United States v. Cleola Sullivan

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[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
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No. 16-17636
Non-Argument Calendar
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D.C. Docket No. 4:14-cr-00056-RH-CAS-2
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
versus
CLEOLA SULLIVAN,
Defendant - Appellant.
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Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Florida
________________________
(December 5, 2017)
Before MARTIN, JILL PRYOR and ANDERSON, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
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Cleola Sullivan appeals the district court’s denial of her motion to suppress
evidence stemming from a warrantless search of her vehicle after she was pulled
over for a traffic violation. She contends that the officers violated her
constitutional rights by continuing to detain her, after issuing a traffic warning, to
conduct a search of her vehicle that was unsupported by probable cause. After
careful review, we affirm the district court’s ruling because the officers had
probable cause to search her vehicle.
I. BACKGROUND
A. Factual Background1
Law enforcement began investigating Sullivan after she was identified by
Jarrick Williams, whom the Drug Enforcement Agency (“DEA”) had suspected of
dealing cocaine. Williams was taken into custody after a search of his residence
revealed 420 grams of cocaine along with other contraband. Following his arrest,
Williams told agents that Sullivan was his primary cocaine supplier, he had known
her for more than a year, and she transported cocaine by hiding it under her car’s
bumper. He also agreed to initiate controlled communications with Sullivan. In a
1
We derive the facts from the transcript of the hearing on Sullivan’s motion to suppress
and the trial transcript. See United States v. Newsome, 475 F.3d 1221, 1224 (11th Cir. 2007)
(“[I]n reviewing a denial of a motion to suppress, we review the entire record, including trial
testimony.”).
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series of phone calls and text messages with Sullivan, Williams requested that she
deliver him five ounces of cocaine, and Sullivan agreed.
After obtaining Sullivan’s phone numbers from Williams, DEA Agent
Matthew Vickers obtained a search warrant to track the associated Global
Positioning System (GPS) information. When the GPS indicated Sullivan was
travelling south toward Tallahassee, where Williams lived, Vickers arranged for
agents to physically surveil her. After identifying Sullivan’s vehicle, the agents
began following her just west of Tallahassee. The agents observed Sullivan stop
for gas before driving to a Walmart and parking next to a black Hyundai. She then
exited her vehicle and entered the passenger side of the Hyundai, where she
remained for a few minutes. Although the agents were unable to see what
happened inside, they testified that they believed a bag had been exchanged.
Agents then followed Sullivan as she drove to Atlanta, Georgia. After
arriving in Atlanta, Sullivan drove to a bank. An agent followed her inside, where
she received a call from Williams, to which she responded, “You know I’m
coming, that’s why I called you.” Trial Tr. Vol. II at 175 (Doc. 195).2 She then
withdrew $1,500, exited the bank, and briefly sat in the passenger side of a car that
was waiting outside. Later that evening, Sullivan visited an industrial park, where
agents were unable to continue following her.
2
Citations to “Doc.” refer to docket entries in the district court record in this case.
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The following morning, the GPS showed that Sullivan had left Atlanta and
was traveling southbound on I-75 toward Florida. Based on Sullivan’s
conversations with Williams, the agents expected that Sullivan was traveling to
Tallahassee to deliver the cocaine and would take I-75 to I-10. Instead, Sullivan
stayed on I-75, traveling south past I-10, causing the agents to lose physical
surveillance. In response, Vickers contacted Sergeant Michael Rowlands of the
Alachua County Sheriff’s Department. Vickers explained to Rowlands that he
suspected Sullivan was transporting cocaine under her bumper, and they decided
that Rowlands would orchestrate “a traffic stop on Ms. Sullivan with
independently-obtained probable cause.” Tr. of Mot. to Suppress Hr’g at 99
(Doc. 148).
Rowlands recruited Officers Rodriguez and Abbot to assist him in stopping
Sullivan. The officers positioned themselves in the center median of I-75, south of
Paynes Prairie, Florida. While the officers waited for Sullivan’s vehicle to appear,
Vickers continued to update Rowlands about Sullivan’s location. When the GPS
indicated that Sullivan was nearing the officers’ area, Vickers informed Rowlands.
