William Castro v. R. Fred Lewis

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[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
________________________
No. 17-15638
Non-Argument Calendar
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D.C. Docket No. 4:17-cv-00236-MW-CAS
WILLIAM CASTRO,
Plaintiff - Appellant,
versus
R. FRED LEWIS,
in his official capacity as Justice of the Florida Supreme Court,
BARBARA J. PARIENTE,
in her official capacity as Justice of the Florida Supreme Court,
JORGE LABARGA,
in his official capacity as Justice of the Florida Supreme Court,
PEGGY A. QUINCE,
in her official capacity as Justice of the Florida Supreme Court,
CHARLES T. CANADY,
in his official capacity as Justice of the Florida Supreme Court,
RICKY POLSTON,
in his official capacity as Justice of the Florida Supreme Court,
C. ALAN LAWSON,
in his official capacity as Justice of the Florida Supreme Court,
THOMAS ARTHUR POBJECKY,
in his individual capacity,
Defendants - Appellees.
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________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Florida
________________________
(June 17, 2019)
Before MARCUS, JILL PRYOR and ANDERSON, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Plaintiff-Appellant William Castro appeals from the district court’s orders
granting the motions to dismiss filed by the Justices of the Florida Supreme Court
sued in their official capacity (the “Justices”) and Thomas Arthur Pobjecky, the
General Counsel of the Florida Board of Bar Examiners (the “Board”). On appeal,
Castro argues that the district court erred by: (1) dismissing the complaint against all
the appellees for lack of subject matter jurisdiction under the Rooker-Feldman 1
doctrine; and (2) dismissing the complaint against Pobjecky for lack of standing.
After thorough review, we affirm. 2
We review de novo the district court’s dismissal for lack of subject matter
jurisdiction based on the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. See Lozman v. City of Riviera
Beach, 713 F.3d 1066, 1069 (11th Cir. 2013).
1
Rooker v. Fid. Tr. Co., 263 U.S. 413 (1923); D.C. Ct. of App. v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462(1983).
2
Because we affirm the district court’s dismissal of Castro’s claims against all of the appellees
on Rooker-Feldman grounds, we do not address any of the remaining arguments made on appeal.
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The relevant background is this. In 1994, Castro, a former criminal defense
attorney in Florida, was charged and convicted in federal court on several felony
charges, including bribery, arising out of his arrangement with a state court judge
who agreed to appoint Castro as a court-appointed defense attorney in exchange for
a percentage of the money Castro earned from the appointments. As a result of his
criminal conviction, the Florida Supreme Court entered an order in April 1994
suspending Castro from the practice of law in Florida; it ultimately disbarred him in
November 1998, effective, nunc pro tunc, May 12, 1994, and prohibited him from
seeking readmission for a period of ten years. See Fla. Bar v. Castro, 728 So. 2d
205 (Fla. 1998). In accordance with the 1998 disbarment order, Castro applied for
readmission to the Florida Bar in 2007, and the Florida Board of Bar Examiners
conducted a formal hearing in 2010. Following the hearing, the Board’s five-
member formal hearing panel was not in agreement and split three to two to deny
admission. There was some discrepancy over how much longer Castro would be
denied admission; while the hearing panel’s majority indicated on the record that
Castro should be given a permanent denial for being part of “a court corruption
scheme” that was so egregious and extreme, the panel’s note-taker, who was in the
two-member minority, completed a “Findings Worksheet” that did not have an
option for permanent denial and checked an option for a recommendation of denial
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for a two-year period. The Board sent Castro a “Notice of Board Action,” indicating
that the panel had decided to deny admission with a two-year disqualification period.
Using the formal hearing record, Pobjecky, as the Board’s General Counsel,
then drafted the Board’s recommendation to the Florida Supreme Court, which
provided that “[t]he board recommends that William Castro not be readmitted to The
Florida Bar.” The Board received the draft recommendation, along with the
“Findings Worksheet” and a cover letter from the Board’s Executive Director noting
that different from the Findings Worksheet, the draft recommendation “does not set
forth a specific period of disqualification” and asked that “[i]f you disagree with this
approach, please state what action you wish to take.” The recommendation was
approved by the Board, without any changes to the length of disbarment or
otherwise, and sent to the Florida Supreme Court.
