United States v. Emanuel Gray

USCA11 Case: 21-14186 Document: 35-1 Date Filed: 01/27/2023 Page: 1 of 11
[DO NOT PUBLISH]
In the
United States Court of Appeals
For the Eleventh Circuit
____________________
No. 21-14186
Non-Argument Calendar
____________________
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
versus
EMANUEL GRAY,
Defendant-Appellant.
____________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Georgia
D.C. Docket No. 1:18-cr-00487-SCJ-LTW-1
____________________
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2 Opinion of the Court 21-14186
Before WILSON, LUCK, and ANDERSON, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Emanuel Gray appeals following his convictions for produc-
tion and attempted production of child pornography, cyberstalk-
ing, and possession of child pornography, as well as his resulting
20-year total sentence.
On appeal, he argues that the district court erred in denying
his pre-trial motion to suppress statements because he was in cus-
tody at the time he made the statements, and thus should have re-
ceived Miranda1 warnings, and the statements were involuntary.
He also argues that insufficient evidence supported the jury’s find-
ing that he was the person who produced and possessed child por-
nography and sent threatening messages. Finally, he argues that
his 20-year total sentence was substantively unreasonable because
the district court failed to consider the nature of his offenses, his
strides toward rehabilitation, sentencing disparities with similarly
situated defendants, and his age and intellectual disability.
I.
In reviewing a district court’s denial of a defendant’s motion
to suppress, we review its factual findings for clear error and its ap-
plication of law to those facts de novo. United States v. Ramirez,
476 F.3d 1231, 1235 (11th Cir. 2007). When considering a ruling on
1 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
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21-14186 Opinion of the Court 3
a motion to suppress, we construe all facts in the light most favor-
able to the party prevailing in the district court. Id. at 1235-36.
A defendant is “in custody” for Miranda purposes when “un-
der the totality of the circumstances, a reasonable man in his posi-
tion would feel a restraint on his freedom of movement to such
extent that he would not feel free to leave.” United States v.
McDowell, 250 F.3d 1354, 1362 (11th Cir. 2001). (alterations omit-
ted). “The test is objective: the actual, subjective beliefs of the de-
fendant and the interviewing officer on whether the defendant was
free to leave are irrelevant.” Id. A person is “in custody” for Mi-
randa purposes only when there is a “formal arrest or restraint on
freedom movement of the degree associated with a formal arrest.”
United States v. Street, 472 F.3d 1298, 1310 (11th Cir. 2006).
In assessing the totality of the circumstances, we consider
whether the officers brandished weapons, touched the suspect,
used language or a tone that indicated that compliance with the
officers should be compelled, and the location and length of the
detention. United States v. Luna-Encinas, 603 F.3d 876, 881 (11th
Cir. 2010). “[T]he fact that an individual is told he is not under
arrest and is free to leave is a fact of substantial importance in de-
termining whether a reasonable person would have felt free to
leave.” United States v. Brown, 441 F.3d 1330, 1347 (11th Cir.
2006).
Even if a defendant is not in custody for Miranda purposes,
a confession is nevertheless inadmissible if it was not voluntarily
given. United States v. Lall, 607 F.3d 1277, 1285 (11th Cir. 2010).
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4 Opinion of the Court 21-14186
In determining whether a confession was voluntary, this Court ex-
amines the totality of the circumstances and considers “the defend-
ant’s intelligence, the length of his detention, the nature of the in-
terrogation, the use of any physical force against him, or the use of
any promises or inducements by police.” Hubbard v. Haley, 317
F.3d 1245, 1252-53 (11th Cir. 2003). A “significant aspect” of the
inquiry “involves the effect of deception in obtaining a confession.”
Lall, 607 F.3d at 1285. While a confession induced by threats or
promises is not voluntary, “a mere admonition to tell the truth
does not render a confession involuntary.” United States v. Vera,
701 F.2d 1349, 1364 (11th Cir. 1983).
Here, we conclude that the district court did not err in deny-
ing Gray’s motion. First, it properly found that he was not “in cus-
tody” at the time that he made his statements, and thus, was not
entitled to Miranda warnings. Under the totality of the circum-
stances, a reasonable person in Gray’s position would not have felt
sufficient restraint such that he was not free to leave. McDowell,
250 F.3d at 1362. Of “substantial importance,” the agents told Gray
on multiple occasions that he was not under arrest and was free to
leave. Brown, 441 F.3d at 1347. Although agents instructed him to
stand in the hallway during the safety sweep and to stay in the liv-
ing room during the subsequent search, the agents told him that he
could go where he needed if he asked and reiterated that he was
free to leave the apartment altogether. Moreover, Gray voluntar-
ily followed the agents back into the apartment after the interview.
