United States v. Daniel Charles Kirk

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[PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
________________________
No. 13-15103
Non-Argument Calendar
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D.C. Docket No. 2:12-cr-00114-JES-UAM-1
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
versus
DANIEL CHARLES KIRK,
Defendant-Appellant.
________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Middle District of Florida
________________________
(September 16, 2014)
Before HULL, MARCUS and ANDERSON, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
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Daniel Charles Kirk appeals his conviction and fifteen-year sentence for
being a felon in possession of a firearm and ammunition, in violation of 18 U.S.C.
§ 922(g)(1). On appeal, Kirk argues that the district court erred in applying the
fifteen-year mandatory minimum sentence under the Armed Career Criminal Act
(“ACCA”), 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(1), for two reasons. First, he argues that his prior
burglary offenses do not qualify as “violent felonies” under the ACCA. Second, he
argues that the government did not show that the burglaries were “committed on
occasions different from one another” as required by the ACCA. As to his
conviction, he argues that the Constitution requires the government to prove that a
firearm or ammunition “substantially affected” interstate commerce before its
possession can be punished under § 922(g).
We address each of his arguments in turn, and after careful consideration,
we affirm his conviction and sentence.
I.
Kirk’s first argument on appeal is that his prior burglary offenses do not
qualify as violent felonies under the ACCA. We consider de novo whether a
particular conviction qualifies as a violent felony for purposes of the ACCA.
United States v. Matthews, 466 F.3d 1271, 1273 (11th Cir. 2006).
Under the Sentencing Guidelines, defendants who are subject to enhanced
sentences under 18 U.S.C. § 924(e) are considered armed career criminals. See
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U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual § 4B1.4(a). The ACCA mandates a fifteen-
year minimum term of imprisonment for defendants who violate § 922(g) and have
three previous convictions for “violent felon[ies] . . . committed on occasions
different from one another.” 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(1). The ACCA defines “violent
felony” as “any crime punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year
. . . that . . . is burglary, arson, or extortion, involves use of explosives, or otherwise
involves conduct that presents a serious potential risk of physical injury to
another.” Id. § 924(e)(2)(B)(ii).
The ACCA’s inclusion of convictions for crimes that “otherwise involve[]
conduct that presents a serious potential risk of physical injury to another” is
known as the statute’s “residual clause.” 1 Id.; see United States v. Weeks, 711
F.3d 1255, 1262 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 134 S. Ct. 311 (2013). The Supreme
Court requires courts to use a “categorical approach” and a “comparative inquiry”
to determine whether a crime qualifies as a violent felony under the ACCA’s
1
Because Kirk and the government agree that Florida’s definition of burglary is
broader that the definition of generic burglary and that the enumerated offenses clause does not
apply to Kirk’s case, we only consider whether Kirk’s prior convictions fall within the residual
clause of the ACCA. See, e.g., Matthews, 466 F.3d at 1276 (“The district court did not decide
whether burglary of the curtilage of a structure is a ‘generic burglary’ as discussed in Taylor[v.
United States, 495 U.S. 575, 599, 110 S. Ct. 2143, 2158 (1990)]. Given our holding that
burglary of the curtilage of a structure (as defined by Florida law) ‘otherwise involves conduct
that presents a serious potential risk of physical injury to another,’ we need not express an
opinion on whether the offenses in question here are ‘generic burglaries’ as discussed in
Taylor.”).
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residual clause. United States v. Petite, 703 F.3d 1290, 1294 (11th Cir.), cert.
denied, 134 S. Ct. 182 (2013).
Using the categorical approach, the central inquiry is whether the
offense presents a serious potential risk of physical injury to another
comparable to the risk posed by the ACCA’s enumerated crimes. . . .
[A] crime involves the requisite risk when the risk posed by [the crime
in question] is comparable to that posed by its closest analog among
the enumerated offenses.
Id. (second alteration in original) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted).
The Florida burglary statute under which Kirk was convicted prior to his
§ 922(g) offense defines burglary as:
1. Entering a dwelling, a structure, or a conveyance with the intent
to commit an offense therein, unless the premises are at the time
open to the public or the defendant is licensed or invited to
enter; or
2. Notwithstanding a licensed or invited entry, remaining in a
dwelling, structure, or conveyance:
a. Surreptitiously, with the intent to commit an
offense therein;
b. After permission to remain therein has been
withdrawn, with the intent to commit an offense
therein; or
c. To commit or attempt to commit a forcible felony,
as defined in s. 776.08.
