George Carlton Davis, III v. Jim Holley Daniels, Jr.

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[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
________________________
No. 15-15741
Non-Argument Calendar
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D.C. Docket No. 1:13-cv-03806-RWS
GEORGE CARLTON DAVIS, III,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
versus
JIM HOLLEY DANIELS, JR.,
Defendant-Appellant.
________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Georgia
________________________
(July 14, 2016)
Before WILSON, ROSENBAUM and ANDERSON, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
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Defendant-Appellant Jim Holley Daniels, Jr., (“Daniels”) appeals from a
final order of the District Court for the Northern District of Georgia granting
summary judgment to Plaintiff-Appellee George Carlton Davis, III, (“Davis”) and
denying Daniels’ motion for reconsideration. Upon review of the record and briefs,
we affirm.
I. BACKGROUND
Davis’s complaint alleges in relevant part that Daniels had breached each of
five promissory notes executed between 1997 and 2000 and sought liquidated
damages and attorney’s fees. On cross motions for summary judgment, the district
court granted summary judgment to Davis on the issues of liability and granted
partial summary judgment to Davis on the issue of damages. Specifically, while
the court found that Davis was entitled to damages and attorney’s fees as a matter
of law, genuine questions of material fact existed about the calculation of those
damages. Accordingly Davis’ motion for summary judgment was granted in part
and denied in part and Daniels’ motion for summary judgment was denied. Davis
then filed a motion for reconsideration with respect to the damages portion of the
summary judgment order and Daniels filed a motion for reconsideration of the
entire order. The district court granted Davis’ motion for reconsideration with
respect to damages and denied Daniels’s motion for reconsideration. The court
then granted judgment in the amount of $2,076,325.38 in favor of Davis.
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On appeal, Daniels argues that the district court erred in granting Davis’
motion for summary judgment on liability with respect to three of the notes.
Daniels concedes that the remaining two notes are under seal. Daniels also argues
that the district court abused its discretion in granting Davis’ motion for
reconsideration and denying his motion for reconsideration. Upon review of the
record and the briefs, we affirm.
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
This Court reviews the grant of a motion for summary judgment de novo.
Merritt v. Dillard Paper Co., 120 F.3d 1181, 1184 (11th Cir. 1997). Summary
judgment is proper if the pleadings, depositions, and affidavits show there is no
genuine issue of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a
matter of law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56.
This Court reviews the denial of a motion for reconsideration for an abuse of
discretion. Sanderlin v. Seminole Tribe of Fla., 243 F.3d 1282, 1285 (11th Cir.
2001). A motion for reconsideration cannot be used “to relitigate old matters, raise
argument or present evidence that could have been raised prior to the entry of
judgment.” Michael Linet, Inc. v. Village of Wellington, 408 F.3d 757, 763 (11th
Cir. 2005).
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III. DISCUSSION
A. Summary Judgment Order
1. Statute of Limitations
Daniels’ first argument is that the district court erred in the summary
judgment order in holding that there was no genuine question of fact that Notes 1,
3, and 4 were executed under seal. Under Georgia law, actions on written contracts
are generally governed by the six-year period of limitations of OCGA § 9-3-24. In
contrast, contracts under seal are governed by the 20-year period of limitations of
OCGA § 9-3-23. Because the claim was brought more than six years after the right
of action accrued, the parties agree that Davis’ claim is barred if the Notes were
not executed under seal
Under Georgia law, “to constitute a sealed instrument, ‘there must be both a
recital in the body of the instrument of an intention to use a seal and the affixing of
the seal or scroll after the signature.’” McCalla v. Stuckey, 504 S.E.2d 269, 270
(Ga. Ct. App. 1998) (quoting Chastain v. L. Moss Music Co., 64 S.E.2d 205 (Ga.
Ct. App. 1951)). “‘Words traced with a pen, or stamped, printed, or made legible
by any other device whereby such act is for the purpose of putting down a
[person's] name at the end of an instrument to attest its validity, and is adopted by
the party whose name is so signed, is a sufficient signature and signing of the
instrument to which it is signed.’” Davis v. Harpagon Co., LLC, 637 S.E.2d 1, 2–3
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(Ga. 2006) (quoting Bank of Ringgold v. Poarch, 117 S.E. 114 (Ga. Ct. App.