Rodriguez then spotted Sullivan’s vehicle and observed that she was travelling too
closely to the vehicle in front of her. Rodriguez pulled Sullivan over, and
Rowlands communicated that fact to Vickers.
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Rodriguez approached Sullivan and asked her for her driver’s license, which
she did not have. He then asked Sullivan and her grandson, who was sitting in the
back seat, to step out of the vehicle. Rodriguez asked Sullivan if the officers could
search her vehicle, and she agreed. Rowlands began searching underneath the
vehicle for contraband, but he did not find any. When Rodriguez finished running
Sullivan’s information, he gave her a written traffic warning.
After Sullivan signed the warning, the officers decided to continue searching
her vehicle. When it began to rain, Rodriguez asked Sullivan and her grandson to
wait in the back of Rodriguez’s vehicle. Having searched for thirty minutes and
failed to find any evidence of contraband, Rowlands signaled it was time to
conduct a dog sniff. Abbot, a canine handler, circled the vehicle with a drug
detection dog. The dog eventually alerted to the front bumper.
By that time, it had begun raining heavily, so the officers decided to
continue the search at the sheriff’s office. One of the officers drove Sullivan and
her grandson in the back of his patrol car while another officer drove Sullivan’s car
to the sheriff’s office. After putting the vehicle on an elevated lift, Rodriguez
spotted a sock tied under Sullivan’s rear bumper, which contained one half of a
kilogram of cocaine. Following her arrest, Sullivan made inculpatory statements
regarding her involvement in cocaine distribution.
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B. Procedural History
Sullivan was charged by a grand jury in the Northern District of Florida with
conspiracy to distribute five or more kilograms of a mixture and substance
containing a detectable amount of cocaine and cocaine base, in violation of
21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(A)(ii), and (b)(1)(C), as well as 21 U.S.C. § 846,
and possession with intent to distribute 500 grams or more of a mixture and
substance containing a detectable amount of cocaine, in violation of 21 U.S.C.
§§ 841(a)(1) and (b)(1)(B)(ii). Prior to trial, Sullivan moved to suppress the
cocaine found in her vehicle and her subsequent inculpatory statements. Sullivan
argued that the evidence should be suppressed because (1) her consent to search
the vehicle did not extend to the dog sniff, (2) the officers unreasonably prolonged
the stop to conduct the dog sniff, and (3) the dog’s alert did not provide a reliable
basis for the search.
After a hearing, the district court denied the motion to suppress, finding that
the traffic stop was supported by probable cause based on Sullivan’s traffic
violation of following too closely and that Sullivan had consented to the search of
her vehicle. The district court found, however, that Sullivan’s consent expired
upon the conclusion of the traffic stop and thus could not justify the search
conducted after the traffic warning had been issued. Regardless, the district court
concluded that the officers’ search of Sullivan’s vehicle was lawful because their
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collective knowledge, including reports from the informant, controlled calls, and
controlled text messages, “established probable cause to believe [Sullivan] would
be transporting drugs on that day.” Tr. of Mot. to Suppress Hr’g at 123 (Doc. 148).
After a four-day jury trial, Sullivan was convicted of both charges. She was
sentenced to 120 months’ imprisonment on both counts, running concurrently,
followed by five years of supervised release. Sullivan appeals the denial of her
motion to suppress.
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
With respect to a motion to suppress, we review the district court’s findings
of fact for clear error and its application of the law to those facts de novo,
construing the facts in the light most favorable to the prevailing party below—here,
the government. United States v. Lewis, 674 F.3d 1298, 1302-03 (11th Cir. 2012).
“We give great deference to a lower court judge’s determination of probable
cause.” United States v. Brundidge, 170 F.3d 1350, 1352 (11th Cir. 1999)
(internal quotation marks omitted).
