Ellis Sampson v. Fulton Co. Jail

[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FILED
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
________________________ December 7, 2005
THOMAS K. KAHN
CLERK
No. 05-12071
Non-Argument Calendar
________________________
D. C. Docket No. 04-02224-CV-JEC-1
ELLIS SAMPSON,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
versus
FULTON COUNTY JAIL,
Defendant-Appellee,
FULTON COUNTY SHERIFF,
JACKIE BARRETT,
Defendant.
________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Georgia
_________________________
(December 7, 2005)
Before TJOFLAT, ANDERSON and HULL, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
The district court dismissed Ellis Sampson’s civil rights complaint for
failing to respond to the defendants Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b) motions to dismiss as
required by Northern District of Georgia Local Rule 7.1B. Sampson now appeals
the dismissals. He contends that because he is proceeding pro se, he should have
been informed of Local Rule 7.1.B’s requirements but was not. He therefore asks
that we vacate the district court’s judgment and remand the case for further
proceedings.
Local Rule 7.1B requires a party opposing a motion to file a response within
ten days after service of the motion. “[F]ailure to file a response shall indicate that
there is no opposition to the motion.” U.S.Dist.Ct.Rules N.D.Ga., Civil Rule 7.1B.
In Magluta v. Samples, 162 F.3d 662 (11th Cir. 1998), we discussed Local Rule
7.1B in the context of the granting of an unoppossed motion to dismiss. We held
that the district court’s dismissal of Magluta’s complaint under the fugitive
disentitlement doctrine was an abuse of discretion, but noted that the court could
have dismissed the complaint under Local Rule 7.1B because Magluta’s attorney
failed to file a response to the defendant’s motion to dismiss. Id. at 664. We
therefore remanded the case to the district court so that the court could determine
whether, in its discretion, dismissal under its rules was appropriate. Id. at 665.
Magluta, however, was represented by counsel, and we do not always hold
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pro se litigants to the same standards and attribute to them the same knowledge as
that of a lawyer. See Tannenbaum v. United States, 148 F.3d 1262, 1263 (11th
Cir.1998) ( holding that pro se pleadings are to be liberally construed); Gunn v.
Newsome, 881 F.2d 949, 962 (11th Cir. 1989) (stating that in determining whether
a pro se habeas petitioner abused the writ, “we do not attribute to the pro se
petitioner the knowledge of a lawyer”). In Mitchell v. Inman, 682 F.2d 886 (11th
Cir.1982), this court discussed a local rule requiring a timely response to a motion
to dismiss, noting generally that “it should not serve as a basis for dismissing a pro
se civil rights complaint where, as here, there is nothing to indicate plaintiff was
ever made aware of it prior to dismissal.” Id. at 887.
Similarly, when discussing Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c), which requires a party
moving for summary judgment to serve the opposing party at least 10 days prior to
the hearing and gives the opposing party the right to file a responsive pleading, we
stated that:
[w]e have recognized the especial care which must
be exercised when an action is brought alleging denial of
basic constitutional liberties by an indigent prisoner
lacking formal legal training. Such parties occupy a
position significantly different from that occupied by
litigants represented by counsel. In such cases, as in that
before us today, a court should be particularly careful to
ensure proper notice to a pro se litigant, so that any rights
that such a litigant might have will not be extinguished
merely through failure to appreciate the subtleties of
modern motion practice.
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Griffith v. Wainwright, 772 F.2d 822, 825 (11th Cir.1985) (internal quotations and
citations omitted).
Relying on Local Rule 7.1B, the district court granted Sheriff Barrett’s
motion to dismiss on March 14, 2005, and Fulton County Jail’s motion to dismiss
on April 1, 2005. There is no indication in the record that Sampson was aware of
Local Rule 7.1B prior to the granting of Barrett’s motion to dismiss. Sampson
knew about the rule, though, prior to the granting of Fulton County Jail’s motion to
dismiss, but failed to file a response to that motion. Given these differing
circumstances, we vacate the court’s dismissal of the complaint against Barrett, and
remand the case as to her for further proceedings. We affirm, however, the
dismissal of the complaint against the Jail.
AFFIRMED in part; VACATED and REMANDED in part.
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