Logie W. Talley v. Housing Authority of Columbus

[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FILED
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
________________________ May 16, 2005
THOMAS K. KAHN
No. 04-14703 CLERK
Non-Argument Calendar
________________________
D. C. Docket No. 04-00061-CV-1-CDL-4
LOGIE W. TALLEY,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
versus
THE HOUSING AUTHORITY
OF COLUMBUS, GEORGIA,
Defendant-Appellant.
_________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Middle District of Georgia
__________________________
(May 16, 2005)
Before EDMONDSON, Chief Judge, BIRCH and BARKETT, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Plaintiff-Appellant Logie W. Talley, appearing pro se, appeals the district
court’s grant of summary judgment to Defendant-Appellee, the Housing Authority
of Columbus, Georgia (“Housing Authority”). Talley brought a section 1983 suit,
42 U.S.C. § 1983, against the Housing Authority challenging a state court order
that allowed the Housing Authority to seize his property. No reversible error has
been shown; we affirm.
Talley’s section 1983 suit arises from the Housing Authority’s
condemnation of Talley’s property in 1994. Talley alleged that the Housing
Authority violated his Fourth, Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment rights when it
unlawfully asserted eminent domain over his private property. At the crux of
Talley’s claim is his assertion that no “public necessity” -- the sine qua non of
Georgia’s power of eminent domain, see Williams v. LaGrange, 98 S.E.2d 617,
620 (Ga. 1957) -- supported the condemnation of his property. Talley complains
that the Housing Authority asserted eminent domain unlawfully over his property
and later sold it to a private citizen at a profit. The Housing Authority moved for
summary judgment, asserting defenses of res judicata, estoppel, laches, and failure
to state a claim.
2
The procedural facts are undisputed. Talley was served as one of several
condemnees in a condemnation action in Superior Court of Muscogee County,
Georgia. A special master was appointed who awarded $17,500 as the value of
the property. The special master’s award was made the order and judgment of the
Superior Court of Muscogee County on 1 August 1994. Talley filed an appeal of
that judgment, but the appeal was dismissed as untimely. Talley filed a motion to
set aside the state court condemnation action on 20 June 1997; that motion was
denied.
The district court concluded that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction under
the Rooker-Feldman doctrine.1 The Rooker-Feldman doctrine precludes federal
courts -- other than the United States Supreme Court -- from reviewing final
judgments of state courts. See Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co., 44 S.Ct. 149, 150
(1923); D.C. Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 103 S.Ct. 1303, 1311-15 (1983).
When four criteria are satisfied, Rooker-Feldman bars lower federal court
jurisdiction: (1) the party in federal court is the same as the party in state court; (2)
1
Although Housing Authority failed to raise the Rooker- Feldman doctrine or to challenge the
district court’s subject matter jurisdiction, a federal court has an independent obligation to satisfy
itself that it has authority to hear a case before it proceeds to the merits. See University of S. Ala. v.
American Tobacco Co., 168 F.3d 405, 410 (11th Cir.1999). That the litigants do not question the
court's jurisdiction is of no consequence; “ the court must inquire into its jurisdictional basis sua
sponte.” Mirage Resorts, Inc. v. Quiet Nacelle Corp., 206 F.3d 1398, 1401 (11th Cir. 2000).
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the prior state court ruling was a final judgment on the merits; (3) a reasonable
opportunity existed for the party seeking relief in federal court to have raised the
federal claims in the state court proceeding; and (4) the issue advanced in federal
court was either adjudicated by the state court or was inextricably intertwined with
the state court’s judgment. Amos v. Glynn County Bd. of Tax Assessors, 347 F.3d
1249, 1265 n.11 (11th Cir. 2003).
We conclude, as did the district court, that the Rooker-Feldman criteria are
satisfied. Talley and the Housing Authority were both parties to the state court
condemnation action. That state court action ended in a final judgment on the
merits: Talley’s property was condemned and the Housing Authority was granted
fee simple title to the property. Talley had the opportunity to argue before the
Special Master and on appeal to the Superior Court of Muscogee County the issue
of public necessity and the claimed violation of his constitutional rights. And the
petition for condemnation in the state court proceedings stated that acquisition of
the property was necessary to achieve the public purpose of urban redevelopment.
See Williams, 98 S.E. 2d at 620 (“[t]he underlying and fundamental principle
upon which the right to take the property of any private citizen against his will ...
by eminant domain is that it is necessary to do so for a public purpose.”). So, the
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issue of whether the property was condemned for a public use necessarily was
litigated in the state court condemnation action.
The district court committed no reversible error in concluding that it lacked
subject matter jurisdiction to consider Talley’s claims.2
AFFIRMED.
2
The district court concluded, alternatively, that principles of res judicata precluded
consideration of Talley’s claims. We address only the jurisdictional basis for the district court’s
decision.
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