Ronald E. Govan v. U.S. Department of Veterans Affairs

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[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
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No. 19-11085
Non-Argument Calendar
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D.C. Docket No. 1:18-cv-01515-WMR
RONALD E. GOVAN,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
versus
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA DEPARTMENT
OF VETERANS AFFAIRS,
Defendant-Appellee.
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Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Georgia
________________________
(September 20, 2019)
Before TJOFLAT, JORDAN and HULL, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
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Ronald Govan, proceeding pro se, appeals from the district court’s sua
sponte dismissal without prejudice of his complaint raising claims under the
Federal Tort Claims Act (“FTCA”), 28 U.S.C. § 2674, against the United States
Department of Veterans Affairs (“VA”). After review, we affirm.
I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND
According to his amended complaint, Govan’s claims in this case arose from
his March 2017 interactions with laboratory personnel at the VA Medical Center in
Decatur, Georgia. On March 15, 2017, Govan went to the VA Medical Center for
a regular visit with his doctor. Govan’s doctor ordered a series of lab tests, and
after his exam, Govan proceeded to the lab for those tests. Because the lab was
crowded, Govan left the VA Medical Center without completing the ordered tests.
Govan returned the next day, March 16, 2017, to complete the tests, but laboratory
personnel told him they could not find any lab orders for him.
Govan then contacted the VA’s Patient Advocate to make a complaint
regarding the lab personnel’s cancellation of his doctor’s lab orders. As a result of
his complaint, the “Lab Supervisor was summoned and made aware of [Govan’s]
concerns and demands,” and Govan returned to the lab to complete the testing his
doctor ordered.
According to Govan, while he was having his blood plasma drawn, and in
retaliation for his complaint, VA lab personnel introduced a “controlled and/or
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regulated substance” into his body, knowing that the substance would cause his
blood sugar to spike, resulting in dizziness or fainting. Upon leaving the VA
Medical Center, Govan “immediately began to feel light-headed” and “was sick all
day.” Late that night, afraid to return to the VA Medical Center for treatment,
Govan instead went to the emergency room at Emory Saint Joseph’s Hospital. At
Saint Joseph’s, Govan underwent “a host of test[s],” including chest x-rays, a CT
scan of his chest, “numerous labs,” an EKG, and “several hours of heart
monitoring.”
Govan further claimed that, after the March 16 incident, VA personnel
continued to retaliate against him by repeatedly leaving messages on his phone
containing confidential, personal information, in violation of VA policy.
II. PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Shortly after the March 16, 2017 incident, Govan filed an administrative
complaint with the VA. In April 2018, after investigating Govan’s complaint, the
VA denied his claim and issued him a right to sue letter.
Govan then filed his present suit against the VA under the FTCA in the
district court. Govan also filed a motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis,
which the district court granted.
In his amended complaint, in addition to recounting the above facts, Govan
asserted that the VA lab personnel: (1) intentionally harmed him and caused him
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emotional distress; (2) were negligent in failing to follow VA policies and
procedures; and (3) conspired to harm him and committed a criminal act against
him by administering the “controlled and/or regulated substance,” which caused
him “to suffer an acute medical emergency” that “could have resulted in a
disabling stroke, coma, and/or death.” Govan stated that he was bringing claims
for medical malpractice and negligence under the FTCA, as well as based on the
lab personnel’s criminal acts.
The district court dismissed Govan’s complaint sua sponte as frivolous and
for failure to state a claim, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). The district
court construed Govan’s complaint as raising claims for medical malpractice,
negligence, and criminal acts and/or criminal conspiracy. The district court first
determined that, to the extent Govan alleged a violation of any criminal statute,
there was no civil cause of action for such claims. Next, the district court
concluded that Govan’s medical malpractice claims were frivolous because he did
not sufficiently allege that the VA breached a duty to him or that such breach was
the proximate cause of any specific injury, and his allegations regarding the
controlled substance were conclusory. Lastly, the district court concluded that
Govan failed to state a claim for negligence because he did not specify which VA
policies the lab personnel allegedly violated or identify which lab personnel
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violated those policies. Accordingly, the district court dismissed Govan’s
complaint as frivolous and for failure to state a claim under § 1915(e)(2)(B).
