Joseph Wells v. Xpedx

[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT FILED
________________________ U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
No. 07-16014 MARCH 16, 2009
________________________ THOMAS K. KAHN
CLERK
D. C. Docket No. 05-02193-CV-T-EAJ
JOSEPH WELLS,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
versus
XPEDX, a Division of International
Paper Co., a foreign corporation
authorized to do business in Florida,
Defendant-Appellee.
________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Middle District of Florida
_________________________
(March 16, 2009)
Before BARKETT and FAY, Circuit Judges, and TRAGER,* District Judge.
__________________
* Honorable David G. Trager, United States District Judge for the Eastern District of New York,
sitting by designation.
PER CURIAM:
Joseph Wells appeals an adverse summary judgment in favor of his former
employer Xpedx, a division of International Paper Corporation, on his claim for
wrongful termination under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act
(“ADEA”), 29 U.S.C. § 621 et seq., the Florida Civil Rights Act (“FCRA”), Fla.
Stat. § 760.01 et seq., the Federal Whistleblower Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3,1 and
the Florida Whistleblower Act, Fla. Stat. § 448.102(3). The summary judgement
was based on the district court’s finding that Wells had executed a valid agreement
to release all claims against Xpedx in exchange for a severance package and,
alternatively, that Wells had failed as a matter of law to establish a prima facie case
of age discrimination and could not establish that Xpdex’s proffered non-
discriminatory reasons for his dismissal were pretextual.2 The district court also
denied Wells leave to amend his complaint and his summary judgment response to
cite to the correct statute corresponding to his whistleblower claim 3 and declined to
1
Wells later conceded that this claim was invalid.
2
Because Wells’s ADEA claim failed, the district court also dismissed his FCRA claim,
on the grounds that the framework for evaluating ADEA cases also applies to FCRA cases.
Reilly v. Duval County Pub. Schs., No:3:04-CV-1320-J-32MMH, 2006 WL 3130918, at *7 n.12
(M.D. Fla. Oct. 31, 20006). Wells does not appeal this holding and we therefore do not address
it.
3
After conceding in his response to Xpedx’s summary judgment motion that his federal
whistleblower claim was invalid, Wells sought leave to amend his response to the motion and
complaint to allege a proper whistleblower claim under the ADEA, 29 U.S.C. § 623(d). The
court denied Wells leave to amend, citing prejudice to Xpedx as well as the fact that Wells had
2
exercise supplemental jurisdiction over his Florida Whistleblower Act claim.
Wells appeals each of these rulings.4
In exchange for a generous severance package, Wells signed a Termination
Agreement that included a provision entitled “Release of Claims” and another
entitled “Covenant Not to Sue.” The “Release of Claims” section provided that
Wells
waives and releases the Company from any and all claims and
demands Employee may have based on Employee’s employment with
the Company or the termination of that employment. This waiver and
release includes, but is not limited to, a permanent and irrevocable
waiver and release of any and all rights or claims under the Age
Discrimination in Employment Act, . . . and any other federal, state or
local laws, ordinances, or regulations prohibiting employment
discrimination or regulating the employment relationship or the terms
and conditions of employment. This release also includes an
irrevocable waiver and release of any claims for breach of express or
implied contract, including any contract of employment entered into
prior to the date of this Agreement, and any other claims under any
federal, state, or local statutory or common law relating in any way to
the employment relationship . . . .
waited over one month after Xpedex filed its summary judgment motion to request the leave,
that the deadline for amendments to pleadings had long past, and that the discovery period had
ended. The court therefore granted summary judgment to Xpedex on Wells’s federal
whistleblower claims, and Wells appeals this holding.
4
We review de novo a district court’s grant of summary judgment, applying the same
legal standards as the district court. See Whatley v. CNA Ins. Cos., 189 F.3d 1310, 1313 (11th
Cir. 1999). Summary judgment is appropriate if the evidence before the court shows that there is
no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a
matter of law. Haves v. City of Miami, 52 F.3d 918, 921 (11th Cir. 1995) (internal marks and
citations omitted). In making this determination, the court must view all evidence and make all
reasonable inferences in favor of the party opposing summary judgment. Id.3
Pursuant to the “Covenant Not to Sue,” Wells expressly agreed not to “file a
lawsuit with respect to any matter released in [the Release of Claims section] of
this Agreement[.]”
