United States v. Joseph-Michael Elias McFarland

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[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
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No. 17-10793
Non-Argument Calendar
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D.C. Docket No. 4:15-cr-00043-MW-CAS-1
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
versus
JOSEPH-MICHAEL ELIAS MCFARLAND,
Defendant-Appellant.
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Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Florida
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(December 26, 2017)
Before MARTIN, JULIE CARNES, and ANDERSON, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
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Defendant pled guilty to one count of sex trafficking of a minor, in violation
of 18 U.S.C. § 1591(a)(1), (b)(2), and two counts of distributing
α-Pyrrolidinovalerophenone (“Alpha-PVP”), in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1),
(b)(1)(C). The district court sentenced him to 132 months’ imprisonment.
Defendant now argues that the district court abused its discretion by denying his
motion to withdraw his guilty plea. He also challenges the substantive
reasonableness of his sentence. After careful review, we affirm.
I. BACKGROUND
A. Facts1
In late summer 2015, a confidential informant arranged a meeting with
Defendant to purchase a controlled substance known as “molly.” Before the
scheduled meeting, Defendant informed the confidential informant that in addition
to selling drugs, he also arranged the prostitution of a female, later determined to
be J.W. On September 1, 2015, Defendant was in the back seat of his brother’s car
with J.W. during a traffic stop and the officer conducting the stop told Defendant
to be careful associating with J.W. because she was only 16 years old.
1
These facts are taken from the undisputed facts in the Presentence Investigation Report
(“PSR”). See United States v. Wade, 458 F.3d 1273, 1277 (11th Cir. 2006) (explaining that un-
objected to facts in the PSR are deemed admitted for sentencing purposes). But regardless,
although Defendant raised various objections to the some of the facts presented in the PSR, he
does not challenge the district court’s rulings as to those objections on appeal. See United States
v. Jernigan, 341 F.3d 1273, 1283 n.8 (11th Cir. 2003) (stating that arguments not raised on
appeal are abandoned).
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The next day, Defendant met with the confidential informant and sold him .5
grams of Alpha-PVP, not Molly. Defendant also introduced the informant to J.W.
Defendant later sent text messages, along with photographs of J.W., to the
confidential informant and asked him whether he could find clients for the
prostitution of J.W.
On September 3, 2015, the confidential informant again met with Defendant
and purchased .6 grams of Alpha-PVP. Defendant and the informant
communicated through text messages later that day regarding the prostitution of
J.W., and in a recorded phone call, Defendant and the informant arranged a
weekend deal for J.W. with one of the informant’s purported clients. Defendant
was arrested later that day. A subsequent search of his cell phone revealed, among
other things, two videos of Defendant holding a black revolver.
B. Procedural History
A federal grand jury subsequently charged Defendant with (1) one count of
sex trafficking of a minor, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1591(a)(1), (b)(2) (“Count
1”); (2) two counts of distributing Alpha-PVP, in violation of 21 U.S.C.
§ 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(C) (“Counts 2 and 3”); and (3) one count of possessing a
firearm in furtherance of a drug trafficking crime, in violation of 18 U.S.C.
§ 924(c)(1)(A)(i) (“Count 4”).
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Defendant initially pled not guilty and proceeded to trial. However, after
selection of the jury, Defendant entered a plea agreement in which he agreed to
plead guilty to Counts 1 through 3. In return, the Government agreed to dismiss
Count 4.
At the change of plea hearing, Defendant acknowledged that he had
reviewed the plea agreement with his attorney, and that he was pleading guilty of
his own free will and was not coerced or threatened. He also acknowledged that he
understood the charges against him and that he faced a ten-year mandatory
minimum sentence as to Count 1. Defendant stated that he was satisfied with his
attorney’s representation of him. After confirming that Defendant did not have any
questions and that there was nothing else of which the court should be aware, the
district court found that Defendant was “alert” and “intelligent,” understood the
nature of the charges, and understood the consequences of pleading guilty, in
particular the ten-year mandatory minimum sentence as to Count 1.
Consequently, the district court accepted Defendant’s guilty plea.
