United States v. Michael James Harrell

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[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
________________________
No. 13-12289
Non-Argument Calendar
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D.C. Docket No. 2:11-cr-00108-JES-SPC-1
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
versus
MICHAEL JAMES HARRELL,
MATTHEW ROLLINS,
a.k.a. Michael Rollins,
MAURICE ANDRE COLBERT,
Defendants-Appellants.
________________________
Appeals from the United States District Court
for the Middle District of Florida
________________________
(December 18, 2015)
Before MARCUS, MARTIN and ANDERSON, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Maurice Colbert, Matthew Rollins, and Michael Harrell appeal their
convictions for conspiracy to commit armed bank robbery, in violation of 18
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U.S.C. §§ 2113(a), (d), and 371; conspiracy to use and carry a firearm in
furtherance of a bank robbery, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 2113(a), (d), and
924(o); armed bank robbery, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2113(a) and (d); using,
carrying, and possessing a firearm in furtherance of a bank robbery, in violation of
18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A)(i), (ii) and (c)(1)(C)(i); and attempted bank robbery, in
violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2113(a). Colbert also appeals his 20-year prison sentence.
On appeal, Colbert argues that: (1) the district court erred by failing to suppress the
wiretap evidence; (2) 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1) violates his rights under the Equal
Protection Clause and the Eighth Amendment; (3) the district court erred by
sentencing him based on relevant conduct not charged or found by the jury; and (4)
his 20-year sentence is substantively unreasonable. Rollins argues that: (1) the
district court abused its discretion by denying his motion for severance; and (2) the
district court erred by admitting Victor Wilson’s testimony regarding Kevyn
Smiley’s statements. Lastly, Harrell argues that the district court abused its
discretion by denying his motion for a mistrial. After thorough review, we affirm.
We review a district court’s denial of a motion to suppress evidence as a
mixed question of law and fact. United States v. Lewis, 674 F.3d 1298, 1302 (11th
Cir. 2012). Rulings of law are reviewed de novo, while the district court’s findings
of fact are reviewed for clear error, in the light most favorable to the prevailing
party below. Id. at 1302-03. We review constitutional sentencing issues de novo.
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United States v. Steed, 548 F.3d 961, 978 (11th Cir. 2008). We also review the
district court’s application and interpretation of the Sentencing Guidelines de novo,
and review the district court’s factual findings for clear error. United States v.
Smith, 480 F.3d 1277, 1278 (11th Cir. 2007). We review the sentence a district
court imposes for “reasonableness,” which “merely asks whether the trial court
abused its discretion.” United States v. Pugh, 515 F.3d 1179, 1189 (11th Cir.
2008) (quoting Rita v. United States, 551 U.S. 338, 351 (2007)).
We review the district court’s denial of a motion to sever for abuse of
discretion. United States v. Walser, 3 F.3d 380, 385 (11th Cir. 1993). We will not
reverse the denial “absent a clear abuse of discretion resulting in compelling
prejudice against which the district court could offer no protection.” Id. We
likewise review the decision to admit co-conspirator statements for abuse of
discretion. United States v. Matthews, 431 F.3d 1296, 1308 (11th Cir. 2006). We
review the district court’s finding that a statement was made in furtherance of a
conspiracy for clear error. United States v. Miles, 290 F.3d 1341, 1351 (11th Cir.
2002). Finally, we review the denial of a motion for a mistrial for abuse of
discretion. United States v. Ettinger, 344 F.3d 1149, 1161 (11th Cir. 2003).
First, we disagree with Colbert that the district court erred by failing to
suppress the wiretap evidence. An application seeking to authorize a wiretap must:
include . . . a full and complete statement of the facts and circumstances
relied upon by the applicant, to justify his belief that an order should be
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issued . . . [and] a full and complete statement as to whether or not other
investigative procedures have been tried and failed or why they reasonably
appear to be unlikely to succeed if tried or to be too dangerous . . . .
