Robert M. Sills v. FCI Talladega Warden

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[DO NOT PUBLISH]
In the
United States Court of Appeals
For the Eleventh Circuit
____________________
No. 22-12656
Non-Argument Calendar
____________________
ROBERT M. SILLS,
Petitioner-Appellant,
versus
FCI TALLADEGA WARDEN,
Respondent-Appellee.
____________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Alabama
D.C. Docket No. 1:21-cv-01685-LSC-SGC
____________________
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2 Opinion of the Court 22-12656
Before WILSON, ROSENBAUM, and LUCK, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Robert Sills, a pro se federal prisoner, appeals the district
court’s denial of his 28 U.S.C. § 2241 habeas corpus petition, which
sought an order directing the warden of his institution to give “fair
treatment” to his request for placement in home confinement un-
der the Coronavirus Aid, Relief, and Economic Security Act
(CARES Act), Pub. L. No. 116-136, § 12003(b)(2), 134 Stat. 281, 516
(2020). The district court found that it lacked the authority to order
his placement in home confinement, and that Sills could not state
a procedural-due-process claim because he lacked a constitution-
ally protected liberty interest in his place of confinement. After
careful review, we affirm.
I.
Sills is a prisoner serving two consecutive 120-month sen-
tences for federal drug crimes. In May 2021, he submitted an ad-
ministrative request at his place of confinement, a minimum-secu-
rity prison camp at FCI Talladega, seeking placement in home con-
finement under the CARES Act. The acting warden denied the re-
quest in a June 2021 response, and the Bureau of Prisons (“BOP”)
denied Sills’s appeal in November 2021, concurring with the acting
warden’s rationale.
According to the warden’s response, Sills’s request was re-
viewed under the BOP’s guidelines for home confinement under
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22-12656 Opinion of the Court 3
the CARES Act. Sills was a “47 year old male” who had a “[l]ow
[r]isk [l]evel of recidivating” under the PATTERN risk assessment.
He was assigned “Medical Care Level 2,” which was “considered
stable, chronic care,” and he had no “underlying medical condi-
tions considered to place [him] at higher risk for severe illness from
COVID-19.” The record reflects that Sills has a medical history of
asthma, headaches, allergies, and chronic ear infections. The act-
ing warden’s response continued that Sills had a “[s]erious history
of [v]iolence,” citing police records relating to a 1990 conviction for
unlawful possession of a firearm, which indicated that Sills had pos-
sessed a loaded firearm while “banging on the door” of a residence
and “yelling threats” with three other individuals. For those rea-
sons, Sills’s request was denied.
In December 2021, Sills filed the instant habeas corpus peti-
tion under 28 U.S.C. § 2241. He claimed that the warden violated
his due-process right to “fair treatment” by failing to follow the
governing criteria for home confinement under the CARES Act.
He relied on an April 2021 BOP memorandum outlining the factors
relevant to determining whether “inmates are suitable for home
confinement under the CARES Act.” As relief on his § 2241 mo-
tion, Sills did not expressly ask to be placed in home confinement.
Rather, he sought an order directing the warden to give “fair treat-
ment” to his request based on the April 2021 guidance.
After soliciting further briefing from Sills, a magistrate judge
issued a report and recommendation that Sills’s § 2241 petition be
denied. The magistrate judge first found that Sills’s claim, while
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4 Opinion of the Court 22-12656
styled as a procedural-due-process claim, was really a challenge to
the substance of the BOP’s decision, which was not subject to judi-
cial review. The magistrate judge further found that any proce-
dural-due-process claim failed because Sills did not have a constitu-
tionally protected liberty interest in his place of confinement.
Sills filed objections, making clear that his “core and only
claim is that the respondent has failed to abide by the BOP’s own
promulgated procedures in denying his request for CARES Act
home confinement.” He cited district-court decisions permitting
habeas challenges based in part on the April 2021 guidance.
The district court overruled Sills’s objections without fur-
ther comment, adopted the magistrate judge’s recommendation,
and denied the § 2241 petition. This appeal followed.
II.
We review the denial of a § 2241 petition de novo. Bowers
v. Keller, 651 F.3d 1277, 1291 (11th Cir. 2011). Any underlying fac-
tual findings are reviewed for clear error. Id. In conducting our
review, we give a generous reading to Sills’s pro se filings. See Tim-
son v. Sampson, 518 F.3d 870, 874 (11th Cir. 2008). In addition, we
must “look behind the label” of his claim and determine whether it
is cognizable under other frameworks. United States v. Jordan, 915
F.2d 622, 624–25 (11th Cir. 1990).
