United States v. Michael Smith

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[PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
________________________
No. 13-15476
________________________
D.C. Docket No. 2:12-cr-00048-MHT-TFM-1
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
versus
MICHAEL SMITH,
Defendant - Appellant.
________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Middle District of Alabama
________________________
(April 29, 2016)
Before JORDAN and JULIE CARNES, Circuit Judges, and ROBREÑO,∗ District
Judge.
JORDAN, Circuit Judge:
∗
Honorable Eduardo Robreño, United States District Judge for the Eastern District of
Pennsylvania, sitting by designation.
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Under Garrity v. New Jersey, 385 U.S. 493 (1967), “a public employee may
not be coerced into surrendering his Fifth Amendment privilege by threat of being
fired or subjected to other sanctions.” United States v. Vangates, 287 F.3d 1315,
1320 (11th Cir. 2002). So, if a state threatens an employee with termination unless
he provides a statement in the course of an internal investigation, it may not use
that statement against the employee in any criminal proceeding or prosecution. See
id. at 1320–21.
The main question we address today, one of first impression, is whether a
state employee can, after he has been fired, waive his Garrity rights and allow his
prior compelled and protected statements to be used by the federal government in a
criminal investigation. Our answer is that Garrity rights may be waived in such
circumstances, as long as the employee’s waiver is voluntary, knowing, and
intelligent. And because we conclude that Michael Smith voluntarily, knowingly,
and intelligently waived his Garrity rights when he spoke to agents of the Federal
Bureau of Investigation following his termination by the Alabama Department of
Corrections, we hold that the government did not violate the Fifth Amendment
when it used his prior statements in a federal criminal investigation concerning the
beating and death of an inmate. We therefore affirm Mr. Smith’s convictions for
violating civil rights, making false statements, obstructing justice, and conspiring
to obstruct justice. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 242, 1001, 1512(b)(3), 1512(k), & 1519.
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I
We begin with the events leading to the 2010 death of Rocrast Mack, an
inmate at the Ventress Correctional Facility. We set out the facts in the light most
favorable to the government, see, e.g., United States v. Browne, 505 F.3d 1229,
1253 (11th Cir. 2007), and then chronicle what transpired afterwards.
A
Mr. Smith worked as a lieutenant at Ventress, a state prison in Alabama.
Though built for 650 inmates, Ventress housed over 1600 prisoners at the time of
trial. The federal charges against Mr. Smith were based on his involvement in the
beating and death of Mr. Mack, and his subsequent attempts to cover up his
conduct.
On August 4, 2010, at around 7:30 p.m., Mr. Mack got into a physical
altercation with Officer Melissa Brown after she found him masturbating in his
bunk at Ventress’ D Dorm. During the fight, Officer Brown and Mr. Mack hit
each other with their fists. Officer Brown also struck Mr. Mack with her baton
several times, and at one point, Mr. Mack took the baton away from her. Officer
John Nolin tried to intervene, but by that point Mr. Mack had left his cell and gone
out to the lobby of D Dorm. Nearby inmates were watching the scuffle.
Officer Brown called for help on her radio. Mr. Smith, who was the shift
commander at the time, mistakenly thought that the incident was taking place
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elsewhere, and did not immediately go to D Dorm. Several other officers,
however, responded to D Dorm. Those officers surrounded Mr. Mack and began
kicking and punching him. As the officers were trying to handcuff him, Mr. Mack
somehow escaped. Officer Nolin thought he heard Mr. Smith say over the radio
“y’all better be beating that motherfucker when I get there,” and “we’re going to
kill that motherfucker.”
When Mr. Smith finally reached Officer Brown, she had blood on her mouth
and uniform, some of her fingernails were broken or missing, and her hair was in
disarray. Mr. Smith told her, “don’t worry about it, we’re going to kill that
motherfucker.”
Once he got to E Dorm, Mr. Mack raised his arms over his head, dropped to
his knees, and surrendered. As he did so, an officer tackled him and punched him
in the head. After Mr. Mack was handcuffed, a few of the officers escorted him to
Mr. Smith’s office in F Dorm.
While waiting for Mr. Smith to arrive, some of the officers hit Mr. Mack—
who was still handcuffed—numerous times in the chest and stomach. Before Mr.
Smith returned to his office, the other officers removed Mr. Mack’s handcuffs.
