Janice Brown v. City of Opelika

[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FILED
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
________________________ ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
DECEMBER 14, 2006
No. 06-13615 THOMAS K. KAHN
Non-Argument Calendar CLERK
________________________
D. C. Docket No. 05-00236-CV-W-E
JANICE BROWN,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
versus
CITY OF OPELIKA, AL,
Defendant-Appellee.
________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Middle District of Alabama
_________________________
(December 14, 2006)
Before TJOFLAT, BLACK and MARCUS, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
In this case, the district court granted the City of Opelika summary judgment
on Janice Brown’s claim under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000e-3(a), that the City retaliated against her, i.e., terminated her employment,
because she had made a complaint of racial discrimination, activity protected by
Title VII.1 The district court ruled against Brown on the ground that she failed to
establish the first prong a prima facie case for retaliation. She now appeals that
ruling.
The court’s ruling appears in its order of May 30, 2006, at pages 5-8. We
find no error in the ruling and therefore affirm the court’s judgment.
“[T]o establish a prima facie case of retaliation under Title VII, a plaintiff
must prove the following elements: (1) she participated in an activity protected by
Title VII; (2) she suffered an adverse employment action; and (3) there is a causal
connection between the participation in the protected activity and the adverse
employment decision.” Gupta v. Florida Bd. of Regents, 212 F.3d 571, 587 (11th
Cir. 2000). A plaintiff can show participation in a protected activity by
demonstrating that she had a subjective, good-faith belief that her employer was
engaged in unlawful employment practices and that her belief was objectively
reasonable in light of the facts and record presented. Little v. United Techs.,
Carrier Transicold Div., 103 F.3d 956, 960 (11th Cir. 1997).
1
Janice Brown is an African American woman. In addition to asserting a claim under
Title VII, she sought relief for the alleged retaliation under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The district court
denied her § 1983 claim on the theory that Title VII provides the sole relief for a claim of
retaliation. Brown does not challenge that ruling in her appeal; we therefore do not consider it.
2
“To establish a causal connection, a plaintiff must show that the decision-
makers were aware of the protected conduct, and that the protected activity and the
adverse action were not wholly unrelated.” Gupta, 212 F.3d at 590 (internal
citation omitted). “Discrimination is about actual knowledge, and real intent, not
constructive knowledge and assumed intent. When evaluating a charge of
employment discrimination, then, we must focus on the actual knowledge and
actions of the decision-maker.” Walker v. Prudential Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co., 286
F.3d 1270, 1274 (11th Cir. 2002) (internal citations omitted).
Once a prima facie case is established, the burden shifts to the defendant to
rebut the presumption of retaliation by producing legitimate reasons for the adverse
employment action. Sullivan v. Nat’l R.R. Passenger Corp., 170 F.3d 1056, 1059
(11th Cir. 1999). If the defendant offers legitimate reasons, the presumption of
retaliation disappears. Id. The plaintiff must then show that the employer’s
proffered reasons for taking the adverse action were actually a pretext for
prohibited retaliatory conduct. Id.
We affirm the district court’s judgment because, as the court correctly noted,
the record contained no evidence that Brown engaged in a protected activity by
making a complaint about racial discrimination or harassment. Brown admitted
that she never mentioned the word “race” when she complained about Kirby’s
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behavior, that she had no knowledge of Kirby making any racially derogatory
comments, and that Kirby took out her anger on everyone, including the white
office assistant. Moreover, Brown did not engage in a protected activity because
she never voiced a complaint that the City was engaged in an unlawful
employment practice. Even if Brown had a subjective belief that Kirby was
harassing and discriminating against her on the basis of race, this belief was not
objectively reasonable in light of the facts presented. Specifically, Brown
conceded that Kirby took out her anger on everyone, including the white office
assistant. To the extent that the office assistant was treated differently, Brown
conceded that the assistant had different responsibilities than hers.
AFFIRMED.
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