Section 2241 permits district courts to grant habeas relief for
petitioners held “in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws
or treaties of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3). A federal
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22-12656 Opinion of the Court 5
prisoner may use § 2241 “to challenge the execution of his sen-
tence, such as the deprivation of good-time credits or parole deter-
minations.” McCarthan v. Dir. of Goodwill Indus.-Suncoast, Inc.,
851 F.3d 1076, 1092–93 (11th Cir. 2017) (en banc).
We start with some background about the BOP, home con-
finement, and the CARES Act. As part of its expansive authority to
manage federal prisons, the BOP has the power to “designate the
place of the prisoner’s imprisonment” and to transfer “a prisoner
from one penal or correctional facility to another.” 18 U.S.C.
§ 3621(b). “[A] designation of a place of imprisonment under
[§ 3621(b)] is not reviewable by any court.” Id.; see McKune v. Lile,
536 U.S. 24, 39 (2002) (“[T]he decision where to house inmates is at
the core of prison administrators’ expertise.”).
In addition, the BOP may place a prisoner in “prerelease cus-
tody,” including home confinement, to facilitate reentry into the
community. See 18 U.S.C. § 3624(c)(2). Ordinarily, the length of
home confinement is limited to no more than six months. Id.But, because of the COVID-19 pandemic, the CARES Act
permits the BOP to “lengthen the maximum amount of time” for
which home confinement is authorized under § 3624(c)(2), as the
BOP deems appropriate, during the national emergency. CARES
Act, § 12003(b)(2), 134 Stat. at 516. Neither § 3624(c)(2) nor the
CARES Act provides the judiciary any authority to grant an inmate
home confinement. See 18 U.S.C. § 3624(c)(2); CARES Act,
§ 12003(b)(2).
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After passage of the CARES Act, the Attorney General di-
rected the BOP to prioritize granting home confinement as a tool
to combat the dangers posed by COVID-19 in federal prisons, un-
locking the BOP’s expanded powers. In a memorandum dated
March 26, 2020, the Attorney General outlined a “non-exhaustive
list of discretionary factors” to consider under the “totality of the
circumstances.” These factors included the age and vulnerability
of the inmate to COVID-19, the security level of the institution, the
inmate’s conduct in prison, the inmate’s risk score under PAT-
TERN (risk assessment for recidivism and violence), whether the
inmate had a reentry plan, and the danger the inmate posed to the
community.
Just over a year later, on April 13, 2021, the BOP adopted
updated guidance listing the criteria for institutions to use when
assessing suitability for home confinement. An inmate was suita-
ble for home confinement, according to the April 13 guidance
memo, if he had the following: (a) a “verifiable release plan”; (b) no
current or prior offense that was “violent, a sex offense, or terror-
ism-related”; (c) no current detainer; (d) a low or minimum secu-
rity placement; (e) a low or minimum PATTERN recidivism risk
score; (f) no violent or gang-related activity while incarcerated; and
(g) served 50% or more of his sentence (or at least 25% if less than
18 months of the sentence remain). The April 13 memo also di-
rected “review[]” of the inmate’s recent prison disciplinary history
and of “the COVID-19 vulnerability of the inmate, in accordance
with CDC guidelines.”
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III.
We conclude that the district court properly denied Sills’s
§ 2241 petition. As Sills concedes, the court lacked the authority to
order his placement in home confinement. See United States v.
Houck, 2 F.4th 1082, 1085 (8th Cir. 2021); United States v. Saun-
ders, 986 F.3d 1076, 1078 (7th Cir. 2021). And he has alleged noth-
ing that would make his custody in violation of the Constitution or
laws of the United States. See 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3).
Sills maintains that the warden and the BOP failed to follow
the BOP’s own promulgated criteria in the April 13 guidance
memo when denying his request for CARES Act home confine-
ment. He states that courts have found this argument to be “an
actionable habeas claim,” which he compares to a challenge to the
denial of parole. Sills asserts that he was denied due process in re-
lation to the denial of his request for home confinement, claiming
that he had a liberty interest in “fair treatment” based on a former
regulation that was codified at 28 C.F.R. § 541.12.
To state a procedural-due-process claim, a petitioner must
show he was deprived of a constitutionally protected liberty inter-
est without due process of law. Grayden v. Rhodes, 345 F.3d 1225,
1232 (11th Cir. 2003). An inmate is entitled to procedural-due-pro-
cess protections only if he has such a “protected liberty interest.”
Jacoby v. Baldwin Cnty., 835 F.3d 1338, 1346–47 (11th Cir. 2016).
In general, liberty interests for prisoners are “limited to freedom
from restraint” which imposes “atypical and significant hardship on
the inmate in relation to the ordinary incidents of prison life.”
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Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 482, 483–84 (1995). There is no liberty
interest in “conditional[] release before the expiration of a valid sen-
tence,” Greenholtz v. Inmates of Neb. Penal and Corr. Complex,
442 U.S. 1, 7 (1979), or in a particular place of confinement more
generally, Meachum v. Fano, 427 U.S. 215, 225, 228–29 (1976).
