Harrison Norris, Jr. v. United States

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[PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
________________________
No. 15-10390
________________________
D.C. Docket Nos. 1:12-cv-03448-RLH-AJB,
1:05-cr-00479-RLH-AJB-1
HARRISON NORRIS, JR.,
Petitioner-Appellant,
versus
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Respondent-Appellee.
________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Georgia
_______________________
(April 25, 2016)
Before WILLIAM PRYOR, ANDERSON, and PARKER, * Circuit Judges.
WILLIAM PRYOR, Circuit Judge:
* Honorable Barrington D. Parker, Jr., United States Circuit Judge for the Second Circuit, sitting
by designation.
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This appeal requires us to decide whether the district court erred by denying
an evidentiary hearing for Harrison Norris’s motion to vacate, 28 U.S.C. § 2255,
which alleged that his conviction violated the Due Process Clause because his trial
judge was biased against him and mentally incompetent. Norris, a black man, was
convicted of forcing women, many of whom were white, into prostitution. Judge
Jack Camp presided over Norris’s trial and sentenced him to life in prison. We
vacated that sentence as an impermissible general sentence. On remand, a different
judge sentenced Norris to 35 years of imprisonment. Three years after Norris’s
trial, Judge Camp was arrested for illegal possession of drugs and a firearm. The
United States disclosed that Camp had bipolar disorder and had suffered a brain
injury from a bicycling accident. The investigation also disclosed allegations of
racial bias. One witness alleged that Camp wanted to give all black men who
pimped white women the maximum penalty and that Camp specifically disliked
Norris. Because Norris sufficiently alleged that Judge Camp was actually biased
against him, we reverse and remand for an evidentiary hearing.
I. BACKGROUND
Harrison Norris Jr. was indicted on 28 counts based on his forced
prostitution of several women. Norris proceeded pro se, and a jury convicted him
of 24 counts. Norris’s offense level was 48, which carried a recommended
sentence of life imprisonment for any criminal-history category. Judge Camp
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sentenced Norris to a general sentence of life. On appeal, we affirmed the
convictions but vacated the sentence because it was a general sentence and some of
the convictions carried maximum penalties. See United States v. Norris, 358 F.
App’x 60 (11th Cir. 2009). The resentencing was assigned to Judge Forrester after
Judge Camp was arrested. Judge Forrester sentenced Norris to 35 years of
imprisonment, and we affirmed that sentence on appeal. See United States v.
Norris, 453 F. App’x 861 (11th Cir. 2011).
Three years after Norris’s trial, Camp pleaded guilty to possessing controlled
substances, 21 U.S.C. § 844(a), aiding and abetting the unlawful possession of
controlled substances, id.; 18 U.S.C. § 2, and conversion of government property,
18 U.S.C. § 641. He filed a sentencing memorandum that detailed his history with
bipolar disorder and an injury to his left temporal lobe from a bicycling accident in
2000.
The United States investigated Camp’s misconduct and disclosed its findings
in a letter from Sally Quillian Yates, then the United States Attorney for the
Northern District of Georgia, to the Federal Defender Program. The Yates letter
concluded that Camp used illegal drugs beginning in May of 2010. Camp denied
ever using drugs while conducting court business, and the government found no
evidence to the contrary. The Yates letter also recounted statements of witnesses
alleging that Camp harbored racial bias. The letter described the statements of one
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witness, S.R., who stated that “Camp told her that when African-American men
appeared before him, he had a difficult time adjudicating their cases and
specifically determining their sentences because he could not differentiate them
from” S.R.’s black boyfriend, who Camp thought was taking advantage of her.
S.R. also said that a particular offender, allegedly Norris, reminded Camp of S.R.’s
boyfriend. Another witness heard Camp use a racial epithet to refer to S.R.’s
boyfriend, but a different witness who overheard the conversation did not. The
letter stated that Camp denied making any of these statements and denied “ever
taking any judicial action based on racial bias.”
