United States v. Carson William Matute-Rankin

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[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
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No. 16-14683
Non-Argument Calendar
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D.C. Docket No. 8:06-cr-00367-SCB-MAP-1
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
versus
CARSON WILLIAM MATUTE-RANKIN,
a.k.a. Aparicio Matute,
Defendant-Appellant.
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Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Middle District of Florida
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(November 2, 2017)
Before WILLIAM PRYOR, MARTIN and ANDERSON, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
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Carson William Matute-Rankin appeals the order that reduced his sentence
based on his substantial assistance to the government. Fed. R. Crim. P. 35(b).
Matute-Rankin argues that the government breached its plea agreement by moving
for a four-level departure instead of requesting a greater reduction of his sentence
based on the “[t]he terms of [a] third party agreement.” We affirm.
As a general rule, a ruling on a motion to reduce based on substantial
assistance under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 35(b) is a discretionary
decision not subject to appellate review. United States v. Manella, 86 F.3d 201,
203 (11th Cir. 1996). Matute-Rankin does not challenge the decision that granted
him a reduction; he contends instead that the government violated its agreement to
award a greater reduction. And we have jurisdiction to review whether the
government breached its plea agreement. See 18 U.S.C. § 3742(a)(1). We review
that issue de novo. United States v. Hunter, 835 F.3d 1320, 1324 (11th Cir. 2016).
The government did not breach its agreement with Matute-Rankin. The plea
agreement provided that the government would “consider whether [Matute-
Rankin’s] cooperation qualifies as ‘substantial assistance’ . . . that warrant[s] the
filing of a motion for a reduction of sentence . . . pursuant to Fed. R. Crim. P.
35(b).” In the written agreement and during his change of plea hearing, Matute-
Rankin acknowledged “that the determination as to whether ‘substantial assistance’
has been provided or what type of motion . . . will be filed, if any, rests with the
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United States Attorney for the Middle District of Florida”; that the plea agreement
“constituted the entire agreement between the government and [him] . . . and no
other promises, agreements, or representations exist[ed] or ha[d] been made . . .
with regard to such guilty plea”; and that no one had promised him “anything
differently in order to get [him] to plead guilty.” See United States v. Medlock, 12
F.3d 185, 187 (11th Cir. 1994) (“There is a strong presumption that the statements
made during the colloquy are true.”). Later, the government complied with its
obligation to consider Matute-Rankin’s assistance and moved for him to receive a
four-level departure based on information that he provided about a hidden
compartment in a vessel and the transportation of cocaine concealed on another
vessel. On the recommendation of the government, the district court reduced
Matute-Rankin’s sentence from 292 months to 188 months.
Matute-Rankin failed to prove there was a supplemental agreement. Matute-
Rankin moved for a further reduction of his sentence and alleged that “[t]he terms
of [a] third party agreement” guaranteed specific reductions in his sentence in
exchange for certain inculpatory information. But he produced no third-party
agreement for the district court to review.
In his motion for leave to supplement the record, Matute-Rankin asked the
district court “to look to the plea agreement itself, to determine if the government
actually promised to give [him] certain amounts of departure based on the extent of
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his cooperation[] (i.e., 5 years for each go-fast boat and crew), and additional
departures based on each individuals [sic] role or position within the conspiracy.”
But the plea agreement contained a promise by the government to consider Matute-
Rankin’s cooperation; it did not require that the government make any specific
recommendation regarding the amount of reduction, if any, that it might seek on
his behalf. See United States v. McNeese, 547 F.3d 1307, 1308 (11th Cir. 2008)
(Rule 35(b) “gives the government ‘a power, not a duty, to file a motion when a
defendant has substantially assisted.’”). Matute-Rankin attaches to his brief his
unsigned affidavit and a letter written by his son that purportedly recount
agreements they each entered to reduce Matute-Rankin’s sentence, but we do not
consider exhibits attached to a brief that were not presented to the district court.
See United States v. Cross, 928 F.2d 1030, 1053 (11th Cir. 1991) (“This court
cannot consider a claim that rests on factual allegations outside the record which
the district court has never considered.”); Wilson v. Apfel, 179 F.3d 1276, 1278
(11th Cir. 1999) (“[N]ew evidence is not properly before the court [when] it is
merely attached as an appendix to [the appellant’s] brief.”).
The determination whether to file a motion to reduce and the extent of the
reduction requested “is reserved to the government,” United States v. Orozco, 160
F.3d 1309, 1315 (11th Cir. 1998). Although “a prosecutor’s discretion when
exercising that power is subject to constitutional limitations that district courts can
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enforce,” Wade v. United States, 504 U.S. 181, 185 (1992), Matute-Rankin did not
allege, much less prove, that the failure of the government to recommend a greater
reduction was attributable to “a constitutionally impermissible motivation,” see
United States v. Forney, 9 F.3d 1492, 1502 (11th Cir. 1993).
We AFFIRM the order that reduced Matute-Rankin’s sentence based on his
substantial assistance.
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