Upon his arrival at F Dorm, Mr. Smith grabbed a fiberglass baton from the
shift office and went inside his own office. Mr. Mack was arguing with the
officers who were there, but was not being physically aggressive. Mr. Smith beat
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Mr. Mack with the baton and ultimately broke the weapon with a blow to his head.
When an officer tried to pull Mr. Smith away from Mr. Mack, who had fallen to
the floor, Mr. Smith said: “[D]o you see my officer down there? She got blood on
her uniform, and this motherfucker gonna die.” Mr. Smith then repeatedly
stomped on Mr. Mack’s body, neck, and head. He also pepper-sprayed Mr. Mack
in the face at close range. Mr. Mack did not attempt to fight back during Mr.
Smith’s attack.1
After the beating in Mr. Smith’s office, several officers handcuffed Mr.
Mack and, together with a nurse, wheeled him to the Health Care Unit because he
was unable to walk. They placed him on a bed so that he could be treated for his
injuries. Twice Mr. Mack fell from the bed and onto the tile floor.
Mr. Smith followed the group into the HCU and ordered the nurses to leave.
After the nurses were gone, Mr. Smith, with two other officers present, pulled Mr.
Mack—who was still handcuffed—off the bed and, again, stomped on his head
several times until he passed out. At one point, when one of the officers tried to
pull him away from Mr. Mack, Mr. Smith said: “[T]rust me, I got this. . . . I’ll take
some days for my officers.”
1
Following Mr. Smith’s return, other officers also hit Mr. Mack with a baton and with
their fists. Three of those officers pled guilty to federal charges of deprivation of civil rights and
conspiracy to obstruct justice. One of those officers testified for the government at Mr. Smith’s
trial.
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Once Mr. Smith left the HCU, and the ruckus had ended, the nurses came
back in and found Mr. Mack lying unconscious on the floor. He was unresponsive
and hemorrhaging from both sides of his skull. He also had severe brain swelling,
multiple facial fractures, massive bruising on his face and body, and a ruptured
spleen.
Emergency personnel transported Mr. Mack to a hospital before midnight on
August 4, but he died around 10:00 a.m. the next day. The neurosurgeon who was
on call at the hospital opined that Mr. Mack likely died from a culmination of all
the trauma he suffered the previous evening. The medical examiner testified that
Mr. Mack died from multiple blunt force trauma and traumatic brain injury.
B
Within hours of his attack on Mr. Mack, Mr. Smith began covering up his
conduct. He met with some of the other officers who were involved in the beatings
and told them to “get [their] stories straight” and submit statements. He instructed
the officers to “document everything” and to indicate in their reports that Mr.
Mack was not handcuffed and that he fought continuously from D Dorm to the
HCU.
As required by the regulations of the Alabama Department of Corrections,
Mr. Smith prepared a duty report and part of an incident report, but lied in those
reports about the details of the beatings. He falsely claimed, for example, that he
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had to use pepper spray on Mr. Mack and hit him on the thigh and arms with his
baton in order to stop him from fighting and allow the other officers to handcuff
him. He also omitted all of the details regarding his beating (and that of others) of
Mr. Mack in the HCU. To account for the head injuries Mr. Mack sustained, Mr.
Smith stated that he fell off the bed several times while in the HCU.
Early in the morning of August 5, 2010, the Investigative & Intelligence
Division of the ADOC (the internal affairs arm of the agency) began an
administrative investigation into what had happened to Mr. Mack. Scottie Wells,
an I&I investigator, interviewed Mr. Smith in the course of that investigation. At
that time Mr. Mack had not passed away. During the interview, Mr. Smith told
Mr. Wells the same false story that was in his duty and incident reports.
On August 20, following Mr. Mack’s death, Ronald Cooper—another I&I
investigator—spoke to Mr. Smith after obtaining copies of his duty and incident
reports. Again Mr. Smith stuck to his untruthful version of events.
Mr. Wells did not advise Mr. Smith of his rights under Miranda v. Arizona,
384 U.S. 436 (1966). Nor did he tell Mr. Smith about his Garrity rights. Mr.
Cooper generally discussed Miranda with Mr. Smith, and told him that if he
invoked his Miranda rights, then he (Mr. Cooper) “would charge him with [his]
Garrity rights.” When Mr. Smith did not understand what that meant, Mr. Cooper
told him that “Garrity rights are what [was] required to answer [his] questions on
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an administrative level,” and that what he (Mr. Smith) said could not be used
against him in criminal court. After Mr. Smith waived his Miranda rights, Mr.