The United States also disclosed a recorded phone call between S.R. and
Camp in which they discussed a specific defendant, believed to be Norris. S.R.
asked Camp if he still believed that “guys like that you couldn’t help but want to
give ’em life.” Camp responded, “Well, maybe I should. I’m much more sensitive
to that after talking with you.” S.R. said, “I was just trying to talk you down out of
the whole, you know, the racism thing, because at one point in time, you were like,
I just can’t help, I want to give ’em all life, and I was like, oh God, I hope he’s not
doing that. And I guess I tried to talk you, you know, a little bit out of that, because
I know not everybody’s the same, but I felt like I had you feeling like that at one
point in time.” Camp responded, “Yeah, I do think you had done like that.” On the
call, S.R. asked Camp specifically about Norris, and asked, “What is your personal
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opinion when you see a black guy like that, I’m sure they were white girls, what do
you think?” Camp responded, “Oh, yeah, mostly were white girls. I think almost
all of them were white girls.” She further asked Camp whether black men pimping
white women “just burns you up, you know, and you just couldn’t help but to want
to give them [life].” Camp responded, “It does burn me up, but isn’t locking him
up until, maybe, he’s 68 enough?” Camp concluded by explaining that “there are
always two sides” to these cases.
Norris filed a motion to vacate, 28 U.S.C. § 2255, on the grounds that
Camp’s racial bias and mental incompetence violated his rights under the Due
Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment. Norris requested an evidentiary hearing.
The district court explained that it could not foreclose the probability of bias, but it
determined that “bias of the kind alleged here is trial error, not a structural defect.”
The district court reviewed the trial transcript and determined that Judge Camp was
fair when dealing with Norris. The district court denied relief without an
evidentiary hearing, but granted a certificate of appealability on the issue “whether
relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 was properly denied without an evidentiary hearing
on the claim that the defendant was denied due process because the trial judge was
biased or was impaired by his neurological condition and mental health.”
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II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
“We review the denial of an evidentiary hearing for abuse of discretion. ‘A
district court abuses its discretion if it applies an incorrect legal standard, applies
the law in an unreasonable or incorrect manner, follows improper procedures in
making a determination, or makes findings of fact that are clearly erroneous.’”
Diveroli v. United States, 803 F.3d 1258, 1262 (11th Cir. 2015) (citation omitted)
(quoting Winthrop-Redin v. United States, 767 F.3d 1210, 1215 (11th Cir. 2014)).
“Unless the motion and the files and records of the case conclusively show that the
prisoner is entitled to no relief,” the court must grant an evidentiary hearing. 28
U.S.C. § 2255(b).
III. DISCUSSION
Norris argues that his trial violated his right to due process because Judge
Camp was biased against him and mentally incompetent. We conclude that the
district court erred by denying Norris’s claim that Camp was biased against him
without an evidentiary hearing. But the district court correctly denied Norris’s
claim that Camp was incompetent.
A. Bias
Norris alleges that Judge Camp was biased against him in violation of the
Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment. “[T]he Due Process Clause clearly
requires a ‘fair trial in a fair tribunal,’ before a judge with no actual bias against the
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defendant or interest in the outcome of his particular case.” Bracy v. Gramley, 520
U.S. 899, 904–05 (1997) (citation omitted) (quoting Withrow v. Larkin, 421 U.S.
35, 46 (1975)); accord In re Murchison, 349 U.S. 133, 136 (1955) (“Fairness of
course requires an absence of actual bias in the trial of cases.”). Even in the
absence of actual bias, a judge’s interest or prejudice may “pose[] such a risk of
actual bias or prejudgment that the practice must be forbidden if the guarantee of
due process is to be adequately implemented.” Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co.,
556 U.S. 868, 884 (2009) (quoting Withrow, 421 U.S. at 47). But “[t]he Due
Process Clause demarks only the outer boundaries of judicial disqualifications.” Id.
at 889 (quoting Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Lavoie, 475 U.S. 813, 828 (1986)). The
federal recusal statute, by contrast, sets a higher bar. It requires a judge to
disqualify himself “[w]here he has a personal bias or prejudice concerning a
party.” 28 U.S.C. § 455(b)(1). Norris raises only a constitutional argument, so we
do not address the recusal statute.