1923)).
In the instant case, it is undisputed that all of the Notes contain both a recital
in the body of the instrument of an intention to use a seal, the affixing of a seal,
and Daniels’ signature. Daniels’ only argument is that on Notes 1, 3, and 4, his
cursive signature appears roughly two inches to the left of the word SEAL rather
than immediately adjacent to it, and that he has written his name in block print
rather than cursive immediately next to the word SEAL. According to Daniels, the
location of the cursive signature relative to the word SEAL raises a genuine
question of fact as to whether the seal is affixed “after the signature.” We disagree.
Whether or not the cursive writing suffices for the purpose of the sealing
requirement, it is clear under Georgia law that the printed writing immediately
adjacent to the word SEAL constitutes a signature and thereby satisfies the seal
requirements.
2. Consideration
Daniels next argues that the district court erred “in reversing its initial Order
and finding that no material facts exist with respect to Daniels’ defense of lack of
consideration” for Note 5.1 On its face, this argument, which appears to challenge
the district court’s order on cross motions for reconsideration, is difficult to
1
These arguments have been re-ordered for the purposes of logical consistency and flow.
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understand. The consideration issue was decided in favor of Davis on summary
judgment and the order on cross motions for reconsideration denied Daniels’
motion for reconsideration with respect to that part of the summary judgment
order. The motion for reconsideration did not “reverse” the summary judgment
order with respect to this issue. Therefore, we construe this argument as a
challenge to the summary judgment order.
Under Georgia law, a plaintiff in a suit to enforce a promissory note
“establishes a prima facie case by producing the note and showing that it was
executed.” Trendmark Homes, Inc. v. Bank of N. Ga., 726 S.E.2d 138, 139 (Ga.
Ct. App. 2012). “Once a holder of a promissory note establishes prima facie right
to judgment as a matter of law, as would support holder's motion for summary
judgment in action on note, burden then shifts to the obligor to establish an
affirmative defense to the claim, such as the lack of consideration.” Han v. Han,
670 S.E.2d 842 (Ga. Ct. App. 2008). “A contract under seal raises a prima facie
presumption of consideration, which is rebuttable.” Autrey v. UAP/GA AG Chem,
Inc., 497 S.E.2d 402, 405 (Ga. Ct. App. 1998).
Daniels argues that there is a genuine question of fact as to consideration
because “neither party has been able to produce a single check showing that
consideration was given for Note 5” and because Daniels’ responses to Davis’
Request for Admissions denied receiving the $281,000 from Davis. We disagree.
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Daniels has not satisfied his burden of adducing evidence sufficient to create a
genuine question of material fact as to consideration.
B. Motion to Reconsider
1. Accord and Satisfaction
Daniels’ next argument is that the district court erred in “reversing its initial
Order and finding that no material facts exist with respect to the apparent
consolidation of Notes 1, 2, 3, and 4.” On its face, this argument is difficult to
understand. Daniels first raised the consolidation argument in his motion for
reconsideration. Because Daniels did not raise this defense at the summary
judgment stage, the district court did not address it in the summary judgment order.
Accordingly, the district court’s denial of Daniels’ motion to reconsider did not
“reverse” its initial Order. Instead, the district court held that it was abandoned.
“A motion for reconsideration cannot be used to relitigate old matters, raise
argument or present evidence that could have been raised prior to the entry of
judgment.” Wilchombe v. TeeVee Toons, Inc., 555 F.3d 949, 957 (11th Cir. 2009)
(citation omitted). “A district court has sound discretion whether to alter or amend
a judgment pursuant to a motion for reconsideration, and its decision will only be
reversed if it abused that discretion.” Id. “Denial of a motion to amend is especially
soundly exercised when a party gives no reason for not previously raising an
issue.” Id. (quotation marks and citation omitted).
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Daniels gives no reason for his failure to previously raise the consolidation
argument at the summary judgment stage. Nor do we believe that the district court
abused its discretion in declining to entertain this argument at the motion to
reconsider stage.
In any event, Daniels’ consolidation argument lacked merit. As discussed
above, under Georgia law, a plaintiff in a suit to enforce a promissory note
“establishes a prima facie case by producing the note and showing that it was
executed. Once that prima facie case has been made, the plaintiff is entitled to
judgment as a matter of law unless the defendant can establish a defense.”
