Robert Hayes v. Secretary, Florida Department of Children and Families

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[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
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No. 13-14649
Non-Argument Calendar
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D.C. Docket No. 4:10-cv-00541-MP-CAS
ROBERT HAYES,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
versus
SECRETARY, FLORIDA DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN AND FAMILIES,
Defendant-Appellee.
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Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Florida
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(April 18, 2014)
Before MARCUS, MARTIN and KRAVITCH, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Robert Hayes, proceeding pro se, appeals the district court’s order granting
summary judgment in favor of the Secretary (“Secretary”) of the Department of
Children and Families (“DCF”), as to his claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Hayes
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argues that the district court erred in granting summary judgment because the
Florida Civil Commitment Center (“FCCC”) staff violated his right to due process
by acting arbitrarily and capriciously to impose standards of conduct for possession
of property without prior notice. After thorough review, we affirm.
We review a district court’s grant of summary judgment de novo,
considering the facts and drawing reasonable inferences in the light most favorable
to the non-moving party. Mann v. Taser Int’l, Inc., 588 F.3d 1291, 1303 (11th Cir.
2009). Summary judgment is appropriate when “the movant shows that there is no
genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a
matter of law.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a).
“Section 1983 does not create a remedy for every wrong committed under
the color of state law, but only for those that deprive a plaintiff of a federal right.”
Knight v. Jacobson, 300 F.3d 1272, 1276 (11th Cir. 2002). To prevail on a § 1983
claim, a plaintiff must show that: (1) the defendant deprived him of a right secured
by the Constitution or federal law; and (2) the deprivation occurred under color of
state law. Arrington v. Cobb Cty., 139 F.3d 865, 872 (11th Cir. 1998). The Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment provides that no state shall “deprive
any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law.” U.S. Const.
amend. XIV, § 1.
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The Eleventh Amendment provides that “[t]he Judicial power of the United
States shall not be construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or
prosecuted against one of the United States by Citizens of another State, or by
Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State.” U.S. Const. amend. XI. It is well
established that, in the absence of consent, “a suit in which the State or one of its
agencies or departments is named as the defendant is proscribed by the Eleventh
Amendment.” Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 276 (1986) (quotation omitted).
The Eleventh Amendment also prohibits suits against state officials where the state
is the real party in interest, such that a plaintiff could not sue to have a state officer
pay funds directly from the state treasury for the wrongful acts of the state.
Summit Med. Assocs., P.C. v. Pryor, 180 F.3d 1326, 1336 (11th Cir. 1999). The
Ex Parte Young 1 doctrine permits federal courts to entertain suits against state
officers seeking prospective equitable relief to end continuing violations of federal
law. McClendon v. Ga. Dept. of Comm’y Health, 261 F.3d 1252, 1256 (11th Cir.
2001). Stated another way, “official capacity suits for prospective relief to enjoin
state officials from enforcing unconstitutional acts are not deemed to be suits
against the state and thus are not barred by the Eleventh Amendment.” Scott v.
Taylor, 405 F.3d 1251, 1255 (11th Cir. 2005). When a state officer uses the name
of the state to enforce an unconstitutional act, the state officer comes into conflict
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Ex Parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908).
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with the supreme authority of the U.S. Constitution and, therefore, is “stripped of
his official or representative character and is subjected in his person to the
consequences of his individual conduct.” Ex Parte Young, 209 U.S. at 159-60.
We have noted that the doctrine is a legal fiction because it “creates an imaginary
distinction between the state and its officers, deeming the officers to act without
the state’s authority, and, hence, without immunity protection, when they enforce
state laws in derogation of the Constitution.” Summit, 180 F.3d at 1336-37.
Section 1983 claims “may not be brought against supervisory officials on the
basis of vicarious liability or respondeat superior.” Keating v. City of Miami, 598
F.3d 753, 762 (11th Cir. 2010). However, a supervisor “can be held liable for the
actions of his subordinates under § 1983 if he personally participates in the act that
causes the constitutional violation or where there is a causal connection between
his actions and the constitutional violation that his subordinates commit.” Am.
Fed’n of Labor v. City of Miami, 637 F.3d 1178, 1190 (11th Cir. 2011). “A causal
connection can be established if a supervisor has the ability to prevent or stop a
known constitutional violation by exercising his supervisory authority and he fails
to do so,” id., or when “a history of widespread abuse puts the responsible
supervisor on notice of the need to correct the alleged deprivation, and he fails to
do so,” Brown v. Crawford, 906 F.2d 667, 671 (11th Cir. 1990). “The deprivations
that constitute widespread abuse sufficient to notify the supervising official must
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be obvious, flagrant, rampant, and of continued duration, rather than isolated
occurrences.” Id.
Here, Hayes’s official capacity claim against the Secretary of DCF seeking
prospective injunctive or declaratory relief for ongoing constitutional violations is
not barred by the Eleventh Amendment. McClendon, 261 F.3d at 1256; Scott, 405
F.3d at 1255. However, Hayes’s claim is not based on an ongoing constitutional
violation committed by the Secretary, but rather by his subordinates, the members
of the FCCC staff.
But Hayes has not shown that the Secretary of DCF could be liable under §
1983 based on vicarious liability or respondeat superior. Keating, 598 F.3d at 762.
As the record reveals, DCF contracted with Geo Group, Inc. (“Geo”) for the
operation of the FCCC. The FCCC provides DCF with copies of their policies and
procedures, but DCF does not approve the individual policies and procedures.
Further, Hayes has not shown that the Secretary personally participated in any
potential ongoing constitutional violations nor did he show that there was a causal
connection between the Secretary of DCF’s actions and the constitutional
violations committed by the FCCC staff. Am. Fed’n of Labor, 637 F.3d at 1190.
In fact, the undisputed evidence shows that the alleged violations were, at most,
“isolated” instances where FCCC officials acted on their own and not in an
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“obvious” or “widespread” manner. Thus, the district court did not err in granting
summary judgment in favor of the Secretary of DCF on Hayes’s § 1983 claim.
AFFIRMED.
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