Fla. Stat. § 810.02(1)(b).
Kirk argues that because it is unclear whether his prior convictions under the
Florida statute were based on his “entering” or “remaining in” a dwelling, 2 this
2
Each criminal information regarding Kirk’s prior convictions reads that on a
particular date, Kirk “did unlawfully enter or remain in a certain structure, to-wit: a dwelling”
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Court must presume that they were based on his remaining in a dwelling, which he
argues presents less of a risk of physical injury than generic “unlawful entry”
burglary and consequently cannot qualify as violent felonies under the ACCA.
However, the Supreme Court has held that “a person has been convicted of
burglary for purposes of a § 924(e) enhancement if he is convicted of any crime,
regardless of its exact definition or label, having the basic elements of unlawful or
unprivileged entry into, or remaining in, a building or structure, with intent to
commit a crime.” Taylor v. United States, 495 U.S. 575, 599, 110 S. Ct. 2143,
2158 (1990) (emphasis added). The Court has recognized the risks posed by such
conduct: “The main risk of burglary arises not from the simple physical act of
wrongfully entering onto another’s property, but rather from the possibility of a
face-to-face confrontation between the burglar and a third party—whether an
occupant, a police officer, or a bystander—who comes to investigate.” James v.
United States, 550 U.S. 192, 203, 127 S. Ct. 1586, 1594 (2007). The Supreme
Court commented on these risks in the context of considering whether attempted
burglary under Florida law, with burglary being defined by the previous version of
§ 810.02, constitutes a violent felony for purposes of the ACCA. See id. at 195,
197, 127 S. Ct. at 1590–91. The definition of burglary under Florida law at the
located at a particular address, “with the intent to commit an offense therein, to-wit: Theft,
contrary to Florida Statute 810.02.”
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time was “entering or remaining in a structure or a conveyance with the intent to
commit an offense therein, unless the premises are at the time open to the public or
the defendant is licensed or invited to enter or remain.” Id. at 197, 127 S. Ct. at
1591 (emphasis added). Thus, the Court was considering a statute with a
“remaining in” element at the time it explained the risks of physical injury
associated with burglary as defined under Florida law, and the Court found that
attempted burglary fell within the ACCA’s residual clause as a violent felony
involving conduct that presents a serious risk of physical injury to another. Id. at
195, 127 S. Ct. at 1590. We therefore have no doubt that “remaining in” burglary
involves the same significant risks of physical injury to another.
Furthermore, we have previously held that a conviction under the earlier
version of § 810.02, which included a “remaining in” element, was a conviction for
a violent felony under the ACCA’s residual clause. See Matthews, 466 F.3d at
1275 (holding that, in the context of a conviction for burglary based on entry into
the roofed portion or curtilage of a structure, “even if [the defendant]’s third-
degree burglary convictions [were] not convictions for ‘generic burglary,’ they
[were] convictions for violent crimes under the ACCA because they satisf[ied]
th[e] alternative definition” under the residual clause). Although Florida’s
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definition of burglary encompasses the curtilage of a structure and is therefore
broader than the definition of generic burglary, 3 we explained in Matthews:
Regardless of whether a burglar breaches the roofed portion of a
structure, his unlicensed entry into the enclosed area surrounding that
structure may bring him into close physical proximity with the same
persons he might encounter were he to enter the structure. He may
come into contact with the property’s owners, occupants, or
caretakers. His close physical presence to the structure could lead an
innocent person to investigate why he is there, and his presence alone
could reasonably be perceived by any of these persons as threatening.
Either the innocent or the burglar might react violently. In short, the
burglar’s presence in the curtilage of the structure presents a serious
potential risk that violence will ensue and someone will be injured.
Id. We thus held that burglary under the prior version of § 810.02 qualified as a
violent felony under the ACCA’s residual clause even though it was unclear from
the record there whether the defendant had entered into the roofed portion or the
curtilage of the structures at issue. Id.
Kirk argues that this precedent is not applicable to his case because we did
not consider the “remaining in” portion of the statute in Matthews. However, the
Supreme Court in James expressed nearly identical concerns about potential
3
In conducting an ACCA analysis, sentencing courts are bound to follow any state
court decisions that define or interpret the statute’s substantive elements. See Johnson v. United
States, 559 U.S. 133, 138, 130 S. Ct. 1265, 1269 (2010) (noting that federal courts are bound by
a state supreme court’s interpretation of state law, including its determination of the elements of
a state statute, in determining whether an offense constitutes a violent felony under the ACCA).
