Nanette Mercer v. Sechan Realty, Inc.

Case: 13-15207 Date Filed: 06/13/2014 Page: 1 of 8
[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
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No. 13-15207
Non-Argument Calendar
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D.C. Docket No. 0:13-cv-61815-RNS
NANETTE MERCER,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
versus
SECHAN REALTY, INC,
Defendant-Appellant.
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Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Florida
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(June 13, 2014)
Before WILSON, KRAVITCH and ANDERSON, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
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Sechan Realty, Inc. (Sechan), appeals the district court’s grant of a
preliminary injunction enjoining it from evicting Nanette Mercer from one of its
rental properties, as well as the court’s denial of its motion to enforce the terms of
a settlement agreement between the parties. After a thorough review, we conclude
that the Anti-Injunction Act precluded the district court from enjoining the state
court eviction proceedings, and thus we vacate the order granting the preliminary
injunction. 1 But we affirm the denial of Sechan’s motion to enforce the terms of a
prior settlement agreement between the parties.
I.
In 2013, Mercer filed a complaint in district court alleging claims against
Sechan under the Fair Housing Act (FHA), 42 U.S.C. § 3601 et seq. By way of
background, Sechan originally filed a complaint for eviction in state court based
upon Mercer’s status as a holdover tenant. Mercer filed a counterclaim setting
forth claims under the Florida FHA, Fla. Stat. § 760.20 et seq. 2 Specifically,
Mercer asserted that Sechan had improperly attempted to evict her after Mercer
requested to keep her emotional-support dog in her residence as a reasonable
1
Because we conclude that the Anti-Injunction Act precluded the district court from considering
Mercer’s injunction request, we do not consider Sechan’s alternate arguments that the district
court improperly granted Mercer injunctive relief based on the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, the
abstention doctrine, and/or res judicata.
2
“The Florida Fair Housing Act contains statutory provisions that are substantively identical to
the federal Fair Housing Act, and the facts and circumstances that comprise the federal and state
fair housing claims are the same.” Loren v. Sasser, 309 F.3d 1296, 1299 n.9 (11th Cir. 2002).
2
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accommodation for her disability. The parties subsequently entered into a
settlement agreement, whereby Sechan agreed to allow Mercer to occupy the rental
property for an additional year. In return, Mercer dismissed with prejudice her
discrimination claims against Sechan.
When Mercer failed to vacate the rental property upon the expiration of the
renewed lease, Sechan again moved to evict Mercer. Mercer, in turn, refiled in
state court her counterclaims under the Florida FHA. After a hearing, the state
court entered a default judgment for eviction, pursuant to Fla. Stat. § 83.60(2), due
to Mercer’s failure to deposit rent into the state court registry or to file a motion to
determine the amount of rent to be paid into the registry.
The following day, Mercer filed a complaint in district court listing claims
under the FHA. She also attached an emergency motion for a temporary
restraining order (TRO) and/or preliminary injunction, seeking to enjoin Sechan
from evicting her pending the resolution of her FHA claims. The district court
initially granted the motion, then, following a hearing, vacated its order and asked
the parties for supplemental briefing.
Back in state court, Mercer appealed the default judgment of eviction and
simultaneously filed a motion for a stay pending her appeal. Sechan moved to
dismiss Mercer’s counterclaims under the Florida FHA for failure to exhaust
3
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administrative remedies. The state court dismissed Mercer’s counterclaims
without prejudice, and also granted Mercer’s motion for a stay.
Following the dismissal of Mercer’s counterclaims in state court, the district
court reinstated the TRO 3 based on its assessment that the “requirement that a
plaintiff exhaust her administrative remedies before she may proceed on a Fair
Housing claim . . . appears inconsistent with federal law.” Mercer filed a copy of
the injunction in state court. Sechan moved in federal court to vacate the
preliminary injunction, and also filed a motion to enforce the terms of the
settlement agreement. The district court denied both motions. This is Sechan’s
appeal.
II.
“[We] review[] a district court’s order granting or denying a preliminary
injunction for abuse of discretion.” Four Seasons Hotels & Resorts, B.V. v.
Consorcio Barr, S.A., 320 F.3d 1205, 1209 (11th Cir. 2003).
Sechan argues that the district court was barred from granting Mercer’s
request for an injunction by the Anti-Injunction Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2283. At the time
the district court granted Mercer’s request for a preliminary injunction enjoining
the eviction order, the state court proceedings, including Mercer’s appeal,
3
Although styled as a TRO, the district court’s order was actually a preliminary injunction from
which an immediate appeal can be taken. See Haitian Refugee Ctr., Inc. v. Baker, 950 F.2d 685,
686 (11th Cir. 1991) (“Although a temporary restraining order is not ordinarily appealable,
where the order has the effect of a preliminary injunction this court has jurisdiction to review the
order and is not bound by the district court’s designation of the order.”).