III. DISCUSSION
Under § 1915(e)(2)(B), in a case where the plaintiff seeks to proceed in
forma pauperis, the district court “shall dismiss the case at any time if the court
determines” that it “is frivolous” or “fails to state a claim on which relief may be
granted.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i)-(ii). 1 A claim is frivolous if it lacks an
arguable basis in law or fact. Miller v. Donald, 541 F.3d 1091, 1100 (11th Cir.
2008). A claim is factually frivolous if the facts alleged are “clearly baseless” and
“rise to the level of the irrational or the wholly incredible.” Denton v. Hernandez,
504 U.S. 25, 32-33, 112 S. Ct. 1728, 1733 (1992).
To state a claim for relief, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter
that, accepted as true, states a claim that is plausible on its face. Evans v. Georgia
Reg’l Hosp., 850 F.3d 1248, 1253 (11th Cir. 2017). A claim is plausible when the
facts pled “allow[] the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is
liable for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S. Ct.
1937, 1949 (2009).
1
We review a district court’s dismissal of a complaint as frivolous under § 1915(e)(2)(B)
for an abuse of discretion. Miller v. Donald, 541 F.3d 1091, 1100 (11th Cir. 2008). We review
de novo a dismissal for failure to state a claim under § 1915(e)(2)(B), accepting the allegations in
the complaint as true and construing them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. Dimanche
v. Brown, 783 F.3d 1204, 1214 (11th Cir. 2015).
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Under the FTCA, the United States is liable for tort claims “in the same
manner and to the same extent as a private individual under like circumstances,”
applying the applicable state law. See 28 U.S.C. § 2674; Turner ex rel. Turner v.
United States, 514 F.3d 1194, 1203 (11th Cir. 2008). Georgia law provides a cause
of action for medical malpractice for “any claim of damages resulting from the
death of or injury to any person arising out of” medical services, diagnosis,
prescription, treatment, or care provided by a hospital or its employees. See
O.C.G.A. § 9-3-70. To establish a medical malpractice claim under Georgia law,
“a plaintiff must show: (1) the duty inherent in the health care provider-patient
relationship; (2) breach of that duty by failing to exercise the requisite degree of
skill and care; and (3) that this failure is the proximate cause of the injury
sustained.” Renz v. Northside Hosp., Inc., 648 S.E.2d 186, 189 (Ga. Ct. App.
2007).
However, not all claims against medical providers constitute medical
malpractice claims. Medical malpractice claims are grounded in allegations of
professional negligence. See Zephaniah v. Georgia Clinic, P.C., 829 S.E.2d 448,
452 (Ga. Ct. App. 2019); see also Jones v. Bates, 403 S.E.2d 804, 806 (Ga. 1991)
(explaining that “not every suit which calls into question the conduct of one who
happens to be a medical professional is a ‘medical malpractice’ action,” and that
“[m]edical malpractice exists only where the act or omission by the professional
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requires the exercise of expert medical judgment” (internal quotations omitted)).
Claims grounded on a professional’s intentional acts that allegedly resulted in
injury are appropriately characterized as intentional tort claims and may be pursued
as such. Zephaniah, 829 S.E.2d at 452 (concluding that plaintiff’s allegation that a
technician performed a venipuncture and blood draw on her without consent was
“like any other touching without consent” and “constitute[d] the intentional tort of
battery” (internal quotations omitted)).
To state a negligence claim under Georgia law, a plaintiff must show: (1) the
existence of a legal duty of care; (2) a breach of that standard of care; (3) a causal
connection between the breach and the plaintiff’s injury; and (4) some loss or
damage to the plaintiff as a result of the alleged breach. See Smith v. United
States, 873 F.3d 1348, 1351 (11th Cir. 2017).
