Gosundi Wusiya v. City of Miami Beach

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[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
________________________
No. 14-15323
Non-Argument Calendar
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D.C. Docket No. 1:12-cv-24233-JEM
GOSUNDI WUSIYA,
a.k.a. James A. Johnson,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
versus
CITY OF MIAMI BEACH,
ELEVENTH JUDICIAL CIRCUIT OF FLORIDA,
Chief Judge Bertila Soto, in her personal and official capacities,
PUBLIC DEFENDER FOR THE ELEVENTH JUDICIAL CIRCUIT OF
FLORIDA,
Carlos J. Martinez, Public Defender,
MIAMI DADE STATE ATTORNEY,
Katherine Fernandez Rundle, in her personal and official capacities,
FLORIDA THIRD DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS,
Frank A. Shepherd, Chief Judge, in his personal and official capacities,
Mayor, Miami-Dade County,
Carlos A. Gimenez, in his personal and official capacities, et al.,
Defendants-Appellees,
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MIAMI-DADE COUNTY,
Defendant.
________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Florida
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(June 3, 2015)
Before JORDAN, JILL PRYOR, and EDMONDSON, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Gosundi Wusiya, proceeding pro se, appeals the district court’s dismissal of
his second amended 42 U.S.C. § 1983 complaint on various grounds and the denial
of his motion for reconsideration. On appeal, Wusiya argues that the district court
erred in dismissing his complaint for several reasons. First, he asserts that the
court failed to consider relevant statistical evidence and other irregularities in his
underlying state criminal proceedings that supported his allegations on Florida’s
widespread policy of “racial felonization;” he defines this practice as one of
causing the convictions of innocent nonwhite persons as felons at
disproportionately higher rates than white persons. This broadly stated theory of
racial felonization and related racial-conspiracy allegations mainly underlie the
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complaint. Wusiya next asserts that the district court erred in denying his request
for injunctive relief for the deprivation of his Social Security benefits during his
term of incarceration in state custody: he had not been convicted of a crime at the
time. In addition, Wusiya contends that the district court erred in concluding that
he lacked standing to seek injunctive relief on his race discrimination claims; he
says his greater vulnerability to future injury was sufficient to satisfy the concrete
injury requirement for standing. Wusiya further argues that the district court
(1) erred in concluding that the Florida Governor, a State Attorney, and two state
judges were immune from suit; (2) ignored relevant evidence when concluding that
he failed to establish a causal connection between the Mayor of Miami-Dade
County and the Governor and the constitutional deprivations he alleged; (3) erred
in concluding that he failed to state a claim for municipal liability against the City
of Miami Beach or Miami-Dade County; and (4) breached its commitment to reset
the trial date for his case.
Wusiya also contends that the district court erred in denying his motion for
reconsideration, which he labels as a Fed.R.Civ.P. 60(b) motion based on
excusable neglect. Wusiya asserts that his motion for reconsideration
demonstrated that he had a strong, meritorious claim and that his request to reopen
the time for appeal was based on excusable neglect. Furthermore, Wusiya argues
that the district court abused its discretion in refusing his request to correct the case
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docket to have the judgment set out in a separate document; he contends this step is
required by Fed.R.Civ.P. 58(a).
No reversible error is presented by the record.
I
We review de novo the dismissal of a complaint for failure to state a claim
for relief, accepting all factual allegations in the complaint as true and viewing
them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. Starship Enters. of Atlanta, Inc. v.
Coweta Cnty., 708 F.3d 1243, 1252 (2013). Courts are not required, however, to
accept as true bare legal conclusions supported by mere conclusory statements.
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678, 681, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1949, 1951, 173
L. Ed. 2d 868 (2009). A complaint must contain sufficient factual allegations that,
accepted as true, “state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Id. at 678,
129 S.Ct. at 1949.
Section 1983 provides a cause of action for deprivations of federal
constitutional rights by state actors acting under color of law. See 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983. Supervisory officials are not vicariously liable for the unconstitutional acts
of their subordinates under section 1983. Cottone v. Jenne, 326 F.3d 1352, 1360
(11th Cir. 2003). Thus, to establish a supervisory official’s liability, the plaintiff
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must show either that the supervisor personally participated in the alleged
unconstitutional conduct or that a causal connection exists between the
supervisor’s actions and the alleged constitutional deprivation. Id. The necessary
causal connection can be established by showing that the supervisor failed to
correct the alleged deprivation after being put on notice of the need to do so by a
history of widespread abuse, established a custom or policy that resulted in
deliberate indifference to constitutional rights, or directed his subordinates to act
unlawfully or knew that they would do so and failed to stop them. Id.