Trendmark Homes, 726 S.E.2d at 139. One such defense is accord and satisfaction.
“Accord and satisfaction occurs where the parties to an agreement, by a subsequent
agreement, have satisfied the former agreement, and the latter agreement has been
executed.” O.C.G.A. § 13-4-101. “Under Georgia law, an accord and satisfaction is
a contract which, like other contracts, requires a ‘meeting of the minds.’” ADP-
Financial Computer Services, Inc. v. First Nat. Bank of Cobb County, 703 F.2d
1261, 1266 (11th Cir. 1983) (citing Myers v. American Finance System of
Decatur, Inc., 615 F.2d 368 (5th Cir. 1980) 2).
2
In Bonner v. City of Prichard, 661 F.2d 1206, 1209 (11th Cir. 1981) (en banc), this
court adopted as binding precedent all decisions of the former Fifth Circuit handed down prior to
October 1, 1981.
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Daniels argues that the grant of summary judgment to Davis on the issue of
liability was error because there is a genuine question of fact as to whether the
parties released the debt obligations in Notes 1, 2, 3, and 4 by accord and
satisfaction and whether Note 5 is a “consolidation” of the earlier four notes.
Specifically, Daniels points to two pieces of record evidence: (1) the handwritten
words “Note Update” in the “Date of Transaction” field of Note 5 and (2)
deposition testimony from Daniels that he received only “about $300,000” in total
consideration from Davis. Because the face value of Note 5 was $281,000, Daniels
claims that there is a fact issue as to whether Note 5 was a consolidation of the
Notes 1, 2, 3, and 4. We disagree. While it is not entirely clear what the words
“Note Update” mean, the record does not contain sufficient evidence such that a
reasonable trier of fact could find that Notes 1, 2, 3, and 4 were released through
accord and satisfaction. Moreover, the signed and sealed note recites that Daniels
received $281,000 as an “amount given to me directly.”
For the foregoing reasons, the district court did not abuse its discretion in
declining to consider this argument below.
2. Calculation of Liquidated Damages
Daniels next argues that the district court abused its discretion in granting
Davis’ motion to reconsider the damages portion of the summary judgment order
because there were genuine questions of fact about whether Davis had credited
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certain payments made by Daniels to the interest accrued on the principal value of
the Notes.
A motion for reconsideration is only appropriate when “absolutely
necessary” to present: (1) newly discovered evidence; (2) an intervening
development or change in controlling law; or (3) a need to correct a clear error of
law or fact. Bryan v. Murphy, 246 F. Supp. 2d 1256, 1258–59 (N.D. Ga. 2003).
Daniels argues that the district court abused its discretion because none of
the three grounds for granting a motion for reconsideration existed. We disagree.
The order on motion for reconsideration recognizes that the summary judgment
order “clearly erred” with regard to its finding that it was impossible to calculate
the exact amount of liquidated damages due to the insufficiency of evidence about
whether Davis had credited certain payments made by Daniels to the interest
accrued on the principal value of the Notes. As Davis pointed out in his motion for
reconsideration, Daniels’ response to Davis’ statement of material fact admits that
Davis properly credited the payments at issue to the outstanding interest.
Accordingly, there was no genuine question of fact that Davis credited the
payments made by Daniels to the interest accrued on the principal value of the
Notes. The district court correctly recognized its earlier clear error and did not
abuse its discretion in granting Davis’ motion to reconsider the damages portion of
the summary judgment order.
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3. Calculation of Interest and Attorney’s Fees
Daniels’ final argument is that the district court abused its discretion “in
reversing its initial Order and finding that no material facts exist with respect to the
calculation of interest and attorneys’ fees.” But Daniels offers no argument—
beyond a reiteration of his claims about lack of consideration and accord and
satisfaction—as to why the district court’s express conclusion that it “clearly
erred” with regard to its earlier finding that it was impossible to calculate the exact
amount of liquidated damages was an abuse of discretion. Accordingly, we cannot
conclude that the district court abused its discretion.
IV. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the district court’s orders granting Davis’ motion
for summary judgment and motion to reconsider and denying Daniels’ motion for
summary judgment and motion to reconsider are affirmed.
AFFIRMED.
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