On Castro’s petition seeking review of the Board’s recommendation, the
Florida Supreme Court issued a decision permanently denying Castro readmission
to the Florida Bar. See Fla. Bd. of Bar Exam’rs re: Castro, 87 So. 3d 699, 702 (Fla.
2012), cert. denied, Castro v. Fla. Bd. of Bar Exam’rs, 568 U.S. 932 (2012). The
Florida Supreme Court detailed Castro’s “scheme involving bribery and kickbacks
to a sitting judge,” and described this “misconduct, involving corruption within the
legal system,” as “particularly egregious.” Id. It decided that although Castro had
engaged in thousands of community service hours “in an effort to show his
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rehabilitation,” “we agree with the Board’s conclusion that no demonstration of
rehabilitation would ever suffice to allow Castro’s readmission to the legal
profession.” Id. Justice Pariente filed a special concurrence, ultimately agreeing
with the majority’s decision. Id. at 703-04.
At that point, Castro reviewed the record from the Board hearing (which he
had received on a compact disc (“CD”) two years earlier), and concluded that the
formal hearing panel had instead recommended a denial of admission with an
opportunity to reapply in two years instead of a permanent denial. Based on his
review of the records, he moved to vacate the Florida Supreme Court’s decision,
which he claimed had been fraudulently procured by the Board’s misconduct. In
response to the Florida Supreme Court’s order for Castro to show cause why his
motion should not be dismissed as unauthorized, Castro argued that it had the
inherent authority to do so and authority under the Florida Constitution. In its
response, the Board acknowledged the Florida Supreme Court’s “general
jurisdiction of this matter,” and addressed the merits of Castro’s allegations of
misconduct. The Board noted that due to initial confusion, the Notice of Board
Action erroneously, and regrettably had informed Castro that the panel voted for a
denial of admission with a two-year reapplication period, but when the Board later
sent the final recommendation to Castro, the cover letter noted that the final
recommendation differed from the Notice of Board Action he’d received. The
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Board’s response to the Florida Supreme Court’s show-cause order added that when
the panel received the draft recommendation for its approval, the enclosed cover
letter specifically had highlighted the inconsistency in the length of disbarment
between the Findings Worksheet and the draft recommendation, but that the panel
had approved the draft recommendation as written with no comment. The Board
concluded its response by arguing that the Florida Supreme Court should dismiss
Castro’s motion as unauthorized because there was no fraud, misrepresentation or
other misconduct by members of the formal hearing panel, and no reason for the
case to be reopened. Upon receiving the responses to its show-cause order, the
Florida Supreme Court summarily dismissed the motion to vacate as unauthorized.
Castro again filed a petition for writ of certiorari, which the United States Supreme
Court also denied. See Castro v. Fla. Bd. of Bar Exam’rs, 134 S. Ct. 1761 (2014).
Thereafter, Castro filed a complaint in federal district court against the
Justices in their official capacity, and Pobjecky in his individual capacity. The
complaint alleged that the disbarment procedure had violated Castro’s substantive
due process rights and liberty interest to pursue his chosen profession; procedural
due process rights to notice and opportunity to be heard; procedural due process right
to an impartial tribunal; and right of access to the courts. The complaint also
included a count for common law fraud under Florida law against Pobjecky.
Thereafter, the United States District Court for the Northern District of Florida
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granted the Justices’ motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction based
on the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, and, later, granted Pobjecky’s motion to dismiss
based on Castro’s lack of standing, and alternatively, the Rooker-Feldman doctrine.
The district court then entered an amended order removing language indicating that
the dismissal was with prejudice, and denied Castro’s motion for reconsideration.
Castro timely appealed the orders dismissing his complaint.