In actions for damages under section 1983, prosecutors enjoy absolute
immunity for acts taken in preparation for and during the course of their roles as
advocates for the state. See Rehberg v. Paulk, 611 F.3d 828, 837-38 (11th Cir.
2010); Bolin v. Story, 225 F.3d 1234, 1242 (11th Cir. 2000). Judges likewise are
entitled to absolute immunity from damages for acts taken in their judicial
capacities, unless those acts were taken in the “clear absence of all jurisdiction.”
Bolin, 225 F.3d at 1239. Thus, a judge is entitled to absolute immunity even when
his actions were erroneous, malicious, or in excess of his jurisdiction. Id.
Furthermore, judges are also generally immune from injunctive relief for acts taken
in their judicial capacities. 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
Public defenders do not act under color of state law for purposes of
section 1983 “when performing a lawyer’s traditional functions as counsel to a
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defendant in a criminal proceeding.” Polk Cnty. v. Dodson, 454 U.S. 312, 325,
102 S. Ct. 445, 453, 70 L. Ed. 2d 509 (1981). A person acts under color of state law
when exercising power that is possessed by virtue of state law and made possible
only because the actor is clothed with the authority of state law. Id. at 317-18, 102
S.Ct. at 449. By contrast, representation of a client is an essentially private
function, for which state office and authority are not required; and that a public
defender is paid by the state rather than the indigent client has no bearing on the
lawyer’s duties and obligations. Id. at 318-19, 102 S.Ct. at 449-50.
In actions brought against a municipality under section 1983, the
municipality will be liable only for those acts for which it is actually responsible.
Grech v. Clayton Cnty., 335 F.3d 1326, 1329 (11th Cir. 2003). A plaintiff may
establish municipal liability by showing either that the municipality had an
officially promulgated policy of permitting the alleged constitutional violation or
that it had an unofficial custom or practice that was the moving force behind the
constitutional violation. Id. at 1329-30.
The Eleventh Amendment bars damages suits against a state in federal court
absent a waiver of immunity by the state or a valid congressional override.
Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 169, 105 S. Ct. 3099, 3107, 87 L. Ed. 2d 114
(1985). Congress has not abrogated the states’ sovereign immunity for purposes of
section 1983 suits for damages, and Florida has not waived its immunity with
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regard to such suits. Gamble v. Fla. Dep’t of Health & Rehab. Servs., 779 F.2d
1509, 1512, 1520 (11th Cir. 1986). The Eleventh Amendment bar also applies to
damages actions brought against state officials in their official capacities because a
judgment against the official in such a suit imposes liability on the entity that he
represents and is effectively a suit against the state itself. See Graham, 473 U.S. at
169, 105 S.Ct. at 3107. State officials may, however, be sued for damages in their
personal capacities. See id. at 165-66, 105 S.Ct. at 3105. In addition, a state
official may be sued in his official capacity when the suit alleges a constitutional
violation by the official, acting in his official capacity and seeks only prospective
injunctive relief. See Grizzle v. Kemp, 634 F.3d 1314, 1319 (11th Cir. 2011). A
state official is subject to suit in his official capacity when, by virtue of his office,
he is imbued with the responsibility to enforce the law at issue in the suit. Id.
Social Security benefits may not be paid to a person who “is confined in a
jail, prison, or other penal institution or correctional facility pursuant to his
conviction of a criminal offense.” 42 U.S.C. § 402(x)(1)(A)(i). We have said that
§ 402(x)(1) is constitutional and does not violate due process. Andujar v. Bowen,
802 F.2d 404, 405 (11th Cir. 1986). To show an equal protection violation, a
plaintiff must demonstrate that he was treated differently from similarly situated
persons and that any such disparate treatment was based on his membership in a
protected class. DeYoung v. Owens, 646 F.3d 1319, 1327-28 (11th Cir. 2011).
