Terrance A. Davis v. Daniele A. Davis

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[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
________________________
No. 13-10903
Non-Argument Calendar
________________________
D.C. Docket No. 0:12-cv-61766-MGC
TERRENCE A. DAVIS,
Individually and as next friend for the
minors D.A. and T.A. Davis,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
versus
DANIELE A. DAVIS,
individually,
MARINA GARCIA-WOODS,
as Judge for Seventeenth Judicial Circuit of Florida,
ALFRED T. LAMBERTI,
as Sheriff of Broward County, Florida; Broward County
Sheriff Office Dept of Detention and Community Control
Broward County Florida; State of Florida,
MICHAEL J. SATZ,
as/& State Attorney in and for Broward County, Florida,
JEANNE NEIL,
Child Protection Investigator, et al.,
Defendants-Appellees.
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________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Florida
________________________
(January 9, 2014)
Before HULL, PRYOR, and MARTIN, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Proceeding pro se, Terrence Davis appeals the district court’s dismissal of
his civil lawsuit as barred by the doctrine of res judicata. Davis filed the instant
suit against: (1) Daniele Davis, his ex-wife; (2) the Honorable Marina
Garcia-Wood, a Florida state judge; (3) Michael Satz, State Attorney for Broward
County, Florida; (4) Alfred Lamberti, the former Sheriff of Broward County,
Florida; (5) Dimos Charoudis, a deputy sheriff; (6) Ronald Faircloth, a deputy
sheriff; and (7) L. Samuels, another deputy sheriff.
We affirm the district court’s ruling with respect to Davis’s claims against
Judge Garcia-Wood, State Attorney Satz, and Sheriff Lamberti.1 We also affirm
with respect to Davis’s claims against Deputy Sheriffs Charoudis, Faircloth, and
Samuel in their official capacities. However, we must reverse and remand the
dismissal of Davis’s claims against his ex-wife Daniele Davis and against Deputy
1
We note that Sheriff Lamberti has been replaced as a defendant by Sheriff Scott Israel,
the current Broward County Sheriff. The dismissal of Davis’s claim against Sheriff Lamberti
operates as a dismissal of Sheriff Israel.
2
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Sheriffs Charoudis, Faircloth, and Samuels in their individual capacities because
these claims are not barred by res judicata.
I. BACKGROUND
A. Dismissal in Davis I
Before the instant 2012 lawsuit, Davis filed a 2011 lawsuit in the Southern
District of Florida against, among others, the seven defendants listed above,
alleging violations of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt
Organizations (“RICO”) statutes. (“Davis I”) Davis’s complaint arose out of the
arrest, investigation, detention, prosecution, trial, and eventual acquittal of Davis
for domestic-violence criminal charges that involved the testimony of his ex-wife
Daniele Davis. Davis contended that the defendants conspired to violate his
constitutional rights by interfering with his parent-child relationship and by failing
to disclose exculpatory evidence in the domestic-violence criminal case against
Davis.
Davis alleged that: (1) his ex-wife Daniele Davis, in an effort to excise
Davis from their daughters’ lives, manipulated the legal system by giving false and
vindictive testimony and other evidence to the court; (2) Deputy Sheriffs
Charoudis and Faircloth improperly investigated the domestic violence allegations
against Davis; and (3) Deputy Sheriff Samuels falsely swore that he saw Davis
punch an individual while detained at the Broward County jail.
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Davis further claimed that, in prosecuting the domestic violence charges,
State Attorney Satz deceived the state court and failed to turn over exculpatory 911
tapes. Finally, Davis asserted that Judge Garcia-Wood (1) essentially terminated
his parental rights by issuing a domestic-violence injunction against Davis without
a full evidentiary hearing and (2) that she aided the other defendants in interfering
with Davis’s relationship to his children.
Davis failed to perfect service of his first lawsuit on Deputy Sheriffs
Charoudis, Faircloth, Samuels, and his ex-wife Daniele Davis. The other
defendants, Judge Garcia-Wood, State Attorney Satz, and Sheriff Lamberti, were
served and moved to dismiss the Davis I complaint for failure to state a claim
under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6).