In this case, the district court properly dismissed Castro’s lawsuit against all
of the appellees for lack of subject matter jurisdiction under the Rooker-Feldman
doctrine. The Rooker-Feldman doctrine is a jurisdictional rule created by the
Supreme Court that precludes the lower federal courts from reviewing state court
judgments. Alvarez v. Att’y Gen. for Fla., 679 F.3d 1257, 1262 (11th Cir. 2012).
The Rooker–Feldman doctrine “is confined to cases of the kind from which [it]
acquired its name: cases brought by state-court losers complaining of injuries caused
by state-court judgments rendered before the district court proceedings commenced
and inviting district court review and rejection of those judgments.” Exxon Mobil
Corp. v. Saudi Basic Indus. Corp., 544 U.S. 280, 284 (2005). In order to determine
which claims invite rejection of a state court decision, we consider “whether a claim
was either (1) one actually adjudicated by a state court or (2) one ‘inextricably
intertwined’ with a state court judgment.” Target Media Partners v. Specialty Mktg.
Corp., 881 F.3d 1279, 1286 (11th Cir. 2018). A federal claim is inextricably
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intertwined with a state court judgment “if it asks to effectively nullify the state court
judgment, or it succeeds only to the extent that the state court wrongly decided the
issues.” Id. (quotation omitted). A federal claim is not “inextricably intertwined”
“when there was no reasonable opportunity to raise that particular claim during the
relevant state court proceeding.” Id. (quotation omitted). Thus, for a federal claim
to be inextricably intertwined with a state court judgment, the federal claim must
raise “a question that was or should have been properly before the state court.” Id.
Here, the district court lacked jurisdiction over Castro’s lawsuit under the
Rooker-Feldman doctrine because his claims are “inextricably intertwined” with the
Florida Supreme Court’s judgment permanently denying his admission to the Bar.
Castro’s complaint alleged that Pobjecky, as the Board’s General Counsel, drafted
proposed factual findings, legal conclusions and a recommended disposition for
review by the Board panel that conducted Castro’s readmission hearing. Using a
transcribed portion of the panel’s deliberations in drafting this document, Pobjecky
allegedly committed fraud by providing that the Board recommended a permanent
denial. The Board panel approved Pobjecky’s draft as written. Castro appealed the
Board’s recommendation to the Florida Supreme Court, which agreed with the
Board’s recommendation and ordered that Castro’s prior conduct warranted
permanent denial of readmission to the Bar. On Castro’s motion to vacate, the
Florida Supreme Court rejected Castro’s argument alleging fraud in the drafting of
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the Board’s recommendation. Based on these allegations, Castro’s federal complaint
raised due process claims, as well as a count for common law fraud against Pobjecky.
For starters, challenges to decisions by state supreme courts disciplining
attorneys for misconduct often are precluded by the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. In
Doe v. Fla. Bar, 630 F.3d 1336, 1340-41 (11th Cir. 2011), we affirmed the Rooker-
Feldman dismissal of a plaintiff’s §1983 claims arising out of the Florida Bar’s use
of confidential peer reviews as part of the attorney certification process, because her
claims would require the district court to review the Florida Supreme Court’s
decision on her certification application. And in Berman v. Fla. Bd. of Bar Exam’rs,
794 F.2d 1529 (11th Cir. 1986), an unsuccessful bar applicant brought § 1983 claims
arising out of the Florida Bar’s refusal to apply a repealed rule that had exempted
graduates of Florida law schools from taking the bar exam. We affirmed the district
court’s Rooker-Feldman dismissal, holding that it lacked jurisdiction over a claim
“that a state court’s judicial decision in a particular case has resulted in the unlawful
denial of admission to a particular bar applicant.” Id. at 1530. As we’ve said, “it is
clear that the Rooker–Feldman doctrine forbids frustrated Florida bar applicants
from seeking an effective reversal of the Florida Supreme Court’s decision in federal
district court.” Dale v. Moore, 121 F.3d 624, 627 (11th Cir. 1997); see also Johnson
v. Supreme Court of Ill., 165 F.3d 1140, 1141 (7th Cir.1999) (“[T]he Rooker–
Feldman doctrine eliminates most avenues of attack on attorney discipline.”).
