United States v. Garfield Alexander Hudnell

[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FILED
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
________________________ ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
APR 6, 2009
No. 08-13499 THOMAS K. KAHN
Non-Argument Calendar CLERK
________________________
D. C. Docket No. 07-20562-CR-JAL
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
versus
GARFIELD ALEXANDER HUDNELL,
Defendant-Appellant.
________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Florida
_________________________
(April 6, 2009)
Before DUBINA, BLACK and BARKETT, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Appellant Garfield Alexander Hudnell appeals his conviction for being a
felon in possession of a firearm in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). Specifically,
he appeals the district court’s denial of his motion to suppress all evidence
obtained as a result of the officers’ stop and frisk. Hudnell argues that the officers
lacked both reasonable suspicion for the stop and a reasonable belief that he was
armed and dangerous in order to conduct the frisk.
We review a denial of a motion to suppress as a mixed question of fact and
law. United States v. Briggman, 931 F.2d 705, 708 (11th Cir. 1991). We review
the district court’s findings of fact for clear error and the application of law to
those facts de novo. Id. We construe the facts most favorably to the prevailing
party, which, in this case is the government. Id.The Fourth Amendment provides that seizures and searches of a person must
be justified by probable cause. See U.S. Const. amend. IV. In Terry v. Ohio, 392
U.S. 1, 88 S. Ct. 1868, 20 L. Ed. 2d 889 (1968), the Supreme Court created an
exception to this rule, creating a “distinction between two elements of police work,
the stop and the frisk.” United States v. Bonds, 829 F.2d 1072, 1074 (11th Cir.
1987).
With respect to the stop, the Supreme Court held that “an officer may,
consistent with the Fourth Amendment, conduct a brief, investigatory stop when
the officer has reasonable, articulable suspicion that criminal activity is afoot.”
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Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 123, 120 S. Ct. 673, 675, 145 L. Ed. 2d 570(2000) (citing Terry, 392 U.S. at 30, 88 S. Ct. 1868). “While ‘reasonable
suspicion’ is a less demanding standard than probable cause and requires a
showing considerably less than preponderance of the evidence, the Fourth
Amendment requires at least a minimal level of objective justification for making
the stop.” Id. at 123, 120 S. Ct. at 675-76. “The officer must be able to articulate
more than an inchoate and unparticularized suspicion or hunch of criminal
activity.” Id. at 123-24, 120 S. Ct. at 676 (quotation omitted). To determine
whether an officer has reasonable suspicion we “must look at the ‘totality of the
circumstances’ of each case to see whether the detaining officer has a
‘particularized and objective basis’ for suspecting legal wrongdoing.” United
States v. Arvizu, 534 U.S. 266, 273, 122 S. Ct. 744, 750, 151 L. Ed. 2d 740 (2002).
With respect to the frisk, after an officer legitimately stops an individual, an
officer may pat down or frisk an individual so long as “a reasonably prudent man
in the circumstances would be warranted in the belief that his safety or that of
others was in danger.” Terry, 392 U.S. at 27, 88 S. Ct. at 1883. Thus, if an officer
has a reasonable belief that the individual is armed and presently dangerous, the
officer may conduct a pat down. Bonds, 829 F.2d at 1074. The standard requires
“an objectively reasonable fear based upon specific facts regarding specific
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individuals.” Id. The sole purpose of the frisk is to protect the officers and others
nearby. Id.Here, we conclude from the record that the district court did not err by
denying Hudnell’s motion to suppress. The officers had reasonable suspicion to
stop Hudnell based on the unresolved 911 call asking for police assistance,
Hudnell’s appearance from behind a house that was not his, and Hudnell’s attempt
to run away upon further questioning. Further, a reasonable officer would believe
that Hudnell was armed and dangerous based on the above facts and his silence as
to whether he had a weapon. Therefore, we conclude that the officers were
justified in frisking Hudnell for their own protection. Accordingly, we affirm
Hudnell’s conviction.
AFFIRMED.
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