Johnny Overstreet, Jr. v. Warden

Case: 13-14995 Date Filed: 01/27/2016 Page: 1 of 10
[PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
________________________
No. 13-14995
________________________
D.C. Docket No. 1:12-cv-00086-JRH-BKE
JOHNNY OVERSTREET, JR.,
Petitioner - Appellant,
versus
WARDEN,
Respondent - Appellee,
ATTORNEY GENERAL, STATE OF GEORGIA,
Respondent.
________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Georgia
________________________
(January 27, 2016)
Before MARTIN, ANDERSON and BLACK, Circuit Judges.
BLACK, Circuit Judge:
Case: 13-14995 Date Filed: 01/27/2016 Page: 2 of 10
Johnny Overstreet, Jr., a Georgia prisoner, appeals the district court’s denial
of his 28 U.S.C. § 2254 petition for writ of habeas corpus. This Court granted a
certificate of appealability on the following issue:
Whether appellate counsel rendered ineffective assistance in failing to
argue that there was insufficient evidence to support Overstreet’s
kidnapping convictions in light of Garza v. State, 670 S.E.2d 73, 78
(Ga. 2008).
After careful review and with the benefit of oral argument, we answer the certified
issue in the affirmative, reverse the order of the district court, and remand with
instructions for the district court to issue the writ.
In 2007, a jury found Overstreet guilty of 35 counts arising from his role in
armed robberies of five fast-food restaurants. Among Overstreet’s convictions
were four counts for kidnapping. The record shows 1 that Overstreet’s kidnapping
convictions were based on Overstreet’s leading the restaurant manager to the
restaurant safe in a back room or office and then ordering the manager to open the
safe. On two of the four occasions, before fleeing, Overstreet led the restaurant
manager back to the front of the restaurant, where the remaining employees were
being held. Under Georgia law at the time of Overstreet’s conviction, Overstreet’s
moving the restaurant managers in this manner was sufficient to satisfy the
asportation element of kidnapping. See Lyons v. State, 652 S.E.2d 525, 528 (Ga.
1
The parties do not dispute the pertinent facts on appeal. The parties do, however,
dispute the legal conclusions to be drawn therefrom.
2
Case: 13-14995 Date Filed: 01/27/2016 Page: 3 of 10
2007) (“The requirement of asportation to prove kidnapping is satisfied if there is
movement of the victim, however slight that movement is.”).
In 2008, the Georgia Supreme Court modified the test for asportation,
overruling Lyons. Garza, 670 S.E.2d at 78. Under the new test, movement of a
victim that is “part and parcel” of an independent crime, such as armed robbery,
would generally not be considered asportation. Id. at 76 (discussing, as an
example of a situation that should not constitute kidnapping, “the robber who
forces his victim to move from one room to another in order to find a cashbox or
open a safe”) (quotation omitted). This modification applied to any kidnapping
conviction that had not yet been adjudicated on direct appeal. See Kollie v. State,
687 S.E.2d 869, 874 (Ga. App. 2009).2
In 2009, the Georgia Court of Appeals overturned several kidnapping
convictions in which the movement of the victim was part and parcel of an armed
robbery. Kollie, 687 S.E.2d at 875 (movement of victim to safe in back office then
to front of restaurant); Grimes v. State, 678 S.E.2d 167, 168 (Ga. App. 2009)
(movement of victim from front of restaurant to money cabinet in back office, then
to front cash register). Kollie and Grimes are substantially identical to the
pertinent facts in Overstreet’s case. See 687 S.E.2d at 873; 678 S.E.2d at 168.
2
The Georgia legislature has since abrogated Garza by statute, but this amendment
applies to conduct on or after July 1, 2009. See Horne v. State, 680 S.E.2d 616, 619 n.1 (Ga.
App. 2009). Overstreet’s conduct took place in 2006 and is therefore adjudicated under the
Garza test for asportation.
3
Case: 13-14995 Date Filed: 01/27/2016 Page: 4 of 10
Likewise, Garza’s example of “the robber who forces his victim to move from one
room to another in order to find a cashbox or open a safe” is strikingly similar to
the pertinent facts in Overstreet’s case. Garza, 670 S.E.2d at 76 (quotation
omitted). Garza, Grimes, and Kollie were all decided after Overstreet’s conviction
but before his direct appeal. Thus, as in Grimes and Kollie, Overstreet’s
kidnapping convictions were likely to be reversed on appeal.
