United States v. Ronald Larose

Case: 15-10487 Date Filed: 07/13/2015 Page: 1 of 4
[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
________________________
No. 15-10487
Non-Argument Calendar
________________________
D.C. Docket No. 0:08-cr-60134-WPD-3
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
versus
RONALD LAROSE,
Defendant-Appellant.
________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Florida
________________________
(July 13, 2015)
Before HULL, WILLIAM PRYOR and ROSENBAUM, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Case: 15-10487 Date Filed: 07/13/2015 Page: 2 of 4
Ronald Larose, a federal prisoner, appeals pro se the denial of his motion to
reduce his sentence, 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2), based on Amendment 782 to the
United States Sentencing Guidelines and the denial of his motion for
reconsideration, Fed. R. Crim. P. 35(a). Larose argues that the district court abused
its discretion in denying his motions because it improperly weighed the relevant
sentencing factors, 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). We affirm in part and vacate in part.
We review for abuse of discretion the denial of a motion to reduce a
sentence based on a later change in the Sentencing Guidelines. United States v.
Brown, 332 F.3d 1341, 1343 (11th Cir. 2003). And we review de novo the
jurisdiction of the district court. United States v. Oliver, 148 F.3d 1274, 1275 (11th
Cir. 1998).
A district court must follow a two-step process in ruling on a motion to
reduce a sentence based on a later change in the Sentencing Guidelines. United
States v. Bravo, 203 F.3d 778, 780 (11th Cir. 2000). First, the district court must
recalculate the defendant’s sentence by “substituting the amended guideline range
for the originally applied guideline range.” Id. That is, “the court shall determine
the amended guideline range that would have been applicable to the defendant if
the amendment[] . . . had been in effect at the time the defendant was sentenced.”
U.S.S.G. § 1B1.10(b)(1). “All other guideline application decisions made during
the original sentencing remain intact.” Bravo, 203 F.3d at 780 (quoting United
2
Case: 15-10487 Date Filed: 07/13/2015 Page: 3 of 4
States v. Vautier, 144 F.3d 756, 760 (11th Cir. 1998)). Second, the district court
must decide whether to retain the original sentence or to resentence the defendant
under the amended guideline range based on the relevant sentencing factors, 18
U.S.C. § 3553(a). Bravo, 203 F.3d at 781; see also Vautier, 144 F.3d at 760 (“The
grant of authority to the district court to reduce a term of imprisonment [under §
3582(c)(2)] is unambiguously discretionary.”). The district court is “not required to
articulate the applicability of each factor as long as the record as a whole
demonstrates that the pertinent factors were taken into account.” United States v.
Williams, 557 F.3d 1254, 1256 (11th Cir. 2009) (internal quotation marks omitted).
Under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 35(a), a district court may correct
a sentence for an “arithmetical, technical, or other clear error” within 14 days after
sentencing. Fed. R. Crim. P. 35(a). That 14-day deadline is jurisdictional. United
States v. Diaz-Clark, 292 F.3d 1310, 1317 (11th Cir. 2002); see also United States
v. Phillips, 597 F.3d 1190, 1196–97 (11th Cir. 2010). In Phillips, we held that
when a district court reduces a sentence under section 3582(c)(2) “the strictures of
Rule 35 apply.” 597 F.3d at 1197–99. We later held that the rationale of Phillips
extends to cases in which the district court denies a motion to reduce a sentence on
the merits because a “denial on the merits is still, in essence, a new sentence.”
United States v. Anderson, 772 F.3d 662, 667 (11th Cir. 2014).
3
Case: 15-10487 Date Filed: 07/13/2015 Page: 4 of 4
The district court did not abuse its discretion when it denied Larose’s motion
to reduce his sentence. The district court correctly followed the two-step process
for deciding whether to grant Larose’s motion. The district court recalculated
Larose’s guideline range and weighed the relevant sentencing factors. The district
court acted within its discretion when it found that Larose’s original 151-month
sentence was necessary to protect the public, promote respect for the law, and act
as a deterrent. We affirm the denial of Larose’s motion to reduce his sentence.
We cannot consider Larose’s arguments about the denial of his motion for
reconsideration. The district court lacked jurisdiction to deny Larose’s motion for
reconsideration more than 14 days after it had denied his motion to reduce his
sentence. Accordingly, we vacate that order.
AFFIRMED IN PART AND VACATED IN PART.
4