In addressing the state’s burglary statute, the Florida Supreme Court has held: “There is no crime
denominated burglary of a curtilage; the curtilage is not a separate location wherein a burglary
can occur. Rather, it is an integral part of the structure or dwelling that it surrounds. Entry onto
the curtilage is, for the purposes of the burglary statute, entry into the structure or dwelling.”
Baker v. State, 636 So. 2d 1342, 1344 (Fla. 1994). “[T]he inclusion of curtilage takes Florida’s
underlying offense of burglary outside the definition of ‘generic burglary’ set forth in Taylor . . .
.” James, 550 U.S. at 212, 127 S. Ct. at 1599.
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violence when considering attempted burglary based on the earlier version of
§ 810.02, which defined burglary as “entering or remaining in a structure or a
conveyance with the intent to commit an offense therein.” See James, 550 U.S. at
197, 203, 127 S. Ct. at 1591, 1594–95. Accordingly, we think the same risks as
explained in Matthews and James are present in the context of “remaining in”
burglary. In sum, we find that Kirk’s prior burglary convictions qualify as violent
felonies under the ACCA’s residual clause regardless of whether they were based
on his “entering” or “remaining in” the dwellings at issue because either type of
offense “involves conduct that presents a serious potential risk of physical injury to
another.” 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(B)(ii).
II.
Kirk’s second argument on appeal is that the government did not prove that
his prior convictions were for offenses “committed on occasions different from one
another” as required for the ACCA mandatory minimum to apply. “Whether prior
convictions meet the ACCA’s separate offenses requirement is a legal
determination we review de novo.” United States v. Sneed, 600 F.3d 1326, 1330
n.5 (citing United States v. Pope, 132 F.3d 684, 689 (11th Cir. 1998)).
A defendant is subject to the ACCA enhancement only if he has three prior
convictions for qualifying offenses “committed on occasions different from one
another.” 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(1). This requirement means that the defendant’s
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prior convictions must have resulted from crimes that are “temporally distinct” and
arise out of “separate and distinct criminal episode[s].” Sneed, 600 F.3d at 1329
(internal quotation marks omitted). “‘[S]o long as [the] predicate crimes are
successive rather than simultaneous, they constitute separate criminal episodes for
purposes of the ACCA.’” Weeks, 711 F.3d at 1261 (alterations in original)
(quoting Pope, 132 F.3d at 692). “Distinctions in time and place are usually
sufficient to separate criminal episodes from one another even when the gaps are
small.” Sneed, 600 F.3d at 1330 (internal quotation marks omitted); see also
Weeks, 711 F.3d at 1261 (holding that the defendant failed to establish that the
district court erred in classifying his three burglary convictions as separate ACCA
predicate offenses even though two of the burglaries occurred on the same date and
in close proximity to each other because “even small gaps in time and place are
sufficient to establish separate offenses”); United States v. Proch, 637 F.3d 1262,
1265–66 (11th Cir. 2011) (holding that two burglaries committed on the same day
at different addresses on the same street constituted separate and distinct criminal
episodes).
We have held that the government must prove that prior offenses occurred
on different occasions using only Shepard documents. See Sneed, 600 F.3d at
1332–33 (holding that police reports may not be used for ACCA inquiries and
vacating the defendant’s § 924(e)-enhanced sentence because the government had
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failed to produce any Shepard-approved documents establishing that the
defendant’s prior offenses occurred on different occasions); Weeks, 711 F.3d at
1259 (“[F]or ACCA purposes, district courts may determine both the existence of
prior convictions and the factual nature of those convictions, including whether
they were committed on different occasions, so long as they limit themselves to
Shepard-approved documents.”).
In this case, the charging documents submitted by the government show that
Kirk pled guilty to burglarizing seven different dwellings, located at seven
different addresses and owned by seven different people, on or about three separate
dates—May 5, August 16, and August 19, 2002. The government therefore used
Shepard-approved documents to prove that Kirk’s prior offenses arose from
separate and distinct criminal episodes that were temporally distinct in that they
were committed on at least three different dates. See Weeks, 711 F.3d at 1261;
Proch, 637 F.3d at 1265–66. Accordingly, Kirk has failed to show that the district
court erred in concluding that his prior convictions were for offenses “committed
on occasions different from one another.”
III.