Norris sufficiently alleged that Camp was actually biased against him. Norris
proffered evidence that Camp “had a difficult time adjudicating [African-American
men’s] cases” and specifically disliked Norris based on the fact that Norris was a
black man who pimped white women. Norris alleged that Camp wanted to give all
black offenders who pimped white women the maximum possible penalty, and
Camp gave Norris the maximum penalty. Norris’s allegations imply that Camp’s
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bias against Norris might have compromised his impartiality. On this record, we
cannot conclusively say whether Camp was actually biased, and Camp denies that
he was, but the record does not “conclusively show that the prisoner is entitled to
no relief.” 28 U.S.C. § 2255(b).
Contrary to the ruling of the district court, structural error occurs when a
judge with actual bias against a defendant presides at his trial. See Arizona v.
Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279, 309–10 (1991); see also Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510,
535 (1927) (“No matter what the evidence was against [the defendant], he had the
right to have an impartial judge.”). The government concedes that denial of an
impartial judge is structural error that demands reversal. “The entire conduct of the
trial from beginning to end is obviously affected . . . by the presence on the bench
of a judge who is not impartial.” Fulminante, 499 U.S. at 309–10; accord United
States v. Mills, 138 F.3d 928, 938 (11th Cir. 1998) (“[T]here are errors that infect
the whole proceeding, such as a biased judge or an absence of counsel.”). And we
cannot review a trial transcript to determine whether the presiding judge, despite
his actual bias, was fair: “The record does not reflect the tone of voice of the judge,
his facial expressions, or his unspoken attitudes and mannerisms, all of which, as
well as his statements and rulings of record, might have adversely influenced the
jury and affected its verdict.” United States v. Brown, 539 F.2d 467, 469 (5th Cir.
1976).
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We acknowledge that the Due Process Clause incorporates the rule at
common law that mandated recusal only when the judge had “a direct, personal,
substantial pecuniary interest in reaching a conclusion against him in his case.”
Tumey, 273 U.S. at 523; see also John P. Frank, Disqualification of Judges, 56
Yale L.J. 605, 609–12 (1947) (collecting historical sources). “[M]atters of kinship,
personal bias, state policy, [and] remoteness of interest would seem generally to be
matters merely of legislative discretion,” Tumey, 273 U.S. at 523, and “[p]ersonal
bias or prejudice ‘alone would not be sufficient basis for imposing a constitutional
requirement under the Due Process Clause,’” Caperton, 556 U.S. at 877 (quoting
Lavoie, 475 U.S. at 820). But Norris alleges something more than the personal
biases or prejudices that are governed by the recusal statute; he identifies specific
statements that imply that Camp could not set aside his prejudice against him.
On remand, the district court must allow Norris an evidentiary hearing to
prove that Camp was actually biased against him. The district court must determine
whether there is an intolerable probability that Camp could not “hold the balance
nice, clear and true.” Id. at 879 (quoting Lavoie, 475 U.S. at 825). We express no
opinion about whether Norris will be able to prove that Camp was actually biased
against him.
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B. Incompetence
Norris also argues that Judge Camp was mentally incompetent in violation
of Norris’s right to due process. The Due Process Clause requires that the trial
judge is “mentally competent to afford a hearing.” Jordan v. Massachusetts, 225
U.S. 167, 176 (1912). Norris proffered evidence in the form of a statement that
Camp made before his sentencing that he suffered from bipolar and mood
disorders since 1999 and suffered frontal lobe damage from a bicycle crash in 2000
resulting in mood issues and problems in impulse control. Norris alleges that this
medical history is why Camp gave him an “illegal general sentence . . . despite his
decades of judicial experience.”
The district court correctly denied this claim without an evidentiary hearing.
A district court need not hold an evidentiary hearing if the allegations are based on
unsupported generalizations. Diveroli, 803 F.3d at 1263. Nothing in the transcript
suggests that Camp was incompetent, and many competent judges make minor
errors such as imposing an improper general sentence. The mere fact that Camp
suffered from mental illness is insufficient to warrant an evidentiary hearing.
IV. CONCLUSION
We AFFIRM in part, REVERSE in part, and REMAND for an evidentiary
hearing on the claim that Norris was denied due process because Judge Camp was
actually biased against him.
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