Lashaun Y. Carter v. Doll House II, Inc.

Case: 14-13132 Date Filed: 06/25/2015 Page: 1 of 4
[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
________________________
No. 14-13132
________________________
D.C. Docket No. 1:14-cv-01097-MHS
LASHAUN Y. CARTER,
individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated who consent to their inclusion in a collective action,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
versus
DOLL HOUSE II, INC.,
a corporation,
d.b.a. Stilettos Gentlemen's Club,
THEO LAMBROS,
an individual,
Defendants - Appellants.
________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Georgia
________________________
(June 25, 2015)
Case: 14-13132 Date Filed: 06/25/2015 Page: 2 of 4
Before JORDAN and DUBINA, Circuit Judges and GOLDBERG, * Judge.
PER CURIAM:
Defendants/Appellants Dollhouse, Inc., Stilettos Gentlemen's Club, and
Theo Lambros appeal the district court’s order denying in part and granting in part
their motion to compel arbitration in plaintiffs/appellees Fair Labor Standards Act
(“FLSA”) complaint.
We first conclude that we have jurisdiction to entertain this appeal because
the order is an appealable interlocutory order. See 9 U.S.C. § 16(a)(1)(B). We
generally apply the de novo standard of review to a district court’s denial of a
motion to compel arbitration. See Jenkins v. First American Cash Advance of
Georgia, LLC., 400 F.3d 868, 873 (11th Cir. 2005). This court reviews the district
court’s factual findings for clear error. Multi-Fin. Secs. Corp. v. King, 386 F.3d
1364, 1366 (11th Cir. 2004).
After reviewing the record, reading the parties briefs, and having the benefit
of oral argument, we agree with the district court that the October Agreement is
enforceable but not retroactive. We base our affirmance of the district court’s
order regarding the October Agreement on general principles of contract
interpretation applicable to all arbitration agreements. The October Agreement
*
Honorable Richard W. Goldberg, United States Judge with the United States Court of
International Trade, sitting by designation.
2
Case: 14-13132 Date Filed: 06/25/2015 Page: 3 of 4
clearly refers “only” to “any dispute regarding this contract/agreement.” This
arbitration clause is similar to one we examined in Thomas v. Carnival Corp., 573
F.3d 1113, 1116-17 (11th Cir. 2009), abrogation recognized by Williams v. NCL
(Bahamas) Ltd., 686 F.3d 1169 (11th Cir. 2012). In Thomas, we refused to apply
retroactively an arbitration clause that provided that “[a]ny and all disputes arising
out of or in connection with this Agreement, . . . shall be referred to, and finally
resolved by arbitration.” Id. at 1117. We concluded that “if the parties had
intended retroactivity, they would have explicitly said so.” Id. at 1119. Because
there is nothing in the October Agreement regarding retroactivity, we conclude the
district court correctly refused to apply the arbitration provision to any claims that
arose before October 2013. Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s order as it
relates to the October Agreement.
Concerning the April Agreement, it is apparent from the record that the
district court made factfindings based on inferences from dates rather than live
testimony. We believe the better course would have been for the district court to
conduct an evidentiary hearing, take live testimony and then make findings of fact.
Accordingly, we vacate that part of the district court’s order concerning the April
Agreement and remand this case for the district court to conduct an evidentiary
hearing.
3
Case: 14-13132 Date Filed: 06/25/2015 Page: 4 of 4
AFFIRMED in part, VACATED in part, and REMANDED.
4