18 U.S.C. § 2518(1)(b) and (c). “The necessity requirement is designed to ensure
that electronic surveillance is neither routinely employed nor used when less
intrusive techniques will succeed.” United States v. Van Horn, 789 F.2d 1492,
1496 (11th Cir. 1986). The affidavit must simply explain the retroactive or
prospective failure of several investigative techniques that reasonably suggest
themselves. United States v. De La Cruz Suarez, 601 F.3d 1202, 1214 (11th Cir.
2010). However, the government is not required to comprehensively exhaust all
possible investigative techniques before applying for a wiretap. Id. Wiretap
affidavits are evaluated in a “common sense fashion,” using “flexible standards.”
United States v. Hyde, 574 F.2d 856, 867 (5th Cir. 1978) (quotation omitted).1
The fact that alternative investigative measures were partially successful
does not necessarily render electronic surveillance unnecessary. United States v.
Perez, 661 F.3d 568, 582 (11th Cir. 2011). In Perez, an agent’s affidavit recounted
several ways that the government’s investigation had failed to reveal important
evidence, and we held that the government met the “necessity” requirement. Id.Here, the district court did not err in denying the motion to suppress the
wiretap evidence. The Special Agent’s affidavit detailed the alternative
1
In Bonner v. City of Prichard, 661 F.2d 1206, 1209 (11th Cir.1981) (en banc), we adopted as
binding precedent all Fifth Circuit decisions issued before October 1, 1981.
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investigative measures that had been tried, with limited success or value, and
explained why certain measures were not tried. The affidavit, therefore, explained
the retroactive or prospective failure of several investigative techniques, and
sufficiently satisfied the necessity requirement. Further, although some of the
alternative investigative measures were partially successful, that did not render
electronic surveillance unnecessary.
We also are unpersuaded by Colbert’s argument that Section 924(c)(1)
violates his constitutional rights. We’ve held that mandatory minimum sentencing
does not deprive a defendant of an individualized sentencing process in violation
of due process. United States v. Holmes, 838 F.2d 1175, 1177 (11th Cir. 1998).
As for Eighth Amendment challenges, mandatory minimum sentencing does not,
in and of itself, constitute cruel and unusual punishment. United States v. Willis,
956 F.2d 248, 251 (11th Cir. 1992). Thus, in a non-capital case, the mandatory
nature of the penalty is irrelevant for proportionality purposes, and the sentence is
evaluated as if it were imposed in the exercise of the sentencing court’s discretion.
United States v. Farley, 607 F.3d 1294, 1343 (11th Cir. 2010).
When mounting an Eighth Amendment challenge to a non-capital sentence,
the defendant must make a threshold showing that the sentence imposed is grossly
disproportionate to the offense committed. United States v. Raad, 406 F.3d 1322,
1324 n.4 (11th Cir. 2005). Generally, a sentence within the statutory limits is
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neither excessive nor cruel and unusual under the Eighth Amendment. United
States v. Johnson, 451 F.3d 1239, 1243 (11th Cir. 2006). We have never found a
term of imprisonment imposed on a competent adult to violate the Eighth
Amendment. See Farley, 607 F.3d at 1343. Rather, we have repeatedly upheld the
constitutionality of mandatory minimum sentences, up to and including, life
imprisonment. See, e.g., United States v. Lopez, 649 F.3d 1222, 1248 (11th Cir.
2011) (upholding mandatory life sentence without parole for defendant convicted
of cocaine conspiracy with two prior drug convictions).
Section 924(c)(1) is not unconstitutional. In Holmes, we expressly rejected
Colbert’s argument that the application of mandatory minimum sentencing violates
due process principles. Only the Supreme Court or our Court sitting en banc can
judicially override a prior panel decision, and neither has overruled Holmes.