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Castro claims that Pobjecky fraudulently prepared a document that ultimately
was before the Florida Supreme Court when it considered his readmission to the Bar,
which is similar to the circumstances in Dale, 121 F.3d at 627. There, we held that
a plaintiff’s disability discrimination claims against the Florida Bar were barred by
the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, where he was challenging a mental health report the
Bar had prepared about him in connection with his application to the Bar. Id. Even
though the Florida Supreme Court admitted Dale to the Florida Bar, we held that
Dale’s claim was “inextricably intertwined” with the state court’s decision on his
bar application because it would have required the federal district court to review
the Florida Bar’s inquiry into his fitness to practice law and the report it prepared for
purposes of his bar admission. Id. So too here. By asking the federal court to review
the Board’s inquiry into Castro’s eligibility for readmission and the recommendation
it gave to the Florida Supreme Court, Castro’s claims are inextricably intertwined
with the state court’s decision on his application for readmission.
To the extent Castro argues that the source of his injury was the allegedly
fraudulent Board’s recommendation prepared by Pobjecky, and not the Florida
Supreme Court’s ultimate decision denying his readmission, that is a distinction
without a difference. When the Florida Supreme Court reviewed the Board’s
recommendation in denying his readmission, it considered the record and issued its
own decision permanently denying him readmission to the Bar, which included a
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separate concurrence from one of the Justices. As we see it, Castro suffered no injury
until the Florida Supreme Court itself denied him readmission.3
Indeed, Castro’s prayer for relief shows that he is asking the district court to
review and vacate the Florida Supreme Court’s final judgment. Castro directly asks
for an order from the district court vacating the Florida Supreme Court’s final
judgment. He also seeks relief that would accomplish the same result indirectly. He
seeks a mandatory injunction requiring the Justices to admit him to the Bar or to
issue a judgment imposing a two-year readmission ban, as well as a declaration that
the Justices will continue to unlawfully enforce the final judgment unless enjoined,
and an injunction against its enforcement. Throughout his prayer for relief, he refers
repeatedly to the judgment as “unlawful.” Based on the prayer for relief, we likewise
reject Castro’s argument that he is not claiming that the Florida Supreme Court ruled
erroneously. The relief Castro seeks plainly asks the district court to find that the
Florida Supreme Court wrongly decided Castro’s case, “effectively nullif[ying] the
3
Because the complaint alleges that the fraudulent conduct occurred during the course of Castro’s
bar readmission proceedings, Castro appears to be alleging “intrinsic fraud” in the Florida Supreme
Court proceedings; intrinsic fraud “applies to fraudulent conduct that arises within a proceeding
and pertains to the issues in the case that have been tried or could have been tried.” Parker v.
Parker, 950 So. 2d 388, 391 (Fla. 2007) (quotation omitted). However, we know of no court to
have ever recognized an intrinsic fraud exception to the Rooker–Feldman doctrine.
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state court judgment.” Target Media Partners, 881 F.3d at 1286 (quotation
omitted). 4
Castro tries to avoid Rooker-Feldman by claiming he did not have an
opportunity to raise his instant claims in state court. But Castro admits that before
he sought readmission by the Florida Supreme Court, he was aware of at least these
revealing documents -- the Notice of Board Action that informed Castro that the
panel voted for a denial of admission with a two-year reapplication period, and a
cover letter to Castro (accompanying the final recommendation) that noted that the
final recommendation differed from the Notice of Board Action in its length of
disbarment. In addition, Castro admits that he had received a CD with even more
information about the Board’s decision-making process, including the internal report
of Board proceedings that allegedly revealed Pobjecky’s fraud, but he did not review
the contents of the CD. All of these materials were transmitted to the Florida
Supreme Court for its review of the Board’s recommendation. See Fla. Bar Admiss.
