability.
The findings and decision of the Commissioner that are made after a hearing
are binding upon all individuals that were party to the hearing. 42 U.S.C. § 405(h).
Under the SSA’s regulations, administrative res judicata applies when the agency
has made a previous final determination or decision regarding the claimant’s rights
on the same facts and issues. 20 C.F.R. § 404.957(c)(1); see also Cash v. Barnhart,
327 F.3d 1252, 1254–55 (11th Cir. 2003).
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The ALJ properly declined to give the March 29, 2001 decision res judicata
effect, as the ALJ’s prior decision adjudicates a different time period, from April
30, 1996 to March 29, 2001. The proceeding at issue here did not address this time
period, and the prior decision did not finally adjudicate any issues or facts that
were raised in this proceeding. Under such circumstances, administrative res
judicata does not apply.
VI. CONCLUSION
Substantial evidence in the record supports the ALJ’s finding that Mr.
Griffin could perform a full range of light work during the relevant time period,
and that a significant number of jobs existed in the national economy that he could
perform. The ALJ properly articulated a credibility finding supported by
substantial evidence, and was not required to give res judicata effect to the March
29, 2001 decision. In light of the above, substantial evidence supports the
conclusion that Mr. Griffin was not disabled and therefore was ineligible for a
period of disability and disability insurance benefits.
AFFIRMED.
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