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remained pending. Mercer responds that because her counterclaims were
dismissed for failure to exhaust administrative remedies, absent injunctive relief,
her rights under the FHA cannot be “meaningfully protected” in state court.
III.
The Anti-Injunction Act prohibits a federal court from “grant[ing] an
injunction to stay proceedings in a State court except as expressly authorized by
Act of Congress, or where necessary in aid of its jurisdiction, or to protect or
effectuate its judgments.” 28 U.S.C. § 2283. If one of the three specific
exceptions contained in the Anti-Injunction Act permits an injunction, the All
Writs Act grants a federal court the power to issue it. Burr & Forman v. Blair, 470
F.3d 1019, 1027-28 (11th Cir. 2006).
“[I]n assessing the propriety of an injunction entered to stop a state court
proceeding, the sole relevant inquiry is whether the injunction qualifies for one of
the exceptions to the Anti-Injunction Act.” Id. at 1028. Here, the district court
never indicated which of the three exceptions to the Anti-Injunction Act, if any, it
was relying on when it granted Mercer’s request for a preliminary injunction
enjoining the state court eviction proceedings. The third exception is clearly
inapplicable because the district court never issued any judgment in connection
with the eviction. Thus, we turn to the remaining two exceptions.
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In Mitchum v. Foster, 407 U.S. 225 (1972), the Supreme Court prescribed a
two-part analysis for determining whether a federal statute comes within the Anti–
Injunction Act’s “expressly authorized” exception: (1) the statute “must have
created a specific and uniquely federal right or remedy, enforceable in a federal
court of equity,” and (2) the federal right or remedy must be such that it can be
“given its intended scope only by the stay of a state court proceeding.” Id. at 237-
38. We need only consider the first prong of the Mitchum test because the FHA is
expressly enforceable in both state and federal courts. See 42 U.S.C. §
3613(a)(1)(A) (highlighting that a plaintiff “may commence a civil action in an
appropriate United States district court or State court not later than 2 years after the
occurrence or the termination of an alleged discriminatory housing practice . . . .”).
Mercer highlights that she was not allowed to fairly present her Florida FHA
claims in state court because her counterclaims were dismissed for failure to
exhaust administrative remedies. She maintains that even if she sought
administrative review, she risked being displaced from her home before her claims
could be heard in state court. Mercer, however, fails to acknowledge that the state
court granted her a stay pending her appeal of the default judgment of eviction.
Thus, she retained an avenue to challenge the eviction order in state court. 4
4
Notably, approximately a month after the district court granted Mercer’s request for a
preliminary injunction, she moved to voluntarily dismiss her appeal of the state court’s final
judgment for eviction.
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Moreover, Mercer could have, but elected not to, appeal the dismissal of her
Florida FHA claims for failure to exhaust administrative remedies as inconsistent
with federal law. As such, we conclude that the “expressly authorized” exception
to the Anti-Injunction Act did not apply here.
Lastly, federal courts may enjoin state court proceedings based on the
“necessary in aid of its jurisdiction” exception in only two situations, where:
“(1) the district court has exclusive jurisdiction over the action because it had been
removed from state court; or, (2) the state court entertains an in rem action
involving a res over which the district court has been exercising jurisdiction in an
in rem action.” In re Bayshore Ford Trucks Sales, Inc., 471 F.3d 1233, 1250-51
(11th Cir. 2006).
There was no “removal,” in the required sense, of this case from state court
to federal court, so the first situation does not exist. The question is whether the
second one does. We conclude that it does not. Here, the state court acquired in
rem jurisdiction over the property at issue first. See id. (providing that where in
rem “jurisdiction of the state court has first attached, the federal court is precluded
from exercising its jurisdiction over the same res to defeat or impair the state
court’s jurisdiction”).
Because we conclude that none of the three exceptions to the Anti-Injunction
Act applies, the district court abused its discretion by enjoining the state court’s
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default eviction judgment. Accordingly, we vacate and remand the district court’s
order awarding Mercer a preliminary injunction.
IV.
Finally, we briefly note that the district court properly denied Sechan’s
motion to enforce the terms of the settlement agreement because that agreement
resolved a prior dispute between the parties, and does not pertain to the current
eviction proceedings, which arose after the execution of the settlement agreement.
VACATED AND REMANDED IN PART; AFFIRMED IN PART.
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