R. 3-40.1 (“At the time of the filing of the answer brief, the executive director will
transmit the record of the formal hearing to the court.”). And in Castro’s 2012
4
While the complaint seeks damages from Pobjecky, it provides no basis for any entitlement to
damages. Rather, the complaint concedes that damages would not afford Castro the relief he
seeks, averring that “[a] damages award against Defendant Pobjecky alone would constitute an
inadequate legal remedy” unless the Florida Supreme Court’s judgment permanently disbarring
him were overturned. In other words, Castro’s damages claim could succeed “only to the extent
that the state court wrongly decided the issues” when it permanently disbarred him, and was
“inextricably intertwined” with the state court decision. See Alvarez, 679 F.3d at 1263
(quotation omitted).
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petition for certiorari, which he filed with the United States Supreme Court before
he allegedly reviewed the contents of the CD, he expressly cited to the Notice of
Board Action, as well as a cover letter from the Executive Director to the Board,
which explained that the Findings Worksheet from the Board had checked a two-
year disbarment period, while the Board majority had voted for permanent
disbarment, and gave the Board the option to change the disbarment period in the
final recommendation.
Thus, even before Castro initially sought review of the Board’s
recommendation in the Florida Supreme Court, he was on notice that there was an
inconsistency in the record concerning the length of his disbarment period, and could
have either sought more information from the Board, or reviewed the CD he already
had in hand, which contained the additional information that formed the basis for his
claims in federal court. We’ve held that a federal claim is “inextricably intertwined”
for Rooker-Feldman purposes “when there was [a] reasonable opportunity to raise
that particular claim during the relevant state court proceeding.” Target Media
Partners, 881 F.3d at 1286 (quotation and citation omitted). So while we’ve held
that a plaintiff did not have a reasonable opportunity to raise a claim in state court
where a judgment was entered pursuant to ex parte proceedings of which he had no
actual notice, Wood v. Orange Cty., 715 F.2d 1543, 1548 (11th Cir. 1983), we’ve
also held that a plaintiff had a reasonable opportunity to raise disability
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discrimination claims against the Florida Bar in state court where he was given
notice of a mental health report the Bar had prepared about him and the Bar’s rules
permitted him to complain about the Bar’s recommendation to the Florida Supreme
Court, yet he failed to do so, Dale, 121 F.3d at 627. We’ve also held that plaintiffs
had a reasonable opportunity to present constitutional claims during state juvenile
court proceedings where “[t]he plaintiffs were both parties to the state court
proceeding, and . . . they were present and participated in the state court
proceedings,” yet failed to raise those claims. Goodman ex rel. Goodman v. Sipos,
259 F.3d 1327, 1334 (11th Cir. 2001). Here, before Castro appeared in the Florida
Supreme Court the first time around, he knew that the Board had conducted
disbarment proceedings, he had access to all of the information forming the basis of
his instant claims, and, at the very least, he had a reasonable opportunity to assert
these claims in state court, even though he failed to do so. Because his instant claims
“should have been properly before the state court” when he initially sought review,
Castro’s claims are inextricably intertwined with the state court judgment. Target
Media Partners, 881 F.3d at 1286.5
5
Moreover, once Castro unsuccessfully sought review of the Florida Supreme Court’s first
decision in the United States Supreme Court, he reviewed the contents of the CD and filed a motion
with the Florida Supreme Court to vacate its disbarment order, raising all the same claims he raises
now. Although the Florida Supreme Court summarily dismissed Castro’s motion to vacate, the
court requested responses from both parties, who admitted the court had jurisdiction over the
motion and argued the fraud claims on the merits. As we’ve said in this context, “the Supreme
Court made clear in Feldman [that] the form of a proceeding is not significant, because ‘[i]t is the
nature and effect which is controlling.’” Doe, 630 F.3d at 1341 (quoting Feldman, 460 U.S. at
14
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Accordingly, the district court properly dismissed Castro’s complaint for lack
of subject matter jurisdiction based on the Rooker-Feldman doctrine.
AFFIRMED.
482). There is little to suggest that as a procedural matter, the Florida Supreme Court could not
have granted Castro relief based on the information contained in his motion to vacate. Thus, not
only did Castro have a reasonable opportunity to raise his claims in his first appearance before the
Florida Supreme Court, but it’s likely that he actually raised these claims in the motion to vacate,
further supporting the “inextricably intertwined” nature of the claims.
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