Cooper told him that he was duty-bound to tell him everything, and Mr. Smith said
he understood.
Several days after Mr. Mack’s death, the Alabama Bureau of Investigation (a
division of the Alabama Department of Public Safety) launched its own criminal
investigation. Investigator Timothy Rodgers of the ABI spoke with a sergeant at
Ventress to schedule interviews of correctional officers and other personnel at the
institution. Mr. Rodgers did not specify who he wanted to speak to, and left it up
to the sergeant to determine which persons had been witnesses to the incidents with
Mr. Mack. Warden J.C. Giles told those who were going to be interviewed by the
ABI to report to the Eufala office of the Alabama Department of Public Safety.
Over the course of several weeks, Mr. Rodgers spoke to 13 Ventress
employees. Most (if not all) of those persons told Mr. Rodgers that they had been
interviewed by I&I, and some (but not Mr. Smith) admitted to Mr. Rodgers that
they had not been truthful with I&I. Mr. Rodgers did not review any of the
statements given to I&I by Ventress personnel.
On August 9, 2010, Mr. Rodgers met with Mr. Smith. Mr. Rodgers told Mr.
Smith he was conducting a criminal investigation concerning the death of Mr.
Mack and advised Mr. Smith of his Miranda rights. Mr. Smith waived those rights
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and agreed to speak to Mr. Rodgers. Mr. Smith repeated the same false account he
had previously given to I&I (an account Mr. Rodgers was not aware of) and denied
that he stomped on Mr. Mack. At no time during the interview did Mr. Rodgers
ask Mr. Smith about what he had said to I&I. 2
On September 20, 2010, Warden Giles served Mr. Smith with a notice of
administrative action, charging him with violating various ADOC regulations. The
notice advised Mr. Smith of a pre-dismissal conference at which he could present
arguments as to why he should not be dismissed. During the conference, which
was held on September 29, Mr. Smith generally denied any wrongdoing. The
ADOC terminated Mr. Smith on October 1, 2010, despite his insistence that his use
of force on Mr. Mack was justified.
C
The FBI initiated a separate criminal investigation into Mr. Mack’s beating
and death in late August of 2010. Once I&I learned of this investigation, it ended
its own inquiry and shared its files with the FBI. A few months later, the ABI also
suspended its investigation and likewise forwarded its files to the FBI. The
incident report that Mr. Smith partially prepared on the night of Mr. Mack’s death
2
The I&I and ABI interviews of Mr. Smith were taped and later transcribed. The state
investigators also prepared reports of their interviews of Mr. Smith.
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was included in the I&I files received by the FBI. Mr. Smith’s interviews with the
I&I and ABI investigators were also in the files received by the FBI.
The federal investigation lasted more than a year. On October 17, 2011, the
FBI scheduled a meeting with Mr. Smith—who was then employed by the U.S.
Postal Service—after learning that the State of Alabama intended to file criminal
charges against him. The FBI hoped that the news of a possible state indictment
might give Mr. Smith some incentive to cooperate with its investigation or even
confess to his involvement in the beating and death of Mr. Mack.
When Mr. Smith arrived at the FBI office, Special Agents Susan Hanson and
Kelvin King advised him of the purpose of the interview. They told him that he
was not under arrest, that the interview was voluntary, that he was free to leave,
and that he could refuse to answer any of their questions. Because Mr. Smith was
not in custody, they did not advise him of his Miranda rights. Agent Hanson did,
however, tell Mr. Smith that if he chose to answer questions it “was imperative”
that he tell the truth and that, if he provided false statements, he could be
prosecuted for violating 18 U.S.C. § 1001.
Mr. Smith chose to continue speaking with the FBI agents, proclaiming that
he was eager to tell his side of the story. He said that other officers had lied about
the events of August 4, 2010, and he wanted to set the record straight.
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During the interview, Mr. Smith mentioned that he had previously given
statements to I&I. The FBI agents told him that they did not have access to and
had not reviewed those statements because they likely had been compelled. Mr.
Smith then began giving his account of what happened on August 4.
