Kyle Michael Brewer v. United States

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[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
________________________
No. 13-15198
Non-Argument Calendar
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D.C. Docket Nos. 6:00-cv-00140-BAE-GRS,
6:96-cr-00004-BAE-2
KYLE MICHAEL BREWER,
Petitioner-Appellant,
versus
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Respondent-Appellee.
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Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Georgia
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(June 9, 2015)
Before HULL, ROSENBAUM, and ANDERSON, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Kyle Michael Brewer, a federal prisoner, appeals the district court’s entry,
following our prior remand, of an amended anti-filing injunction upon denying his
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fourth Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b) motion in his 28 U.S.C. § 2255
proceedings. That revised injunction provided that Brewer (1) could not appeal
any judgment or bring any civil action in forma pauperis (“IFP”) unless he was in
imminent danger of serious physical injury, (2) could not file further motions in his
§ 2255 case, (3) could not litigate any claim arising from the facts underlying that
suit, and (4) needed to seek leave of court before filing pleadings. On appeal,
Brewer argues that the district court abused its discretion in imposing the amended
anti-filing injunction because its four terms were “inappropriately overbroad” and
violated his constitutional right of access to the courts for matters unrelated to any
abusive or repetitive filings he may have submitted in his § 2255 proceedings. He
asserts that broad restrictions on his ability to file other pleadings IFP, without first
demonstrating he is in imminent physical danger or obtaining leave of court, is not
properly tailored and is unduly punitive.
We review an anti-filing injunction for abuse of discretion. Miller v.
Donald, 541 F.3d 1091, 1095-96 (11th Cir. 2008). District courts have
considerable discretion when designing an anti-filing injunction. Procup v.
Strickland, 792 F.2d 1069, 1074 (11th Cir. 1986) (en banc). However, a court
abuses its discretion when “it applies an incorrect legal standard, follows improper
procedures in making the determination, or makes findings of fact that are clearly
erroneous.” Sacred Heart Health Sys., Inc. v. Humana Military Healthcare Servs.,
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Inc., 601 F.3d 1159, 1169 (11th Cir. 2010). A court may also abuse its discretion
if it applies the law in an incorrect or unreasonable manner. Id. Further, “an abuse
of discretion occurs if the district court imposes some harm, disadvantage, or
restriction upon someone that is unnecessarily broad or does not result in any
offsetting gain to anyone else or society at large.” Id.
“[P]risoners have a constitutional right of access to the courts.” Bounds v.
Smith, 430 U.S. 817, 821, 97 S. Ct. 1491, 1494, 52 L. Ed. 2d 72 (1977). That right,
however, “is neither absolute nor unconditional.” Miller, 541 F.3d at 1096.
“Federal courts have both the inherent power and the constitutional obligation to
protect their jurisdiction from conduct which impairs their ability to carry out
Article III functions.” Procup, 792 F.2d at 1073. “The court has a responsibility to
prevent single litigants from unnecessarily encroaching on the judicial machinery
needed by others.” Id. at 1074. To counter this threat, courts are authorized to
restrict access to vexatious and abusive litigants. Miller, 541 F.3d at 1096. While
a court may severely restrict a litigant’s filings, it cannot completely foreclose a
litigant from any access to the courts. Procup, 792 F.2d at 1074. When devising
methods to curtail the activity of particularly abusive prisoners, however, “courts
must carefully observe the fine line between legitimate restraints and an
impermissible restriction on a prisoner’s constitutional right of access to the
courts.” Id. at 1072. An injunction is impermissible when it goes beyond what is
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sufficient to protect the court from a prisoner’s repetitive filings and, considering
its exceptions, fails to provide meaningful access to the courts. See Miller, 541
F.3d at 1098 (vacating an injunction that “[went] beyond what [was] sufficient to
protect the . . . court’s jurisdiction from [the prisoner’s] repetitive filings related to
the conditions of his confinement, and fail[ed] to uphold [the prisoner’s] right of
access to the courts,” and concluding that “[t]he . . . limited exceptions in the
injunction, taken together, do not provide [the prisoner] with meaningful access.”).