Fifteen months after Garza, nine months after Grimes, and three months
after Kollie, Overstreet’s appellate counsel 3 filed a brief in support of Overstreet’s
direct appeal of his convictions. The brief mentioned neither asportation generally
nor Garza and its progeny specifically. The brief argued, among other things, that
Overstreet’s conviction was “strongly against the weight of the evidence” and
challenged the credibility of several witnesses for the prosecution. Without having
been notified in any way of the Garza issue, the Georgia Court of Appeals denied
Overstreet’s appeal. Overstreet v. State, 696 S.E.2d 114 (Ga. App. 2010).
In the ensuing years, Overstreet sought habeas corpus relief in the Georgia
Superior Court, the Georgia Supreme Court, and the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Georgia. Before each court, Overstreet, proceeding pro
se, argued that his appellate counsel had been ineffective for failing to raise Garza.
3
Overstreet’s counsel in this federal habeas corpus appeal is not the appellate counsel to
whom the Court refers. References to Overstreet’s appellate counsel refer to the attorney who
represented Overstreet in Georgia state court for his post-trial motions and direct appeal.
4
Case: 13-14995 Date Filed: 01/27/2016 Page: 5 of 10
Among a series of meritless arguments, Overstreet attempted to articulate a
meritorious argument—Overstreet’s appellate counsel was ineffective for failing to
raise Garza because Garza changed the law and compelled reversal of the four
kidnapping counts.
Although Overstreet raised a meritorious claim of ineffective assistance of
appellate counsel, both the Georgia Superior Court and district court appear to
have been mired in Overstreet’s many meritless claims and to have misinterpreted
Overstreet’s argument as being a fact-based challenge to the sufficiency of the
evidence presented at trial. Overstreet’s challenge was not based on the facts but
on the law—the jury had convicted Overstreet using the wrong test for asportation,
and the facts did not support the asportation element under the new law. Without
ever mentioning Garza or its progeny, each court denied Overstreet’s request for
relief. With the benefit of thorough briefing and oral argument as to the single
issue on appeal, the Court now recognizes what was nearly overlooked:
Overstreet’s appellate counsel rendered ineffective assistance under Strickland v.
Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984).
When reviewing a district court’s denial of a 28 U.S.C. § 2254 petition, we
review “questions of law and mixed questions of law and fact, including
ineffective assistance of counsel claims, de novo, and review findings of fact for
clear error.” Pardo v. Sec’y, Fla. Dept. of Corr., 587 F.3d 1093, 1098 (11th Cir.
5
Case: 13-14995 Date Filed: 01/27/2016 Page: 6 of 10
2009). The Court is “highly deferential” to a state court’s adjudication on the
merits. Id. When a state court has adjudicated on the merits a state prisoner’s
claim, a federal court may grant the writ of habeas corpus only if the state court’s
decision:
(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an
unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as
determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or
(2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable
determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in
the State court proceeding.
28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). “A state court decision involves an unreasonable application
of Supreme Court precedent ‘if the state court identifies the correct governing legal
rule from [Supreme Court] cases but unreasonably applies it to the facts of the
particular state prisoner’s case.’” Bottoson v. Moore, 234 F.3d 526, 531 (11th Cir.
2000) (quoting Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 407–08 (2000)). “Where a state
court’s decision is unaccompanied by an explanation, the habeas petitioner’s
burden still must be met by showing there was no reasonable basis for the state
court to deny relief.” Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 98 (2011).
Strickland governs a claim of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel.
Dell v. United States, 710 F.3d 1267, 1273 (11th Cir. 2013). Under Strickland, a
petitioner must show (1) his attorney’s performance was deficient, and (2) the
deficient performance prejudiced the petitioner’s defense. 466 U.S. at 687. When
6
Case: 13-14995 Date Filed: 01/27/2016 Page: 7 of 10
considering deficient performance, a court must presume counsel’s performance
was “within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance.” Id. at 689.
Appellate counsel has no duty to raise every non-frivolous issue and may
reasonably weed out weaker (albeit meritorious) arguments. See Philmore v.
McNeil, 575 F.3d 1251, 1264 (11th Cir. 2009). “Generally, only when ignored
issues are clearly stronger than those presented, will the presumption of effective
assistance of counsel be overcome.” Smith v. Robbins, 528 U.S. 259, 288 (2000)
(quoting Gray v. Greer, 800 F.2d 644, 646 (7th Cir. 1986)); see also Burger v.
