United States v. Miguel Glaze

Case: 14-14663 Date Filed: 06/09/2015 Page: 1 of 3
[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
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No. 14-14663
Non-Argument Calendar
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D.C. Docket No. 0:13-cr-60255-KAM-4
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
versus
MIGUEL GLAZE,
Defendant - Appellant.
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Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Florida
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(June 9, 2015)
Before TJOFLAT, WILSON and JILL PRYOR, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Case: 14-14663 Date Filed: 06/09/2015 Page: 2 of 3
Miguel Glaze, a federal prisoner proceeding pro se, appeals the district
court’s denial of a motion to vacate his conviction and sentence which he
purported to file pursuant to Rule 60 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. For
the reasons that follow, we vacate that order and remand for further proceedings.
On February 24, 2014, Mr. Glaze pled guilty with the assistance of retained
counsel to one count of conspiracy with intent to distribute five kilograms or more
of cocaine. On May 9, 2014, the district court sentenced Mr. Glaze to 120 months’
imprisonment, to be followed by 5 years of supervised release. Four and a half
months later, on September 29, 2014, Mr. Glaze filed a pro se “Motion for Relief
from Judgment Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. Rule 60(b)(3), Rule 60(b)(4), and Rule
60(d)(3)” in which he asked the court to “vacate [his] judgment and sentence.” In
that motion, he asserted, among other things, that his trial counsel was ineffective,
the sting operation that resulted in his arrest was racially motivated, and his guilty
plea was obtained fraudulently, all in violation of the Constitution of the United
States.
Two days later, the district court summarily denied Mr. Glaze’s motion. As
relevant here, the court stated: “Defendant is seeking to vacate his sentence
pursuant to a rule of civil procedure. Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b). Rule 60(b) . . . does
not provide relief from a judgment in a criminal case.” Mr. Glaze appealed.
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Case: 14-14663 Date Filed: 06/09/2015 Page: 3 of 3
We generally review a district court’s ruling on a Rule 60 motion for an
abuse of discretion. See Burke v. Smith, 252 F.3d 1260, 1263 (11th Cir. 2001).
But here, the district court’s conclusion that 60(b) did not provide a vehicle for
relief was a threshold legal conclusion, and we review that conclusion de novo.
See AIG Baker Sterling Heights, LLC v. Am. Multi-Cinema, Inc., 579 F.3d 1268,
1270 (11th Cir. 2009). We, like the district court, must liberally construe pleadings
prepared by pro se litigants. Tannenbaum v. United States, 148 F.3d 1262, 1263
(11th Cir. 1998).
“Federal courts have long recognized that they have an obligation to look
beyond the label of a motion filed by a pro se inmate and determine whether the
motion is, in effect, cognizable under a different remedial statutory framework.”
See Gooden v. United States, 627 F.3d 846, 847 (11th Cir. 2010). We see no
indication that the district court did so here despite the fact that Mr. Glaze moved
the court to vacate his conviction and sentence, a motion that could properly be
considered under 28 U.S.C. § 2255.1 Accordingly, we vacate the district court’s
order and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
VACATED AND REMANDED.
1
We note, however, that Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 11(e) does impose some
restrictions on the district court’s authority to address Mr. Glaze’s request to have his guilty plea
set aside.
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