United States v. Victor Manuel Manta-Carillo

Case: 11-15976 Date Filed: 10/04/2012 Page: 1 of 8
[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
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No. 11-15976
Non-Argument Calendar
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D.C. Docket No. 1:11-cr-00103-CB-C-1
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
llllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllll Plaintiff-Appellee,
versus
VICTOR MANUEL MANTA-CARILLO,
llllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllll Defendant-Appellant.
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Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Alabama
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(October 4, 2012)
Before BARKETT, MARCUS and PRYOR, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
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Victor Manuel Manta-Carillo appeals the district court’s denial of his
suppression motion arguing that the government violated his Fifth Amendment right
against self-incrimination when it failed to read him the warnings set out in Miranda
v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). The district court denied his motion to suppress on
the ground that the circumstances surrounding Manta-Carillo’s statements did not rise
to the level of custodial interrogation and, thus, did not implicate Miranda.
Thereafter, Manta-Carillo and the government entered into a stipulation of facts, and
the district court found him guilty in a bench trial on that basis. On appeal,
Manta-Carillo claims that the district court erred in denying his motion to suppress
his statements. After careful review, we affirm.1
In an appeal from a denial of a motion to suppress, we review the district
court’s factual findings for clear error and its application of the law de novo. United
States v. Luna-Encinas, 603 F.3d 876, 880 (11th Cir. 2010). Where a district court
erroneously denies a motion to suppress, that error is harmless if other evidence of
the defendant’s guilt is so overwhelming that the defendant suffered no prejudice
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Moreover, because both parties operated under the assumption that Manta-Carillo had
preserved his right to appeal the suppression issue, and because the parties’ claim that we lack
jurisdiction over the suppression issue is not clearly supported by controlling authority, the joint
motion to remand for an evidentiary hearing concerning whether the stipulation of facts as
currently written renders moot any disposition on the suppression issue is DENIED.
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from the admitted evidence. United States v. Rhind, 289 F.3d 690, 694 (11th Cir. 2002).
The Fifth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution provides individuals with a
right against self-incrimination. U.S. Const. amend. V. In Miranda, the Supreme
Court held that, in its case in chief, the prosecution may not use self-incriminating
statements elicited during a custodial interrogation unless officials warn a suspect of
his rights against self-incrimination beforehand. 384 U.S. at 444. Nevertheless, law
enforcement officers must give the warning only when custodial interrogation begins.
Luna-Encinas, 603 F.3d at 880. Miranda does not bar admission of any statement
given freely and voluntarily. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 478; see also Cannady v. Dugger,
931 F.2d 752, 754 (11th Cir. 1991) (holding that voluntary and spontaneous
comments by a defendant, even after Miranda rights are asserted, are admissible if not
made in response to government questioning). Moreover, the Self-Incrimination
Clause in the Fifth Amendment does not bar the admission of physical evidence that
is the fruit of an unwarned but voluntary statement. United States v. Jackson, 506
F.3d 1358, 1360-61 (11th Cir. 2007) (citing United States v. Patane, 542 U.S. 630,
636 (2004) (plurality opinion); and Patane, 542 U.S. at 645 (Kennedy, J., concurring
in the judgment)).
We consider whether an interrogation is custodial in the light of the strong
government interest in controlling its borders. United States v. Moya, 74 F.3d 1117,
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1119 (11th Cir. 1996). To determine whether an individual is in custody, courts look
at whether the restrictions on the suspect’s freedom of movement rise to the degree
associated with formal arrest. Id. (quoting Minnesota v. Murphy, 465 U.S. 420, 430
(1984)). Even if a defendant feels constrained not to leave the scene of an encounter
with law enforcement, that, by itself, does not necessarily rise to the level of being in
custody for Fifth Amendment purposes. Luna-Encinas, 603 F.3d at 881; United
States v. Muegge, 225 F.3d 1267, 1270-71 (11th Cir. 2000).
In Moya, an Immigration and Naturalization Service inspector ran a computer
check on the defendant’s resident alien card when the defendant arrived in the
country. Id. at 1118. The computer check suggested that the defendant may have
been deported previously. Id. at 1118 n.1. Officials referred the defendant to a
secondary area at customs, and an inspector eventually led the defendant to an office
to interview the defendant. Id. at 1118. In the interview, the defendant denied ever
having been deported, but a computer search later confirmed that he had been
deported. Id. In holding that the defendant was not in custody, we emphasized
several factors: (1) officials did not physically move or restrain him on the way to the
scene of the interview; (2) officials did not use handcuffs or draw their weapons; (3)
the defendant was not booked, told of formal accusations, or told that he was under
arrest; and (4) the defendant did not ask to leave, and the inspector never told him that
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he could not leave. Id. at 1119. We also stated that the defendant made no
admissions that would have led a reasonable person to conclude that he would be
arrested immediately. Id. In reaching its conclusion, we held that questioning at the
border must rise to “a distinctly accusatory level” before a reasonable person would
feel the restraints on his freedom of movement to the degree associated with formal
arrest. Id. at 1120. We also explained that events signaling “custody” away from the
border may not establish “custody” in the context of entry into the country. Id.