The district court dismissed Davis I in its entirety. The district court ruled
that (1) Davis’s RICO claim failed because “the alleged actions do not, and cannot,
establish a pattern of racketeering activity”; (2) Davis’s claim against State
Attorney Satz must be dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction because a
complaint relating to lawyer misconduct is subject to an investigation by the
Florida Bar and then, if necessary, must be referred to the exclusive jurisdiction of
the Florida Supreme Court; (3) Davis’s constitutional claims against Judge Garcia-
Wood under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 were barred by judicial immunity and the Rooker-
Feldman doctrine; and (4) Davis’s claim against Sheriff Lamberti, liberally
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construed, attempted to hold the sheriff vicariously liable for the actions of the
deputy sheriffs on the basis of respondeat superior, which is not a viable theory
under § 1983.
The district court also addressed Davis’s claims against the unserved
defendants Charoudis, Faircloth, Samuels, and Daniele Davis, even though none of
these four defendants had moved for dismissal. The district court ruled that: (1)
Davis’s claims against Deputy Sheriffs Faircloth and Charoudis failed because
“[n]egligent investigation is not a valid cause of action under § 1983”; (2) Davis’s
“allegations against Deputy Samuels fail[ed] to state sufficient facts that provide
any relevance to the case at issue”; and (3) Davis’s claim against his ex-wife failed
“because Florida does not recognize” a cause of action for tortious interference
with a parent-child relationship by another parent.
Concluding that amendment of the Davis I complaint would be futile, the
district court dismissed the first lawsuit in its entirety under Rule 12(b)(6) and
directed the clerk of the court to close the case.
B. Dismissal of Davis II
Davis brought suit again in 2012, once more naming the same seven
defendants. In this second lawsuit, Davis sued all public-employee defendants in
their official and individual capacities. (“Davis II”)
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Davis’s complaint again arose out of the same arrest, investigation,
detention, and criminal prosecution of Davis for domestic violence. Although
adding more detail to his claims, Davis again alleged a conspiracy among the
defendants to deprive him of his parental rights. The complaint again centered
around: (1) his ex-wife’s false charges against him; (2) the deputy sheriffs’
investigation and filing of false reports; (3) State Attorney Satz’s prosecution and
failure to produce the 911 tapes; and (4) Judge Garcia-Wood’s injunction against
Davis.
Davis also added a few new contentions stemming from the same course of
events. For example, he alleged that Sheriff Lamberti (1) implemented policies or
practices that allowed his deputies to violate constitutional rights and (2) created
and enforced a policy or practice that did not ensure that his deputies provided
appropriate medical care to detainees.
Davis sought redress for the defendants’ alleged constitutional violations
under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983, 1985, 1986, and 1988. He also asserted a myriad of
other claims, such as malicious prosecution and defamation.
All seven defendants moved to dismiss the complaint. The district court
granted these motions after concluding that Davis’s claims in Davis II were all
barred by the doctrine of res judicata. Davis timely appealed.
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
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We review de novo the district court’s grant of a motion to dismiss under
Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim, “accepting the allegations in the
complaint as true and construing them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff.”
Leib v. Hillsborough Cnty. Pub. Transp. Comm’n, 558 F.3d 1301, 1305 (11th Cir.
2009). We also review de novo the district court’s application of the res judicata
doctrine. Griswold v. Cnty. of Hillsborough, 598 F.3d 1289, 1292 (11th Cir.
2010).
III. DISCUSSION
A. Res Judicata
“The doctrine of res judicata, or claim preclusion, bars the parties to an
action from litigating claims that were or could have been litigated in a prior action
between the same parties.” Lobo v. Celebrity Cruises, Inc., 704 F.3d 882, 892
(11th Cir. 2013). Res judicata may be applied only if the party asserting the
doctrine can meet its burden of showing that “certain prerequisites are met.” In re
Piper Aircraft Corp., 244 F.3d 1289, 1296 (11th Cir. 2001). More specifically, the
party invoking res judicata must establish that “(1) the prior decision was rendered
by a court of competent jurisdiction; (2) there was a final judgment on the merits;
(3) the parties were identical in both suits; and (4) the prior and present causes of
action are the same.” Davila v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 326 F.3d 1183, 1187 (11th
Cir. 2003) (internal quotation marks omitted).
