Kimberly A. Nice v. L-3 Communications Vertex Aerospace LLC

Case: 16-15541 Date Filed: 03/22/2018 Page: 1 of 8
[PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
________________________
Nos. 16-15541; 17-10545; 16-90014
________________________
D.C. Docket No. 3:12-cv-00009-MCR-CJK
KIMBERLY A. NICE,
a personal representative of the estate of Shawn R. Nice
1st Lt USMC deceased,
H.N.,
a minor child,
Plaintiffs-Appellees,
versus
L-3 COMMUNICATIONS VERTEX AEROSPACE LLC,
ESTATE OF CHARLES HAROLD MCDANIEL,
Defendants-Appellants.
________________________
Appeals from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Florida
________________________
(March 22, 2018)
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Before ED CARNES, Chief Judge, DUBINA, Circuit Judge, and ABRAMS, *
District Judge.
PER CURIAM:
Kimberly Nice filed this wrongful death action against L-3 Communications
Vertex Aerospace and the Estate of Charles McDaniel after a Navy aircraft crashed
during a training exercise, killing her husband and everyone else on board. The
defendants filed a motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction on
political question grounds, which the district court denied. The defendants appeal
that order, contending that interlocutory review is proper under the collateral order
doctrine and, alternatively, that it is appropriate under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b).
I. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
First Lieutenant Shawn Nice was training as a navigator on a Navy-owned
jet aircraft during a training exercise when the aircraft crashed in north Georgia.
Charles McDaniel, a Navy-approved pilot and Vertex employee, was piloting the
aircraft when it crashed. An investigation showed that the aircraft was travelling at
a speed of 330 knots when a malfunction caused an inadvertent left rudder
movement, which McDaniel countered by moving the rudder to the right.
McDaniel’s attempt to compensate for the malfunction at that speed broke the tail
apart, causing the crash.
*
Honorable Leslie J. Abrams, United States District Judge for the Middle District of
Georgia, sitting by designation.
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Nice’s wife filed this wrongful death action against Vertex and McDaniel’s
estate. She claimed that McDaniel’s negligent response to the malfunction caused
the tail to fail and the aircraft to crash. The defendants raised the affirmative
defense of comparative fault by the Navy, arguing that the Navy’s choice of the
aircraft, selection of the mission speed and altitude, and oversights in the training
manual contributed in whole or in part to the crash. 1 The defendants filed a motion
to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction on the ground that their
comparative fault defense would require the jury to evaluate sensitive Navy
decisions, making the case nonjusticiable under the political question doctrine.
The district court denied the motion, finding that the negligence claim
hinged on McDaniel’s reaction to the malfunction, which had nothing to do with
the Navy’s decisions. The defendants appealed that order, asserting appellate
jurisdiction as of right under the collateral order doctrine. The defendants also
filed a petition for permission to appeal under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b), which permits
discretionary interlocutory appeals, and a motions panel of this Court granted that
petition. 2
1
The district court determined that Florida law governed Nice’s negligence claim, and
that Florida’s comparative fault doctrine would allow the defendants to attempt to shift some or
all of the fault to the Navy. See Fla. Stat. § 768.81(3)(a).
2
The district court found that its order involved a “controlling question of law as to
which there is substantial ground for difference of opinion and that an immediate appeal from the
order may materially advance the ultimate termination of the litigation.” See 28 U.S.C.
§ 1292(b). The motions panel granted permission for the appeal to proceed under § 1292(b), but
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II. DISCUSSION
We have jurisdiction over “appeals from all final decisions of the district
courts of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 1291. A decision “is considered final
and appealable only if it ends the litigation on the merits and leaves nothing for the
court to do but execute the judgment,” W.R. Huff Asset Mgmt. Co. v. Kohlberg,
Kravis, Roberts & Co., L.P., 566 F.3d 979, 984 (11th Cir. 2009), so denials of a
motion to dismiss are normally not considered final under § 1291, see Foy v.
Schantz, Schatzman & Aaronson, P.A., 108 F.3d 1347, 1350 (11th Cir. 1997).
This appeal presents two jurisdictional issues: (1) whether the district
court’s order is appealable as of right under the collateral order doctrine, which is
an exception to the final judgment rule, and (2) whether we should exercise our
discretion to permit the defendants’ appeal under § 1292(b).
A. Collateral Order Issue
The collateral order doctrine recognizes “a small category of decisions that,
although they do not end the litigation, must nonetheless be considered final.” In
re Hubbard, 803 F.3d 1298, 1305 (11th Cir. 2015) (quotation marks omitted). That
small category “includes only decisions that are conclusive, that resolve important
questions separate from the merits, and that are effectively unreviewable on appeal
we may conclude that the “motion for leave to appeal was improvidently granted and vacate the
order.” Burrell v. Bd. of Trustees of Ga. Military College, 970 F.2d 785, 788 (11th Cir. 1992).
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from the final judgment in the underlying action.” Mohawk Indus., Inc. v.
