United States v. Mark Darnell Porter

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[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
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No. 13-11111
Non-Argument Calendar
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D.C. Docket No. 6:12-cr-00012-BAE-GRS-2
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
versus
MARK DARNELL PORTER,
Defendant-Appellant.
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Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Georgia
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(October 30, 2013)
Before CARNES, Chief Judge, MARTIN and FAY Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
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Mark Porter appeals his 180-month sentence after pleading guilty to
possession with intent to distribute 280 grams or more of crack cocaine in violation
of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(B). He claims that his sentence is substantively
unreasonable, and that the district court violated his plea agreement with the
government.
I.
In the spring of 2012 officers arrested Porter as he was selling crack cocaine
to a confidential informant. A federal grand jury issued an eight-count indictment
charging Porter and his codefendants with various drug trafficking and firearms
offenses. Porter entered into a written plea agreement in which he agreed to plead
guilty to one count of possession with intent to distribute 280 grams or more of
crack cocaine in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(B). In return the
government agreed to: (1) dismiss the remaining charges against Porter; (2) not
object to the probation officer’s recommendation that Porter receive a three-level
guidelines reduction for acceptance of responsibility; (3) agree with Porter that
there were no aggravating circumstances that justified an enhancement under the
sentencing guidelines; and (4) advise the district court of the extent and value of
Porter’s assistance in the government’s investigation and prosecution of others.
The plea agreement warned Porter “that the Court is not a party to this agreement,
that the government can only make recommendations which are not binding on the
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Court, and that . . . the Court is free to impose any sentence authorized by law up
to the statutory maximum sentence.” The district court issued a similar warning at
Porter’s change-of-plea hearing, telling him that its sentence could be higher than
the applicable guideline range and more severe than what he might anticipate
based on his plea bargain. Porter confirmed that he understood and wanted to
plead guilty anyway.
The presentence investigation report calculated a base level of 32 under
United States Sentencing Guidelines § 2D1.1(c)(4). It added 2 levels under
§ 2D1.1(b)(1) for possession of a firearm during the commission of the offense,
and subtracted 3 levels under § 3E1.1 for acceptance of responsibility, resulting in
a total offense level of 31. That offense level combined with his criminal history
category of II to give Porter a guidelines range of 121 to 151 months
imprisonment. Porter did not object to the PSR.
At sentencing the district court varied upward, imposing a sentence of 180
months imprisonment. The court did so based on its determination that an
additional 29 months was appropriate under the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) sentencing
factors. The district court considered Porter’s history and characteristics, as well
as the circumstances of his offense. See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(1). It also cited four
findings as especially important in its decision to impose an upward variance.
First, Porter’s criminal history “show[ed] almost an entire life of lack of respect for
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the laws.” Second, Porter had not been deterred from criminal activity even
though “he has had opportunities and the ability to earn a decent income.” Third,
Porter’s offense conduct created “a significant danger to the community” by
paying an individual to drive him to a high volume crack deal and having a firearm
present. Finally, Porter had a “history of trying to -- or attempting to avoid
responsibility for his conduct by minimizing his actions,” including three prior
convictions in which Porter pleaded to lesser offenses.
II.
Porter claims that the district court’s sentence was substantively
unreasonable because it misapplied the sentencing factors set out in 18 U.S.C.
§ 3553(a). Section §3553(a) requires district courts to impose sentences that are
“sufficient, but not greater than necessary, to comply with the purposes” listed in
that statutory provision. Id. Those purposes include the needs to: reflect the
seriousness of the offense, promote respect for the law, provide just punishment of
the offense, deter criminal conduct, protect the public from the defendant’s future
criminal conduct, and provide the defendant with needed educational or vocational
training or medical care. Id. § 3553(a)(2). Among other factors, the district court
must also consider the nature and circumstances of the offense, the history and
characteristics of the defendant, the applicable guidelines range, and the need to
avoid unwarranted sentencing disparities. See id. § 3553(a)(1), (4), (6).
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We apply an abuse of discretion standard in reviewing the district court’s
application of those factors. See United States v. White, 663 F.3d 1207, 1215
(11th Cir. 2011). Porter has the burden of proving that his sentence is
substantively unreasonable. Id. at 1217. He does not claim that the district court’s
sentence “is grounded solely on one factor, relies on improper factors, or ignores
relevant factors.” United States v. Pugh, 515 F.3d 1179, 1194 (11th Cir. 2008).
Instead he takes issue with the district court’s conclusion that the facts in his case
justify a variance under the § 3553(a) factors. To prevail on his argument, he must
leave us with “the definite and firm conviction that the district court committed a
clear error of judgment in weighing the § 3553(a) factors by arriving at a sentence
that lies outside the range of reasonable sentences dictated by the facts of the case.”
United States v. Irey, 612 F.3d 1160, 1190 (11th Cir. 2010) (en banc) (quotation
marks omitted).
Porter’s argument does not inspire such conviction. His sentence is well
below the statutory maximum of life in prison. See United States v. Gonzalez, 550
F.3d 1319, 1324 (11th Cir. 2008) (holding that a defendant’s sentence was
reasonable in part because it was well below the statutory maximum).
Furthermore, the district court considered the § 3553(a) factors and made specific
findings as to why the nature and circumstances of the offense, Porter’s history and
characteristics, deterrence of criminal conduct, and protecting the public from
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Porter’s future criminal conduct justified an upward variance from the guidelines
range. Porter offers reasons to disagree with the court’s conclusion, but the abuse-
of-discretion standard requires more. See Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 51,
128 S. Ct. 586, 597 (2007) (“The fact that the appellate court might reasonably
have concluded that a different sentence was appropriate is insufficient to justify
reversal of the district court.”). Thus Porter’s claim fails.
III.
Porter also claims that the district court’s 180-month sentence “breached”
his plea agreement with the government. Because Porter raises this argument for
the first time on appeal, we review only for plain error. United States v.
Rodriguez, 398 F.3d 1291, 1298 (11th Cir. 2005).
Porter argues that the district court “violated the plea agreement” because it
imposed a higher sentence than what he expected based on his plea negotiations
with the government. Not so. The plea agreement specifically acknowledged two
facts that made it legally impossible for the district court’s upward variance to
breach the plea agreement: (1) “the Court is not a party to this agreement,” and (2)
“the Court is free to impose any sentence authorized by law up to the statutory
maximum sentence.” It cannot be error — let alone plain error — for a district
court to exercise its sentencing discretion if the defendant’s plea agreement does
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not limit that discretion. See United States v. Eldick, 443 F.3d 783, 789 (11th Cir.
2006). Thus Porter’s claim fails.
AFFIRMED.
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