Among the reasonable measures that a court may employ to curtail repetitive
and vexatious litigation are the following: (1) “enjoin[ing] prisoner litigants from
relitigating specific claims or claims arising from the same set of factual
circumstances”; (2) “requir[ing] litigants to accompany all future pleadings with
affidavits certifying that the claims being raised are novel, subject to contempt for
false swearing”; (3) “direct[ing] the litigant to attach to future complaints a list of
all cases previously filed involving the same, similar, or related cause of action,
and to send an extra copy of each pleading filed to the law clerk of the chief judge
of the district”; (4) “direct[ing] the litigant to seek leave of court before filing
pleadings in any new or pending lawsuit”; and (5) “permitt[ing] abusive prisoner
litigants to file in forma pauperis only claims alleging actual or threatened physical
harm; and requiring payment of a filing fee to bring other claims.” Procup, 792
F.2d at 1072. To the indigent, however, “a filing fee is a blunt instrument that
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cannot discriminate between valid and bogus claims,” and a blanket injunction
prohibiting all IFP filings by a given person is overinclusive. Miller, 541 F.3d
at 1096.
In Procup, we concluded that a prisoner engaged in “ridiculously extensive
litigation” by filing 176 cases, most of which were pro se IFP civil rights actions
brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Procup, 792 F.2d at 1070. The district court
enjoined the prisoner from filing any case with the court unless submitted by an
attorney. Id. We held that the injunction was overbroad because the requirement
that he file suits only through counsel could have foreclosed him from filing any
suits at all, because private attorneys might be unwilling to sift through Procup’s
lengthy and generally frivolous claims to discern one that might have some merit.
Id. at 1071.
In Miller, the district court enjoined a prisoner who had filed at least
30 cases against, for the most part, prison officials from “submitting further filings
with the court, except in limited circumstances, without paying the unpaid filing
fees he has accrued.” Miller, 541 F.3d at 1094. The exceptions to this injunction
were that the prisoner could file: “(1) papers in a criminal proceedings brought
against him by the state, (2) a timely motion for reconsideration of the filing bar as
applied, and (3) a pleading or paper demonstrating that he has been denied access
to state court and has no recourse except to repair to the district court.” Id. at 1095.
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We noted that there was no exception for a complaint alleging that the prisoner
was in immediate danger of serious physical injury. Id. We concluded that this
injunction was impermissibly overbroad because “a narrower injunction could
target [the prisoner’s] filings arising from the facts or transaction already raised
and litigated in other cases.” Id. at 1098.
In Cofield v. Alabama Public Service Commission, 936 F.2d 512, 513-14
(11th Cir. 1991), we considered an order requiring an “overly litigious” prisoner,
who had brought 105 suits against various prison officials, as well as McDonald’s,
Burger King, and Coca-Cola, “to pay full filing fees and seek pre-filing approval of
any complaints or papers.” We held that requiring pre-filing screening of claims
allowed for sufficient access to the courts, but, that, by prospectively denying IFP
status for all claims, the court “could be prospectively shutting the courthouse
door.” Id. at 518.
Section 1915(g) of Title 28 of the U.S. Code, part of the Prison Litigation
Reform Act (“PLRA”), provides that:
In no event shall a prisoner bring a civil action or appeal a judgment
in a civil action or proceeding under this section if the prisoner has, on
3 or more prior occasions, while incarcerated or detained in any
facility, brought an action or appeal in a court of the United States that
was dismissed on the grounds that it is frivolous, malicious, or fails to
state a claim upon which relief may be granted, unless the prisoner is
under imminent danger of serious physical injury.
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28 U.S.C. § 1915(g). Congress, however, “promulgated the PLRA to curtail
prisoner tort, civil rights and conditions litigation, not the filing of habeas corpus
petitions.” Anderson v. Singletary, 111 F.3d 801, 805 (11th Cir. 1997). There is
no indication that Brewer has filed such actions.
Here, the district court abused its discretion in imposing the amended
anti-filing injunction because the injunction, as crafted, was unnecessarily broad
and went beyond what was sufficient to protect the court from Brewer’s repetitive
filings related to his § 2255 proceedings. The injunction also functioned as an
impermissible restriction on Brewer’s constitutional right of access to the courts,
for example, because it could prevent him from seeking future legitimate post-
conviction relief or relief pursuant to a retroactive change to sentencing laws or
guidelines.
“We do not here design the kind of inju[n]ction that would be appropriate in
this case.” Procup, 792 F.2d at 1074. As stated above, “[c]onsiderable discretion
necessarily is reposed in the district court.” Id. “The injunction is vacated and the
case is remanded for the district court to consider an appropriate substitute order.”
Id.
VACATED AND REMANDED.
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