In the middle of the interview, but after Mr. Smith had begun to relate his
version of events, the FBI agents advised him of his Garrity rights. Mr. Smith said
that he was familiar with and understood those rights. The agents then presented
him with a consent form that granted the FBI permission to use any and all prior
statements that he might have given under compulsion. One of the agents read the
form to Mr. Smith, who said he understood its contents. The consent form, in full,
read as follows:
I, Michael Smith, fully understand that some or all of my prior
statements regarding allegations of excessive use of force against
Rocrast Mack on August 4, 2010, in the Ventress Correctional Facility
could be considered as having been given under administrative
compulsion and therefore could not be used against me in any
criminal investigation or proceeding.
Nevertheless, I believe that all pertinent information should be
provided to United States law enforcement officials in their
investigation concerning these allegations of excessive force. I
therefore knowingly, intelligently and voluntarily waive my
constitutional and statutory right not to have those statements used
against me, and I voluntarily give my consent that all of my prior
statements be furnished to special agents of the Federal Bureau of
Investigation, the Department of Justice, and the United States
Attorney’s Office, knowing that these prior statements may be used
against me in any criminal investigation and proceeding regardless of
whether I take the witness stand in any subsequent trial.
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Mr. Smith signed and dated the consent form, saying he had no problem with the
FBI agents reviewing his prior statements because they were consistent with what
he was relating to them during the interview. With that, Mr. Smith continued
giving his statement to the agents. That statement was essentially the same as the
one Mr. Smith had given to the ABI. When he had finished, Agent Hanson told
Mr. Smith that his version was not consistent with what other witnesses had said.
D
On March 8, 2012, a federal grand jury indicted Mr. Smith on charges
related to the beating and death of Mr. Mack. The charges were two counts of
deprivation of civil rights under color of law resulting in bodily injury and death, in
violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 2 & 242 (Counts 1 and 3); one count of obstruction of
justice for persuading others to engage in misleading conduct, in violation of 18
U.S.C. § 1512(b)(3) (Count 5); one count of conspiracy to obstruct justice, in
violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1512(k) (Count 6); one count of obstruction of justice for
falsifying documents, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1519 (Count 7); two counts of
obstruction of justice for misleading conduct, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §
1512(b)(3) (Counts 11 and 12); and one count of making false statements to the
FBI, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1001 (Count 15).
Prior to trial, Mr. Smith filed a motion to suppress, arguing that the
statements he gave to the state agencies (I&I and the ABI) were compelled, and
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had been used in the federal investigation in violation of Garrity. He also filed a
motion for a hearing under Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441 (1972),
asserting that the government was required to prove that all of the evidence it
intended to present at trial was derived from independent sources and was not
tainted by the illegal use of his compelled statements.
After holding an evidentiary hearing—at which Mr. Smith did not testify—a
magistrate judge issued two reports recommending that the district court deny Mr.
Smith’s motions. Among other things, the magistrate judge found that some of
Mr. Smith’s statements (the duty and incident reports, the statements to the ABI,
and the statements at the pre-termination conference) were not protected by
Garrity because they were not compelled; that Mr. Smith was not entitled to a
Kastigar hearing because the I&I and ABI investigations were free of any Garrity
taint; that the federal prosecutors and FBI agents did not have access to any
compelled/protected statements before Mr. Smith signed the consent form waiving
his Garrity rights; and that Mr. Smith voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently
waived his Garrity rights as to his prior compelled statements during the FBI
interview.
Mr. Smith raised several objections to the magistrate judge’s reports. He
argued, in part, that his waiver was insufficient to relinquish his Garrity rights
because the consent form he signed did not reference Garrity by name or
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specifically identify the statements that the waiver sought to cover. He also
asserted that the waiver was involuntary because he did not understand the nature
of the rights he was waiving and because, prior to his execution of the consent
form, I&I and the ABI had already shared his compelled statements with the FBI.
The district court overruled Mr. Smith’s objections (as well as some
objections lodged by the government), adopted the magistrate judge’s reports,
denied Mr. Smith’s motion to suppress, and rejected Mr. Smith’s request for a
Kastigar hearing. The district court assumed that the waiver of Garrity rights was
limited to the statements Mr. Smith made to I&I and the ABI (and the derivatives
of such statements). But it ruled that the duty and incident reports, like Mr.