Kirk’s final argument on appeal is that the district court erred in denying his
motion for a judgment of acquittal because the government failed to prove that the
firearm and ammunition in his possession “substantially affected” interstate
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commerce. Kirk also argues that § 922(g) is an unconstitutional exercise of
Congress’s Commerce Clause power as applied to purely intrastate conduct, such
as mere possession of a firearm, under United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 115
S. Ct. 1624 (1995). Kirk concedes that these arguments are foreclosed by
“Eleventh Circuit precedent directly to the contrary,” but he presents the arguments
“in order to preserve the issue for further review.”
It is unlawful for a convicted felon to “possess in or affecting commerce,
any firearm or ammunition.” 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). The Supreme Court, in
considering the predecessor statute to § 922(g), held that the interstate commerce
element is met by demonstrating a “minimal nexus that the firearm have been, at
some time, in interstate commerce.” Scarborough v. United States, 431 U.S. 563,
575, 97 S. Ct. 1963, 1969 (1977). In Lopez, the Supreme Court held that gun
control legislation related to the possession of firearms in school zones was an
invalid exercise of Congress’s Commerce Clause power partly because the statute
could not be sustained under the reasoning that the regulated activities, in the
aggregate, substantially affected interstate commerce. See Lopez, 514 U.S. at 561,
115 S. Ct. at 1631. In addition, the Supreme Court emphasized that the challenged
statute “contain[ed] no jurisdictional element which would ensure, through case-
by-case inquiry, that the firearm possession in question affect[ed] interstate
commerce.” Id.
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Since Lopez, we have continually held that § 922(g) is not a facially
unconstitutional exercise of Congress’s Commerce Clause power because unlike
the statute at issue in Lopez, § 922(g) contains a jurisdictional requirement. See,
e.g., United States v. Jordan, 635 F.3d 1181, 1189 (11th Cir. 2011) (“We have
repeatedly held that Section 922(g)(1) is not a facially unconstitutional exercise of
Congress’s power under the Commerce Clause because it contains an express
jurisdictional requirement.”); United States v. Scott, 263 F.3d 1270, 1273 (11th
Cir. 2001) (reaffirming the holding that “the jurisdictional element of the statute,
i.e., the requirement that the felon ‘possess in or affecting commerce, any firearm
or ammunition,’ immunizes § 922(g)(1) from [a] facial constitutional attack”);
United States v. Dupree, 258 F.3d 1258, 1260 (11th Cir. 2001) (upholding the
conclusion that “the jurisdictional element of § 922(g) brings it within the
commerce powers of the Congress”); United States v. McAllister, 77 F.3d 387,
389–90 (11th Cir. 1996) (holding that the jurisdictional element of § 922(g) defeats
a facial challenge to the statute even after the Supreme Court’s decision in Lopez).
Moreover, we have also held that § 922(g) is not unconstitutional as applied
to a defendant who merely possessed a firearm within state lines so long as the
government introduces sufficient evidence showing that the firearm has a minimal
nexus to interstate commerce, i.e., that the firearm was manufactured, assembled,
or sold outside the state or that it travelled in interstate commerce. See, e.g.,
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Jordan, 635 F.3d at 1189 (holding that § 922(g) was not unconstitutional “as
applied to a defendant who possessed a firearm only intrastate” because the
government showed that the firearm involved was manufactured and assembled
outside the state); Dupree, 258 F.3d at 1260 (holding that § 922(g) requires only a
minimal nexus to interstate commerce and that the defendant’s actions of
brandishing in Georgia a firearm that was manufactured in California satisfied the
jurisdictional requirement of § 922(g)); McAllister, 77 F.3d at 390 (holding that
even in the wake of Lopez, § 922(g) is constitutional as applied to a defendant who
merely possessed a firearm within state lines so long as the firearm has a minimal
nexus to interstate commerce, an element that was satisfied in that case because the
firearm possessed by the defendant had travelled in interstate commerce).
Here, the government produced evidence that the firearm and ammunition
Kirk possessed in Florida were manufactured outside the state and therefore had
necessarily traveled in interstate commerce. Given our undisturbed precedent,
such evidence was sufficient to demonstrate the minimal nexus between the
firearm and ammunition Kirk possessed and interstate commerce. Therefore, the
jurisdictional element of § 922(g) was satisfied, and the statute is not
unconstitutional as applied to Kirk’s conduct. Accordingly, the district court did
not err in denying Kirk’s motion for a judgment of acquittal, and Kirk’s conviction
and sentence are
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AFFIRMED.
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