Rhonda Fleming v. Warden of FCI Tallahassee

Case: 15-11471 Date Filed: 11/18/2015 Page: 1 of 8
[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
________________________
No. 15-11471
Non-Argument Calendar
________________________
D.C. Docket No. 4:14-cv-00300-MW-CAS
RHONDA FLEMING,
Petitioner-Appellant,
versus
WARDEN OF FCI TALLAHASSEE,
Respondent-Appellee,
BALLENTYNE-DAVIS,
Unit Manager, et al.,
Respondents.
________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Florida
________________________
(November 18, 2015)
Before TJOFLAT, MARCUS and JILL PRYOR, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Case: 15-11471 Date Filed: 11/18/2015 Page: 2 of 8
Rhonda Fleming, a federal prisoner proceeding pro se, appeals the district
court’s dismissal of her habeas corpus petition, filed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241.
Fleming raised six grounds in her § 2241 petition: (1) that the prison was violating
her court-ordered restitution payment schedule by forcing her to pay a higher
amount each month; (2) that she was “factually innocent” of the charges against
her; (3) that she was “factually innocent” of the loss amount used to calculate her
total sentence; (4) that she was being held in the Special Housing Unit (“SHU”)
without a hearing; (5) that she was being denied access to the law library; and (6)
that prison officials had retaliated against her for filing grievances by placing her in
the SHU and monitoring her mail. The district court denied the petition in full. On
appeal, Fleming argues that: (1) the district court erred in dismissing Claims 1, 4,
5, and 6 for failure to exhaust administrative remedies; and (2) the district court
erred in dismissing Claims 2 and 3 on the ground that they should have been
brought in a motion under 28 U.S.C. § 2255. After careful review, we affirm.
We review de novo the district court’s denial of habeas relief under § 2241.
Bowers v. Keller, 651 F.3d 1277, 1291 (11th Cir. 2011). Jurisdictional issues are
also subject to de novo review. See Taylor v. United States, 396 F.3d 1322, 1327
(11th Cir. 2005) (reviewing de novo the dismissal of an alien’s habeas petition for
lack of jurisdiction). A district court’s denial of an evidentiary hearing is reviewed
for abuse of discretion. Breedlove v. Moore, 279 F.3d 952, 959 (11th Cir. 2002)
2
Case: 15-11471 Date Filed: 11/18/2015 Page: 3 of 8
(analyzing a claim that the district court abused its discretion in denying an
evidentiary hearing concerning a 28 U.S.C. § 2254 habeas corpus petition). The
abuse of discretion standard recognizes there is a range of choice for the district
court, and as long as its decision does not amount to a clear error of judgment, we
will not reverse even if we may have gone the other way. Drew v. Dep’t of Corr.,
297 F.3d 1278, 1293 n.7 (11th Cir. 2002), overruled on other grounds by Pace v.
DiGuglielmo, 544 U.S. 408, 417 (2005). While briefs by pro se parties are read
liberally, issues not briefed on appeal by pro se litigants are deemed abandoned.
Timson v. Sampson, 518 F.3d 870, 874 (11th Cir. 2008).
First, we are unpersuaded by Fleming’s claim that the district court erred by
dismissing several of her claims on exhaustion grounds. In the past, we’ve held
that failure to exhaust administrative remedies deprives a court of subject matter
jurisdiction over a § 2241 petition. See Santiago-Lugo v. Warden, 785 F.3d 467,
471 (11th Cir. 2015). Recently, however, we acknowledged that subsequent
Supreme Court decisions have undermined that holding to the point of abrogation,
and we concluded that a § 2241 petitioner’s failure to exhaust administrative
remedies is not a jurisdictional defect. Id. at 471-72, 474-75. We noted that §
2241’s exhaustion requirement was judicially imposed, not congressionally
mandated, and that nothing in the statute itself supported the conclusion that the
requirement was jurisdictional. Id. at 474. But we added that the exhaustion
3
Case: 15-11471 Date Filed: 11/18/2015 Page: 4 of 8
requirement was still a requirement and that courts cannot “disregard a failure to
exhaust . . . if the respondent properly asserts the defense.” Id. at 475.
In Cani v. United States, 331 F.3d 1210 (11th Cir. 2003), a federal prisoner
appealed the dismissal of a “Petition for Recalculation of Amount and Manner of
Payment of Restitution,” and argued that the district court erred in characterizing
his claim as a § 2255 motion. Id. at 1212. We said the district court erred insofar
as it concluded that the petition was not cognizable under 18 U.S.C. § 3664(k), but
we nevertheless affirmed since his claim was plainly unmeritorious. Id. at 1212-
13. In doing so, we noted that, as a technical matter, the district court had subject
matter jurisdiction and therefore should have denied the motion as opposed to
dismissing it. Id. at 1216. However, because Cani’s claims were not meritorious,
we determined that the distinction made “no significant difference,” and construed
the district court’s dismissal as a denial. Id.; see also 28 U.S.C. § 2106.
An evidentiary hearing is not required if the petitioner’s allegations or
claims are affirmatively contradicted by the record. Hernandez v. United States,
778 F.3d 1230, 1232 (11th Cir. 2015). Nor is an evidentiary hearing warranted
based on mere allegations, absent evidentiary support, especially when the
evidence presented undermines the petitioner’s claim. Drew, 297 F.3d at 1293 n.7.
Here, district court did not err in determining that Fleming had not exhausted
administrative remedies for her first, fourth, fifth, and sixth claims. As for Claim 1
4
Case: 15-11471 Date Filed: 11/18/2015 Page: 5 of 8
-- Fleming’s restitution claim -- the record showed that she had filed a grievance as
to the issue in 2010, but later withdrew the grievance and did not file any more.
