Frederick Levin Waterfield, Jr. v. William Gary Law, Jr.

Case: 13-11613 Date Filed: 10/25/2013 Page: 1 of 5
[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
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No. 13-11613
Non-Argument Calendar
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D.C. Docket No. 5:12-cv-00077-WTH-PRL
FREDERICK LEVIN WATERFIELD, JR.,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
versus
WILLIAM GARY LAW, JR.,
JACQUELINE R. GRIFFIN,
VINCENT GEORGE TORPY, JR.,
CHARLES ALAN LAWSON,
Defendants-Appellees.
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Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Middle District of Florida
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(October 25, 2013)
Before DUBINA, MARTIN and FAY, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
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Appellant Frederick Waterfield, Jr., a state prisoner proceeding pro se,
appeals the district court’s dismissal of his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 complaint, pursuant to
28 U.S.C. § 1915A. Waterfield alleged that Florida Judges William Gary Law,
Jr., Jacqueline R. Griffin, Vincent George Torpy, Jr., and Charles Alan Lawson
(collectively referred to as the “Judges”) violated his constitutional rights in their
respective orders denying his 2011 motion for post-conviction relief and affirming
that denial on appeal. He sought damages and requested injunctive relief directing
the Judges to discharge him from liability for his 1985 conviction and sentence.
The district court dismissed his damages claims because the Judges were entitled
to judicial immunity and dismissed his claim for injunctive relief because it was
not cognizable under § 1983.
On appeal, Waterfield argues that the district court applied the wrong legal
standard in dismissing his complaint under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A. He also contends
that the Judges were not entitled to absolute judicial immunity because they lacked
subject matter jurisdiction over his case.
We review de novo a district court’s sua sponte dismissal under 28 U.S.C.
§ 1915A for failure to state a claim. Leal v. Ga. Dep’t Corr., 254 F.3d 1276, 1278-
79 (11th Cir. 2001). We review a district court’s grant of judicial immunity de
novo. Smith v. Shook, 237 F.3d 1322, 1325 (11th Cir. 2001). The Prison Litigation
Reform Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1915A, requires the district court to review all complaints
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filed by prisoners against a governmental entity or officer or employee of a
governmental entity to determine whether the action is “frivolous, malicious, or
fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted”; or “seeks monetary relief
from a defendant who is immune from such relief.” See 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a),
(b)(1)-(2).
The standards that apply to a dismissal under Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6) apply to
a dismissal under § 1915A(b)(1). Leal, 254 F.3d at 1278-79. In reviewing a
complaint, the district court accepts the allegations in the complaint as true. Boxer
X v. Harris, 437 F.3d 1107, 1110 (11th Cir. 2006). To survive dismissal, a
plaintiff’s complaint “must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to
state a claim for relief that is plausible on its face.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S.
662, 678, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009) (internal quotation marks omitted). Stating
a claim upon which relief may be granted “requires more than labels and
conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will
not” be enough to survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss. Bell Atl. Corp. v.
Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555, 127 S. Ct. 1955, 1965 (2007). A pro se complaint is
liberally construed and held to a less stringent standard than pleadings drafted by
attorneys. Boxer X, 437 F.3d at 1110.
Judges are entitled to absolute immunity for all actions taken in their judicial
capacity, except where they act in the “clear absence of all jurisdiction.” Bolin v.
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Story, 225 F.3d 1234, 1239 (11th Cir. 2000) (quoting Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S.
349, 356-57, 98 S. Ct. 1099, 1105 (1978)). Absolute judicial immunity “applies
even when the judge’s acts are in error, malicious, or were in excess of his or her
jurisdiction.” Id. Pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, “in any action brought against a
judicial officer for an act or omission taken in such officer’s judicial capacity,
injunctive relief shall not be granted unless a declaratory decree was violated or
declaratory relief was unavailable.” 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
“[H]abeas corpus is the exclusive remedy for a state prisoner who challenges
the fact or duration of his confinement and seeks immediate or speedier release.”
Bradley v. Pryor, 305 F.3d 1287, 1289 (11th Cir. 2002). A prisoner “cannot use a
§ 1983 action to challenge the fact or duration of his confinement.” Wilkinson v.
Dotson, 544 U.S. 74, 78, 125 S. Ct. 1242, 1245 (2005) (internal quotation marks
omitted). Thus, a § 1983 action is barred if “success in that action would
necessarily demonstrate the invalidity of confinement or its duration.” Id. at 81-82,
125 S.Ct. at 1247-48.
We conclude from the record that the district court did not err in dismissing
Waterfield’s damages claims against the Judges because Waterfield sought relief
from immune defendants. The actions taken by the Judges with respect to
Waterfield’s post-conviction motion were taken in their judicial capacity. See
Story, 225 F.3d at 1239. To the extent that Waterfield argues that the Judges acted
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without subject matter jurisdiction, this argument is unavailing because
Waterfield’s conclusory allegations did not establish that they acted in “clear
absence of jurisdiction.” See Rolleston v. Eldridge, 848 F.2d 163, 165 (11th Cir.
1988) (“The applicability of judicial immunity does not depend on the
determination of nice questions of jurisdiction.”) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
As to Waterfield’s claim for injunctive relief, we conclude that he fails to
state a claim upon which relief could be granted because his claim is not
cognizable in a § 1983 action. See 42 U.S.C. § 1983. To the extent that Waterfield
challenges the validity of his conviction and confinement, he must pursue that
relief through a habeas petition. See Bradley, 305 F.3d at 1289; Dotson, 544 U.S.
at 78, 125 S.Ct. at 1245. Contrary to Waterfield’s contentions on appeal, the
district court properly concluded that the 28 U.S.C. § 1915A standard applied
because Waterfield was a prisoner seeking redress from a governmental authority.
See 28 U.S.C. § 1915A. Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s judgment of
dismissal of Waterfield’s complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A.
AFFIRMED.
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