Sills does not dispute that he lacks a protected liberty interest
in home confinement. See, e.g., Grayden, 345 F.3d at 1232; Green-
holtz, 442 U.S. at 7. So he was not entitled to due-process-protec-
tions in relation to that decision.
Still, though, Sills argues that he has a liberty interest in “fair
treatment” on his request for placement in home confinement, cit-
ing 28 C.F.R. § 541.12 and case law regarding parole decisions. See,
e.g., Wilson v. U.S. Parole Comm’n, 193 F.3d 195 (3d Cir. 1999)
(“[T]he Parole Commission must follow its own regulations,
which have the force of law.”). Section 541.12 does not appear to
be a current regulation and cannot be read to create a protected
entitlement, in any event. 1 But we agree that case law regarding
1 Section 541.12 appears to have stated that “[inmates] have the right to expect
that as a human being [they] will be treated respectfully, impartially and fairly
by all personnel.” Barden v. Keohane, 921 F.2d 476, 483 (3d Cir. 1990) (quoting
28 C.F.R. § 541.12 (1989)). But Barden did not hold that this regulation created
a protected liberty interest. See id. Nor does this regulation meet Sandin’s
standard for protected liberty interests. See Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 482,
483–84 (1995). Plus, Sills’s interpretation of § 541.12, even if valid, would sub-
ject a wide array of prison-management decisions to judicial review, in contra-
vention of Supreme Court precedent. See, e.g., Meachum v. Fano, 427 U.S.
215, 225 (1976) (rejecting a view of due process that “would subject to judicial
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22-12656 Opinion of the Court 9
discretionary parole decisions offers useful guidance in the absence
of more on-point precedent. We briefly summarize the relevant
law before turning to the facts here.
A.
As a general rule, unless there is a liberty interest in parole,
a defendant does not have a “constitutional right to procedural due
process protections” in parole determinations. O’Kelley v. Snow,
53 F.3d 319, 322 (11th Cir. 1995); see Slocum v. Ga. St. Bd. of Par-
dons & Paroles, 678 F.2d 940, 941–42 (11th Cir. 1982) (“Unless there
is a liberty interest in parole, the procedures followed in making
the parole determination are not required to comport with stand-
ards of fundamental fairness.”). We have specifically rejected a
due-process challenge based on an alleged entitlement to fair pa-
role consideration. See Slocum, 678 F.2d at 941–42.
But our precedent does not wholly foreclose judicial review
of discretionary parole decisions. In Monroe v. Thigpen, for exam-
ple, we recognized a due-process right not to be treated “arbitrarily
and capriciously,” even in the absence of a liberty interest in parole.
932 F.2d 1437, 1441–42 (11th Cir. 1991). A parole board violates
this right if it engages in “flagrant or unauthorized action,” such as
admittedly relying on false information beyond its statutory au-
thority. Id. But cf. Thomas v. Sellers, 691 F.2d 487, 489 (11th Cir.
1982) (no flagrant or unauthorized action where the parole board’s
review a wide spectrum of discretionary actions that traditionally have been
the business of prison administrators rather than of the federal courts”).
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decision was “within the powers established by the statutes”). But
even so, Monroe did not adopt a broader “due process right to be
fairly considered for parole.” See Monroe, 932 F.2d at 1440–42.
Nevertheless, even in “the absence of a constitutional
claim,” a federal prisoner challenging “the decision of the board or
the process by which that decision was reached” can obtain relief
by showing that the board’s actions were “so unlawful as to make
his custody in violation of the laws of the United States.” Brown v.
Lundgren, 528 F.2d 1050, 1053–54 (5th Cir. 1976) (citing 28 U.S.C.
§ 2241(c)) 2; see also Bowers v. Keller, 651 F.3d 1277, 1291 (11th Cir.
2011) (“Our review is limited to whether the [parole board] acted
unlawfully such that Bowers is in custody in violation of the Con-
stitution or laws . . . of the United States.” (cleaned up)). But “[a]
departure by the board [from its own rules] does not necessarily
make [a prisoner’s] custody illegal.” Brown, 528 F.2d at 1055. We
will not reverse a decision of the board “unless it involves flagrant,
unwarranted, or unauthorized action.” Bowers, 651 F.3d at 1291.
B.
We have not previously addressed the scope of judicial re-
view over the denial of home confinement under the CARES Act.
For purposes of this appeal, we assume without deciding that the
denial of home confinement is reviewable to the same extent as the
2This Court adopted as binding precedent all Fifth Circuit decisions prior to
October 1, 1981. Bonner v. City of Prichard, 661 F.2d 1206, 1209 (11th Cir.
1981) (en banc).
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denial of parole to a federal prisoner. 3 But Sills has alleged nothing
to suggest his custody by the warden violates the Constitution or
laws of the United States. See 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c); cf. Bowers, 651
F.3d at 1291; Brown, 528 F.2d at 1054–55.
