Willie James Pye v. Warden, Georgia Diagnostic Prison

USCA11 Case: 18-12147 Document: 83-1 Date Filed: 01/25/2023 Page: 1 of 4
[DO NOT PUBLISH]
In the
United States Court of Appeals
For the Eleventh Circuit
____________________
No. 18-12147
____________________
WILLIE JAMES PYE,
Petitioner-Appellant,
versus
WARDEN, GEORGIA DIAGNOSTIC PRISON,
Respondent-Appellee.
____________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Georgia
D.C. Docket No. 3:13-cv-00119-TCB
____________________
USCA11 Case: 18-12147 Document: 83-1 Date Filed: 01/25/2023 Page: 2 of 4
2 Opinion of the Court 18-12147
Before WILSON and JILL PRYOR, Circuit Judges. *
PER CURIAM:
After a jury found defendant Willie James Pye guilty of mal-
ice murder, kidnapping with bodily injury, armed robbery, bur-
glary, and rape, he was sentenced to death. In federal habeas pro-
ceedings, Pye challenged his convictions and sentence on several
grounds, including that his trial counsel provided ineffective assis-
tance at the penalty stage and that he could not be executed be-
cause he had an intellectual disability.
After oral argument, this panel concluded that Pye was enti-
tled to relief on his ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim but did
not reach his intellectual-disability claim. See Pye v. Warden, Ga.
Diagnostic Prison, 853 F. App’x 548, 548 & n.1 (11th Cir. 2021) (un-
published). The panel opinion was later vacated, and this Court sit-
ting en banc held that Pye was not entitled to habeas relief on his
ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim because “the state court rea-
sonably concluded that Pye was not prejudiced by any of his coun-
sel’s alleged deficiencies in connecting with his sentencing proceed-
ing.” Pye v. Warden, Ga. Diagnostic Prison, 50 F.4th 1025, 1030
(11th Cir. 2022) (en banc). The en banc court remanded the case
back to the panel for further proceedings so that we could consider
the intellectual-disability claim. See id. at 1057.
* Due to the retirement of Judge Beverly B. Martin, this case is decided by a
quorum. See 28 U.S.C. § 46(d); 11th Cir. R. 34-2.
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18-12147 Opinion of the Court 3
The Supreme Court has held that the execution of a person
with an intellectual disability violates the Eighth Amendment’s
prohibition on cruel and unusual punishments. See Atkins v. Vir-
ginia, 536 U.S. 304, 321 (2002). In Atkins, the Supreme Court stated
that it was “leav[ing] to the States the task of developing appropri-
ate ways to enforce the constitutional restriction” banning the exe-
cution of individuals with intellectual disabilities. Id. at 317 (altera-
tion adopted) (internal quotation marks omitted).
Under Georgia law, to prove an intellectual disability, a de-
fendant must establish three things: (1) “that he has significantly
subaverage general intellectual functioning”; (2) “this functioning
is associated with impairments in adaptive behavior”; and (3) “the
functioning and associated impairments manifested during the de-
velopmental period,” meaning before the defendant turned 18
years of age. Fults v. GDCP Warden, 764 F.3d 1311, 1319 (11th Cir.
2014) (internal quotation marks omitted); see O.C.G.A. § 17-7-
131(a)(2). Georgia law requires a defendant to prove beyond a rea-
sonable doubt that he has an intellectual disability. See O.C.G.A.
§ 17-7-131(c)(3).
Our focus in this appeal is whether Pye satisfied the second
prong of the intellectual-disability standard. Pye argues that he es-
tablished beyond a reasonable doubt that he has the requisite adap-
tive deficits. After careful consideration, we conclude that the state
court’s decision that Pye failed to carry his burden was not unrea-
sonable and thus is entitled to deference under the Antiterrorism
and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”). See 28 U.S.C.
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4 Opinion of the Court 18-12147
§ 2254(d). We reach this conclusion for the reasons stated in the
district court’s well-reasoned order.
Pye also argues on appeal that Georgia’s requirement that a
defendant prove beyond a reasonable doubt that he has an intellec-
tual disability violates the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments.
Pye raised the claim in his state habeas proceedings, and the state
habeas court summarily rejected it. Our precedent makes clear that
this decision, too, was not unreasonable and therefore is entitled to
AEDPA deference. See Raulerson v. Warden, 928 F.3d 987, 1001–
04 (11th Cir. 2019) (affording deference to state habeas court deci-
sion rejecting similar due process claim); Hill v. Humphrey, 662
F.3d 1335, 1360 (11th Cir. 2011) (en banc) (affording deference to
state habeas court decision rejecting similar Eighth Amendment
claim).
We thus affirm the denial of relief on Pye’s intellectual disa-
bility claim.
AFFIRMED.