Nearly four months later and prior to sentencing, Defendant filed a pro se
motion to withdraw his guilty plea. He argued that his attorney, Lucas Taylor, was
ineffective because he had withheld favorable evidence from him. 2 Based on this
2
Defendant was referring to emails that his sister received from the alleged victim, purportedly
stating that Defendant did not commit the offense of sex trafficking of a minor. At the plea-
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motion, Taylor moved to withdraw as Defendant’s counsel. The district court
granted Taylor’s motion and appointed new counsel to Defendant, who
subsequently filed a motion to withdraw Defendant’s guilty plea. In this motion,
Defendant asserted that he had shown a fair and just reason for withdrawal of his
plea because Taylor had withheld potential exculpatory evidence and had failed to
attend his presentence investigation interview.
At a subsequent hearing on the motion, Defendant raised for the first time
that he wanted to withdraw his guilty plea because he did not understand what the
term “mandatory minimum” meant and because Taylor pressured him into
pleading guilty by lying to him about what his parents wanted him to do.
Defendant testified that although Taylor had told him that ten years was the least
amount of time he could be sentenced to, he did not explain that Defendant would
be required to serve the entire ten years. Defendant thought that with gain time he
would only have to serve approximately 7.5 years. Taylor also told him that his
parents said he should go ahead and plead guilty. He explained that this factored
heavily into his decision to plead guilty.
Taylor testified that he informed Defendant about the range of penalties,
particularly the mandatory minimum, and that he never told Defendant he could
withdrawal hearing, Taylor testified that he advised Defendant early on that the emails from the
victim would likely not be admissible at trial.
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end up serving less than the full ten years. He also stated that Defendant initially
wanted to go to trial but later expressed interest in a guilty plea without the gun
charge. After securing the plea deal with the Government, Taylor spoke to
Defendant “at great length” about the proffered deal. Defendant’s parents told
Taylor that the decision about pleading guilty was up to Defendant and that they
wanted Defendant to listen to Taylor’s advice. Taylor communicated this to
Defendant, telling him that his parents were leaving the decision up to him and that
he should consider Taylor’s advice. The district court ultimately denied
Defendant’s motion to withdraw his plea, concluding that he had close assistance
of counsel, that his testimony during the plea hearing was truthful, and that his plea
was knowing and voluntary.
In preparation for sentencing, the probation officer prepared the Presentence
Investigation Report (“PSR”). As to the sex-trafficking offense, the PSR assigned
Defendant a base offense level of 30 pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 2G1.3(a)(2). He
received a two-level enhancement under § 2G1.3(b)(3)(B) because the offense
involved the use of a smart phone to facilitate the prostitution of a minor. He also
received a two-level obstruction-of-justice enhancement under U.S.S.G. § 3C1.1
because he denied material facts relating to the offense during the presentence
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interview, resulting in an adjusted offense level of 34.3 Because he did not receive
a reduction for acceptance of responsibility, his total offense level was 34. Based
on a total offense level of 34 and a criminal history category of I, Defendant’s
guideline range was 151 to 188 months’ imprisonment. The PSR also noted that
Count 1 carried a statutory minimum of ten years’ imprisonment.
At the sentencing hearing, the district court calculated a guideline range of
151 to 188 months’ imprisonment based on a total offense level of 34 and a
criminal history category of I. Defendant requested a downward variance to the
mandatory minimum of 120 months’ imprisonment. After considering the 18
U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors, the district court sentenced Defendant to 132 months’
imprisonment. This appeal followed.
II. DISCUSSION
A. Denial of Motion to Withdraw Guilty Plea
We review the district court’s denial of a motion to withdraw a guilty plea
for abuse of discretion and will reverse only if the denial was “arbitrary or
unreasonable.” United States v. Brehm, 442 F.3d 1291, 1298 (11th Cir. 2006)
(quotations omitted). A criminal defendant may withdraw a guilty plea prior to
3
Pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 3D1.4, the probation officer grouped Count 1 and Counts 2 and 3
separately. As to the drug offenses, the PSR assigned Defendant a base offense level of 6 under
U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(c)(17). With a 2-level enhancement under § 2D1.1(b)(1) because a firearm
was possessed during the offense, and a 2-level enhancement for obstruction of justice, the
adjusted offense level was 8. Because Count 1 (sex trafficking offense) resulted in a greater
adjusted offense level than Counts 2 and 3, the probation officer calculated a combined adjusted
offense level of 34.