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Here, there is no dispute that the district court’s judgment in Davis I was
entered by a court of competent jurisdiction, satisfying the first element of res
judicata. We therefore turn to the remaining elements.
B. Second Element: Final Judgment on the Merits
The dismissal in Davis I satisfies the second element because an order
dismissing a claim under Rule 12(b)(6) is a final judgment on the merits for
purposes of res judicata. See Lobo, 704 F.3d at 893 (“We also conclude that the
[prior] order was an adjudication on the merits because the order was a Rule
12(b)(6) dismissal with prejudice.”); see also Hall v. Tower Land & Inv. Co., 512
F.2d 481, 483 (5th Cir. 1975) (“[G]ranting defendant’s motion to dismiss for
plaintiff’s failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted operates as an
adjudication on the merits.”). 2
We reject Davis’s argument that there was no adjudication on the merits
because the district court’s order dismissing the complaint in Davis I did not use
the term “with prejudice.” Even without the words “with prejudice,” the dismissal
order was, in fact, an adjudication on the merits. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
41(b) explains that “[u]nless the dismissal order states otherwise,” the dismissal
order “operates as adjudication on the merits.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(b). The district
2
In Bonner v. City of Prichard, 661 F.2d 1206, 1209 (11th Cir. 1981) (en banc), this
Court adopted as binding precedent all decisions of the former Fifth Circuit handed down prior
to October 1, 1981.
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court in Davis I expressly concluded that amendment of the complaint would be
futile and thus dismissed the case “in its entirety” for failure to state a claim. There
is no indication that the dismissal in Davis I was without prejudice or that it was
anything other than an adjudication on the merits. Because the dismissal order
here did not “state[] otherwise,” it “operates as adjudication on the merits.” Fed.
R. Civ. P. 41(b).
C. Fourth Element: The Same Causes of Action
Before discussing the third element, we readily conclude that the fourth
element of res judicata—the “same causes of action” requirement—is met. This
element is satisfied when the second action “arises out of the same nucleus of
operative fact, or is based upon the same factual predicate, as a former action.”
Ragsdale v. Rubbermaid, Inc., 193 F.3d 1235, 1239 (11th 1999).
This test is easily met here, as both Davis I and Davis II arose out of the
same nucleus of operative facts. Both cases arose out of the same accusation,
investigation, arrest, detention, and prosecution of Davis for a domestic-violence
crime. This conclusion is not altered by the fact that Davis II asserted, in part,
different legal theories than Davis I and that Davis II alleged certain factual
circumstances not explicitly alleged in Davis I. Because “res judicata operates to
preclude not only the issues raised in the prior action, but issues which could have
been raised in the prior action,” N.A.A.C.P. v. Hunt, 891 F.2d 1555, 1561 (11th
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Cir. 1990), “[r]es judicata applies not only to the exact legal theories advanced in
the prior case, but to all legal theories and claims arising out of the same nucleus of
operative facts,” Wesch v. Folsom, 6 F.3d 1465, 1471 (11th Cir. 1993); Eastman
Kodak Co. v. Atlanta Retail, Inc. (In re Atlanta Retail, Inc.), 456 F.3d 1277, 1288
(11th Cir. 2006) (same).
All claims and legal theories advanced in Davis II arise out of the same
nucleus of operative facts that formed the basis for the complaint in Davis I.
D. Third Element: Identical Parties
Under the third element of res judicata, “a judgment will only bar
subsequent claims involving the same parties or their privies.” Citibank, N.A. v.
Data Lease Fin. Corp., 904 F.2d 1498, 1502 (11th Cir. 1990). This requirement is
satisfied with respect to (1) Judge Garcia-Wood; (2) State Attorney Satz; and
(3) Sheriff Lamberti. Each one of these three defendants was a party in both
Davis I and Davis II.