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We review the denial of a preliminary injunction for abuse of discretion,
reviewing the court’s factual findings for clear error and its legal conclusions de
novo. Scott v. Roberts, 612 F.3d 1279, 1289-90 (11th Cir. 2010). To receive
declaratory or injunctive relief, a plaintiff must establish a violation, a serious risk
of continuing irreparable injury if the relief is not granted, and the absence of an
adequate remedy at law. Bolin, 225 F.3d at 1242.
To establish constitutional standing, a plaintiff must show (1) a concrete and
particularized injury in fact that is actual or imminent; (2) that the injury is fairly
traceable to the challenged action of the defendant; and (3) that the injury is likely
to be redressed by a favorable decision. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S.
555, 560-61, 112 S. Ct. 2130, 2136, 119 L. Ed. 2d 351 (1992). Where the plaintiff
seeks injunctive relief, a showing of past injury will not suffice to establish
standing. See O’Shea v. Littleton, 414 U.S. 488, 495-96, 94 S. Ct. 669, 676, 38
L. Ed. 2d 674 (1974). Instead, the plaintiff must also show “a sufficient likelihood
that he will be affected by the allegedly unlawful conduct in the future.” Houston
v. Marod Supermarkets, Inc., 733 F.3d 1323, 1328-29 (11th Cir. 2013). In other
words, the plaintiff must demonstrate a real and immediate threat of future injury
that is not hypothetical or conjectural. Id. at 1329. Federal courts may not
entertain a claim for injunctive relief by a citizen who does no more than assert that
certain law enforcement practices are unconstitutional. City of L.A. v. Lyons, 461
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U.S. 95, 111, 103 S. Ct. 1660, 1670, 75 L. Ed. 2d 675 (1983). In Lyons, the Supreme
Court held that the plaintiff lacked standing to seek injunctive relief barring the use
of chokeholds by Los Angeles police officers based on his past subjection to such a
chokehold. Id. at 105-07, 103 S.Ct. at 1667-68. The Court decided that Lyons’s
past injury did not establish a real and immediate threat that he would again
encounter law enforcement officers who would unlawfully place him in a
chokehold absent resistance or provocation, and he failed to allege facts that would
otherwise demonstrate a realistic possibility that such an encounter would occur.
Id. at 105-06, 103 S.Ct. at 1667. We are guided in our decision here by Lyons.
Every federal court judgment, subject to certain exceptions, must be set out
in a separate document. Fed.R.Civ.P. 58(a). The notice of appeal in a civil case
must be filed within 30 days after the entry of the judgment appealed from.
Fed.R.App.P. 4(a)(1)(A). The time to file a notice of appeal does not begin to run
until a separate judgment is entered pursuant to Rule 58. Reynolds v. Golden
Corral Corp., 213 F.3d 1344, 1346 (11th Cir. 2000). Where Rule 58(a) requires a
judgment to be entered in a separate document and no such document is entered,
the judgment is considered entered for purposes of Rule 4 when 150 days have run
from the entry of the underlying order. See Fed.R.App.P. 4(a)(7)(A)(ii);
Fed.R.Civ.P. 58(c)(2)(B).
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As a preliminary matter, we have jurisdiction to consider Wusiya’s appeal of
the district court’s order dismissing his second amended complaint, despite that his
notice of appeal was filed more than 30 days after the entry of that order: final
judgment was not entered in a separate document, as required by Rule 58(a).
Wusiya therefore had 180 days from the date of district court’s order to file his
notice of appeal, and he filed a notice of appeal within that time.
When we consider the merits, the district court did not err in dismissing
Wusiya’s second amended complaint. First, the district court correctly concluded
that Wusiya lacked standing to seek injunctive relief against any defendant for his
race-discrimination claims: he alleged no facts showing a real and immediate
threat of future harm. Wusiya’s request for a preliminary injunction ordering the
County to provide his correct conviction date to the Social Security Administration
was also properly denied: Wusiya did not demonstrate that he lacked an adequate
remedy at law for the allegedly unlawful deprivation of his Social Security benefits
during his term of incarceration.
Second, the district court correctly concluded that State Attorney Rundle and
Florida Judges Soto and Shepherd were immune from suit for damages: Wusiya’s
claims against them arose from acts taken in their official capacities, for which
they enjoyed absolute immunity.
