Henry D. Howard v. Augusta-Richmond County, Georgia, Commission

Case: 14-15474 Date Filed: 09/02/2015 Page: 1 of 4
[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
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No. 14-15474
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D.C. Docket No. 1:14-cv-00097-JRH-BKE
HENRY D. HOWARD,
EARNEST G. SMITH,
GLORIA FRAZIER,
THOMAS WALKER,
KENNETH MARTIN,
MELVIN IVEY,
ALBERT ROBINSON, JR.,
Plaintiffs - Appellants,
versus
AUGUSTA-RICHMOND COUNTY, GEORGIA, COMMISSION,
DEKE S. COPENHAVER,
in his official capacity as Mayor of Augusta-Richmond County,
LYNN BAILEY,
in her official capacity as Executive Director of the Richmond
County Board of Elections,
Defendants - Appellees.
Case: 14-15474 Date Filed: 09/02/2015 Page: 2 of 4
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Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Georgia
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(September 2, 2015)
Before JORDAN and JULIE CARNES, Circuit Judges, and ROBREÑO, * District
Judge.
PER CURIAM:
Following oral argument, and for the reasons which follow, we conclude that
the district court abused its discretion in awarding attorneys’ fees to Augusta-
Richmond County.
A prevailing defendant in a civil rights case brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §
1983 can recover attorneys’ fees under 42 U.S.C. § 1988(b) if the action was
“frivolous, unreasonable, or without foundation.” Sullivan v. Sch. Bd. of Pinellas
Cty., 773 F.2d 1182, 1188 (11th Cir. 1985). The same standard applies under 52
U.S.C. § 10310(e), a provision of the Voting Rights Act. See Dillard v. City of
Greensboro, 213 F.3d 1347, 1353 (11th Cir. 2000).
To be frivolous, a complaint must be “so lacking in arguable merit as to be
groundless or without foundation.” Sullivan, 773 F.2d at 1189 (internal quotation
marks and citation omitted). The plaintiffs’ complaint here, though ultimately
unsuccessful, was not frivolous.
*
Honorable Eduardo C. Robreño, United States District Judge for the Eastern District of
Pennsylvania, sitting by designation.
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First, at the time the complaint was filed, there was no binding precedent
clearly establishing that the Supreme Court’s decision in Shelby County v. Holder,
133 S. Ct. 2612 (2013), was retroactive. The County had a good argument—
indeed, what turned out to be a winning argument—that Shelby County was
retroactive under the rule set forth in Harper v. Virginia Department of Taxation,
509 U.S. 86, 96 (1993), but we explained, in an en banc opinion, that Harper
“clearly retained the possibility of pure prospectivity and . . . also retained the . . .
test [from Chevron Oil Co. v. Huson, 404 U.S. 97 (1971)], albeit in a modified
form, as the governing analysis for such determinations in civil cases.” Glazner v.
Glazner, 347 F.3d 1212, 1216-17 (11th Cir. 2003) (en banc). So the plaintiffs had
a non-frivolous argument under Glazner that Shelby County should be given only
prospective effect. See Christiansburg Garment Co. v. EEOC, 434 U.S. 412, 422
(1978) (“Even when the law or the facts appear questionable or unfavorable at the
outset, a party may have an entirely reasonable ground for bringing suit.”).
Second, in response to queries from legislators, attorneys working for the
State of Georgia disagreed on the effect of Shelby County given the DOJ’s
previous objection. Deputy Legislative Counsel H. Jeff Lanier wrote that, despite
Shelby County, the DOJ objection “[wa]s still valid.” Deputy Attorney General
Dennis Dunn took a different view, opining that Shelby County was retroactive,
and it therefore “appear[ed]” that the new Georgia legislation concerning voting
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dates could be implemented. He cautioned, however, that “there is no settled law
in Georgia that definitively adopts these conclusions in relation to the
implementation of a practice or procedure to which the DOJ had previously
objected.” These conflicting views further indicate that the scope of Shelby County
was not clear at the time the plaintiffs filed suit. Cf. Harris v. Ariz. Indep.
Redistricting Comm’n, 993 F. Supp. 2d 1042, 1076 (D. Ariz. 2014) (three-judge
court) (“Nothing in Shelby County suggests that all those [previously drawn
redistricting] maps are now invalid, and we are aware of no court that has reached
such a conclusion.”).
“[T]he showing required to support a finding of frivolity is a ‘stringent’
one[.]” Johnson v. Florida, 348 F.3d 1334, 1354 (11th Cir. 2003). Because that
showing was not made, we reverse the district court’s award of attorneys’ fees to
Augusta-Richmond County.
REVERSED AND REMANDED.
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