The “identical party” requirement is also satisfied for Davis’s claims against
Deputy Sheriffs Charoudis, Faircloth, and Samuels in their official capacities.
When a law enforcement officer “is sued under Section 1983 in his or her official
capacity, the suit is simply another way of pleading an action against an entity of
which an officer is an agent.” Abusaid v. Hillsborough Cnty Bd. of Cnty. Com’rs,
405 F.3d 1298, 1302 n.3 (11th Cir. 2005) (internal quotation marks omitted).
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Thus, Davis’s claims against the three deputy sheriffs in their official capacities
were actually claims against the Sheriff of Broward County, and not against the
three deputy sheriffs. See id.; Welch v. Laney, 57 F.3d 1004, 1009 (11th Cir.1995)
(“[W]here a plaintiff brings an action against a public official in his official
capacity, the suit is against the office that official represents, and not the official
himself.”); Owens v. Fulton Cnty, 877 F.2d 947, 951 n.5 (11th Cir. 1989) (“For
liability purposes, a suit against a public official in his official capacity is
considered a suit against the local government entity he represents.”).
Given that (1) Davis’s claim against the three deputy sheriffs in their official
capacities in Davis II were actually claims against Sheriff Lamberti and (2) Sheriff
Lamberti was a party in Davis I, the “identical parties” requirement is met for
Davis’s claims against the three deputy sheriffs in their official capacities.
A different conclusion, however, is warranted with respect to Davis’s claims
against Daniele Davis and against the three deputy sheriffs in their individual
capacities. While they were named as defendants in the Davis I complaint,
Daniele Davis and the three deputy sheriffs were never served with process and
thus did not become parties for res judicata purposes. Hart v. Yamaha-Parts
Distributors, Inc., 787 F.2d 1468, 1471 (11th Cir. 1986) (holding that “named but
unserved defendants [are not] ‘parties’ for res judicata purposes”); cf. Loman Dev.
Co. v. Daytona Hotel & Motel Suppliers, Inc., 817 F.2d 1533, 1536 (11th Cir.
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1987) (holding that an unserved defendant is not a “party” for purposes of Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 54(b) and, thus, the existence of unserved defendants does
not prevent finality of a judgment); Insinga v. LaBella, 817 F.2d 1469, 1470 (11th
Cir. 1987) (same); cf. also Neals v. Norwood, 59 F.3d 530, 532 (5th Cir. 1995)
(holding that “because [certain defendants] had not been served, they were not
parties to this action at the time the magistrate entered judgment”).
Because a person is “not bound by a judgment in personam in a litigation in
which he is not designated as a party or to which he has not been made a party by
service of process,” the doctrine of res judicata may not operate against an
unserved defendant to the first action—unless the unserved defendant was in
privity with a party to the first action. See Griswold, 598 F.3d at 1292 (internal
quotation marks omitted); Richards v. Jefferson Cnty., Ala., 517 U.S. 793, 797-99
& n.4, 116 S. Ct. 1761, 1765-67 & n.4 (1996). Accordingly, an unserved
defendant in the first action may not affirmatively assert the doctrine of res judicata
as a defense to the second action—unless the unserved defendant was in privity
with a party to the first action. Hart, 787 F.2d at 1471-72 (holding that an unserved
defendant in the first action could not assert res judicata defense unless it could
establish privity with a party to the first action); see Lozman v. City of Riviera
Beach, Fla.,713 F.3d 1066, 1075 n.7 (11th Cir. 2013) (explaining that nonparties to
the first action “cannot rely on res judicata unless they are in privity with [a party
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to the first action]”); Mann v. Palmer, 713 F.3d 1306, 1311 (11th Cir. 2013)
(holding that a defendant who was not a party to the first action could assert res
judicata in the second action because he was in privity with a party to the first
action); Pelletier v. Zweifel, 921 F.2d 1465, 1501-02 (11th Cir. 1991) (same);
Citibank, N.A., 904 F.2d at 1502-03 (same).
