James McFarland v. United States

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[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
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No. 13-11076
Non-Argument Calendar
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D.C. Docket No. 5:10-cv-00639-WTH-TBS
JAMES MCFARLAND,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
versus
WARDEN, et al.,
Defendants,
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Defendant-Appellee.
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Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Middle District of Florida
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(March 3, 2014)
Before HULL, MARCUS and PRYOR, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
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James McFarland, a federal prisoner, appeals pro se the summary judgment
against his complaint that the United States was liable under the Federal Torts
Claims Act for injuries he suffered after fellow inmates stabbed him at the United
States Penitentiary at Coleman, Florida. McFarland complained that officials were
negligent when they understaffed the prison; failed to patrol the recreation yard;
failed to monitor metal detectors; and provided inadequate wound care that caused
him to develop an abscess. We vacate in part the summary judgment against
McFarland’s complaints about staffing and deployment of guards and remand for
the district court to dismiss those complaints for lack of subject matter jurisdiction,
and we affirm in part the summary judgment against McFarland’s complaint about
his medical care.
The Act provides a limited waiver of sovereign immunity for the United
States for claims in tort, but exempts from that waiver of immunity “[a]ny claim
based upon . . . the exercise or performance or the failure to exercise or perform a
discretionary function or duty on the part of a federal agency” or a government
employee. 28 U.S.C. § 2680(a); see Cohen v. United States, 151 F.3d 1338, 1340
(11th Cir. 1998). That exemption applies if the conduct in question “involves an
element of judgment or choice,” and if the “judgment is grounded in considerations
of public policy.” Cohen, 151 F.3d at 1341 (internal quotations marks and
citations omitted). “When the discretionary function exception to the [Act]
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applies, no federal subject matter jurisdiction exists.” U.S. Aviation Underwriters,
Inc. v. United States, 562 F.3d 1297, 1299 (11th Cir. 2009).
The district court lacked jurisdiction to consider McFarland’s complaints
about inadequate staffing and deployment of prison guards. The conduct that
McFarland challenged fell within the discretionary function exception to the Act,
which made the United States immune from liability. The Bureau of Prisons is
obligated to “provide for the safekeeping, care, and subsistence” of all federal
prisoners, 18 U.S.C. § 4042(a)(2), but officials at Coleman exercised discretion in
determining how many officers to have on duty, where to position them, and
whether to use metal detectors, see Bureau of Prisons Policy Statement 5521.05 ¶ 6
(providing that the Warden “may install metal detection services within the
institution as necessary” and that “[a] metal detector search may be done in
addition to [a] pat search”). Although McFarland argues that the officials’
discretion was constrained by two memos dated July 2008 requiring “[i]nmates [to]
walk through metal detectors normally” and to submit “[a]ll [their] items . . . [to a]
visual[] search[] and . . . [screening] through the metal detectors,” those memos
were addressed to inmates regarding their conduct, not to prison guards about their
responsibilities. The discretionary decisions of officials about staffing and
deployment of guards at Coleman were grounded in security concerns. As
explained in a sworn declaration prepared by Ronald Proffitt, a special
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investigator, random monitoring of metal detectors and of officers’ movements
prevents inmates from determining a routine security schedule. Because the
district court lacked jurisdiction to consider McFarland’s complaints about staffing
and deployment of guards, we vacate the summary judgment against those
complaints and remand for the district court to dismiss them for lack of subject
matter jurisdiction. See Cohen, 151 F.3d at 1340.
The district court did not err by entering summary judgment against
McFarland’s complaint about his medical care. No genuine dispute existed about
whether officials breached the prevailing professional standard of care or
proximately caused McFarland’s injuries. McFarland alleged that the medical staff
provided inadequate wound care that caused him to develop an abscess, but he
could not rely on his conclusory assertions to avoid summary judgment. See Ellis
v. England, 432 F.3d 1321, 1327 (11th Cir. 2005) (“[M]ere conclusions and
unsupported factual allegations . . . are insufficient to withstand a motion for
summary judgment.”). Sworn declarations from Dr. Ivan Negron and Dr. Olga
Grajales established, without dispute, that McFarland received proper treatment
and counseling about his wounds and that there was no correlation between the
care of his wounds and his abscess.
We AFFIRM in part the summary judgment against McFarland’s complaint
about his medical care, but because the discretionary function exception deprived
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the district court of jurisdiction, we VACATE in part the summary judgment
against McFarland’s complaints about staffing and deployment of guards and
REMAND for the district court to dismiss those complaints for lack of subject
matter jurisdiction.
AFFIRMED IN PART, VACATED AND REMANDED IN PART.
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