Cargill v. Turpin, 120 F.3d 1366, 1386 (11th Cir. 1997). As for his Eighth
Amendment claim, Colbert has not met the requisite threshold showing that the
total sentence imposed was grossly disproportionate to his offenses. The district
court sentenced Colbert to a total of 20 years’ imprisonment, following his
convictions for one count of conspiracy to commit armed bank robbery, one count
of conspiracy to use, carry, or possess a firearm in furtherance of the conspiracy to
commit armed bank robbery, one count of armed bank robbery, one count of using,
carrying, or possessing a firearm in furtherance of bank robbery, and three counts
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of attempted bank robberies. Colbert could have been sentenced to life in prison,
and his 20-year sentence -- well within the statutory limits -- was not excessive nor
cruel and unusual under the Eighth Amendment.
Next, we are unconvinced by Colbert’s claim that the district court erred by
sentencing him based on relevant conduct not charged or found by the jury. The
Supreme Court has established that any fact that increases the penalty for a crime
is an “element” to be submitted to the jury and found beyond a reasonable doubt.
Alleyne v. United States, 570 U.S.__, 133 S. Ct. 2151, 2155 (2013). The Supreme
Court also held that mandatory minimum sentences increase the penalty for a
crime, so any fact that increases the mandatory minimum is an “element” to be
submitted to the jury. Id. But, since Alleyne, we’ve said that a district court may
continue to enhance a defendant’s sentence based upon judicial fact findings, so
long as its findings do not increase the statutory maximum or minimum sentence.
United States v. Charles, 757 F.3d 1222, 1225 (11th Cir. 2014). The sentencing
court must find that the relevant conduct was established by a preponderance of the
evidence. See United States v. Saavedra, 148 F.3d 1311, 1314 (11th Cir. 1998).
“Credibility determinations are typically the province of the fact finder
because the fact finder personally observes the testimony and is thus in a better
position than a reviewing court to assess the credibility of witnesses.” United
States v. Ramirez-Chilel, 289 F.3d 744, 749 (11th Cir. 2002). Therefore, we defer
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to the fact finder’s determinations, unless his understanding of the facts was
“unbelievable.” See id. (quotation omitted).
In this case, attributing the relevant conduct did not increase Colbert’s
statutory mandatory minimum sentence, and did not implicate Alleyne. Further,
the district court did not clearly err in finding that the relevant conduct concerning
a Wells Fargo robbery had been established by a preponderance of the evidence.
As the record reveals, the Wells Fargo robbery followed the robbery of which
Colbert was convicted, and preceded the three attempted robberies of which he was
also convicted. Further, the court found that the modus operandi was similar in all
robberies, and the physical evidence was compelling. Lastly, the court reasonably
credited one witness’s trial testimony over another witness’s testimony at
sentencing, and we will not disturb those credibility determinations.
Colbert has also failed to show that his sentence was substantively
unreasonable. In reviewing the “‘substantive reasonableness of [a] sentence
imposed under an abuse-of-discretion standard,’” we consider the “‘totality of the
circumstances.’” Pugh, 515 F.3d at 1190 (quoting Gall v. United States, 552 U.S.
38, 51 (2007)). The district court must impose a sentence “sufficient, but not
greater than necessary to comply with the purposes” listed in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a).2
2
The § 3553(a) factors include: (1) the nature and circumstances of the offense and the
history and characteristics of the defendant; (2) the need for the sentence imposed to reflect the
seriousness of the offense, to promote respect for the law, and to provide just punishment for the
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“[W]e will not second guess the weight (or lack thereof) that the [court] accorded
to a given [§ 3553(a)] factor ... as long as the sentence ultimately imposed is
reasonable in light of all the circumstances presented.” United States v. Snipes,
611 F.3d 855, 872 (11th Cir. 2010) (quotation, alteration and emphasis omitted).
We will vacate a sentence only if we “are left with the definite and firm conviction
that the district court committed a clear error of judgment in weighing the §
3553(a) factors by arriving at a sentence that lies outside the range of reasonable
sentences dictated by the facts of the case.” United States v. Irey, 612 F.3d 1160,
1190 (11th Cir. 2010) (en banc) (quotations omitted). The party challenging the
sentence bears the burden to show it is unreasonable. United States v. Tome, 611
F.3d 1371, 1378 (11th Cir. 2010).