In this case, the record shows that Manta-Carillo was the captain of the Pera,
a commercial ship that arrived in Mobile, Alabama from Port au Prince, Haiti. When
the Pera arrived in Mobile, officials boarded the vessel to conduct an inspection of
the ship. A customs and border patrol officer found a DVD with a cover depicting
“bestiality” in Manta-Carillo’s quarters. When an agent informed Manta-Carillo that
this DVD may be a problem, Manta-Carillo stated that he possessed child
pornography on his laptop computer and on an external hard drive. Agents then
questioned Manta-Carillo and obtained a written confession. Agents also seized his
laptop computer and external hard drive and later searched both pursuant to a search
warrant, and they found approximately 160 images of child pornography. At no point
did the agents read Miranda warnings to Manta-Carillo.
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On this record, Manta-Carillo has not shown that he was in custody at any
point, and, therefore, has not shown that he was entitled to Miranda warnings. For
starters, Manta-Carillo was not physically restrained. Agents did not arrest
Manta-Carillo following the interview and, in fact, allowed him to leave the country
with the Pera. Formal accusations were not brought during the course of the
interview, and agents never told Manta-Carillo that he could not leave or terminate
the interview. We recognize that Manta-Carillo was unable to leave the Pera and the
Pera was unable to leave the port during the inspections; however, these restrictions
on his movements were the result of a routine border inspection. Senior Special
Agent Christopher Anderson testified that the interview lasted approximately an hour
and a half, and that the inspection of the entire ship took just over two hours. During
that time, Anderson had a Spanish-speaking agent confirm that Manta-Carillo had
admitted to possessing child pornography, and he had a second Spanish-speaking
agent aid in translating a written confession to Manta-Carillo. Although the interview
was moved from the cabin across the hall from Manta-Carillo’s quarters to his
quarters, none of the evidence in the record suggests that agents ever physically
forced Manta-Carillo to move. Further, while Manta-Carillo made an admission that
likely would have led a reasonable person to believe that he would be arrested
immediately, none of the other factors outlined in Moya support a finding that
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Manta-Carillo was in custody for Fifth Amendment purposes. Thus, under these
circumstances, Manta-Carillo was not in custody. Moya, 74 F.3d at 1119-20.
Manta-Carillo also asserts that he only blurted out that he had child
pornography after agents confronted him with possession of other contraband. Even
if true, Manta-Carillo has not shown how this indicates that his initial admission
implicated Miranda. Per Special Agent Anderson’s testimony, Manta-Carillo
confessed to having child pornography after Anderson told him that a DVD
containing bestiality found in his quarters “may be a problem.” From the record, it
appears that Manta-Carillo’s statement was not in response to any question that
Anderson posed and, therefore, Miranda would be inapplicable, even assuming
Manta-Carillo was in custody for Fifth Amendment purposes at that point. Cannady,
931 F.2d at 754.
In a single sentence at the end of his initial brief, Manta-Carillo also asserts that
“his statements and fruits of his statement[s] must be suppressed.” He does not
elaborate upon what the fruits of his statements are, but the record suggests that he
is referring to the search and seizure of his laptop and external hard drive. This
passing mention is likely insufficient to raise an argument that the fruits of his
statements must be suppressed. United States v. Jernigan, 341 F.3d 1273, 1283 n.8
(11th Cir. 2003) (holding that if an appellant makes only a passing reference to an
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issue in an initial brief, he has abandoned it). Even if he had sufficiently raised such
an argument, though, it would be unpersuasive because the Self-Incrimination Clause
does not require exclusion of the physical fruits of a voluntary statement. Jackson,
506 F.3d at 1360-61.
Finally, even assuming the district court did err in denying Manta-Carillo’s
motion to suppress his statements for Miranda violations, any such error was
harmless. As the record shows, the images recovered from Manta-Carillo’s laptop
and external hard drive -- admissibility of which is not implicated by any purported
Miranda violations -- provided overwhelming evidence that Manta-Carillo was guilty.
Rhind, 289 F.3d at 694. Accordingly, we affirm.
AFFIRMED.
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