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Further, the agents did not brandish their weapons during
the encounter, did not touch Gray, and spoke in a calm tone with-
out yelling. While the interview took place in an FBI vehicle, it
was unmarked and parked in front of Gray’s residence, and the
agents did not lock the vehicle or otherwise impede Gray from
leaving. Finally, the interview lasted about one hour and ten
minutes, and there is no evidence that the agents extended the du-
ration of the interview unnecessarily. Thus, there was no “restraint
on freedom movement of the degree associated with a formal ar-
rest,” and Gray was not “in custody” for Miranda purposes. Street,
472 F.3d at 1310.
Second, the district court did not err in finding that Gray’s
statements were voluntary. Although Gray was young, had no
prior experience with law enforcement, and had intellectual defi-
cits, the interview was not excessively long, and the tone of the
conversation was calm. Moreover, the agents did not use or
threaten to use any force against Gray, or make any promises or
inducements to get him to make his confession. Finally, Kabrhel’s
statements that he “was not owning up to what he did,” and that
saying that he did not remember was the same as lying appear to
be mere admonitions to tell the truth, as Gray does not contend
that Kabrhel made a threat or promise to him. Vera, 701 F.2d at
1364. Accordingly, we affirm the denial of Gray’s motion to sup-
press.
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6 Opinion of the Court 21-14186
II.
We review de novo a challenge to the sufficiency of the evi-
dence supporting a conviction and the denial of a motion for judg-
ment of acquittal, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable
to the government and making all reasonable inferences and cred-
ibility choices in support of the jury’s verdict. United States v.
Gamory, 635 F.3d 480, 497 (11th Cir. 2011). The district court’s
denial of a motion for judgment of acquittal will be upheld if a rea-
sonable trier of fact could determine that the evidence presented
establishes the defendant’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Id.It is unlawful for any person to employ, use, persuade, in-
duce, entice, or coerce a minor to engage in sexually explicit con-
duct for the purpose of producing a visual depiction of such con-
duct. 18 U.S.C. § 2251(a). Likewise, it is illegal to knowingly pos-
sess a visual depiction of a minor engaging in sexually explicit con-
duct. 18 U.S.C. § 2252(a)(4)(B). Finally, it is unlawful to use an
electronic communication service, with intent to harass or intimi-
date, to engage in a course of conduct that “causes, attempts to
cause, or would be reasonably expected to cause substantial emo-
tional distress” to another person. 18 U.S.C. § 2261A(2)(B).
Here, viewed in the light most favorable to the government,
the evidence supports Gray’s convictions for production of child
pornography, possession of the same, and cyberstalking. First, as
to Gray’s convictions for production of child pornography, Gray
admitted in his interview with Perry that both phones were his,
and the phone numbers matched the phone number from which
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21-14186 Opinion of the Court 7
Cierra received messages. He gave the FBI agents the password to
his phones and showed them how to access the sexually explicit
content stored on them. He also admitted to receiving nude pho-
tos from Cierra. Moreover, Cierra testified that Gray asked her to
send him sexually explicit photos, and that she only sent them
when he asked for them. She recognized the sexually explicit im-
ages that agents recovered from Gray’s phones and stated that she
sent them to him. Accordingly, a rational trier of fact could have
determined that sufficient evidence showed that Gray induced Ci-
erra to engage in sexually explicit conduct and produce visual de-
pictions of that conduct. Gamory, 635 F.3d 480, 497; 18 U.S.C. §
2251(a).
As to Sachi, she testified that she made sexually explicit con-
tent to send to an anonymous person. She also confirmed that she
recognized the content that agents discovered on Gray’s phones
and stated that it matched the content that she sent. Thus, suffi-
cient evidence also supported Gray’s convictions for production of
child pornography in relation to Sachi.
Second, as to Gray’s possession conviction, the agents dis-
covered sexually explicit images and videos depicting Cierra and
Sachi on Gray’s phones. Moreover, as mentioned above, Gray ad-
mitted to ownership of the phones, and the agents located them in
a room that also contained his identification card. Accordingly, the
jury reasonably found that Gray knowingly possessed visual depic-
tions of minors engaged in sexually explicit conduct. 18 U.S.C. §
2252(a)(4)(B).
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8 Opinion of the Court 21-14186
Finally, sufficient evidence supports Gray’s cyberstalking
convictions. Cierra described that Gray threatened to expose her
nude images if she did not provide additional images and videos.