Smith’s statements at the pre-termination conference, were not compelled under
threat of job loss and therefore were not protected by Garrity.
E
Following a six-day trial, the jury convicted Mr. Smith of all the charges
against him. The presentence investigation report, prepared by a probation officer,
recommended a base offense level of 43 under the advisory Sentencing Guidelines.
The probation officer applied U.S.S.G. § 2A1.1, the guideline for first-degree
murder, finding that Mr. Smith willfully, deliberately, and maliciously murdered
Mr. Mack. The probation officer also applied several guideline sentencing
enhancements: committing an offense under color of law; targeting a vulnerable
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and physically restrained victim; organizing a criminal activity with five or more
participants; and obstructing justice. As a result of the enhancements, Mr. Smith’s
adjusted offense level increased to 59. Because 43 was the highest possible
offense level under the Sentencing Guidelines, Mr. Smith’s offense level was
ultimately set at 43. With no criminal history points, Mr. Smith had an advisory
guideline range of life imprisonment.
Mr. Smith objected to the probation officer’s guideline calculations. He
argued that the guideline for voluntary manslaughter, which would have resulted in
a base offense level of only 29, was appropriate. See U.S.S.G. § 2A1.3. He
claimed that he did not have the intent necessary to allow application of the first-
degree murder guideline because he acted under an impaired capacity and
substantial distress. Mr. Smith also challenged the application of the victim-related
guideline enhancements.
For the most part, the district court rejected Mr. Smith’s guideline
arguments. It found that that the appropriate underlying offense was second-
degree murder (not first-degree murder) and calculated a base level offense of 38.
See U.S.S.G. § 2A1.2. As the district court saw things, the actions of Mr. Smith in
the HCU were not consistent with voluntary manslaughter but rather demonstrated
that he intended to kill Mr. Mack and had a depraved heart. The district court
further concluded that the applicable guideline enhancements raised Mr. Smith’s
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base offense level from a 38 to a 52. Again, because Mr. Smith’s total offense
level exceeded the maximum offense level in the Sentencing Guidelines, the
district court set the total offense level at 43.
The district court denied Mr. Smith’s request for a downward departure, but
did vary downward from the advisory guideline range of life imprisonment.
Instead of imposing a sentence of life as recommended by the Sentencing
Guidelines, the district court sentenced Mr. Smith to 30 years of imprisonment on
Counts 1 and 3 and 20 years on the remaining counts, with all of those terms to run
concurrently. The district court also imposed three-year terms of supervised
release on each count, with all of those terms to run concurrently as well.
Mr. Smith now appeals, raising a number of challenges to his convictions
and sentence. We address only the issues related to Mr. Smith’s Garrity claim, and
affirm on the other issues without further discussion.
II
In Garrity, 385 U.S. at 499–500, the Supreme Court held that Fifth
Amendment protections apply to public employees who, under the threat of job
loss, are required to make incriminating statements. Such compelled statements by
public employees, ruled the Court, cannot be used in any criminal proceeding or
prosecution. See id. See also Vangates, 287 F.3d at 1320–21. Mr. Smith requests
that we vacate his convictions because the government violated his Garrity rights.
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He contends that the various statements he made—the statements contained in the
duty and incident reports, the statements he provided to I&I, the statements he gave
to the ABI, the statements he offered at the pre-termination conference—were all
given under compulsion and subsequently (and improperly) shared with the FBI
during its criminal investigation.
“We review the denial of a motion to suppress as a mixed question of law
and fact; ‘rulings of law [are] reviewed de novo and findings of fact [are] reviewed
for clear error, in the light most favorable to [the government,] the prevailing party
in district court.’” United States v. Spoerke, 568 F.3d 1236, 1244 (11th Cir. 2009)
(modifications in original and citations omitted). A finding is not clearly erroneous
unless we are left with a “definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been
committed.” Anderson v. City of Bessemer City, N.C., 470 U.S. 564, 573 (1985).
Stated differently, “[w]here there are two permissible views of the evidence, the
fact-finder’s choice between them cannot be clearly erroneous.” Id. at 574.
A
We first address the statements in the duty and incident reports prepared by
Mr. Smith. For a number of reasons, we conclude that those reports were not
compelled within the meaning of Garrity.