Given that Daniele Davis and the three deputy sheriffs were not served with
process in Davis I and thus were not parties to that litigation, they can assert the
defense of res judicata in Davis II only if they can establish privity with a party in
Davis I. Daniele Davis does not contend that she was in privity with any party in
Davis I, and we fail to see how she possibly could have been. Thus, the “identical
parties” requirement is not satisfied with respect to Daniele Davis. She therefore
cannot assert the defense of res judicata in Davis II. Accordingly, we must reverse
and remand with respect to Davis’s claims against Defendant Daniele Davis.
Deputy Sheriffs Charoudis, Faircloth, and Samuels, however, assert that they
have shown they were in privity with Sheriff Lamberti, who was a party in Davis I.
We recognize that a substantial legal relationship between an employer and his
employee may create privity for purposes of res judicata when the employer is
vicariously liable for the employee’s acts. See, e.g., Citibank, N.A., 904 F.2d at
1502-03 (holding that a bank could assert a res judicata defense based on a prior
judgment dismissing the bank’s directors when the claim against the bank in the
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second action was premised on vicarious liability for the misdeeds of the
directors).
This type of privity does not exist here because under Monell v. Dep’t of
Soc. Serv. of City of N.Y., 436 U.S. 658, 98 S. Ct. 2018 (1978), Sheriff Lamberti
cannot, as a matter of law, be vicariously liable for the § 1983 violations of the
three deputy sheriffs. Id. at 694, 98 S. Ct. at 2037-38. In the first lawsuit, Davis I,
the district court construed Davis’s claim against Sheriff Lamberti to allege
vicarious liability for the actions of the three deputy sheriffs, but the district court
then correctly dismissed this claim under Monell . Given that Davis could not, as a
matter of law, even assert a claim for vicarious liability against Sheriff Lamberti,
the district court’s ruling in favor of the Sheriff in Davis I does not serve as a res
judicata bar to Davis’s claims against the three deputy sheriffs in their individual
capacities in Davis II. The three deputy sheriffs have cited no precedent from this
Court or any other circuit finding privity for res judicata purposes in a scenario
similar to the one at hand in this case.
We also reject the deputy sheriffs’ attempt to establish privity based on
“adequate representation.” See Griswold, 598 F.3d at 1292. The Supreme Court
in Taylor v. Sturgell, 553 U.S. 880, 128 S. Ct. 2161 (2008), indicated that this
privity concept applies in representative litigation, like class actions or cases
litigated by trustees or guardians. Id. at 894, 128 S. Ct. at 2172-73. Sheriff
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Lamberti’s role in this case does not fit this type of representative litigation.
Certainly, the deputy sheriffs have cited no case applying the “adequate
representation” concept to circumstances similar to this case.3
Given that the three deputy sheriffs were not parties and cannot establish
privity with a party in Davis I, the “identity of parties” requirement is not satisfied
with respect to Davis’s claims against the three deputy sheriffs in their individual
capacities. The deputies therefore cannot assert the defense of res judicata in
Davis II. Accordingly, we must reverse and remand as to these claims.
IV. CONCLUSION
All four elements of res judicata are satisfied with respect to all claims
against Judge Garcia-Wood, State Attorney Satz, and Sheriff Lamberti. All
elements of res judicata are also satisfied with respect to Davis’s claims against
Deputy Sheriffs Charoudis, Faircloth, and Samuel in their official capacities. We
therefore affirm the district court’s order as to these claims.
However, we reverse with respect to Davis’s claims against his ex-wife
Daniele Davis and against Deputy Sheriffs Charoudis, Faircloth, and Samuels in
their individual capacities and remand for further proceedings. While these four
defendants asserted other grounds for dismissal, the district court based the
3
It is also dubious whether the “adequate representation” concept even applies when a
nonparty seeks to affirmatively use res judicata as a defense, as the three deputies attempt to do
here. We need not decide this question today, given our conclusion that the three deputy sheriffs
cannot meet the “adequate representation” exception in any event.
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dismissal on only res judicata and did not reach the alternative grounds asserted by
them. Their other defenses should be examined by the district court in the first
instance on remand.
AFFIRMED IN PART AND REVERSED AND REMANDED IN
PART.
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