The district court did not abuse its discretion in sentencing Colbert to 20
years’ imprisonment, instead of the 15-year sentence he requested. Although
Colbert had a minor criminal history, the offenses were serious charges with
threats to public safety. Further, even if Colbert was only 28 years old at the time
of his conviction, his sentence was not substantively unreasonable. Indeed, the
offense; (3) the need for the sentence imposed to afford adequate deterrence; (4) the need to
protect the public; (5) the need to provide the defendant with educational or vocational training
or medical care; (6) the kinds of sentences available; (7) the Sentencing Guidelines range; (8) the
pertinent policy statements of the Sentencing Commission; (9) the need to avoid unwanted
sentencing disparities; and (10) the need to provide restitution to victims. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a).
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court said it considered all of the § 3553 factors, and believed a 20-year sentence
was appropriate. Accordingly, we affirm Colbert’s convictions and sentences.
As for Rollins’s claim that the district court abused its discretion by denying
his motion for severance, we disagree. In determining the merits of a motion to
sever, the district court must balance the possibility of prejudice to the defendant
against the public interest in judicial efficiency and economy. United States v.
Eyster, 948 F.2d 1196, 1213 (11th Cir. 1991). However, severance will only be
granted if a defendant shows a joint trial would result in “specific and compelling
prejudice to the conduct of his defense.” Id. at 1213-14 (quotation omitted).
Severance is mandated by the district court where compelling evidence not
admissible against one or more codefendants will be introduced against another
codefendant. United States v. Blankenship, 382 F.3d 1110, 1123 (11th Cir. 2004).
However, the mere fact that there might be an “enormous disparity in the evidence
admissible against [one defendant] compared to the other defendants is not a
sufficient basis for reversal.” Id. (quotation omitted). In other words, a defendant
does not suffer the necessary compelling prejudice for severance simply because
much of the evidence presented at trial is only applicable to codefendants. Id.There is also a strong presumption that jurors can compartmentalize evidence by
respecting instructions specifying the defendants against whom the evidence may
be considered. Id. Severance must be granted only where the evidence is so
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convincing that a limiting instruction is unlikely to prevent the jury from
considering the evidence against all codefendants. Id. at 1224. Alternatively,
severance is appropriate when the sheer number of defendants and charges with
different standards of proof and culpability, and the massive volume of evidence,
makes it nearly impossible for a jury to juggle everything properly and assess the
guilt or innocence of each defendant independently. Id.Here, the district court did not abuse its discretion by denying Rollins a
severance. As the record shows, the court instructed the jury to consider the case
of each defendant separately, and there is a presumption that the jury followed
those instructions. Moreover, nothing suggests that it was impossible for the jury
to juggle the evidence in this case -- only three defendants were charged, each
charge had the same burden of proof, and the jury did not otherwise indicate it was
confused. Thus, Rollins did not suffer compelling prejudice merely because there
was evidence presented at trial only admissible against his codefendants.
We also reject Rollins’s argument that the district court erred by admitting
Victor Wilson’s testimony regarding co-conspirator Kevyn Smiley’s statements.
Hearsay is generally inadmissible. Fed. R. Evid. 802. But, an out-of-court
statement is not hearsay if it “is offered against an opposing party and … was made
by the party’s coconspirator during and in furtherance of the conspiracy.” Fed. R.
Evid. 801(d)(2)(E). Before a co-conspirator’s statement can be admitted, the
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government must prove that (1) a conspiracy existed, (2) the conspiracy included
the declarant and the defendant against whom the statement is offered, and (3) the
statement was made during the course of and in furtherance of the conspiracy.
United States v. Underwood, 446 F.3d 1340, 1345-46 (11th Cir. 2006).
We apply a liberal standard to determine whether a statement was made in
furtherance of a conspiracy. Miles, 290 F.3d at 1351. The statement does not need
to be necessary to the conspiracy, it just must further the interests of the conspiracy
in some way. Id. If a statement could have been intended to affect future dealings
between the parties, then the statement is in furtherance of the conspiracy. United
States v. Caraza, 843 F.2d 432, 436 (11th Cir. 1988).
