United States v. Jose Ernesto Perez-Morales

[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
________________________ FILED
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
No. 08-14616 ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
APRIL 2, 2009
Non-Argument Calendar
THOMAS K. KAHN
________________________
CLERK
D. C. Docket No. 05-20892-CR-ASG
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
versus
JOSE ERNESTO PEREZ-MORALES,
Defendant-Appellant.
________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Florida
_________________________
(April 2, 2009)
Before BIRCH, HULL and KRAVITCH, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Jose Ernesto Perez-Morales (“Morales”), a federal prisoner proceeding pro
se, appeals the district court’s denial of his motion for a Fed. R. Crim. P. (“Rule”)
35(b) sentence reduction. The district court rejected Morales’s argument that the
government breached the plea agreement and concluded that it lacked jurisdiction
to review the government’s decision not to file a Rule 35(b) motion. After a
thorough review, we affirm.
I. BACKGROUND
Morales pleaded guilty to one count of conspiracy to possess with intent to
distribute five kilograms or more of cocaine, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 846. The
written plea agreement contained the following provision regarding Morales’s
cooperation with the government:
If in the sole and unreviewable judgment of this Office the
defendant’s cooperation is of such a quality and significance to the
investigation or prosecution of other criminal matters as to warrant the
court’s downward departure . . . this Office may at or before
sentencing make a motion consistent with the intent of Section 5K1.1
of the Sentencing Guidelines prior to sentencing, or Rule 35 of the
Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure subsequent to sentencing,
reflecting that the defendant has provided substantial assistance and
recommending that the defendant’s sentence be reduced . . . . The
defendant acknowledges and agrees, however, that nothing in this
Agreement may be construed to require this Office to file any such
motions and that this Office’s assessment of the nature, value,
truthfulness, completeness, and accuracy of the defendant’s
cooperation shall be binding insofar as the appropriateness of this
Office’s filing of any such motion is concerned.
The Presentence Investigation Report (“PSI”) identified Morales’s guideline
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sentencing range as 70-87 months’ incarceration. The district court ultimately
sentenced Morales to 70 months’ imprisonment. The government did not file a
motion for a reduction based on substantial assistance.
Morales filed a pro se motion in district court requesting the court to compel
the government to honor its agreement by filing a Rule 35(b) motion based on his
testimony against a co-defendant, as well as other substantial assistance. This was
denied, as was a later motion for a reduction of his sentence or downward
departure. This appeal followed.
II. STANDARDS OF REVIEW
We construe briefs filed by pro se litigants liberally. Tannenbaum v. United
States, 148 F.3d 1262, 1263 (11th Cir. 1998). We review de novo whether the
government has breached a plea agreement. United States v. Mahique, 150 F.3d
1330, 1332 (11th Cir. 1998). We also review de novo whether the government can
be compelled to file a substantial assistance motion. See United States v. Forney, 9
F.3d 1492, 1498 (11th Cir. 1993). We review the district court’s denial of an
evidentiary hearing for an abuse of discretion. United States v. Gay, 251 F.3d 950,
951 (11th Cir. 2001).
III. DISCUSSION
A court may reduce a defendant’s sentence where the government moves for
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such a reduction under Rule 35(b) based on the defendant’s substantial assistance
in investigating or prosecuting another person. Fed. R. Crim. P. 35(b); see also
U.S.S.G. § 5K1.1. Morales argues that he is entitled to a reduction in his sentence
because he agreed to testify against his co-defendant and provided additional
information to the government. Morales contends that because the government did
not make such a motion, it breached the plea agreement and that he is now entitled
to specific performance of the agreement. He also argues that the district court
violated his Fifth and Eighth Amendment rights by not compelling the government
to move for a Rule 35(b) sentence reduction and that the district court abused its
discretion by declining to grant an evidentiary hearing as to whether Morales was
entitled to a Rule 35(b) sentence reduction. We disagree.
Although the government has the discretion to determine whether to file a
Rule 35(b) motion, in Wade v. United States, 504 U.S. 181 (1992), the Supreme
Court held that “federal district courts have authority to review a prosecutor’s
refusal to file a substantial-assistance motion and to grant a remedy if they find that
the refusal was based on an unconstitutional motive . . . say, because of the
defendant’s race or religion.” Id. at 185-86.
Because Morales has not proven that the government acted with an
unconstitutional motive in declining to move for a sentence reduction, the district
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court lacked jurisdiction to compel the government to make a Rule 35(b) motion.
Morales seeks to satisfy the “unconstitutional motive” element by arguing that by
refusing to file the motion, the district court violated Morales’s due process rights
and infringed on his liberty rights, in violation of the Fifth and Eighth
Amendments. This argument is unavailing for two reasons. First, it treats the
refusal to file the motion as the cause of a constitutional violation, whereas the
Supreme Court requires that, in order to obtain relief, the government’s refusal to
file the motion must be “based on an unconstitutional motive.” Second, Wade is
limited to the types of impermissible prosecutorial motives described by the
Supreme Court, namely those based on, “race, religion or other arbitrary
classification.” Forney, 9 F.3d at 1501 n.4 (citing Wade, 504 U.S. at 186); see
United States v. McNeese, 547 F.3d 1307, 1309 (11th Cir. 2008) (“The
government’s desire to retain some control over McNeese’s sentence is not of the
same ilk as those unconstitutional motives described by the Supreme Court,
namely the defendant’s race or religion.”). Morales does not assert that the
government declined to make a Rule 35(b) motion based on one of the
unconstitutional motives described by the Court in Wade. We therefore conclude
that the district court lacked the authority to compel the government to make a
Rule 35(b) motion based on Morales’s alleged substantial assistance.
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Next, the district court did not abuse its discretion in declining to conduct an
evidentiary hearing as to whether the government violated Morales’s rights in
refusing to file the Rule 35(b) motion. A defendant is not entitled to an evidentiary
hearing simply because he alleges that he “provided substantial assistance or []
makes only generalized allegations of an improper motive.” United States v.
Dorsey, 554 F.3d 958, 961 (11th Cir. 2009). It is only where there is an “an
allegation and a substantial showing” of an unconstitutional prosecutorial motive
that an evidentiary hearing is appropriate. Id. (quoting Forney, 9 F.3d at 1502)
(emphasis in original). Because we conclude that Morales has not made a
substantial showing that the government declined to file a Rule 35(b) motion
because of an unconstitutional motive, the district court did not abuse its discretion
by refusing to grant an evidentiary hearing on this issue.
Finally, we conclude that the government did not breach the plea agreement
by declining to move for a Rule 35(b) sentence reduction. The plea agreement
specifically stated the government would file a Rule 35(b) motion if, in its “sole
and unreviewable judgment,” it determined that such a motion was warranted.
This court has held that such language precludes courts “from intruding into
prosecutorial discretion.” Forney, 9 F.3d at 1501. The plea agreement at issue in
Morales’s case did not obligate the government to file a Rule 35(b) motion,
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therefore the government did not breach the agreement by declining to seek a
reduction of Morales’s sentence.
IV. CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated, we affirm the district court.
AFFIRMED.
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