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sentencing if “the defendant can show a fair and just reason for requesting the
withdrawal.” Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(d)(2)(B). The defendant bears a heavy burden to
show that his guilty plea should be withdrawn. United States v. Buckles, 843 F.2d
469, 471–72 (11th Cir. 1988).
To determine whether a defendant has shown a fair and just reason for
withdrawing the plea, a court may consider the “totality of the circumstances
surrounding the plea,” including “(1) whether close assistance of counsel was
available; (2) whether the plea was knowing and voluntary; (3) whether judicial
resources would be conserved; and (4) whether the government would be
prejudiced if the defendant were allowed to withdraw his plea.” Brehm, 442 F.3d
at 1298 (quoting Buckles, 843 F.2d at 472). If a defendant cannot satisfy the first
two factors, the district court need not give “considerable weight” or “particular
attention” to the remaining factors. See United States v. Gonzalez-Mercado, 808
F.2d 796, 801 (11th Cir. 1987). The timing of the motion to withdraw is relevant
because “[a] swift change of heart is itself strong indication that the plea was
entered in haste and confusion.” Id. (quotations omitted).
Here, the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Defendant’s
motion to withdraw his guilty plea because Defendant failed to show a fair and just
reason for withdrawal. As to close assistance of counsel, at the plea colloquy,
Defendant stated that he discussed the terms of the plea agreement with Taylor, he
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was satisfied with Taylor’s representation, and he understood the terms of the
agreement. See United States v. McCarty, 99 F.3d 383, 385 (11th Cir. 1996)
(concluding that defendant had close assistance of counsel where his attorney was
“available and utilized extensively”). There is a strong presumption that
statements made during the plea colloquy are true. United States v. Medlock, 12
F.3d 185, 187 (11th Cir. 1994). Given Defendant’s affirmative responses that he
received assistance from counsel and was satisfied with that assistance, the district
court did not abuse its discretion by concluding that Defendant had entered his
guilty plea with “close assistance of counsel.”
With respect to whether a plea was entered into knowingly and voluntarily,
the district court must address “three core concerns” under Federal Rule of
Criminal Procedure 11: “(1) the guilty plea must be free from coercion; (2) the
defendant must understand the nature of the charges; and (3) the defendant must
know and understand the consequences of his guilty plea.” United States v.
Hernandez-Fraire, 208 F.3d 945, 949 (11th Cir. 2000) (quotations omitted).
Here, the district court’s questioning of Defendant at the plea colloquy
satisfied these three core concerns. See Brehm, 442 F.3d at 1298 (“It does not
amount to abuse of discretion when a court has conducted extensive Rule 11
inquiries prior to accepting the guilty plea.”). Defendant testified at the plea
colloquy several times that no one, including Taylor, had threatened him or
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otherwise forced him to plead guilty. He acknowledged that he was pleading
guilty of his own free will. The district court reviewed the elements of the crime
with Defendant and ensured that he understood the nature of the charges against
him. The district court also confirmed that Defendant understood the rights he was
giving up and the consequences of pleading guilty, and in particular, the court
made sure that Defendant understood that Count 1 carried a mandatory minimum
sentence of ten years’ imprisonment.
Defendant asserts that his guilty plea was not knowing and voluntary due to
his counsel’s ineffectiveness. 4 We have explained that a guilty plea is not knowing
and voluntary if the defendant did not receive “reasonably effective assistance of
counsel in connection with [his] decision to plead guilty.” McCoy v. Wainwright,
804 F.2d 1196, 1198 (11th Cir. 1986). To show ineffective assistance of counsel,
the defendant must (1) show deficient performance and (2) prejudice. Strickland v.
Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984). To establish prejudice in the context of a
challenged guilty plea, a defendant must show that, but for his counsel’s errors, he
4
As the Government correctly points out, although Defendant raised the substance of his
argument below—that is, that his counsel failed to properly explain the ten-year mandatory
minimum and lied to him regarding what his parents said—this argument was not framed under
the Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984) standard governing ineffective assistance of
counsel claims. We do not typically review ineffective assistance claims on direct review unless
the record is sufficiently developed. United States v. Freixas, 332 F.3d 1314, 1316 (11th Cir.
2003). However, because the district court heard testimony from Defendant and Taylor on these
issues at the plea-withdrawal hearing and the Government addresses Defendant’s ineffective
assistance of counsel argument on appeal, we conclude that the record is sufficiently developed
for our review. Further, the claim falls within the broader analysis of whether Defendant
provided a fair and just reason for withdrawal of his guilty plea.
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would not have pleaded guilty and would have insisted on going to trial. Hill v.
Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 58–59 (1985).
Defendant first argues that Taylor coerced him into pleading guilty by lying
to him and telling him that his parents said he should go ahead and plead guilty.
The district court, however, did not find Defendant’s allegation to be credible. At
the plea-withdrawal hearing, Taylor testified that he told Defendant that his parents
said the decision was up to Defendant and that they wanted Defendant to follow
Taylor’s advice. The district court found Taylor’s testimony credible. We defer to
this credibility determination unless it is “so inconsistent or improbable on its face
that no reasonable factfinder could accept it.” United States v. Ramirez-Chilel, 289
F.3d 744, 749 (11th Cir. 2002) (quotations omitted). Defendant has not
demonstrated any reason why we should not defer to that determination. In fact,
Defendant’s failure to mention Taylor’s alleged coercion in his pro se motion to
withdraw his plea, or even in his later motion to withdraw his guilty plea that was
filed by his new counsel, supports the district court’s decision to credit Taylor’s
testimony over Defendant’s.
Defendant also argues that he did not understand the consequences of
pleading guilty because Taylor failed to explain that the ten-year mandatory
minimum sentence meant that he would serve every single day in jail. The district
court, however, found credible Taylor’s testimony at the plea-withdrawal hearing
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that he had explained the mandatory minimum sentence to Defendant and never
told Defendant that he could serve less than ten years if he pled guilty to Count 1.
Defendant again has not provided any reason why we should not defer to that
determination. See United States v. Rodriguez, 398 F.3d 1291, 1296 (11th Cir.
2005) (“Where the fact[-]finding resolves a swearing match of witnesses, the
resolution will almost never be clear error.”). But regardless, Defendant cannot
show that he would not have pled guilty and would have insisted on going to trial
but for counsel’s alleged error because the district court explained the mandatory
minimum sentence at the plea colloquy. In fact, the district court explicitly stated
that if Defendant pled guilty to Count 1, he would not get “one day less” than ten
years unless he received a substantial assistance motion. The district court
repeatedly confirmed that Defendant understood the ten-year mandatory minimum
sentence. See Blackledge v. Allison, 431 U.S. 63, 74 (1977) (“Solemn declarations
in open court carry a strong presumption of verity.”); Cf. Barker v. United States, 7
F.3d 629, 633 (7th Cir. 1993) (concluding that defendant failed to show prejudice
because any misinformation from counsel regarding plea consequences was
“cured” by district court’s colloquy).
The timing of Defendant’s motion to withdraw his guilty plea is also
relevant, as he filed the motion nearly four months after entering his guilty plea
and after having received the Presentence Investigation Report. See Buckles, 843
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F.2d at 473 (“The longer the delay between the entry of the plea and the motion to
withdraw it, the more substantial the reasons must be as to why the defendant seeks
[to] withdrawal.”). For all of the above reasons, we agree with the district court’s
conclusion that Defendant’s plea was knowing and voluntary.
Because Defendant received close assistance of counsel and entered his plea
knowingly and voluntarily, we need not give “considerable weight” to the final two
factors, i.e., conservation of judicial resources and prejudice to the Government.
