Jean J. Jules v. Florida Dept. of Corrections

[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FILED
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
________________________ ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
FEB 19, 2009
No. 08-14677 THOMAS K. KAHN
Non-Argument Calendar CLERK
________________________
D. C. Docket No. 07-23095-CV-ASG
JEAN J. JULES,
Petitioner-Appellant,
versus
FLORIDA DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS,
Walter A. McNeil, Secretary,
ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE STATE
OF FLORIDA,
Bill McCollum,
Respondents-Appellees.
________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Florida
_________________________
(February 19, 2009)
Before MARCUS, KRAVITCH and ANDERSON, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Jean J. Jules, a Florida state prisoner proceeding pro se, appeals the district
court’s denial of his petition for habeas relief pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. Jules
filed his petition after the effective date of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death
Penalty Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”), Pub. L. No. 104-32, 110 Stat. 1214 (1996), and,
therefore, the provisions of that act govern this appeal. For the reasons stated
herein, we conclude that Jules’s petition is without merit and AFFIRM the district
court’s denial.
I. BACKGROUND
Because the procedural history in this case is lengthy, we will address only
the state convictions and motions relevant to this appeal.
Jules has state convictions from 1985, 1986, and 1987, all of which resulted
from guilty pleas. In 1988, Jules was charged in state court with burglary and
possession of cannabis in case number 88-33816. In 1989, he was charged in state
court with burglary and grand theft in case number 89-2983. He pleaded nolo
contendere to all charges in 1989 and was sentenced as a habitual offender to 40
years’ imprisonment. At the plea hearing, the state court confirmed that Jules was
satisfied with counsel, understood his rights and the possible sentences, and was
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pleading guilty without coercion. Jules did not file a direct appeal. Although his
1988 and 1989 cases were combined at the time of the plea and for sentencing
purposes, Jules filed separate post-conviction motions for relief for each case. In
these motions, he challenged his sentence, claimed ineffective assistance of
counsel, and raised double jeopardy claims.
In 2002, Jules filed a motion in state court pursuant to Rule 3.850 seeking to
vacate, set aside, or correct his sentence in case number 88-33816, alleging that his
pleas were involuntary because he had not been informed of the immigration
consequences of his pleading guilty. Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.850. According to Jules,
he was notified by the INS of on-going deportation proceedings in 1994 or 1995,
but had not been informed at his plea hearings in 1985, 1986, 1987, or 1989 that
entering a guilty plea would make him eligible for deportation. He noted that
Florida Criminal Procedure Rule 3.172(c)(8) requires the state court to inform a
criminal defendant of collateral consequences prior to accepting a plea. The state
court denied Jules’s motion on the ground of laches. The decision was affirmed on
appeal.
In 2007, Jules filed a motion pursuant to Rule 3.800(a) seeking to correct the
sentence imposed in case number 89-2983, challenging his sentence as illegal on
the ground that he had not been advised of the immigration consequences of his
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guilty pleas. Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.800(a). He alleged that he would not have pleaded
had he known of these consequences. The state court denied this motion without a
hearing. Jules initially appealed this decision, then voluntarily dismissed the
appeal.
Thereafter, Jules filed another motion to correct pursuant to Rule 3.850
(“Rule 3.850 motion”), seeking to vacate his guilty pleas from 1985, 1986, 1987
and 1989. He noted that the Florida Rules of Criminal Procedure were amended in
1989 to require the state court to inform defendants of the collateral consequences
of their pleas. See Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.172(c)(8). He claimed that he was unaware
when he pleaded guilty in 1985, 1986, and 1987 that these convictions would
require mandatory deportation. He further alleged that he was not informed of
these consequences at his plea hearing in 1989, even though the new law required
the court to so inform him, and that he was therefore prejudiced by the court’s
failure to advise him as evidenced by the fact that he was facing deportation
proceedings. The state court denied this motion without a hearing, concluding that
Rule 3.172 was not retroactively applicable and therefore did not provide a basis
for vacating Jules’s guilty pleas from 1985, 1986 and 1987. It also found that
Jules’s prior convictions in 1985, 1986 and 1987 provided sufficient independent
basis for deportation and that he was therefore not prejudiced by the state court’s
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failure to advise him of his 1989 pleas’ implications on his immigration status.
Accordingly, the state court found that Rule 3.172 did not allow Jules to withdraw
his guilty pleas. Jules sought rehearing, which was denied. The decision was
affirmed on appeal.
Jules thereafter filed the instant petition for relief in federal district court,
challenging the constitutionality of his state convictions pursuant to § 2254. In this
petition, Jules asserts the state court (1) committed prejudicial error by denying his
Rule 3.850 motion without an evidentiary hearing and without attaching the
portions of the record which refuted his claim and (2) violated his rights under the
Due Process clause by failing to advise him of the immigration consequences of
his pleas. The state responded that the petition failed to state a constitutional
violation entitling Jules to habeas relief. The reviewing magistrate judge
recommended that the petition be denied for failing to state a cognizable basis for
federal relief. The district court adopted the recommendation of the magistrate
judge and denied Jules’s petition. Jules requested a certificate of appealability,
which the district court granted on both issues.
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
In reviewing a district court’s denial of habeas relief, factual findings are
reviewed for clear error and questions of law are reviewed de novo. Nyland v.
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Moore, 216 F.3d 1264, 1266 (11th Cir. 2000). A state court’s factual
determinations are presumed to be correct unless shown otherwise by clear and
convincing evidence. 28 U.S.C § 2254(e).
Pursuant to the AEDPA,
An application for a writ of habeas corpus on behalf of a person in
custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court shall not be granted
with respect to any claim that was adjudicated on the merits in State
court proceedings unless the adjudication of the claim - (1) resulted in
a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable
application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the
Supreme Court of the United States; or (2) resulted in a decision that
was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the
evidence presented in the State court proceeding.
