Robert Lee Williams, IV v. James McDonough

[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
________________________ FILED
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
No. 06-15574 ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
APRIL 17, 2009
Non-Argument Calendar
THOMAS K. KAHN
________________________
CLERK
D. C. Docket No. 03-00264-CV-4-SPM-AK
ROBERT LEE WILLIAMS, IV,
Petitioner-Appellant,
versus
WALTER A. MCNEIL, as Secretary Department of
Corrections State of Florida,
Respondent-Appellee.
________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Florida
_________________________
(April 17, 2009)
Before BIRCH, HULL and ANDERSON, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Robert Lee Williams, IV, a Florida prisoner convicted of two DUI felony
charges, filed the present habeas corpus petition alleging, among other things, that
his trial counsel was constitutionally ineffective by failing to inform the trial court
that a juror improperly communicated with his family during his trial. The district
court denied his 28 U.S.C. § 2254 habeas petition, finding that his claim was
factually and legally meritless. For reasons set forth below, we affirm.
I.
We review de novo a district court’s denial of a habeas petition under 28
U.S.C. § 2254 and its factual findings for clear error. See Sims v. Singletary, 155
F.3d 1297, 1304 (11th Cir. 1998). A habeas petition based on ineffective
assistance of counsel presents “a mixed question of fact and law requiring
application of legal principles to the historical facts of the case.” Coulter v.
Herring, 60 F.3d 1499, 1503 (11th Cir. 1995).
Under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d), a federal court may not grant habeas relief on
claims that were previously adjudicated in state court unless the decision was
contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established federal
law, as determined by the Supreme Court, or was based on an unreasonable
determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the state court
proceeding. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1)-(2). Here, the district court apparently
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assumed that the state court failed to address Williams’s ineffective assistance
claim although he properly raised it. Therefore, the district court apparently
assumed that the present controversy falls outside of § 2254(d)(1)'s requirement
that we defer to state court decisions that are not contrary to, or an unreasonable
application of, clearly established federal law. Davis v. Sec’y for Dept. of
Corrections, 341 F.3d 1310, 1313 (11th Cir. 2003). Thus, the district court denied
Williams’ claim on the merits. On appeal, the State does not argue that there
should be deference to the state court decision. Accordingly, we too address the
merits without the ordinary deference.
In order to prove ineffective assistance of counsel, a defendant must
overcome the strong presumption that his counsel’s performance was “within the
wide range of reasonable professional assistance. Strickland v. Washington, 466
U.S. 668, 688-89, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 2064-65, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984). If he
overcomes this presumption, the petitioner must also affirmatively prove that, but
for his counsel’s errors, there is a reasonable probability that the result of the
proceeding would have been different. Johnson v. Alabama, 256 F.3d 1156, 1177
(11th Cir. 2001) (requiring proof of attorney error so “egregious that the trial was
rendered unfair and the verdict rendered suspect.”).
The district court correctly denied Williams’ §2254 petition. For purposes
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of this opinion, we accept Williams’ allegation that his attorney was aware of the
alleged juror contact to Williams’ family, and that the gist of the contact was as
follows:
After the jury was seated at one point during a break, a black female
juror came over to where we were standing and asked [petitioner’s]
parents if he was their son. Then she said, “I know how it feels, my
boy is in prison. You folks got nothing to worry about.”
The gist of Williams’ argument is that his trial attorney had an ethical duty to
report the juror contact to the court, and that his failure to do so constituted
ineffective assistance of counsel.
We agree with the district court that Williams’ allegations failed to establish
deficient performance. The juror’s alleged communication to Williams’ family
obviously suggested to counsel that the juror was favorable to the defense. The
attorney’s failure to report same to the court may have violated an ethical duty to
the court, but it was not an action against the best interest of the client such as to
rise to the level of ineffective assistance of counsel. In a very similar situation, the
Third Circuit so held:
If counsel breaches a duty to the court, this does not necessarily mean
that the representation of his client was ineffective. Assuming that
Joseph did violate some ethical duty to the court that would warrant
disciplinary sanctions against him, that breach would provide no
justification for a remedy that would, in effect, impose a sanction
upon the government. Indeed, we believe that overturning a
conviction in a situation of this kind on the basis of counsel’s breach
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of an ethical duty to the court would create a perverse incentive for
defense counsel to “build in” reversible error for their clients by
violating their duties as officers of the court.
Government of Virgin Islands v. Weather Wax, 77 F.3d 1425, 1438 (3 rd Cir. 1996)
(emphasis in original). See also United States v. Jones, 597 F.2d 485, 489 n.3 (5 th
Cir. 1979) (“Another line of cases forcefully shows the relevance of a defendant’s
knowledge or lack of knowledge before the verdict of jury tampering. These cases
teach that a defendant cannot learn of juror misconduct during the trial, gamble on
a favorable verdict by remaining silent, and then complain in a post-verdict motion
that the verdict was prejudicially influenced by that conduct.”).
Because we conclude that Williams cannot establish deficient performance,
we need not address the prejudice prong.
Accordingly, the judgment of the district court is
AFFIRMED. 1
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Williams’s request for oral argument is denied.
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