Carpenter, 558 U.S. 100, 106, 130 S. Ct. 599, 605 (2009). Nice does not contest
the first two requirements. As for the third requirement, the defendants argue that
without an immediate appeal their comparative fault defense will require the jury
to second-guess sensitive Navy decisions, which harms the public’s interest in
separation of powers, and a later appeal will not undo that damage. That argument
fails.3
Courts cannot engage in an “individualized jurisdictional inquiry” to
determine whether a decision fits into the small category of collateral order
decisions. Id. at 107, 130 S. Ct. at 605 (quotation marks omitted). 4 That is exactly
what the defendants want us to do here. Their argument that an immediate appeal
is necessary to stop a jury from second-guessing the Navy’s decisions turns on the
Navy’s choice of the aircraft, selection of the mission speed and altitude, and
3
Although it does not impact our decision, we note that the Navy is aware of this case (it
has responded to discovery requests and was ordered to appear in a telephonic discovery hearing)
but has not filed a statement of interest or amicus brief. See 28 U.S.C. § 517 (“The Solicitor
General, or any officer of the Department of Justice, may be sent by the Attorney General to any
State or district in the United States to attend to the interests of the United States in a suit
pending in a court of the United States, or in a court of a State, or to attend to any other interest
of the United States.”).
4
We have not decided whether the denial of a motion to dismiss on political question
grounds fits into that small category, McMahon v. Presidential Airways, Inc., 502 F.3d 1331,
1357 (11th Cir. 2007), but two of our sister circuits have addressed the issue and have held that
the “denial of a motion to dismiss based upon political question grounds is not an immediately
appealable collateral order.” Doe v. Exxon Mobil Corp., 473 F.3d 345, 353 (D.C. Cir. 2007); see
also Abelesz v. OTP Bank, 692 F.3d 638, 650 (7th Cir. 2012) (same).
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instructions in the training manual, all of which are facts peculiar to this case.
Instead of delving into those facts, we must focus on whether the “class of claims,
taken as a whole, can be adequately vindicated” by means other than an immediate
appeal. Id. 5 The defendants can raise their subject matter jurisdiction argument
after final judgment, 6 and their argument that the court’s order may be burdensome
in “ways that are only imperfectly reparable by appellate reversal of a final district
court judgment . . . has never sufficed” to satisfy the third condition. Id. (quotation
marks omitted); see also Digital Equip. Corp. v. Desktop Direct, Inc., 511 U.S.
863, 873, 114 S. Ct. 1992, 1998–99 (1994) (stating that “virtually every right that
could be enforced appropriately by pretrial dismissal might loosely be described as
conferring a right not to stand trial,” which means that courts of appeals must
“view claims of a right not to be tried with skepticism, if not a jaundiced eye”)
(quotation marks omitted). For those reasons, the district court’s order is not
“final” under the collateral order doctrine.
5
The defendants attempt to shoehorn this case into the collateral order doctrine by
asserting that the relevant category of cases are those where an “issue exists regarding the
military’s negligence and the governing allocation of fault law allows the jury to allocate a
percentage of fault to the military on the verdict form.” That attempt fails because defining the
“class of claims” at such a narrow level amounts to an “individualized jurisdictional inquiry”
largely based on the facts of the case, which is prohibited. Mohawk, 558 U.S. at 107, 130 S. Ct.
at 605 (quotation marks omitted).
6
See Kontrick v. Ryan, 540 U.S. 443, 455, 124 S. Ct. 906, 915 (2004) (“A litigant
generally may raise a court’s lack of subject-matter jurisdiction at any time in the same civil
action, even initially at the highest appellate instance.”).
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B. Jurisdiction Under Section 1292(b)
That leaves the issue of whether we should permit this appeal under
§ 1292(b), which grants us discretionary jurisdiction to exercise interlocutory
review. See 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b); McFarlin v. Conseco Servs., LLC, 381 F.3d
1251, 1253 (11th Cir. 2004). “We have identified five conditions that generally
must be met before we will consider an issue on interlocutory appeal under
§ 1292(b).” Mamani v. Berzain, 825 F.3d 1304, 1312 (11th Cir. 2016). One of
those is that the “issue is a pure question of law,” id., and the defendants falter at
that first hurtle. They argue that the condition is satisfied because we need to
decide only whether their comparative fault defense divests the district court of
subject matter jurisdiction under the political question doctrine. They assert that
the facts underlying that issue are undisputed and sit “neatly and clearly atop the
record.”
The issue is neither neat nor clear from any vantage point in the record. And
it is far from being one of pure law. The basic historical facts underlying this case
may be undisputed — the what, when, and where of the crash. The question of
who caused the crash, however, is hotly disputed, as the defendants conceded at
oral argument. O.A. Trans., Oct. 27, 2017. 7 And determining whether the
7
For instance, the defendants assert that the district court’s finding that the Navy was not
responsible for McDaniel’s training is clearly erroneous.
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defendants’ comparative fault defense would force the jury to evaluate sensitive
Navy decisions requires us to answer the disputed question of who caused the
crash: the Navy, the defendants, or both. That case-specific inquiry does not
present a pure question of law but a mixed one of law and fact. It would require us
to decide whether “the district court properly applied settled [political question
doctrine principles] to the facts or evidence of [this] particular case.” Mamani, 825
F.3d at 1312 (quotation marks omitted). As a result, the first requirement for
exercising jurisdiction under § 1292(b) is not satisfied. 8
The appeals are DISMISSED, the order granting permission to appeal under
§ 1292(b) is VACATED, the petition for permission to appeal under that statute is
DENIED, and the case is REMANDED for further proceedings consistent with
this opinion.
8
Even if the defendants could satisfy the first condition, we would exercise our discretion
not to review this appeal. See McFarlin, 381 F.3d at 1259 (“Even when all of [the] factors are
present, the court of appeals has discretion to turn down a § 1292(b) appeal.”).
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