28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1), (2). A state court’s decision is “contrary to” clearly
established federal law if either (1) the state court applied a rule that contradicts the
governing law set forth by the Supreme Court case law, or (2) when faced with
materially indistinguishable facts, the state court arrived at a result different from
that reached by the Supreme Court case. Bottoson v. Moore, 234 F.3d 526, 531
(11th Cir. 2000) (citing Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362 (2000)). A state court
decision involves an unreasonable application of Supreme Court precedent “if the
state court identifies the correct governing legal rule from [Supreme Court] cases
but unreasonably applies it to the facts of the particular state prisoner’s case.” Id.In addition, a state court decision involves an unreasonable application of Supreme
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Court precedent “if the state court either unreasonably extends a legal principle
from [Supreme Court] precedent to a new context where it should not apply or
unreasonably refuses to extend that principle to a new context where it should
apply.” Id.III. DISCUSSION
A. Lack of Evidentiary Hearing and Citation to the Record
On appeal, Jules reasserts his argument that the state court violated clearly
established law as set forth by Florida Rules of Criminal Procedure 3.850(d) by
failing to hold an evidentiary hearing and identify those portions of the record
refuting his claims prior to denying his Rule 3.850 motion. He claims that the
district court erred in denying his habeas petition because Florida law “creates a
constitutional requirement upon the trial court” to either state its rationale in its
decision or attach the specific parts of the record that refute each claim presented
by a defendant.
We conclude that the district court properly denied relief on this issue. As
we have held, “[n]either the state court’s failure to hold a hearing on petitioner’s
3.850 motion nor its failure to attach the relevant portions of the record in any way
undermines the validity of petitioner’s conviction.” Spradley v. Dugger, 825 F.2d
1566, 1568 (11th Cir. 1987); see also Anderson v. Sec’y Dept. of Corrs., 462 F.3d
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1319, 1330-31 (11th Cir. 2006) (noting that “[a] state’s interpretation of its own
laws or rules provides no basis for federal habeas corpus relief, since no question
of constitutional nature is involved”). As such, the state court’s alleged violation
of its own procedural rules can not entitle Jules to federal habeas relief.
Moreover, Jules misunderstands the standard of review. Even assuming the
state court’s decision is contrary to established state law, Jules is only entitled to
habeas relief if the state court’s decision is contrary to established federal law,
specifically United States Supreme Court case law. Anderson, 462 F.3d at 1331.
As the issue here does not implicate a Supreme Court decision, we conclude that
Jules is not entitled to habeas relief and we affirm the district court on this issue.
B. Failure to Advise Regarding Immigration Consequences of Plea
Jules next argues that the district court erred in finding that he is not entitled
to habeas relief due to the state court’s failure to advise him of the collateral
consequences of his plea as required by Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.172.
He alleges that he would not have pleaded guilty had he known the immigration
consequences and thus he should be permitted to withdraw his pleas because he
now faces deportation proceedings.
Rule 3.172(c)(8) requires the state court to advise a defendant of possible
immigration consequences flowing from the entry of a nolo contendere plea. Fla.
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R. Crim. P. 3.172(c)(8). The failure to comply with this Rule, however, will not
invalidate a plea unless a defendant demonstrates prejudice by reason of the plea.
See Almanza v. State, 992 So.2d 427, 428 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2008). Accordingly,
Florida courts require the defendant to establish that the plea in the case under
attack is the only basis for deportation. Forrest v. State, 988 So.2d 38, 40 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 2008). “Only then can the movant show prejudice resulting from the
failure to advise of deportation consequences in the case under attack.” Id.; see
State v. Seraphin, 818 So.2d 485, 488-89 (Fla. 2002) (explaining that to establish
prejudice in this type of claim the motion must show that the movant would not
have entered the plea if properly advised). Florida courts have uniformly held that
rule 3.172(c)(8) is not to be applied retroactively to pleas entered before 1989.
State v. Haddad, 950 So.2d 434, 436 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2007).
Here, Jules entered pleas in 1985, 1986, 1987 and 1989. Only the 1989 plea
was subject to the requirements of Rule 3.172(c)(8). Id. As Jules conceded in his
post-conviction motions, any of his prior convictions could have required
mandatory deportation. Thus, because the earlier convictions not subject to the
rule provide an independent basis for deportation, Jules can not show prejudice
from the state court’s failure to advise him of the deportation consequences of his
plea in 1989. See State v. Oakley, 715 So.2d 956 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1998)
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(finding that movant failed to establish prejudice where the record showed he could
be deported based on other convictions). Accordingly, we conclude that the state
court properly denied Jules’s Rule 3.850 motion.
We further conclude that Jules has not shown that the state court’s decision
is contrary to or an unreasonable application of federal law. As we have repeatedly
held, there is no constitutional requirement that a defendant be advised of collateral
consequences of a plea, and the failure to advise a defendant does not render a plea
involuntary. McCarthy v. United States, 320 F.3d 1230, 1234 (11th Cir. 2003); see
also United States v. Campbell, 778 F.2d 764, 768 (11th Cir. 1985) (explaining
that deportation is a collateral consequence and “counsel’s failure to advise the
defendant of the collateral consequences of a guilty plea cannot rise to the level of
constitutionally ineffective assistance.”). As such, Jules is not entitled to habeas
relief on this ground and we affirm the district court.
IV. CONCLUSION
Because the state court’s decision was not contrary to or an unreasonable
application of federal law, the district court properly denied Jules’s petition for
habeas relief. Accordingly, we AFFIRM.
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