See Gonzalez-Mercado, 808 F.2d at 801 (explaining that we need not analyzing the
two remaining factors based on determination that defendant failed to satisfy the
first two factors). Even so, it is worth noting that judicial resources were already
expended given that Defendant did not plead guilty until after the jury had already
been selected. In short, Defendant has failed to show that the district court abused
its discretion by denying his motion to withdraw his plea.
B. Substantive Reasonableness of Sentence
Using a two-step process, we review the reasonableness of a district court’s
sentence for abuse of discretion. United States v. Cubero, 754 F.3d 888, 892 (11th
Cir. 2014). We first look to whether the district court committed any procedural
error, and then we examine whether the sentence is substantively reasonable in
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light of the totality of the circumstances and the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors. 5 Id.
“A district court abuses its discretion when it (1) fails to afford consideration to
relevant factors that were due significant weight, (2) gives significant weight to an
improper or irrelevant factor, or (3) commits a clear error of judgment in
considering the proper factors.” United States v. Irey, 612 F.3d 1160, 1189 (11th
Cir. 2010) (en banc) (quotations omitted). The party challenging the sentence
bears the burden of showing that it is unreasonable. United States v. Pugh, 515
F.3d 1179, 1189 (11th Cir. 2008).
Defendant has not shown that his sentence is substantively unreasonable.
The district court imposed a 132-month sentence, which reflected a 19-month
downward variance from the guideline range of 151 to 188 months’ imprisonment.
Because we generally expect a sentence imposed within the guideline range to be
reasonable, one would not typically expect a sentence below that range to
constitute an unreasonably high sentence. United States v. Hunt, 526 F.3d 739,
746 (11th Cir. 2008) (explaining that, although we do not presume that a sentence
within the guideline range is reasonable, we typically expect it to be reasonable).
5
The § 3553(a) factors include: (1) the nature and circumstances of the offense and the history
and characteristics of the defendant; (2) the need to reflect the seriousness of the offense, to
promote respect for the law, and to provide just punishment for the offense; (3) the need for
deterrence; (4) the need to protect the public; (5) the need to provide the defendant with needed
education or vocational training or medical care; (6) the kinds of sentences available; (7) the
Sentencing Guidelines range; (8) pertinent policy statements of the Sentencing Commission;
(9) the need to avoid unwarranted sentencing disparities; and (10) the need to provide restitution
to victims. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a).
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Further, Defendant’s sentence is well below the statutory maximum sentence of
life imprisonment on Count 1. See United States v. Gonzalez, 550 F.3d 1319, 1324
(11th Cir. 2008) (suggesting that a sentence well below the statutory maximum is
an indicator of reasonableness).
In imposing Defendant’s sentence, the district court explicitly considered the
mitigating and aggravating circumstances. The court acknowledged that
Defendant’s sex trafficking offense was not the most serious among the spectrum
of sex trafficking cases and noted that Defendant’s lack of criminal history was a
relevant factor. Despite these mitigating circumstances, the district court
determined that a sentence above the ten-year mandatory minimum was
appropriate because Defendant obstructed justice and was “selling drugs [and]
running around with guns” without regard for his safety or those around him. That
the district court may have placed more weight on these aggravating factors was
entirely within its discretion. See United States v. Clay, 483 F.3d 739, 743 (11th
Cir. 2007) (“The weight to be accorded any given § 3553(a) factor is a matter
committed to the sound discretion of the district court.” (quotations omitted)).
We are not persuaded by Defendant’s argument that his obstruction of
justice was a result of his counsel’s failure to attend the presentence investigation
interview. The PSR applied the enhancement because, during his interview,
Defendant denied facts material to the guilty plea, including his involvement in the
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prostitution of a minor. Yet, at the sentencing hearing, when he was represented
by new counsel, Defendant continued to deny any involvement. In other words,
the presence of counsel, or lack thereof, seems to have had no impact on
Defendant’s insistence that he had no involvement in prostitution.
In short, Defendant has not met his burden of showing that “the district court
committed a clear error of judgment in weighing the § 3553(a) factors by arriving
at a sentence that lies outside the range of reasonable sentences dictated by the
facts of the case.” Irey, 612 F.3d at 1190 (quotation omitted).
AFFIRMED.
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