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Third, the district court also correctly concluded that Wusiya failed to state a
claim against Public Defender Martinez: in representing Wusiya, the Public
Defender’s office was not acting under color of state law for purposes of
secion 1983.
Fourth, the district court properly dismissed Wusiya’s claims against
Governor Scott. Wusiya’s claim for damages against Governor Scott in his official
capacity was effectively a claim for damages against the State of Florida and was,
therefore, barred by the Eleventh Amendment. Wusiya did not allege facts
showing a causal connection between Governor Scott’s acts and the constitutional
deprivations that Wusiya alleged and, therefore, failed to state a claim against
Governor Scott in his personal capacity.
Fifth, the district court did not err in dismissing Wusiya’s claims against
Miami-Dade County Mayor Gimenez: Wusiya did not allege facts showing that the
constitutional deprivations he allegedly suffered at the hands of Miami-Dade
County were caused by an official policy or unofficial custom of the County.
Wusiya did not allege facts showing a causal connection between Mayor
Gimenez’s acts and the constitutional deprivations that Wusiya alleged and,
therefore, failed to state a claim against Mayor Gimenez in his personal capacity.
Furthermore, Wusiya’s due process challenge to 42 U.S.C. § 402(x)(1) was
foreclosed by our binding precedent, and his equal protection challenge lacked
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merit because he did not demonstrate that he was treated differently than other
similarly situated persons or that such disparate treatment was based on his
membership in a protected class.
Sixth, the district court properly dismissed Wusiya’s claims against the City
because Wusiya did not allege facts showing that the City had adopted an official
or unofficial policy of racial discrimination; so, he failed to state a claim against
the City under section 1983 for the allegedly unlawful conduct of an officer who
arrested Wusiya in 2008.
Wusiya is not entitled to relief based on his argument that the district court
breached its “commitment” to reschedule the trial date in his case when it
dismissed his second amended complaint, as Wusiya simply misunderstands the
obligations of the district court with regard to scheduling.
II
We review for an abuse of discretion the denial of a motion for
reconsideration. Richardson v. Johnson, 598 F.3d 734, 740 (11th Cir. 2010). A
motion for reconsideration may not be used to relitigate old matters or raise
arguments or present evidence that could earlier have been raised. Id. Under
Fed.R.Civ.P. 59(e), a party may move to alter or amend a judgment within 28 days
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after the entry of judgment. Fed.R.Civ.P. 59(e). Rule 60(b) allows a party to seek
relief from a judgment on a number of grounds, including excusable neglect and
“any other reason that justifies relief.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 60(b)(1), (6). A Rule 60(b)
motion must be made “within a reasonable time” and, if based on excusable
neglect, no more than one year after the entry of judgment. Fed.R.Civ.P. 60(c)(1).
In classifying a post-judgment motion as either a Rule 59(e) motion or a Rule
60(b) motion, the party’s label is not controlling; and a motion that seeks
reconsideration of the merits of the dispute rather than collateral matters will
typically be considered a Rule 59(e) motion. Finch v. City of Vernon, 845 F.2d
256, 258 (11th Cir. 1988). A Rule 59 motion may be granted only on the basis of
newly discovered evidence or a manifest error of law or fact. Arthur v. King, 500
F.3d 1335, 1343 (11th Cir. 2007).
Here, the district court did not err in denying Wusiya’s motion for
reconsideration. Although Wusiya labeled his motion as a Rule 60(b) motion, it is
more appropriately characterized as a motion to alter or amend the judgment under
Rule 59(e): it chiefly sought reconsideration of the merits of the district court’s
order dismissing his second amended complaint. Wusiya’s motion simply
reiterated arguments he already had made, did not demonstrate manifest error of
law or fact, and did not rely on newly discovered evidence. Wusiya therefore did
not present grounds that warranted reconsideration, and the district court did not
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abuse its discretion in denying relief. Wusiya’s assertion that the denial of his
motion violated his right to equal protection lacks merit: he did not demonstrate
that he was treated differently from other similarly situated persons or that any
such disparate treatment was based on his membership in a protected class.
Given the briefs and the record, we see no reversible error.
AFFIRMED.
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