As a preliminary matter, Govan does not challenge on appeal the district
court’s dismissal of his claims based on alleged criminal violations. Accordingly,
he has abandoned any such challenge. See Timson v. Sampson, 518 F.3d 870, 874
(11th Cir. 2008) (noting that while this Court reads pro se briefs liberally, issues
not briefed by a pro se litigant are deemed abandoned). Nevertheless, we note that
the district court correctly dismissed those claims. Plaintiffs generally cannot
pursue civil claims based on violations of a criminal statute unless the criminal
statute itself creates a private right of action. See Donald Frederick Evans &
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Assocs., Inc. v. Continental Homes, Inc., 785 F.2d 897, 912-13 (11th Cir. 1986);
see also Shotz v. City of Plantation, 344 F.3d 1161, 1167 n.7 (11th Cir. 2003).
Here, Govan’s amended complaint did not identify any criminal statutes at all as
the basis for his claims, let alone one that creates a private right of action.
Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s dismissal of Govan’s criminal claims.
We likewise affirm the district court’s dismissal of Govan’s negligence
claims regarding VA personnel’s alleged failure to follow various, unspecified VA
policies and procedures. As the district court noted, Govan’s complaint, for the
most part, does not identify what specific VA policies were violated, who violated
them, or how exactly they were violated. The only policy Govan does identify
with some particularity is the alleged VA policy concerning nondisclosure of
confidential information over the phone. As to that claim, however, Govan again
does not specify which VA personnel allegedly violated that policy, nor does he
allege that he suffered any injury as a result of the violation. The district court
correctly concluded that, absent greater factual detail, Govan failed to sufficiently
plead a negligence claim. See Smith, 873 F.3d at 1351.
Finally, we also affirm the district court’s dismissal of Govan’s medical
malpractice claims, but for a different reason. See Evans, 850 F.3d at 1253 (“[W]e
may affirm on any ground supported by the record, regardless of whether that
ground was relied on or considered below.”). Although Govan characterizes his
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amended complaint as raising a medical malpractice claim regarding his allegation
that the VA lab personnel purposely introduced a controlled substance into his
body while obtaining his blood plasma samples, his claim is more properly
construed as an intentional tort claim. See Zephaniah, 829 S.E.2d at 451-52.
To be clear, unlike the plaintiff in Zephaniah, Govan is not challenging the
blood draw itself—indeed, that was the very reason for his visit to lab, and Govan
consented to that procedure. Rather, Govan’s claim is that, while they were
conducting the authorized blood draw, the VA lab personnel intentionally, and in
retaliation for his complaint to the Patient Advocate, administered a controlled
substance that they knew would cause elevated blood sugar, dizziness, and
possibly fainting. Though somewhat different from the claim in Zephaniah,
Govan’s complaint likewise alleges that he was subjected to an unauthorized
medical procedure—essentially, a battery claim. See id. at 452; see also King v.
Dodge Cty. Hosp. Auth., 616 S.E.2d 835, 837 (Ga. Ct. App. 2005) (“An action for
battery arises in the medical context when a medical professional makes
unauthorized contact with a patient during examination, treatment, or surgery.”).
Although the district court did not construe Govan’s complaint as raising an
intentional tort claim, we need not remand here for the district court to consider
that claim because Govan has not raised it on appeal. In his brief on appeal, Govan
argues only that his complaint stated plausible claims for medical malpractice and
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negligence and that the district court erred in dismissing it for that reason. Govan
does not argue that his complaint also raised an intentional tort claim or that the
district court erred in dismissing his complaint without addressing that claim. Cf.
Zephaniah, 829 S.E.2d at 449, 452 (plaintiff argued on appeal that the district court
erred in dismissing her medical malpractice complaint in part because it also
alleged claims for intentional misconduct). Accordingly, Govan has abandoned his
intentional tort claim on appeal. See Timson, 518 F.3d at 874.
IV. CONCLUSION
For all of these reasons, we affirm the district court’s dismissal without
prejudice of Govan’s complaint.
AFFIRMED.
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