Kemp, 483 U.S. 776, 784 (1987) (finding no ineffective assistance of counsel when
the failure to raise a particular issue had “a sound strategic basis”). A petitioner
satisfies the prejudice prong upon showing that “there is a reasonable probability
that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would
have been different.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694. “The standards created by
Strickland and § 2254(d) are both highly deferential, and when the two apply in
tandem, review is doubly so.” Harrington, 562 U.S. at 105 (internal citation and
quotations omitted).
Overstreet’s appellate counsel’s failure to make a Garza argument can be
explained in one of two ways: he either failed to recognize or elected not to raise
7
Case: 13-14995 Date Filed: 01/27/2016 Page: 8 of 10
this strong basis for reversal of four criminal convictions. 4 Either way, counsel’s
performance is patently deficient. Cf. Cave v. Singletary, 971 F.2d 1513, 1518
(11th Cir. 1992) (“The attorney’s choice of tactic must be reasonable under the
circumstances.”) (emphasis in original). Although Overstreet’s appellate counsel
made arguments in support of more comprehensive relief than reversal of just four
out of 35 counts, no argument was particularly likely to succeed. Even if
meritorious, none of appellate counsel’s arguments was as compelling as Garza,
which almost certainly would have resulted in reversal of the kidnapping counts.
Appellate counsel’s deficient performance also prejudiced Overstreet. See Black v.
United States, 373 F.3d 1140, 1142 (11th Cir. 2004) (explaining that a petitioner
satisfies the prejudice prong of Strickland upon showing that “but for the deficient
performance, the outcome of the appeal would have been different”). But for
appellate counsel’s failure to raise Garza, the Georgia Court of Appeals would
almost certainly have reversed Overstreet’s kidnapping convictions.
The United States Supreme Court holds that it is possible for appellate
counsel to render ineffective assistance. See Smith v. Murray, 477 U.S. 527, 535
(1986). Therefore, there must be a set of facts under which appellate counsel could
be found ineffective. The fundamental purpose of an appellate lawyer representing
4
At an evidentiary hearing before the Georgia Superior Court, appellate counsel testified
that he believed he raised every meritorious argument and that any arguments he omitted were
left out for a reason. Counsel was not questioned about Garza specifically and provided no
reason for the omission.
8
Case: 13-14995 Date Filed: 01/27/2016 Page: 9 of 10
a defendant in a direct criminal appeal is to identify and argue bases for reversal of
a conviction. See Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353, 358 (1963) (describing the
value of appellate counsel’s “examination into the record, research of the law, and
marshalling of arguments on [the defendant’s] behalf”). Appellate counsel might
fail to identify a mediocre or obscure basis for reversal without being ineffective
under Strickland. See, e.g., Brown v. United States, 720 F.3d 1316, 1335 (11th Cir.
2013). In many (perhaps most) cases, counsel may err without being deficient or
may be deficient without causing prejudice. Overstreet’s chances of reversal,
however, were not merely possible or even probable. As discussed above, had
Overstreet’s appellate counsel raised Garza, Grimes, or Kollie, absent a departure
from precedent, Overstreet’s kidnapping convictions would have been reversed.
Therefore, Overstreet’s appellate representation was undeniably ineffective. See
Eagle v. Linahan, 279 F.3d 926, 943 (11th Cir. 2001) (“Where, as here, appellate
counsel fails to raise a claim on appeal that is so obviously valid that any
competent lawyer would have raised it, no further evidence is needed to determine
whether counsel was ineffective for not having done so. . . . Her failure to raise it,
standing alone, establishes her ineffectiveness.”). The state court’s determination
to the contrary was an unreasonable application of Strickland. 5
5
We need not and do not address whether the district court should have reviewed the
adjudication of the Georgia Superior Court or of the Georgia Supreme Court because there is no
9
Case: 13-14995 Date Filed: 01/27/2016 Page: 10 of 10
We therefore answer the certified issue in the affirmative. Overstreet’s
appellate counsel rendered ineffective assistance in failing to argue that there was
insufficient evidence to support Overstreet’s kidnapping convictions in light of
Garza. This case is reversed and remanded with instructions for the district court
to issue the writ as to Overstreet’s kidnapping convictions, counts 2, 10, 17,
and 26.
REVERSED and REMANDED.
reasonable basis upon which either state court could have concluded that Overstreet’s appellate
counsel rendered effective assistance. See Harrington, 562 U.S. at 98.
10