Fleming claims that there was an informal favorable resolution, which exhausted
administrative remedies, but this argument falls short. First, she cites no binding
Circuit precedent for her position. Second, even if a favorable informal resolution
was sufficient to exhaust administrative remedies, this kind of response to her 2010
grievance did not do so, because the instant complaint arose out of a payment
contract that she entered in 2014.
As for Claims 4, 5, and 6, evidence showed that Fleming attempted to
bypass the institutional level for grievances in September 2014 by marking two
grievances “sensitive” and sending them to the regional level. However, her
grievances were not deemed “sensitive,” and Fleming was instructed to resubmit
them at the institutional level, but there is no record that she did so. Fleming
argues that the district court abused its discretion by determining that she did not
exhaust her administrative remedies without first holding an administrative
hearing, because she had alleged that officials failed to process grievances that she
filed at the institutional level. However, it was not a clear error in judgment not to
hold an evidentiary hearing based on those allegations alone, in light of the
evidence submitted by the government. Drew, 297 F.3d at 1293 n.7.
5
Case: 15-11471 Date Filed: 11/18/2015 Page: 6 of 8
We recognize that Santiago-Lugo indicates that it was improper for the
district court to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction because Fleming failed to exhaust
her administrative remedies. 785 F.3d at 471-72, 474-75. But while Santiago-
Lugo held that the exhaustion requirement in § 2241 cases is not jurisdictional, it
expressly noted that it is still a requirement that may be raised as a defense. Id. at
475. The government raised the issue below, and the court determined that
Fleming had not exhausted administrative remedies as to all of her claims other
than her factual innocence claims. Therefore, this is a situation where the
distinction between dismissal and denial makes “no significant difference,” and we
construe the district court’s order as a denial as to claims 1, 4, 5, and 6, and affirm.
See Cani, 331 F.3d at 1216.
We are also unpersuaded by Fleming’s argument that the district court erred
in dismissing her actual innocence claims. Challenges to the execution of a
sentence, rather than the validity of the sentence itself, are properly brought under
§ 2241. Antonelli v. Warden, U.S.P. Atlanta, 542 F.3d 1348, 1352 (11th Cir.
2008) (stating that a § 2241 action was the appropriate vehicle to challenge a
decision of the federal Parole Commission). While there is ambiguity in our
precedent as to whether § 2241 and 28 U.S.C. § 2254 embody distinct remedies
(and, thus, whether a state prisoner may avoid the procedural restrictions on § 2254
petitions by filing under § 2241), there is no such dispute concerning federal
6
Case: 15-11471 Date Filed: 11/18/2015 Page: 7 of 8
prisoners. Id. at 1351 n.1. A prisoner in custody pursuant to a federal court
judgment cannot avoid the procedural restrictions on § 2255 motions by changing
the caption on her petition to § 2241, and may proceed under § 2241 only when she
raises claims outside the scope of § 2255(a). Id.
Our cases refer to an “actual innocence” claim in at least three different
types of habeas cases. Rozzelle v. Sec’y, Fla. Dep’t of Corr., 672 F.3d 1000, 1010
(11th Cir. 2012). In the first type, a petitioner’s actual innocence is itself the
constitutional basis of the habeas petition. Id. In the other two types of actual
innocence claims, the petitioner’s assertion of innocence is not itself a freestanding
claim, but merely serves as a “gateway” to get the federal court to consider claims
that the federal court would otherwise be barred from hearing. Id. at 1011.
Therefore, to successfully plead actual innocence, a petitioner must show that her
conviction resulted from a constitutional violation. Id. We have said that
“freestanding” actual innocence claims are generally insufficient to state a claim to
postconviction relief. Zelaya v. Sec’y, Fla. Dep’t of Corr., 798 F.3d 1360, 1371
n.8 (11th Cir. 2015). Moreover, a petitioner may not assert “actual innocence” and
nothing more in a § 2241 petition where § 2255 is not inadequate or ineffective.
Id. at 1272.
In Dansby v. Hobbs, 766 F.3d 809 (8th Cir. 2014), the Eighth Circuit found
that a § 2254 petitioner did not meet the “extraordinarily high” threshold to bring a
7
Case: 15-11471 Date Filed: 11/18/2015 Page: 8 of 8
freestanding actual innocence claim. Id. at 816-17. Similarly, in Jones v. Taylor,
763 F.3d 1242 (9th Cir. 2014), the Ninth Circuit determined that a § 2254
petitioner failed to establish a free-standing claim of actual innocence. Id. at 1246.
Although Jones had not exhausted the claim in state court, the Ninth Circuit
reviewed his unexhausted actual innocence claim under § 2254(b)(2)’s language
stating that a habeas corpus petition may be denied on the merits notwithstanding
the failure to exhaust administrative remedies. Id. at 1243 n.1.
Here, the district court properly found that Claims 2 and 3, which asserted
“factual innocence,” were not cognizable in the § 2241 context because they were
more appropriate for a § 2255 motion. The Eighth and Ninth Circuit cases
Fleming cites for the proposition that the court could hear her free-standing actual
innocence claims are inapplicable, since they were both decided in the context of §
2254 petitions. See Dansby, 766 F.3d at 816-17; Jones, 763 F.3d at 1246. While
we’ve acknowledged that state prisoners may be able to avoid the procedural
requirements of § 2254 by filing a § 2241 petition, the precedent is clear that
federal prisoners may not avoid § 2255’s procedural requirements by doing so.
Antonelli, 542 F.3d at 1351 n.1. Claims 2 and 3 did not challenge the execution of
Fleming’s sentence, and the district court correctly concluded that it could not hear
them in a § 2241 petition because they were within § 2255’s scope. Id.
AFFIRMED.
8