III. DISCUSSION
On appeal, Sullivan argues that the traffic stop was unreasonably prolonged,
violating her constitutional rights and requiring that the resulting physical evidence
and inculpatory statements be suppressed. Sullivan argues that because her
consent had expired following the traffic stop and there was no probable cause to
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search her vehicle, her continued detention was unjustified. We hold that because
the officers had probable cause to justify the search, there was no violation of
Sullivan’s constitutional rights. 3
The Fourth Amendment protects the “right of the people to be secure in their
persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures.”
U.S. Const. amend. IV. This right is generally protected by requiring that searches
be conducted pursuant to a warrant supported by probable cause. United States v.
Tamari, 454 F.3d 1259, 1261 (11th Cir. 2006). There is an exception to the
warrant requirement, however, for automobile searches. Automobiles may be
searched without a warrant if two requirements are satisfied: “(1) the vehicle is
readily mobile (i.e., operational); and (2) agents have probable cause to believe the
vehicle contains contraband or evidence of a crime.” Id. Probable cause, in turn,
exists “when the facts and circumstances would lead a reasonably prudent [person]
to believe that the vehicle contains contraband.” United States v. Talley, 108 F.3d
277, 281 (11th Cir. 1997) (alteration in original) (quoting United States v.
Campbell, 920 F.2d 793, 796 (11th Cir. 1991)). A court may aggregate multiple
officers’ knowledge and consider probable cause collectively when the officers
3
Sullivan’s only argument with respect to her seizure is that it was unlawful because
there was no probable cause to search her vehicle. We therefore assume, without deciding, that
Sullivan’s detention was lawful if there was probable cause to conduct the search.
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“maintained at least a minimal level of communication during their investigation.”
United States v. Willis, 759 F.2d 1486, 1494 (11th Cir. 1985).
Here, Sullivan’s vehicle was mobile when the search occurred, and viewing
the evidence in the light most favorable to the government, there was probable
cause to search the vehicle after the traffic warning was issued. Probable cause
existed based on the tip from Williams, who had recently been found with cocaine,
identified Sullivan as his primary supplier, and described how she hid cocaine
under her car’s bumper; Sullivan and Williams’s phone calls and text messages
arranging for the sale and delivery of cocaine; and Sullivan’s statement on the
phone in the bank indicating to Williams that she was coming to meet him.
Although this information came from various officers, the district court correctly
determined that because Vickers was in touch with the officers on the road, his
knowledge could also be considered. See Willis, 759 F.2d at 1494.
As the district court acknowledged, the government’s evidence was
imperfect. Sullivan’s driving past Tallahassee was inconsistent with the officers’
expectation that she would deliver cocaine to Williams there. Additionally, the
court noted, Vickers testified “in somewhat conclusory fashion.” Tr. of Mot. to
Suppress Hr’g at 130 (Doc. 148). The district court nevertheless concluded that “a
reasonable officer with the information that was available to Mr. Vickers [would]
believe that there were drugs in that car[.]” Id. Giving the required “great
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deference” to the district court, we agree with its finding of probable cause.
Brundidge, 170 F.3d at 1352 (internal quotation marks omitted). 4 Because the
evidence against Sullivan would lead “a reasonably prudent [person] to believe that
the vehicle contain[ed] contraband,” the district court properly found there was
probable cause to conduct the search and thus that the automobile exception to the
warrant requirement was satisfied. See Talley, 108 F.3d at 281 (first alteration in
original) (internal quotation marks omitted).
IV. CONCLUSION
Because the district court properly found there was probable cause to believe
that Sullivan’s vehicle contained contraband, the search of her vehicle was proper,
and we affirm the district court’s denial of Sullivan’s motion to suppress the
cocaine and her inculpatory statements.
AFFIRMED.
4
Sullivan also argues that dog sniffs are an improper basis for probable cause because of
their unreliability, and that this particular dog was insufficiently reliable. However, the district
court determined that there was probable cause to search Sullivan’s vehicle independent of the
dog’s alert. Because we agree with the district court’s determination, we need not consider
whether probable cause could properly be based on a dog sniff in this case.
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