It is true, as Mr. Smith says, that the administrative regulations of the ADOC
require employees to complete a report of all unusual incidents that occur during a
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shift or tour of duty, and to cooperate with investigations by providing information
and or verbal/written statements. It is also true, as Mr. Smith points out, that
failure to comply with the ADOC’s regulations can lead to progressive disciplinary
sanctions. But where there is no direct threat, the mere possibility of future
discipline is not enough to trigger Garrity protection:
In the absence of a direct threat [of termination], we determine
whether the officer’s statements were compelled by examining h[is]
belief and, more importantly, the objective circumstances surrounding
it. Thus, for [an officer’s] statements to be protected under Garrity,
the officer must have in fact believed the statements to be compelled
on threat of loss of job and this belief must have been objectively
reasonable.
Vangates, 287 F.3d at 1321–22 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).
See also United States v. Waldon, 363 F.3d 1103, 1112 (11th Cir. 2004) (“Before a
police officer’s testimony will be considered ‘coerced’ within the meaning of
Garrity, he must show that he subjectively believed that he would lose his job if he
refused to answer questions and that his belief was objectively reasonable.”).
Mr. Smith did not testify at the evidentiary hearing, and the magistrate judge
and the district court found that he failed to present any evidence that he
subjectively believed that he would be terminated if he refused to submit the
reports. See D.E. 281 at 2. Indeed, the magistrate judge and the district court
found that Mr. Smith’s “motive to make the written statements more than likely
was to deflect suspicion and avoid jail rather than [a] desire to retain his
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employment.” D.E. 187 at 7. This finding was not error, and certainly not clear
error. Mr. Smith, therefore, has not satisfied the subjective belief prong of
Vangates.
Even if Mr. Smith had put on evidence as to his own belief, “Garrity does
not stand for the proposition that a statement made in a standard report is coerced
whenever an officer faces both the remote possibility of criminal prosecution if he
files the report and arguably even speculative possibility of termination if he
declines to do so. Rather, the touchstone of the Garrity inquiry is whether the
defendant’s statements were coerced and therefore involuntary.” United States v.
Cook, 526 F. Supp. 2d 1, 8 (D.D.C. 2007) (holding that field and use of force
reports prepared by deputy U.S. Marshal, concerning incident between himself and
individual in the custody of the U.S. Marshals Service, were not coerced within the
meaning of Garrity, in part because the deputy was not under administrative or
criminal investigation when the reports were requested). Cf. United States v. Rios
Ruiz, 579 F.2d 670, 676 (1st Cir. 1978) (not discussing Garrity, but holding that an
arrest report prepared by a police officer could be used at his criminal trial because
it “clearly does not come within the ambit of the [F]ifth [A]mendment”). So Mr.
Smith fails on the second prong of Vangates as well. See Waldon, 363 F.3d at
1112 (holding that police officer did not have an objectively reasonable belief that
he would be fired for refusing to testify before a grand jury even though
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municipality’s regulations reflected a “general expectation that police officers
w[ould] cooperate and testify” and allowed for discipline of employees who
exercised their Fifth Amendment rights). See also Robert Myers, Code of Silence:
Police Shootings and the Right to Remain Silent, 26 Golden Gate U. L. Rev. 497,
525–26 (1996) (“Police officers have unsuccessfully attempted to exclude reports
prepared in the normal course of their duties from criminal trials. Arguing that
preparation of the reports were mandated by departmental regulations, officers
have claimed that the reports [were] ‘compelled’ for Fifth Amendment purposes.
This argument has been consistently rejected.”) (internal footnotes and citations
omitted).
B
Next we turn to Mr. Smith’s statements to the ABI. We agree with the
magistrate judge and the district court that those statements were not compelled
under Garrity.
As an initial matter, there is no evidence that Mr. Rodgers, the ABI
investigator, told Mr. Smith that he could (or would) lose his job if he failed to
answer questions. To the contrary, Mr. Rodgers informed Mr. Smith that he was
conducting a criminal investigation into the death of Mr. Mack and advised him of
his Miranda rights. Mr. Smith waived those rights and answered the questions
posed to him by Mr. Rodgers. And although Warden Giles instructed Mr. Smith
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(and other Ventress employees) to go to the Eufala office of the Alabama
Department of Public Safety, there is no evidence that he told them they had to
answer questions put to them by ABI investigators once they got there. Cf.