In this case, the district court did not clearly err in admitting Wilson’s
testimony about what Smiley told him. As the record shows, Wilson had discussed
robbing a bank with Colbert, Smiley, and Harrell before he returned to jail,
including the fact that Wilson would steal a getaway vehicle, and Harrell would be
the getaway driver. While Wilson might have originally thought they were joking
about robbing banks, at the time he called Smiley, he knew it was not a joke.
Wilson told Smiley that he wanted a piece of the action, and they had previously
discussed bank robbery in detail, including who would play what role. After
Wilson got out of jail, he assisted in the conspiracy by stealing vehicles, and was
present during the casing of banks. Smiley’s statements explained to Wilson how
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the robbery depicted on television had gone, and could have been intended to
affect future dealings between them. On this record, it is clear that Wilson and
Smiley were co-conspirators, and that Smiley’s statements updated Wilson on the
conspiracy, and, thus, were in furtherance of the conspiracy.
Lastly, we find no merit to Harrell’s claim that the district court abused its
discretion by denying his motion for a mistrial. “The decision to grant a mistrial is
within the discretion of the trial judge since he is in the best position to evaluate
the prejudicial effect of a statement or evidence on the jury.” United States v.
Saget, 991 F.2d 702, 707-08 (11th Cir. 1993) (quotation omitted). A defendant is
entitled to a mistrial only if he shows substantial prejudice -- that is, that absent the
prejudice, the outcome of the trial would have been different. United States v.
Chavez, 584 F.3d 1354, 1362 (11th Cir. 2009). However, when a district court
gives a curative instruction, we will reverse the denial of a grant of mistral only if
the evidence was so highly prejudicial that it was incurable. United States v.
Newsome, 475 F.3d 1221, 1227 (11th Cir. 2007). Further, if the record contained
sufficient independent evidence of guilt, it was a harmless error. Id.In Bruton v. United States, a witness testified in a joint trial that a
codefendant had confessed that he and the petitioner had committed armed
robbery. 391 U.S. 123, 124 (1968). The district court instructed the jury that the
evidence of the confession was inadmissible hearsay against the petitioner. Id. at
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124-25. The Supreme Court later said that the introduction of the confession posed
a substantial threat to the petitioner’s constitutional right of confrontation. Id. at
137. It held that despite clear instructions for the jury to disregard the inadmissible
hearsay as to the petitioner, a limiting instruction in the context of a joint trial was
inadequate to substitute for the petitioner’s right of cross-examination. Id.Here, Harrell claims that the district court abused its discretion by denying
him a mistrial based on a gesture Collins made during trial. Specifically, one juror
wrote a note to the court reporting that “Defendant Colbert ran his finger across his
throat, and Mr. Wilson was looking at him when he did it.”’ Harrell argues that
because he was accused of a conspiracy with Colbert, the gesture was substantially
prejudicial to him. However, after receiving the note, the district court instructed
the jury to disregard what they had seen, if they had seen it, and that the court had
taken care of the matter. The court later instructed the jury that it could only
consider evidence when assessing guilt, which was testimony and exhibits. This
instruction was sufficiently curative, and Harrell does not cite any authority
demonstrating otherwise. Further, the jury is presumed to have followed the
court’s instructions, and Harrell has not offered any evidence to disprove that
presumption. Moreover, Colbert’s in-court gesture was not an incurable error,
since it was not an in-court confession directly implicating Harrell.
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Regardless, the error, if any, was harmless. Strong evidence of Harrell’s
guilt was introduced at trial, including that: Harrell was identified as the driver of a
vehicle near one of the robberies; Harrell had been in one of the robbed banks prior
to the robbery; and Harrell had previously been in one of the banks that was
attempted to be robbed. Phone conversations between the co-conspirators were
also presented. In addition, Wilson’s testimony, unrelated to Colbert’s gesture,
implicated Harrell. Therefore, there would not have been a different result absent
Colbert’s threatening gesture, and we affirm Harrell’s convictions.
AFFIRMED.
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