He also told her that if she did not comply, he would get her kicked
out of the band and expelled from school. Further, Gray created
an Instagram account that featured a nude image that Cierra sent
to him, which made Cierra scared and upset and caused her friends
to make fun of her. The agents discovered the threatening mes-
sages Cierra received on Gray’s phones. Given this evidence, a rea-
sonable jury could have concluded that Gray’s messages intention-
ally caused substantial emotional distress to Cierra. 18 U.S.C. §
2261A(2)(B).
Moreover, Sachi testified that she received messages threat-
ening to expose her and ruin her life. The agents discovered the
messages on Gray’s phones, as well as additional messages threat-
ening to expose her if she did not send more images or videos. Fur-
ther, Sachi testified that, when Trumble came to her house, she
was afraid that she was going to be in trouble and lose her place in
the band. She also stated that she began seeing a therapist as a re-
sult of the threatening messages that she received. Thus, while her
father and Trumble reassured her and told her that her spot in the
band was safe, a reasonable jury could have found that Gray’s
threatening messages caused Sachi substantial emotional distress.
Nevertheless, even assuming that Gray’s conduct did not cause
such distress, the jury could have determined that Gray’s threats to
publicize nude images of Sachi if she did not send more images
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21-14186 Opinion of the Court 9
“would be reasonably expected to cause substantial emotional dis-
tress.” 18 U.S.C. § 2261A(2)(B). Thus, we affirm in this respect.
III.
We review the reasonableness of a district court’s sentence
for an abuse of discretion. United States v. Trailer, 827 F.3d 933,
935 (11th Cir. 2016). The party challenging the sentence bears the
burden of proving that it is unreasonable based on the facts of the
case and the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors. United States v. Tome,
611 F.3d 1371, 1378 (11th Cir. 2010).
A district court must consider all § 3553(a) factors, but it is
not required to explicitly discuss, or state, that it has considered
each of the § 3553(a) factors. United States v. Kulhman,
711 F.3d 1321, 1326 (11th Cir. 2013). Moreover, the district court
is not required to give all factors equal weight, and it may attach
greater weight to one factor over others. United States v. Rosales-
Bruno, 789 F.3d 1249, 1254 (11th Cir. 2015). The decision about
how much weight to assign a particular sentencing factor is com-
mitted to the sound discretion of the district court. Id.A district court abuses its discretion when it “(1) fails to af-
ford consideration to relevant factors that were due significant
weight; (2) gives significant weight to an improper or irrelevant fac-
tor; or (3) commits a clear error of judgment in considering the
proper factors.” Id. at 1189. We have stated that an indicator of a
reasonable sentence is one that is imposed at the bottom of the ad-
visory guideline range and is substantially below the statutory
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10 Opinion of the Court 21-14186
maximum sentence. United States v. Carpenter, 803 F.3d 1224,
1234 (11th Cir. 2015).
A claim of unwarranted sentencing disparities requires that
the defendant be similarly situated to the defendants to whom he
compares himself. United States v. Duperval, 777 F.3d 1324, 1338
(11th Cir. 2015). District courts should not draw comparisons to
cases involving defendants who were convicted of less serious of-
fenses, pleaded guilty, or who lacked extensive criminal histories.
United States v. Jayyousi, 657 F.3d 1085, 1118 (11th Cir. 2011).
Here, we conclude that Gray’s 20-year total sentence is sub-
stantively reasonable. The district court acknowledged that other
cases may have involved worse photos, but it found that Gray’s
intentional extortion and punishment of the victims for refusing to
give him more images necessitated a total sentence above the ap-
plicable mandatory minimums. It also noted Gray’s young age and
immaturity but found that these were not a substantially mitigating
factors, and they were outweighed by the seriousness of the of-
fenses. It explicitly stated that it considered each of the § 3553(a)
factors, and it was within its discretion to weigh certain factors
more heavily than others. Rosales-Bruno, 789 F.3d at 1254.
Moreover, his 20-year total sentence was below the advisory
guideline range of life and substantially below the statutory maxi-
mum total sentence he faced, further indicating the reasonableness
of his total sentence. Finally, although Gray points to cases in
which defendants convicted of similar offenses were sentenced be-
low the 15-year total sentence he requested, he was not similarly
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situated to those defendants, because, as the district court noted,
he faced a mandatory minimum of 15 years’ imprisonment for two
of his convictions. Accordingly, we affirm.
AFFIRMED.