Benjamin v. City of Montgomery, 785 F.2d 959, 962 (11th Cir. 1986) (holding that
police officers, who had refused to testify on Fifth Amendment grounds at another
officer’s criminal trial, were compelled to provide testimony when city mayor
threatened them with termination unless they testified).
Because there was no direct threat of termination (or similarly severe
employment action), Mr. Smith had to demonstrate a subjective belief that his
statements to the ABI were “compelled on threat of loss job,” and that this belief
was “objectively reasonable.” Vangates, 287 F.3d at 1322 (internal quotation
marks and citations omitted). As already noted, Mr. Smith did not testify at the
evidentiary hearing, and he failed to present any evidence that he subjectively
believed that failing to answer Mr. Rodger’s questions would lead to termination.
He therefore did not satisfy the subjective belief prong of Vangates with respect to
his statements to the ABI. See, e.g., United States v. Palmquist, 712 F.3d 640, 645
(1st Cir. 2013) (“Garrity immunity is contingent upon the degree of certainty that
an employee’s silence alone will subject the employee to severe employment
sanctions. . . . Nothing that Bond [the criminal investigator] said or presented to
Palmquist [the employee] could have led Palmquist to believe that, if he remained
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silent, he would automatically lose his job or suffer similarly severe employment
consequences solely for having remained silent.”).
C
That leaves the statements made by Mr. Smith to I&I and to ADOC officials
at his pre-termination conference. We assume, without deciding, that these
statements were compelled within the meaning of Garrity. But we affirm the
denial of the motion to suppress because Mr. Smith waived his Garrity protections
as to those statements when he executed the consent form during the FBI
interview. Cf. Garner v. United States, 424 U.S. 648, 663–64 (1976) (rejecting
Garrity claim where taxpayer, instead of asserting an available Fifth Amendment
privilege, made incriminating disclosures on his tax return).
A person can waive his Fifth Amendment rights if he does so voluntarily,
knowingly, and intelligently, see Colorado v. Spring, 479 U.S. 564, 573 (1987),
and Garrity protections—which derive from the Fifth Amendment—are no
exception to this general rule. See United States v. Gray, 2010 WL 1487218, at *3
(N.D. Ohio Apr. 13, 2010) (concluding that law enforcement officers waived their
Garrity rights as to prior compelled statements by executing, during their FBI
interviews, a consent form virtually identical to the one signed by Mr. Smith in this
case). A waiver is voluntary if it is the “product of a free and deliberate choice”
rather than intimidation, coercion, or deception, and it is knowing and intelligent if
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it is done with “full awareness . . . of the right being abandoned and the
consequences of the decision to abandon it.” Spring, 479 U.S. at 573. “Only if the
‘totality of the circumstances surrounding the investigation’ reveal[s] both an
uncoerced choice and the requisite level of comprehension may a court properly
conclude that the [Fifth Amendment] rights have been waived.” Id.Whether there has been a valid waiver of Fifth Amendment rights is a mixed
question of law and fact. See United States v. Barbour, 70 F.3d 580, 584–85 (11th
Cir. 1995). Here the magistrate judge and the district court concluded that Mr.
Smith’s Garrity waiver was voluntary, knowing, and intelligent. Construing the
record in the light most favorable to the government, which prevailed at the
suppression hearing, see id. at 584, and assessing the totality of the circumstances,
we agree.
First, the Garrity waiver was voluntary. The FBI agents asked Mr. Smith to
come meet with them and he agreed to do so. At its inception, therefore, the
meeting was consensual. After Mr. Smith arrived for the interview, the agents told
him that they were investigating the death of Mr. Mack, that he was not under
arrest, that he was free to leave, and that he could refuse to answer any questions.
Mr. Smith told the agents that he wanted to tell his side of the story and set the
record straight. Mr. Smith was never in custody, spoke to the agents freely, and
there was no evidence of coercion, threats, or deception on the part of the agents.
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Second, the waiver was knowing and intelligent. When Mr. Smith said that
he had previously provided statements to I&I, the agents told him that they did not
have access to those statements because they likely had been compelled. The
agents advised Mr. Smith of his Garrity rights, and he said he understood those
rights. In the middle of the interview, the agents provided Mr. Smith with a
consent form that he signed. The first paragraph of the form informed Mr. Smith
that his prior statements during the investigation into the alleged use of excessive
force against Mr. Mack might have been compelled, and that, as a result, they
could not be used against him in any criminal investigation or proceeding. The
second paragraph of the form stated that Mr. Smith, understanding this protection,
nevertheless wanted the federal government to have all pertinent information for its
investigation.