According to Sills, the BOP failed to follow its own guide-
lines by denying home confinement based on findings that he had
a serious history of violence and did not have a medical condition
placing him at higher risk for severe illness from COVID-19. He
asserts that his prior convictions did not include violence and that
he has asthma, which the CDC indicates can make severe illness
from COVID-19 more likely “if it’s moderate to severe.” See Peo-
ple with Certain Medical Conditions, Centers for Disease Control
and Prevention, https://www.cdc.gov/coronavirus/2019-
ncov/need-extra-precautions/people-with-medical-condi-
tions.html (last visited Jan. 23, 2023).
Given the broad range of discretion vested in the BOP, Sills
cannot show the BOP’s conduct was “flagrant” or “unauthorized”
3 Sills has not briefed this issue, and the warden has not filed a brief at all. It
does not appear that Sills is asking for a different standard than the parole
cases, nor is there an obvious reason to apply a different standard, since the
two situations are broadly comparable. To the extent material differences ex-
ist, they would work against Sills. Notably, § 3625 expressly exempts the
BOP’s prisoner-placement and prerelease-custody decisions, including home
confinement, from judicial review under the Administrative Procedures Act
(APA), see 18 U.S.C. § 3625, while the federal parole board appears to be sub-
ject to the APA at least in part, cf. Brown v. Lundgren, 528 F.2d 1050, 1053–54
(5th Cir. 1976) (discussing the APA in relation to the federal parole board).
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such that his custody is unlawful. He does not dispute that the BOP
could consider his criminal history and medical conditions as part
of assessing his suitability for home confinement under the totality
of the circumstances. And nothing in the April 13 guidance mem-
orandum prohibited the warden from looking at the underlying
facts of a prior conviction. To extent the warden departed from
the BOP guidance, such a departure does not necessarily make
Sills’s custody illegal. Cf. Brown, 528 F.2d at 1055 (“A departure by
the board does not necessarily make his custody illegal.”). After all,
he is serving a valid sentence, and home confinement is committed
to the BOP’s discretion. See Greenholtz, 442 U.S. at 7 (“There is
no constitutional or inherent right of a convicted person to be con-
ditionally released before the expiration of a valid sentence.”).
Nor has Sills shown that the warden relied on false infor-
mation, as in Monroe. See 932 F.2d at 1441–42. He does not deny
the warden’s description of the police records, which reflect that he
engaged in intimidating and threatening behavior while armed.
Plus, CDC guidance indicates that the severity of asthma deter-
mines whether it increases the risk of severe illness from COVID-
19, and the warden apparently found that Sills’s asthma was not
severe enough to qualify under CDC guidelines. Nothing in the
record contradicts that assessment. The question whether these
factors warranted the denial of home confinement is not before us.
Our review is, at best, much narrower. And we see nothing before
us to support a conclusion that the denial of home confinement in
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22-12656 Opinion of the Court 13
Sills’s case exceeded the BOP’s authority or rendered Sills’s custody
illegal. Cf. Bowers, 651 F.3d at 1291; Brown, 528 F.2d at 1055.
The cases Sills cites are not binding and do not warrant a
different outcome. Sills refers to case law from the Third Circuit
permitting judicial review of certain discretionary decisions of the
BOP. See Coburn v. Spaulding, No. 3:20-cv-01389, 2021 WL
3026851, *4 (M.D. Penn. June 15, 2021) (“Although the Court can-
not review Coburn’s challenge to the BOP’s decision under the
CARES Act, the Court may assess ‘whether the BOP abused its dis-
cretion.’”); see also Vasquez v. Strada, 684 F.3d 431, 434 (3d Cir.
2012) (reviewing a placement decision under § 3621(b) for
“whether the BOP abused its discretion”). Under this case law, the
BOP abuses its discretion if it fails to recognize and exercise the
discretion available to it to decide a prisoner’s claim for relief. See
Barden v. Keohane, 921 F.2d 476, 481, 483 (3d Cir. 1990) (remand-
ing for the BOP to give “fair treatment” to a prisoner’s request,
where the BOP had mistakenly found it lacked the authority to
grant relief).
In this case, though, the BOP considered Sills’s request and
exercised its broad authority under § 3624(c)(2) and the CARES Act
to deny home confinement after discussing many of the factors
listed in the April 13 guidance memo. It did not fail to recognize
its authority or deny the request on nondiscretionary grounds. So
Barden does not support remand here. And even under Barden,
the petitioner still must establish a “serious potential for a
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14 Opinion of the Court 22-12656
miscarriage of justice” warranting habeas relief. See id. at 479. Sills
has made no such showing here.
For these reasons, we affirm the denial of Sills’s § 2241 peti-
tion.
AFFIRMED.