When a termination agreement contains a waiver of the employee's age
discrimination claim, the Older Workers Benefit Protection Act (OWBPA), 29
U.S.C. § 626(f), requires that the employer establish that the waiver is “knowing
and voluntary.” Id. § 626(f)(3); Burlison v. McDonald’s Corp., 455 F.3d 1242,
1245 (11th Cir. 2006). There is no dispute that Xpdex has met five of the eight
statutory factors required to establish the validity of the waiver set forth in §
626(f)(1)(A)-(H)5 and, although Wells argues otherwise, we find that the remaining
5
The statutory requirements are:
(1) the release must be written in a manner calculated to be understood by the
employee signing the release, or by the average individual eligible to participate;
(2) the release must specifically refer to claims arising under the ADEA;
(3) the release must not purport to encompass claims that may arise after the date
of execution;
(4) the employer must provide consideration for the waiver or release of ADEA
claims above and beyond that to which the employee would otherwise already be
entitled;
(5) the employee must be advised in writing to consult with an attorney prior to
executing the agreement;
(6) the employee must be given at least 21 days within which to consider the
agreement or 45 days to consider signing if the waiver is offered in connection
with an “exit incentive or other employment termination”;
(7) the release must allow the employee to revoke the agreement up to 7 days
after signing; and
(8) if the release is offered in connection with an exit incentive or group
termination program, the employer must provide information relating to the job
titles and ages of those eligible for the program, and the corresponding
information relating to employees in the same job titles who were not eligible or
4
three factors have also been satisfied.
First, because Wells testified unequivocally that he was the only one
terminated, it is undisputed that Wells’s termination was not part of a group
“termination program” or a reduction in force, and therefore Wells was not
statutorily entitled to information regarding the other employees eligible for the
program. See 29 C.F.R. § 1625.22(f)(1)(iii)(B) (“Typically, an involuntary
termination program is a standardized formula or package of benefits that is
available to two or more employees . . . .”) (emphasis added); 29 U.S.C. §
626(f)(1)(H). Although Wells argues that his Termination Agreement included a
standardized package of benefits and that there is no requirement that the “two or
more” employees be terminated at the same time, Wells has offered no evidence
that any other employees were terminated at any time as part of his program.
Second, Wells argues that the Termination Agreement was not “written in a
manner calculated to be understood by [the employee signing the release].” 29
U.S.C. § 626(f)(1)(A). We disagree. Xpedx has established that Wells was an
educated business professional experienced in negotiating large, multi-million
dollar contracts with large retailers. In addition, our own review of the “Release of
not selected for the program.
Thiessen v. Gen. Elec. Capital Corp., 232 F. Supp. 2d 1230, 1234-35 (D. Kan. 2002) (citations
omitted); see 29 U.S.C. § 626(f)(1)(A)-(H). Wells challenges numbers (1), (5), and (8).
5
Claims” and “Covenant Not to Sue” provisions reveals that they were written in
plain English and would be readily understandable by someone in Wells’s position.
Wells has offered no specific facts that raise a genuine issue for trial, see Celotex
Corp. V. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 325 (1986), and we therefore find that Xpedx has
demonstrated that the Termination Agreement was written in a manner calculated
to be understood by Wells.
Third, Wells argues that because he never actually received advice from an
attorney about the release, the factor requiring that he be “advised in writing to
consult with an attorney prior to executing the agreement,” 29 U.S.C. §
626(f)(1)(E), has not been met. We find no merit to Wells’s argument on this
issue, because the record is undisputed that Wells was advised in writing to consult
with an attorney. That he never spoke to an attorney about the release is
immaterial.
We note also that the parties do not dispute the absence of any non-statutory
factors relevant to whether Wells knowingly and voluntarily waived his rights. See
Griffin v. Kraft Gen. Foods, Inc., 62 F.3d 368, 373-74 (11th Cir. 1995); Gormin v.
Brown-Forman Corp., 963 F.2d 323, 327 (11th Cir. 1992). For example, Wells has
not alleged fraud, duress, or coercion. See Griffin, 62 F.3d at 373.
Finally, we agree with Xpedx that the evidence indicating that Wells
6
knowingly and voluntarily waived his ADEA claims also supports a finding that he
knowingly and voluntarily waived his FCRA and Federal Whistleblower claims.6
See, e.g., Alexander v. Gardner Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36, 52 n.15 (1974);
Blackwell v. Cole Taylor Bank, 152 F.3d 666, 673 (7th Cir. 1998). We therefore
decline to address the remainder of Wells’s arguments. The judgment of the
district court is
AFFIRMED.
6
As noted above, the district court declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over
Wells’s Florida Whistleblower claim.
7