By signing the consent form, Mr. Smith voluntarily, knowingly, and
intelligently agreed to make all of his prior statements available to FBI agents and
federal prosecutors, even with the understanding that those statements could be
used against him if he chose not to take the stand at a subsequent trial. Although
the consent form did not mention Garrity by name, that omission was not fatal, for
the magistrate judge and the district court found that the FBI agents had explained
to Mr. Smith the rights he had under Garrity, and Mr. Smith said that he
understood those rights. Simply put, Mr. Smith knew the rights he was giving up,
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and he realized the consequences of waiving those rights. Cf. Chavez v. Martinez,
538 U.S. 760, 768 n.2 (2003) (dicta in plurality opinion) (“Once an immunity
waiver is signed, the signatory is unable to assert a Fifth Amendment objection to
the subsequent use of his statements in a criminal case, even if his statements were
in fact compelled. A waiver of immunity is therefore a prospective waiver of the
core self-incrimination right in any subsequent criminal proceeding.”).
Third, and critically, there was no violation of Garrity by the federal
government prior to Mr. Smith signing the consent form. The magistrate judge and
the district court found that “none of the prosecutors or investigators assigned to
the prosecution had access to any statements [Mr.] Smith move[d] to suppress until
after [he] signed the waiver form[.]” D.E. 187 at 5. As we explain, this finding—
at least with respect to Mr. Smith’s statements to I&I and at the pre-termination
conference—finds substantial support in the record, and is not clearly erroneous.
FBI Agents Hanson and King testified that, although the I&I and ABI files
had been received by the FBI months before Mr. Smith’s interview, they had not
reviewed any Garrity-protected materials (i.e., Mr. Smith’s prior statements to
I&I) prior to that interview. Agent Hanson acknowledged that she had reviewed
Mr. Smith’s ABI interview and the incident report, but explained that she had not
seen or been told about any of Mr. Smith’s prior statements to I&I because she
considered those statements compelled under Garrity. Agent King, for his part,
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testified that he was not even involved in the investigation into Mr. Mack’s death
until Mr. Smith’s FBI interview, and had not seen any of Mr. Smith’s prior
statements.
The testimony of Agents King and Hanson concerning the lack of Garrity
taint was corroborated to some degree by the state investigators. For example, Mr.
Cooper testified that Agent Hanson did not want to violate Mr. Smith’s Garrity
rights and told him that she did not want to discuss or gain access to any of Mr.
Smith’s statements to I&I. Mr. Cooper therefore did not talk to Agent Hanson
about Mr. Smith’s I&I interview.
The magistrate judge and the district court credited the testimony of the FBI
agents and the state investigators. Insofar as Mr. Smith’s statements to I&I and to
ADOC officials at the pre-termination conference are concerned, we see no basis
for overturning those credibility determinations, and we agree that the FBI agents
did not review or access those statements prior to their interview of Mr. Smith. See
generally Amadeo v. Zant, 486 U.S. 214, 227 (1988); United States v. Ramirez-
Chilel, 289 F.3d 744, 749 (11th Cir. 2002). We acknowledge, as indicated above,
that Agent Hanson testified that she had reviewed Mr. Smith’s statements to the
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ABI prior to the FBI interview, but those statements were not, as we have
explained, compelled within the meaning of Garrity.3
III
Mr. Smith has not shown that his rights under Garrity were violated, and his
other claims of error are not persuasive. We therefore affirm Mr. Smith’s
convictions and sentence.
AFFIRMED.
3
In affirming the factual finding that any Garrity-protected statements made by Mr.
Smith were not reviewed by the FBI agents prior to their meeting with Mr. Smith, we do not rely
on the magistrate judge’s subsidiary finding that, prior to the FBI interview, the federal
prosecutors used a “wall” to shield the agents from any Garrity taint. D.E. 187 at 5. As the
district court correctly noted in its order, the government did not present any evidence “as to the
existence of a Garrity-statement filter within the [U.S. Attorney’s Office] at the evidentiary
hearing.” D.E. 300 at 3.
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