United States v. Jeremy C. Jones

[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
________________________ FILED
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
No. 08-14505 ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
APRIL 6, 2009
Non-Argument Calendar
THOMAS K. KAHN
________________________
CLERK
D. C. Docket No. 01-00101-CR-CB
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
versus
JEREMY C. JONES,
a.k.a. Suicide,
a.k.a. Jay,
Defendant-Appellant.
________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Alabama
_________________________
(April 6, 2009)
Before TJOFLAT, BLACK and FAY, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Jeremy C. Jones appeals the district court’s denial of his 18 U.S.C.
§ 3582(c)(2) motion for sentence reduction based on Amendment 706 to the
Sentencing Guidelines, which reduced the base offense levels for crack cocaine
offenses. In 2003, Jones pled guilty to one count of possession with intent to
distribute cocaine base (crack cocaine), in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1).
Jones’s Guidelines offense level was initially calculated at 32 based on the amount
of cocaine base involved, pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1. Jones, however, qualified
as a career offender under U.S.S.G. § 4B1.1, and an offense level of 37 applied
because the statutory maximum for the offense was life imprisonment. The district
court denied the instant motion for sentence reduction, finding Amendment 706
did not affect Jones’s sentencing range because it was ultimately calculated based
on the career offender provision and not the crack cocaine guideline.
We review for an abuse of discretion a district court’s decision whether to
reduce a sentence based on a subsequent change in the Sentencing Guidelines.
United States v. Brown, 332 F.3d 1341, 1343 (11th Cir. 2003). We review de novo
the district court’s legal conclusions and questions of statutory interpretation in a
§ 3582(c)(2) proceeding. United States v. Moore, 541 F.3d 1323, 1326 (11th Cir.
2008), cert. denied, McFadden v. United States, 129 S. Ct. 965 (2009)
In Moore, this Court addressed whether a defendant sentenced pursuant to
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the career offender guideline is eligible for sentence reduction based on
Amendment 706. Id. at 1327. There, the defendants’ offense levels were initially
calculated based on the amount of crack cocaine involved. Id. at 1325. The
defendants, however, were ultimately sentenced as career offenders under § 4B1.1,
which was not affected by Amendment 706. Id. We affirmed the denials of their
motions for sentence modification, holding, “[w]here a retroactively applicable
guideline amendment reduces a defendant’s base offense level, but does not alter
the sentencing range upon which his or her sentence was based, § 3582(c)(2) does
not authorize a reduction in sentence.” Id. at 1330; see also U.S.S.G. § 1B1.10
cmt. n.1(A) (“[A] reduction in the defendant’s term of imprisonment is not
authorized under 18 U.S.C. 3582(c)(2) and is not consistent with this policy
statement if . . . [a retroactive amendment] is applicable to the defendant but the
amendment does not have the effect of lowering the defendant’s applicable
guideline range because of the operation of another guideline or statutory
provision[.]”).
Here, as in Moore, Jones was sentenced based on a range that was
determined by application of the career offender provision. The offense level that
would have applied under § 2D1.1, based on the amount of crack cocaine involved,
ultimately played no role in his sentence. Because Amendment 706 “does not
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alter the sentencing range upon which his . . . sentence was based,” Jones is
ineligible for sentence reduction. See Moore, 541 F.3d at 1330. Accordingly, we
affirm the denial of his § 3582(c)(2) motion.
AFFIRMED.
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